

**Gaining Government Allies**  
**Groups, Officials, and Alliance Behavior**

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## ABSTRACT

This paper reports an initial analysis of the relationship between interest group resources and the ability to gain government allies. Attempting to assess what types of interests and resources are more likely to gain government support—the wealthy or the weak—we find that the aggregate resources of entire coalitions of allies determine support from government officials more so than the resources controlled by any single interest group or lobbyist. The stronger a perspective is as a collective, the more likely individual actors in that perspective are to gain the support of government. In addition, we find these perspectives to be markedly mixed, with each advocate contributing to create a range of resources available for their common cause. Besides the substantive interest of our findings, we believe they have important implications for the design and interpretation of studies of the lobbying that do not control for coalitional behavior and for the important roles of government officials themselves in acting as policy advocates, not only as neutral decision-makers as they are often portrayed.

The larger project from which this analysis is drawn will constitute a random sample of approximately 120 cases, with over 2,000 advocates; this paper presents data on the first 25 issues coded, representing the activities of 575 individual advocates identified as the major participants in these cases. Since our analysis is preliminary and the data collection is on-going, we interpret our preliminary findings with some caution. Still, our approach to the question is made clear, our measures and derived indices are explained and justified, and certain of our findings are robust enough that we expect we will follow up on them with greater confidence when the larger project is complete. We provide full documentation and data from our project on our web site: <http://lobby.la.psu.edu> and encourage readers of this paper to visit the site before or after reading this paper.

## **Introduction**

This paper, a preliminary analysis of initial data from a larger project, focuses on the ability of interest groups to recruit government allies to become active participants in their policy advocacy efforts.<sup>1</sup> We first lay out some theoretical perspectives, describe the larger project from which this paper is drawn, explain our methods, and then show our preliminary results. The conclusion focuses on both the substantive and methodological implications of our approach.

### ***Three Perspectives on Groups and Government***

At least three perspectives may be said to structure how political scientists think, or should think, about the relations between groups and government officials. These are: 1) business advantage; 2) conflict expansion; and 3) pluralist neutrality. The first perspective focuses on the role of the state in reinforcing existing social and economic cleavages. Private interests with great economic and political power are able to maintain close relations with government officials and can count on these allies to become involved in policy disputes when their support is needed. Authors associated with this view include Lindblom in his discussion of the “privileged position of business” (1977); Lowi in his discussion of “interest group liberalism” (1969); Olson in his

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discussion of the relative powers of business and other types of interest groups to mobilize (1965); as well as entire schools of economics treating government relations as rent-seeking behavior (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; see Mitchell and Munger 1991 for a review); and this view is implicit in most of the literature on PAC contributions, campaign finance, and money in politics (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998a for a review). In sum, a rich tradition suggests that government officials are specially attuned to the needs of the most powerful actors in the economy and that they will actively become involved in policy disputes when the opportunity arises for them to reward their most powerful supporters, or at least to protect them from developments they fear.

A second perspective on the roles of government stems from Shattschneider's work on conflict expansion (1960). Government officials are called upon to intervene when those with relatively few resources realize that they need help. Appeals to government for intervention come from labor as opposed to business, from environmentalists as opposed to polluting industrialists, and from those advocating child labor standards, more educational benefits, or generally from those seeking help from government where and because market mechanisms alone cannot be expected to address their concerns. Government officials, concerned not only with the health of the economy (as correctly noted by Lindblom and others above), but also with an eye towards the next election, often find it in their interests to support policies that may be favored by other social or economic classes. In this view, government often intercedes on behalf of the weak. Even if authors such as Schattschneider did not believe that government always intervened on the side of the weak, he illustrated a mechanism, through partisan competition, through which it could do so, as he believed it should.

A third perspective views the role of government in essentially neutral terms. Pluralists such as Dahl (1961) and Truman (1951) noted that as long as there were no restrictions on the growth and mobilization of voters and interest groups, and assuming overlapping and cross-cutting political cleavages, competition and uncertainty would rule the day, ensuring that government officials consistently would favor neither one side nor the other in any given political issue, or at least not for long. Government officials may become involved in issues that have potentially dramatic impacts on society or the economy, for example, but they do not choose their issues on the basis of what allies they can expect to find. In any case, if this perspective is accurate, then officials should have no clear patterns of allies and opponents in the policy process.

In this paper we take these questions seriously and we attempt to explain, for a random sample of issues on which lobbyists were involved with the federal government, what determines the mobilization of government officials to become active proponents of a given policy objective, working in concert with private and/or other public actors. (Note that we distinguish between government actors simply making a decision—acting as the potential targets of lobbying activity—and government actors actively taking part in the policy debate, in effect becoming an active member in a coalition of actors attempting to achieve some policy goal; this point is explained in greater detail below.)

Government officials often play active roles in promoting certain policy decisions, not only acting as the targets of interest-group lobbying activity as they are often modeled in the literature. How do government officials become active? Certainly self-motivation and institutional roles may be an important first hypothesis. The Secretary of Agriculture, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, and the Secretary of Defense each have

institutionally defined roles to play, as do other government officials, in promoting the roles and functions of their respective administrative departments. On the other hand, officials typically have quite substantial latitude in paying attention to certain issues rather than others, and their own ideologies, predilections, and pet causes may well play a role here. A second general set of incentives for government officials to become active advocates for a given cause is when they are recruited by allies. As many scholars have noted, groups often work with their closest allies within government, supplying them with information and encouragement in order to secure their involvement in a given issue. So involvement may come because of being asked to join a coalition. Finally, involvement may be indirect, a reaction to the activities of one's policy opponents. Rather than being recruited to be part of a pro-active policy campaign, government officials may counter-mobilize when they see trouble afoot. We will pay attention to what attracts allies as well as what attracts opponents among government officials. Certainly, the lobbying strategy that leads to powerful allies, but also to formidable opponents is less of a winner than that which can be effective without drawing out active governmental opposition. Mark Smith's (2000) recent work has shown clearly how the US Chamber of Commerce, for example, can recruit government allies but also seems to recruit a determined and large set of opponents to its major lobbying efforts. This makes the group less of a potent lobbying force than might be expected on the basis of its resources alone.

It should be clear from the preceding that partisanship may play an important role in determining patterns of government involvement in policy issues. Partisanship on the one hand can ensure that no issue will be completely one-sided as Democratic and Republican elected officials react differently and ensure that at least two sides of the issue are fully aired. On the other hand, we will certainly not find that all issues are equally partisan, nor would we contend

that the highly rigidified arguments that often are made during partisan debates necessarily represent an ideal toward which government should strive. In any case, we will pay careful attention to issues of partisanship in this process.

### ***Advocacy and Public Policymaking***

The larger project from which we draw is a collaborative research project on lobbying currently being conducted with NSF support. The project is a multi-year, multi-investigator undertaking designed to study how groups compete for political influence. It includes hundreds of interviews with Washington policy advocates as well as the collection of a large quantity of publicly available information on a selection of over a hundred randomly selected policy issues. Each issue in our sample becomes the object of an intensive case study based on a combination of confidential interviews with those involved plus a compilation of publicly available documents, including: congressional floor statements, bills, congressional testimonies, media stories, organizational press releases, organizational directories, FEC reports, among other items. In the case studies we gather information about the activity of the groups and advocates we interview and also about many groups and important players whom we do not interview. The research is therefore a combination of fieldwork and collection of publicly available sources, all of which is available on our continually evolving web site.

Issues were selected at random and therefore include a broad range of topics of government advocacy from the highest visibility issues generating intense activity by scores of powerful groups and leading to public statements and news coverage of major political figures to the most mundane and obscure efforts to amend regulations, Medicare payment schedules, and other smaller lobbying topics. Lobbyists chosen at random were asked to identify the issue on which they had most recently been working, and then subsequent interviews were conducted

with other participants in the chosen issue. In all, over ninety interviews were conducted for the subset of 25 issues discussed in this paper (and approximately 200 interviews have been completed thus far on our project, across 70 different issues). We asked advocates to identify the major actors working with them on the issue, such as in a formal coalition and those working separately but toward the same goal—that is, all other members of their perspective. We also requested interviewees to name those participants advocating different positions or actively opposing them. Major participants then, are those actors perceived by the players involved to be the primary representatives of various policy positions on an issue. From these interviews and subsequent review of publicly available information such as congressional statements, hearings, organizational web sites, and news reports, we compiled complete lists of the major participants on each of the issues and their perspectives. Table 1 lists the 25 cases included here, the various perspectives involved on each issue, and the total number of actors composing each of the distinct perspectives. The perspectives range in size from the largest, with 58 participants (proponents for repealing the estate tax), to a number of perspectives made up of only a single actor. In all, our preliminary sample includes 575 actors divided among 66 perspectives.

(Table 1 about here)

As is clear from Table 1, we base our analysis on a broad range of issues. Fundamental to our approach is the identification of members of a shared “perspective.” A perspective, as we define it, is a group of policy advocates (from within or outside of government) who share a common goal. Perspectives may not be permanent, but they exist for as long as their members are advocating the same thing. If, for example, several disparate groups all lobby for reform of Medicare reimbursement rates and have a single goal in common, we call them a single perspective. Later, as the issue progresses they may well break down into different perspectives



each attempting to push the rates in a certain direction favoring their own interests. Our perspectives are therefore defined by the actions and goals of those who make them up. Perspectives may consist of a formal coalition with letter-head and weekly meetings like the Coalition for Postal Reform, or they may be composed of engine manufactures and environmental organizations who are both pushing for regulation of sulfur in gasoline, though these interests are often at odds on other issues. Members of a perspective may or may not coordinate their activities actively, though in our experience the vast majority of them do. Government officials are considered to be members of these perspectives if and only if they are identified as actively advocating the policy goal shared by other members of the perspective. Government officials with decision-making responsibility who are the targets of lobbying are not coded as active participants even if their final decision may go one way or the other, thereby helping or hurting the cause of a given perspective. They are members of these perspectives only when they become active policy advocates.

Table 1 makes clear that a great range of perspectives is apparent in our cases. Cases range from those in which there are no active opponents to what a set of lobbyists are attempting to accomplish (e.g., issue 2, Hearing Screening for Infants), to straightforward clashes between business and labor (e.g., issue 20, OSHA's Proposed Ergonomic Standards), to confusing and multi-faceted technical debates with no clear pattern of conflict (e.g., issue 7, Medicare Funding for Graduate Medical Education, issue 3, Risk Adjuster for the Medicare+Choice Program). These patterns of conflict, ranging from no active opposition, to straightforward partisan battles, to more complex free-for-alls, represent the range of types of lobbying battles in any given period in Washington. Having laid out the background of our larger project, the cases on which

this preliminary paper is based, we can turn now to a more detailed description of our data and measurement strategy.

## **Data and Measurement**

Each participant identified through our interviews and primary sources as a major player was coded by type, and for each type of participant we also gathered a range of background information summarizing their resources. For government officials this was simply to note the type of government position that they control, but for outside actors we gather information on their membership size, annual budget and assets, staff size, use of paid lobbyists, investment in a Washington DC office, corporate sales, number of employees, PAC contributions, and a range of other indicators of group resources that we detail below. Table 2 presents the breakdown of our 575 advocates by category.

(Table 2 about here)

Table 2 shows a wide range of types of actors, including 385 outside interests, 157 Members of Congress or congressional staff identified as major advocates, and 32 executive branch officials ranging from cabinet secretaries to lower level bureau officials. Among the outside interest groups involved, individual corporations, trade and business associations are prominent, as are citizens' groups and ad-hoc coalitions specific to the issue at hand. In any case, given this range of types of participants involved in our set of issues, we will focus on the ability of advocates to recruit government allies. Since government officials constitute approximately one-third of the major participants we have identified in our 25 cases, their participation is clearly widespread. Both government officials and outside interests face the task of recruiting other government officials to their cause; we present separate analyses here for the tendency of government and non-governmental actors to attract allies and opponents. We will be able to

determine whether these officials systematically intervene in those cases where the most Fortune 500 corporations are also involved, whether there is a partisan determination of involvement, whether PAC contributions from the various sides explain these behaviors, or what. Before turning to the analysis, we first discuss our efforts to gauge the various resources of the various participants in the advocacy process.

### ***Indicators of Material Resources***

A great variety of actors are represented in our 575 participants, ranging from the American Association of Retired Persons, several of the nation's largest corporations, local governments, educational institutions, citizen groups, labor unions, trade associations, and such professional groups as the American Speech-Hearing Language Association. How to determine their resources?

While most authors agree that resources are the foundation of all advocacy activity, their effective measurement remains elusive. Scholars discuss various conceptualizations of a group's resources ranging from massive campaign contributions to a knack for getting one's foot in the door, and lament the difficulty in measuring such disparate types of advantages. Because of the imposing scope of a comprehensive method of resource measurement, many scholars have used only one or two measures to represent resources generally. Using a single indicator alone as a proxy for a group's total resource base fails to distinguish groups' different types of resources. Taking all types into consideration offers a more complete picture of the set of resources a group controls, and allows us to assess the impact of the different types. To accurately assess the relationship between the strengths of groups and their ability to gain allies we must first improve upon the state of resource measurement. We describe first the individual actor resource data collection and measurement, and explain the construction of our actor level budget resource

index. Second we describe the calculation of the aggregate resources of an advocate's perspective, and four indexes we constructed to simplify analysis. Descriptive statistics of the various individual and aggregate resources, as well as information on the index constructions can be found in the Appendix.

When we identify an individual or group as a major participant in one of our cases, we systematically code a variety of bits of information concerning each participant. For different types of participants, different indicators of resources are appropriate—corporations have different types of resources than membership organizations, for example. In this section we review each of our measures in turn.

#### *Individual level resources*

The first measure of actor resources is a dichotomous variable indicating membership in a coalition; this is coded from interviews and other public sources, including press releases and our list of participants. Those actors that are part of a formal coalition may be more likely to gain government allies than those that are not.

Second, if the group has members we note the total membership size as well as separate subtotals indicating memberships of individuals, organizations, corporations, local chapters, and other types of members. Data are taken from Associations Unlimited (AU) and in some cases, if not available in AU, from organizational web sites. (In this paper, because of low numbers of groups coded so far, we do not analyze separately the numbers of different types of members, though we plan to do so in the larger project when we have complete data on a larger number of groups.)

We use *Washington Representatives* to collect the following information: 1) the presence or absence of an affiliated political action committee; 2) the presence or absence of a D.C. office;

3) the number of on-staff professional advocates or lobbyists; and 4) the number of outside counsels retained by the organization. These indicators are included separately tapping different aspects of Washington resources.

Staff size and annual budget were collected for each group reporting them from AU; assets and annual income were also gathered from the IRS Masterlist for all non-profit organizations. In cases where we had budget data self-reported to AU as well as that reported to the IRS, we used the average of the two. As numerous scholars have noted, staff size is highly correlated with budget (the correlation in our sample is .958), and these budgetary resources together formed clearly identifiable factor, which we combined into an index of budget resources. This is described in more detail in the appendix, but it consists of the four measures mentioned in this paragraph. In case of missing data for one or more of the component parts of the index, we imputed the values of the index by multiplying the scores and weights of the available indicators by the appropriate weight to scale the variable as it was with all four indicators available.

Organizational founding dates are taken when available from AU; we can distinguish between recently created groups and those with long established histories. In the analysis that follows we do not make use of this variable but we expect age to load as a factor with monetary resources when we have more complete data.

Corporations have different types of resources than membership groups, and we code their resources as follows, taken from the Fortune 500 website and occasionally from individual corporate reports and web sites: Annual sales, annual income, number of employees. These variables load clearly into a factor of corporate monetary resources, described in the Appendix, which is the index we use in the analysis below. Because we have relatively few corporations in

the analysis to date, we do not include this index for individual corporations, but we do include its aggregated figure for each perspective, as described below.

We have not yet gathered this information but we plan to gather data from the FEC on PAC contributions by each of our actors as well as that from the Lobby Disclosure Reports on lobbying expenditures by each actor. These data are not yet included in this analysis.

We did not code individual resources for government officials but rather divided them into categories by rank. Congressional actors are rank and file; committee (and subcommittee) leadership; and party leadership. Executive branch officials are bureau-level; agency/department level; and White House. Republicans, Democrats, and nonpartisan career government officials are coded separately, so that when we have full data we will be able to note the differences in lobbying towards those in the majority and those in the minority party in Congress.

No statistical summary of material resources can tap all dimensions of interest, and certainly none will tap perfectly such important resources as access, credibility, knowledge of key players, accumulated expertise in an issue area (though we expect that our index of Washington resources, representing the presence and size of an actor's DC lobbying capacity, to come close). Nonetheless, we have adapted a strategy of searching widely for a broad range of indicators of material strength, and to construct indices based on many of them rather than on one or just a few. This time consuming work proves valuable in generating a list of the resources available to each participant and can be aggregated to construct indices of resources available to each perspective as well.

### *Perspective Resources*

The various types of resources of the individual actors composing a perspective are aggregated to yield indicators of the strength of each of the resources for the entire perspective. From this set

of variables we create two types of indices: Aggregated resources, and allied resources. Allied resources are simply the aggregated resources of the perspective minus the resources contributed by the individual participant. This allows us to test separately models relating to individual resources with models focusing on the resources of allies, with our allied resources measure not being contaminated by the resources of the individual group, as the aggregated resources are. For government actors there is no need to create separate allied and aggregate resource indicators since the government officials do not contribute these types of resources to the perspective. As we will show below, individual resources, while correlated with aggregate resources because by definition one includes the other, show very little correlation on average with our various indicators of allied resources. This means that, so far, we have found that large corporations do not work only with other large corporations, that citizens' groups do not operate in a permanent ghetto of the poorly endowed, and that the average perspective shows a greater diversity among its membership than one might expect.

The perspective resources are measured through a series of indices. Total membership data from the individual participants is summed across all members of the perspective, separately for individual, institutional, corporate, associations, and government units as members and these counts of different membership types are then aggregated into a of overall membership index. In later analyses, with more data available, make use of the various membership measures, but for this paper we use a single index of total aggregated overall membership, as laid out in the Appendix. (Readers may note that two of the membership types do not load on the factor but we have included them nonetheless; with additional data collection we expect to revise this indicators by analyzing the different types of memberships separately.)

Beltway and lobbying resources are aggregated to the perspective level by counting the total numbers of DC offices, PACs, number of lobbyists, and number of retained outside counsels, described above. Once aggregated, an perspective level Washington Resources index was constructed from these four variables. Allied organizational budgetary resources are simply aggregated from the index made at the individual level, as are corporate budget resources. Finally, we aggregate the total number of local chapters of each membership organization; we use this at the aggregate level as an indicator of geographic dispersion. Table 3 shows the correlations among our allied resources and those measured at the individual level.

(Table 3 about here)

The various indicators listed in Table 3 represent a range of resources available to each of our perspectives. The low levels of correlation between the individual-level measures and the same measures aggregated from all of an actor's allies indicate the diversity of these perspectives. An actor's individual resources do not predict the type of other actors with whom they will work: the correlation between membership size and total allied membership size is almost exactly zero; that for budgetary resources is similarly below .10. In fact, the table shows that across a range of indicators of resources and characteristics there is virtually no relation between a single actor's resources and those of their allies. This is a useful methodological characteristic of our dataset, but it is also heavy with substantive implications. Groups work in diverse perspectives, on average.

#### *Additional Variables*

In addition to individual and perspective resources we also include a variable of partisanship of the perspective. This is the absolute value of the percent of Democratic perspective members minus fifty. Thus, the larger the value the more fully Democratic or Republican the perspective,



the smaller the value the more bi-partisan the coalition. Sixty-three percent of the participants in our study so far participate in perspectives that are at least nominally bi-partisan—that is, there is at least one member of each party involved, if any partisan figures are involved. Fully 37 percent of the actors participate in perspectives that are purely partisan affairs, however. Just ten percent of the actors participate in perspectives that are evenly balanced between Democrats and Republicans, while exactly half are involved in perspectives that have roughly equal numbers of members of each party—that is, with a score on our partisanship variable between 0 and 25, where 50 represents purely partisan perspectives.

We also measure the overall size of the perspective by a simple count of the members (perspectives range from 1 participate to 58, with an average of 19); we also count the number of non-governmental actors so that we can relate this to the ability of recruiting government allies without including these officials as part of the indicator variable. This indicator equals the total perspective size minus the number of government actors in the perspective. This gives us a clean measure of perspective size outside of government, unrelated to the presence or absence of government officials in the perspective. As we will see below, government officials are quite prominent in some perspectives; on average there are 4 government allies, or 21 percent of the typical perspective, with a range of 0 to 10.

Finally, we control for the salience of the issue, which allows us to assess if it is simply the more salient issues that draw the most government allies and/or opponents. We include two measures, one to measure salience inside the beltway and the other outside the beltway. These indicators come from documentation counts collected for the larger Advocacy and Public Policymaking project. We conducted keyword searches for our 25 issues on the websites of the Library of Congress, the House of Representatives, Lexis-Nexus Congressional Universe, and

*National Journal* Online. The inside-the-beltway salience index is constructed from retrieved document counts of floor statements concerning the issue by members of Congress, web pages on the case on House member sites, witness testimony on our issue and finally, articles on the topic in the *National Journal*. The number of news stories in the nation's major papers is used as a proxy for salience of an issue outside the beltway. Each of these indices is based on a factor analysis reported in the Appendix. In our larger project we expect to combine the counts of newspaper articles with our indicator of television news stories on the topic, but with our limited data collection so far this indicator did not load on the same factor so for this paper we have used just newspaper articles as a measure of outside-the-beltway salience.

### ***Counting Government Allies and Opponents***

Our dependent variable of interest in this paper is a simple count of the number of federal government officials actively advocating or opposing the views of a given perspective. An official can constitute his or her own perspective if they advocate a position shared by no other actors. Typically, however, officials are involved in coalitions with others outside and inside government. Note that we do not count officials as allies of anyone if they are simply in a position to make a decision. They are included in our database not simply if they are the targets of lobbying activity. Rather, we seek to identify each major player in the advocacy process, so we count only those who are actively involved in trying to advocate to others. Technical staff from the professional units of Congress such as the Congressional Budget Office, staffers from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA, as it was called during the time of our study), and others who may well provide important technical data are not counted as advocates in our study, unless and until they play an active role in attempting to advocate a given position.

Similarly, fence-sitting Members of Congress who have not decided which way to vote and who

may be the targets of considerable lobbying are counted as advocates only if they use their bargaining position actively to advocate for changes in a policy. They are not counted as advocates merely by the fact that they end up having to choose to vote one way or another; advocates must actively attempt to persuade others, through whatever means that others notice.

Table 2, above, indicated that 157 Members of Congress and 32 officials of the executive branch were active participants in our various issues. As that table noted, we can count separately the numbers of high, medium, and low level officials active in both Congress and in the executive, and we have constructed indices of these counts to see if certain types of groups may be successful in recruiting rank and file Members of Congress, for example, whereas other groups can routinely recruit Cabinet Secretaries and leading figures in the majority party leadership. As of this writing, we have too few cases in these indices to support any robust findings, so here we report only the aggregated counts with all government officials combined. In future work, with more of our cases coded, we expect to analyze these different types of government officials in more detail.

Counting the number of government allies and opponents is simple once each actor is coded into a perspective, and after we note which perspectives are actively opposed by which other perspectives. For each of our 66 perspectives so far coded we have noted whether that perspective has any active opponents, and our government opponents variable counts the numbers of government officials among this group for each perspective. Many of our perspectives have no active opposition, and several of the cases display complicated patterns of alliance and opposition. For example, on the debate over repealing the estate tax (issue 14 in Table 1), there are three perspectives. While the first two perspectives are clearly and actively opposed to one another, the third perspective, proposing alterations to the tax, is not actively

working in opposition to either of the other two. Table 4 presents the total numbers of government allies and opponents for each of our 575 actors. Note that for government officials themselves, their number of government allies is the same as that for other members of their perspective minus one. (One cannot be one's own ally, in other words.) Our counts of low, medium, and high level allies are similarly adjusted so that they represent the numbers allied with each individual actor in each perspective, though we do not present those data here.

(Table 4 about here)

The number of allies an actor was able to gain exhibits a significant degree of variation. We see some actors with little governmental support, with 105 actors (18 percent) having no allies and 63 having only one, while others were quite successful in their search for allies; 19 actors have 10 different government allies. The majority of participants had 5 allies or less. We see a similar pattern in the number of opposing government officials, with most actors attracting five or less. Note that 82 percent of the participants in our cases work within a perspective with at least one active government official not just leaning their way as they make decisions, but actively advocating their cause. Active opposition by government officials, present for 71 percent of our actors, is also a common feature of the lobbying landscape. These numbers are quite robust and correspond almost exactly to those reported by Baumgartner and Leech (1998b) based on a survey of interest groups Leech conducted in 1995. In answer to the question of whether any government officials actively opposed them, approximately 70 percent answered yes; approximately 80 percent indicated that some government officials actively supported them on the issue that they were discussing.

Having laid out the various indicators and methods of collecting our data, we can turn now to an analysis of outside interests' abilities to attract government friends and foes.

## **Methods and Analysis**

In this section we present a series of four analyses. Each is designed to predict the number of government officials actively supporting (or opposing) the work of a given advocate. Since some of our advocates are government officials themselves and some are outside of government (and since we have different indicators of resources for each), we present separate analyses for the two groups. So we turn first to a model predicting the ability of a government official to attract other governmental allies; then to a model for government officials predicting their likelihood of attracting opponents; then the same two models for outside interests rather than for officials themselves. In each case, we present three models: a baseline model, a model including the aggregated resources of one's allies, and a model including these factors plus a series of measures of one's individual resources. As the results make clear, individual-level resources have little impact once other factors are controlled. This finding holds even for government officials themselves. Cabinet secretaries and the leaders of Congress are no more likely to recruit allies to their cause than are rank-and-file members of the congressional opposition, other things held constant. The involvement of any single individual actor, even the most powerful, has little impact on the lobbying structure, controlling for the overall resources of the other actors involved.

We present three models increasing in restrictiveness. The first model is a baseline model containing the independent variables of perspective partisanship and size and issue salience. We then add the block of variables assessing the impact of the perspective level resources for the second model. The third additionally includes indicators of individual level characteristics, to form the complete model. While the interpretation of the negative binomial coefficients (which we explain in more detail below) is different from the familiar OLS parameter estimates, the interpretation of their significance and direction are similar. We use a negative binomial

distribution in place of the more common OLS estimation because the dependent variables are event counts rather than continuous variables. This maximum likelihood estimation technique produces more accurate parameter estimates and thus more reliable results. Also, this distribution relaxes the assumptions of independence of the observations; an appropriate modification considering the linkage between the number of allies one actor has to the number of allies another actor of the same perspective has.

Because of the limited number of cases we concentrate here on the significance of blocks of independent variables and not on particular parameter estimates. In the current analysis we find a relatively high degree of instability in the coefficients, likely due to the modest number of cases; as such we urge caution in the focus on any individual variables and parameter estimates at this point. With the collection of more data we are confident the individual coefficients will become much more robust, and we expect that several may change significantly from what we present here, based as they are on only 25 cases from a much larger study. In contrast to the individual parameters, which show some sensitivity to the particular specification of the model, the clusters of baseline, allied, and individual resources exhibit considerable robustness to various specifications, and we focus for that reason on these groups of variables instead.

Looking first at the government official model, using maximum likelihood estimation, Tables 5 and 6 present negative binomial regressions on the dependent variables of total government allies and total government opponents. This model was run only on those actors that were government officials, not the entire dataset, 171 cases in all. Note that we include dummy variables for the type of actor; the excluded variable is Democratic rank and file. Coefficients for these actor-types should therefore be interpreted as indicating and expected increase or decrease

in the number of allies and opponents compared to backbench Democratic Members of Congress.

(Tables 5 and 6 about here)

Table 5 shows that the size of the perspective and the salience of the issue have significant effects on the number of allies and that these findings are robust across the three models. Few of our individual level resource indicators are significant in either the model predicting the recruitment of allies (Table 5) or opponents (Table 6). More important than the individual coefficients, however, is a comparison of the value of the different models. Each table presents a set of likelihood-ratio tests for the significance in difference across the models, and in each case we see that model 2, including allied resources, presents a statistically significant improvement over the baseline model, whereas model 3, including individual-level resources, presents no significant improvement over model 2. In table 5 we see these numbers quite starkly, with probability values of .0165 for model 2 v. model 1, but only .6593 for model 3 v. model 2. Similarly in table 6 the probability value for model 2 v. model 1 is less than .0001 whereas it is over .4 for model 3 v. model 2. Clearly, we are gaining something by considering the aggregated resources of one's allies, but very little when we include individual level resources. Tables 5 and 6 refer to government officials; Tables 7 and 8 present the analogous models for outside interests.

(Tables 7 and 8 about here)

Analysis of the interest-group model shows a greater ability to predict the presence of allies and opponents within government, but confirms the patterns of the other model. We see several significant coefficients relating to the baseline model, appropriately switching signs indicating their links to allies (positive for size of perspective, negative for partisanship) and

opponents (signs switched). Adding the aggregated resources for allied organizations shows some tantalizing indications that Washington resources (investment in lobbying capacity) may be more likely related to the number of one's enemies than to one's allies; similarly it appears that budgetary resources may be more related to the willingness of government officials actively to oppose one rather than to join in an alliance (wealthy coalitions may have the ability to depress active opposition more so than to recruit committed allies). In any case, we see a similar pattern to that in Tables 5 and 6: The second model, including aggregated resources of one's allies, is a statistically significant improvement on the first, baseline, model, but the third model, including individual level resources, provides either no statistically significant improvement on the second model (Table 7), or only the slightest improvement (Table 8).

## **Conclusions**

We have presented some preliminary analysis from a project that is on-going. We find strong suggestions that our project, when completed, will have powerful evidence concerning the abilities of advocates to recruit allies and to attract opposition in governmental circles. Most importantly for now, we have demonstrated the importance of looking systematically at the patterns of alliance behavior among the actors in our sample of issues.

Lobbyists typically work in packs, not alone. More often than not, these packs include government officials working in concert and coordinating their activities with outside interest groups, corporations, and others who need the help of allies in government and how in turn provide resources and cooperation to them as they work together to achieve some shared policy goal. The pack-like behavior of interest groups and their government allies has increasingly been recognized in various ways in the literature, but most have approached the question from the perspective of why government officials grant access. Mark Hansen (1991) discussed the



conditions under which officials with shared interests with outside interests would grant them long-term privileged access, which may in practice be similar to some of what we see here, though we approach the question in a different way. Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) discussed in some detail the coalitional behaviors of groups, but not with a specific focus on the roles of government officials within those coalitions. Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright's recent work on mobilization surrounding judicial nominations also found that the material resources controlled by the interest groups had little bearing on their decisions to get involved in a given confirmation dispute (2000, 65). More recently Richard Hall, in a series of papers (see Hall 1998), has modeled the process as one in which groups offer material subsidies to government officials in order to encourage their participation in the issue on which they share an interest. This is to induce the official to become active in this issue rather than in another one where they may be equally interested and motivated, but where the staff, information, and other subsidies may not be available. The ability of interests outside of government to recruit allies inside of government is fundamental to understanding the policy process and democratic representation. With this paper, we have laid out an approach to the question and some preliminary data from a large and on-going project. While this paper alone will not answer all these questions, we hope to make important progress on them in the larger project. To understand the behaviors of groups as they work with government officials, as they do in most cases, we must conceptualize all policy advocates for what they are, not matter where their institutional positions happen to be. Advocates advocate; officials decide. Since there are many officials deciding in many different venues of governmental policymaking, and since the vast bulk of governmental decisions are collective rather than unilateral, those who are decision-makers in one instance are almost always advocates in another setting. We should treat them as such in our analyses.

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**Table 1. Issues and Perspectives**

	<b>Number of Participants</b>
<b>1. Extending the Patent Term for Drugs Undergoing FDA Review During the Enactment of Hatch-Waxman</b>	
1 Proponents of granting patent extension to pipeline drugs	7
2 Opponents of granting patent extension to pipeline drugs	14
3 Original opponent of granting extension now no longer actively opposed	1
<b>2. Hearing Screening for Infants</b>	
1 Proponents for funding hearing screening generally	29
<b>3. Risk Adjuster for Medicare+Choice</b>	
1 Decision maker who supports the imposition of a risk adjuster to limit overpayments	1
2 Proponents of the idea of a risk adjuster.	2
3 Opponents of the imposition of a risk adjuster as currently envisioned by HCFA	12
4 Opponents of the imposition of a risk adjuster but believe there are larger Medicare+Choice problems to address	5
5 Support the idea of a risk adjuster but believe there are bigger Medicare +Choice problems to address	4
6 Neutral – actors providing technical assistance	4
<b>4. Medicare Payment Rate for Pap Screenings</b>	
1 Proponents for increased Medicare payments for PAP Screenings	12
2 Opposed to changing status quo	1
3 Neutral/ No Position	1
<b>5. Medicare Payment for Clinical Social Workers</b>	
1 Proponents of excluding CSWs from the bundled payment rules	5
2 Neutral/ No position	1
<b>6. Appropriations for the AIDS Drug Assistance Program (ADAP)</b>	
1 Proponents of funding ADAP at the level of ADAP Working Group estimate	37
2 Proponents of funding ADAP but not necessarily at the level of ADAP Working Group estimate	1
<b>7. Medicare Funding of Graduate Medical Education</b>	
1 Change in conceptualization of GME, no actual legislative change proposed	6
2 Proponents of funding GME through an appropriation	1
3 Proponents of funding from Medicare and a new trust fund to be created	8
4 Allied Health Professions who want to be included in whatever funding package is adopted	8
<b>8. Coverage of Chiropractic Services Under Medicare+Choice</b>	
1 Proponents of coverage of Chiropractic Services	8
2 Opposed to changing regulations to include Chiropractic Services	1
<b>9. Prescription Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives</b>	

1	Proponents of mandating contraceptive coverage by insurance companies	18
2	Opponents of mandating contraceptive coverage by insurance companies	9
<b>10. Limiting Mine Waste Disposal at Mill Sites</b>		
1	Proponents of limiting the number of mill sites at mine sites	15
2	Opponents of limiting the number of mill sites at mine sites	12
<b>11. Postal Service Modernization and Reform</b>		
1	Proponents of modernizing the postal service	24
2	Opponents of modernizing the postal service	6
3	Proponents of modernizing the postal service in theory but refuses to allow the proposal of first perspective to move forward	1
<b>12. Standards for Low Sulfur Gasoline</b>		
1	Proponents of Low Sulfur Regulations	14
2	Opponents of Low Sulfur Regulations	4
<b>13. Distribution of Low Power FM Radio Licenses</b>		
1	Proponents of granting Low Power FM Radio Licenses	15
2	Opposed to granting Low Power FM Radio Licenses	12
<b>14. Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax</b>		
1	Proponents of repealing the estate tax	58
2	Opponents of repealing the estate tax	3
3	Advocates of various alterations to the tax, not repeal	2
<b>15. Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China</b>		
1	Proponents of normalized trade with China	13
2	Opponents of normalized trade with China	15
3	Neutral/ No position	1
<b>16. Elimination of the 3% Excise Tax on Phone Bills</b>		
1	Proponents for cutting the 3% excise tax	15
2	Neutral/ No position	2
<b>17. Bankruptcy Reform</b>		
1	Proponents of bankruptcy reform legislation	17
2	Opponents of bankruptcy reform legislation	4
3	Neutral – actors providing statistics and other information	1
<b>18. Aviation Trust Fund</b>		
1	Proponents to mandate aviation trust fund be spent completely on aviation	8
2	Opposed to changing status quo	2
3	Neutral/no position	2
<b>19. Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title I</b>		
1	Proponents for reauthorization of ESEA	11
2	Proponents for funding public schools through a block grant	1
3	Proponents for funding public schools through categorical grants	1

<b>20. OSHA's Proposed Ergonomics Standards</b>	
1 Proponents of Ergonomic Regulations	3
2 Opponents of Ergonomic Regulations	10
3 Neutral/ No Position	2
<b>21. Roads in National Forests</b>	
1 Proponents of a moratorium on new road building in national forests	13
2 Supports status quo, allowing new road building in national forests	3
3 Want Access to forest roads maintained	3
<b>22. Proposed United Airlines-US Airways Merger</b>	
1 Proponents of US Air - United Airlines merger	4
2 Opponents to US Air - United Airlines merger	5
3 Neutral/ No position	1
<b>23. Exempting Physicians and Pharmacists from Antitrust Laws</b>	
1 Proponents of physician antitrust waivers	4
2 Opponents of physician antitrust waivers	16
<b>24. Changing Class Action Law so that More Cases are Heard in Federal Court</b>	
1 Proponents for Class Action Reform	20
2 Opposed to Class Action Reform	10
<b>25. Export Controls on Computers</b>	
1 Computer Industry against export controls	10
2 Those favoring export controls because of national security concerns	10
<b>Unable to Identify Actor's Perspective</b>	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>575</b>

NOTE: The table lists the number of major participants in each perspective, for 25 cases. Major participants are those mentioned in interviews or identified through searches of publicly available information as playing an important role in advocating a particular perspective. Many more actors were involved in these issues; this list represents those who were especially active and visible to others.

**Table 2. Participants by Type**

	<b>Number</b>
Interest Groups, Corporations, and other Non-Federal Government Actors	385
Coalition Specific to an Issue or Issue Area	10
Citizen, Ideological, or Cause-oriented Group	89
Foundations, Non-profit Providers, etc.	6
Religious group – Affiliated group or denomination	8
Labor Union	13
Professional Association	50
Trade Association	98
Business Association (e.g., Business Round Table, Chamber of Commerce)	18
Lobbying or Consulting Firm	1
Corporation – for profit (not Fortune 500)	35
Corporation – Fortune 500	20
Think Tank or Research Institute	13
Institution (Hospitals, Universities)	2
Association of Institutions (Hospitals, Universities)	9
State and Local Governmental Unit (school systems, utility providers, etc)	3
Association of Governmental Units	9
Foreign Government	0
Individual Outside Expert	1
International Non-Governmental Organization	0
Congressional Actors	157
Republican Party Leadership	7
Republican Committee or Subcommittee Leader	48
Republican Rank & File	30
Democratic Party Leadership	7
Democratic Committee or Subcommittee Leader	30
Democratic Rank & File	28
CBO, GAO, other staff agencies	3
Task force or ad hoc commission	4
Executive Branch Actors	32
White House	3
Department or Agency	23
Lower Level/ Bureau	2
Individual White House Official	1
Individual Department or Agency Official	3
Individual Bureau Official	0
Un-identifiable	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>575</b>

NOTE: The table lists each major participant by type. Some individuals may be included more than once if they were involved as a major participant in more than one of our 25 cases.

**Table 3. Individual and Allied Resources**

<b>Allied</b>	<b>Individual</b>							<b>N</b>
	Membership Size	DC Office	Lobbyists	Outside Counsel	PAC	Budget Resources		
Membership Size	-0.0066							232
DC Offices		0.1268						277
Lobbyists			-0.0123					277
Outside Counsel				0.1087				277
PACs					0.1258			277
Budget Resources						0.0956		278

NOTE: The table shows the correlations among resources measured at the individual level and the aggregated resources of all those allied with the individual organization.

**Table 4. The Number of Government Allies and Opponents**

	<b>Number of Government Allies or Opponents</b>											<b>Total</b>
	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	
<b>Allies</b>												
<b>N</b>	105	63	36	52	64	108	99	9	0	20	19	575
<b>%</b>	18	11	6	9	11	19	17	2	0	3	3	100
<b>Opponents</b>												
<b>N</b>	168	97	144	12	19	71	41	13	0	0	10	575
<b>%</b>	29	17	25	2	3	12	7	2	0	0	2	100

NOTE: For each of the 575 participants listed in Tables 1 and 2, this table lists the number of government officials active within their perspective (allies), or advocating an opposing perspective (opponents).



**Table 5. Attracting Government Allies (Government Officials Model)**

	<b>Model 1 Baseline</b>	<b>Model 2 Baseline and Allied Resources</b>	<b>Model 3 Baseline, Allied, and Individual Resources</b>
Partisanship of Perspective	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Number of Non-government Actors in Perspective	.016*** (.004)	.024* (.009)	.022* (.01)
Issue Salience outside the Beltway	-.001 (.00048)	-.001 (.0004)	-.001 (.0004)
Issue Salience inside the Beltway	-.264*** (.054)	-.253*** (.061)	-.257*** (.062)
<i>Aggregate Resources of Allied Organizations</i>			
Total Membership Index		.009 (.068)	.006 (.072)
Local Chapters		1.41 e-06 (.00001)	2.37 e-06 (.00001)
Washington Resources Index		-.248 (.151)	-.219 (.162)
Corporate Budgetary Resources Index		.042 (.047)	.045 (.048)
Organizational Budgetary Resources Index		-.034* (.014)	-.035* (.015)
<i>Individual Resources (Actor Type Dummies)</i>			
Republican Party Leadership			-.057 (.227)
Republican Committee or Subcommittee Leader			-.056 (.114)
Republican Rank & File			-.155 (.126)
Democratic Party Leadership			-.275 (.254)
Democratic Committee or Subcommittee Leader			-.154 (.133)
White House			.370 (.321)
Department or Agency			.058 (.161)
Lower Level/ Bureau			-.177 (.437)
Constant	1.278*** (.112)	1.122*** (.157)	1.235*** (.175)
N	171	171	171
R-squared	.0739	.0914	.0989

Likelihood ratio tests for difference in models:

Model 1 v. Model 2: Chi-sq (5) = 13.87\*\*, Prob>Chi-sq = .0165

Model 2 v. Model 3: Chi-sq (8) = 5.89, Prob>Chi-sq = .6593, n.s.

\* = p<.05, \*\* = p<.01, \*\*\* = p<.001

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of other government officials active as members of the same perspective. Participants are all government officials themselves. Entries are negative binomial regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

**Table 6. Attracting Government Opponents (Government Officials Model)**

	<b>Model 1 Baseline</b>	<b>Model 2 Baseline and Allied Resources</b>	<b>Model 3 Baseline, Allied, and Individual Resources</b>
Partisanship of Perspective	.005 (.004)	.008* (.004)	.008* (.004)
Number of Non-government Actors in Perspective	-.008 (.009)	-.097*** (.027)	-.1*** (.027)
Issue Salience outside the Beltway	.002* (.001)	.002** (.001)	.002** (.001)
Issue Salience inside the Beltway	-.3*** (.078)	-.416*** (.099)	-.441*** (.101)
<i>Aggregate Resources of Allied Organizations</i>			
Total Membership Index		-.315* (.143)	-.324* (.146)
Local Chapters		5.98 e-06 ( 8.39 e-06)	4.19 e-06 (8.54 e-06)
Washington Resources Index		1.647*** (.468)	1.714*** (.475)
Corporate Budgetary Resources Index		-.548*** (.149)	-.536*** (.146)
Organizational Budgetary Resources Index		.021 (.024)	.017 (.024)
<i>Individual Resources (Actor Type Dummies)</i>			
Republican Party Leadership			-.544 (.417)
Republican Committee or Subcommittee Leader			-.270 (.211)
Republican Rank & File			-.225 (.236)
Democratic Party Leadership			.435 (.392)
Democratic Committee or Subcommittee Leader			-.134 (.236)
White House			.230 (.637)
Department or Agency			.229 (.298)
Lower Level/ Bureau			-.206 (.744)
Constant	.698*** (.197)	1.742*** (.390)	1.886*** (.415)
N	171	171	171
R-squared	.0265	.0665	.0774

Likelihood ratio tests for difference in models:

Model 1 v. Model 2: Chi-sq(5) = 29.83\*\*\*; prob>Chi-sq = .0000

Model 2 v. Model 3: Chi-sq(8) = 8.15; prob>Chi-sq = .4194, n.s.

\* = p<.05, \*\* = p<.01, \*\*\* = p<.001

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of other government officials active as opponents to the perspective. Participants are all government officials themselves. Entries are negative binomial regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

**Table 7. Attracting Government Allies (Interest Group Model)**

	<b>Model 1 Baseline</b>	<b>Model 2 Baseline and Allied Resources</b>	<b>Model 3 Baseline, Allied, and Individual Resources</b>
Partisanship of Perspective	-.014*** (.002)	-.013*** (.002)	-.014*** (.003)
Number of Non-government Actors in Perspective	.008*** (.002)	.037*** (.007)	.019 (.011)
Issue Salience outside the Beltway	-.001* (.0003)	-.001 (.0003)	-.001* (.0004)
Issue Salience inside the Beltway	-.077** (.026)	-.022 (.03)	-.013 (.037)
<i>Aggregate Resources of Allied Organizations</i>			
Total Membership Index		.082 (.045)	.09 (.054)
Local Chapters		-3.52 e-06 (2.48 e-06)	2.47 e-07 (3.20 e-06)
Washington Resources Index		-.531*** (.103)	-.377* (.159)
Corporate Budgetary Resources Index		.070* (.034)	.028 (.044)
Organizational Budgetary Resources Index		-.010 (.011)	-.036* (.016)
<i>Individual Resources</i>			
Member of a Coalition			-.003 (.115)
Size of Total Membership			3.33 e-09 (1.59 e-08)
DC Office			-.054 (.109)
Lobbyists			.0023 (.004)
Hired Outside Counsels			-.002 (.012)
Political Action Committee			-.029 (.08)
Budget Resources Index			-.06 (.045)
Constant	1.875*** (.084)	1.423*** (.14)	1.741*** (.227)
N	260	260	171
R-squared	.1474	.1795	.1972

Likelihood ratio tests for difference in models:

Model 1 v. Model 2: Chi-sq (5) = 21.03\*\*\*, Prob>Chi-sq = .0008 (Calculated on 171 cases with full data)

Model 2 v. Model 3: Chi-sq (6) = 2.79, Prob>Chi-sq = .8347, n.s. (Calculated on 171 cases with full data)

\* = p<.05, \*\* = p<.01, \*\*\* = p<.001

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of government officials active as members of the perspective. Participants are all non-government actors (interest groups, corporations, etc). Entries are negative binomial regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

**Table 8. Attracting Government Opponents (Interest Group Model)**

	<b>Model 1 Baseline</b>	<b>Model 2 Baseline and Allied Resources</b>	<b>Model 3 Baseline, Allied, and Individual Resources</b>
Partisanship of Perspective	.007* (.003)	.007* (.003)	.008* (.004)
Number of Non-government Actors in Perspective	-.004 (.003)	-.074*** (.015)	-.076** (.022)
Issue Salience outside the Beltway	.003*** (.0004)	.003*** (.0004)	.002*** (.0004)
Issue Salience inside the Beltway	-.213*** (.031)	-.280*** (.043)	-.206*** (.049)
<i>Aggregate Resources of Allied Organizations</i>			
Total Membership Index		-.135 (.075)	.028 (.087)
Local Chapters		5.95 e-06* (2.88 e-06)	.00001** (3.99 e-06)
Washington Resources Index		1.025*** (.242)	.832* (.343)
Corporate Budgetary Resources Index		-.253*** (.064)	-.362*** (.094)
Organizational Budgetary Resources Index		-.024 (.014)	-.085*** (.024)
<i>Individual Resources</i>			
Member of a Coalition			-.277 (.17)
Size of Total Membership			1.35 e-08 (1.65 e-08)
DC Office			.655** (.230)
Lobbyists			.001 (.005)
Hired Outside Counsels			-.010 (.016)
Political Action Committee			-.062 (.115)
Budget Resources Index			-.070 (.045)
Constant	.472** (.141)	1.392*** (.233)	.816* (.388)
N	260	260	171
R-squared	.0612	.0961	.1458

Likelihood ratio tests for difference in models:

Model 1 v. Model 2: Chi-sq (5) = 30.71\*\*\*, Prob>Chi-sq = .0000 (Calculated on 171 cases with full data)

Model 2 v. Model 3: Chi-sq (6) = 14.63, Prob>Chi-sq = .0411 (Calculated on 171 cases with full data)

\* = p<.05, \*\* = p<.01, \*\*\* = p<.001

NOTE: The dependent variable is the number of government officials active as opponents to the perspective. Participants are all non-government actors (interest groups, corporations, etc). Entries are negative binomial regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

## Appendix

### Descriptive Statistics of Actor and Perspective Resources

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range	
				Min	Max
<i>Individual Actor Resources</i>					
Size of Total Membership	232	692,165	3.4e+06	4	32,000,000
Budget Resources Index (composed of following variables)	278	.2416	1.645	-.4774	11.32
Budget	163	1.9e+07	5.8e+07	5000	6.852e+08
Staff	217	187.69	447.88	1	10,961
Income	249	5.7e+07	1.6e+08	54,250	1.458+09
Assets	249	4.0e+07	8.6e+07	9945	5.14e+08
Organizational Age	250	58.44	38.1345	7	261
Lobbyists	277	8.70	10.12	0	50
Hired Outside Counsels	277	2.23	3.61	0	23
Member of a Coalition					
No	417				
Yes	158				
DC Office					
No	56				
Yes	221				
Political Action Committee					
No	170				
Yes	106				
<i>Aggregate Resources of Perspectives</i>					
Individual Membership	575	2.9e+06	7.2 e+06	0	32,598,000
Institutional Membership	575	584.059	5587.984	0	54,950
Corporate Membership	575	606,210	1.4 e+06	0	3,920,932
Association Membership	575	843.207	1539.449	0	4194
Governmental Unit Membership	575	7.109565	43.84118	0	284
Local chapters	575	5867.89	25946.1	0	163,251
DC Offices	575	8.27	9.74	0	35
Lobbyists	575	77.86	86.56	0	301
Hired Outside Counsels	575	20.04	21.03	0	69
Political Action Committees	575	4.226087	6.016037	0	21
Organizational Budgetary Resources Index (composed of following variables)	575	.106	5.6	- 10.74	20.54
Budget	575	9.7 e+07	1.5 e+08	0	7.74 e+08
Staff	575	1290.63	2209.74	0	11,620
Income	575	3.5 e+08	4.4 e+08	0	2.12 e+09
Assets	575	2.6 e+08	2.8 e+08	0	1.23 e+09
Corporate Budgetary Resources Index	575	.0379	.9202	-1.78	4.29

## **Index Construction**

### **Individual Actor Organizational Budget Resources Index**

Factor Loadings

	<b>1</b>
Budget	0.92037
Staff Size	0.83711
Annual Assets	0.64107
Annual Income	0.66790

\*This individual level index was also aggregated for each perspective.

### **Individual Actor Corporate Budget Resources Index**

Factor Loadings

	<b>1</b>
Annual Sales	0.90317
Annual Income	0.81529
Number of Employees	0.64192

\*This individual level index was then aggregated for each perspective

### **Allied Total Membership Index**

Factor Loadings

	<b>1</b>
Allied Membership size	0.89984
Allied Individual Membership	0.81509
Allied Institutional Membership	-0.05119
Allied Corporate Membership	0.80130
Allied Association Membership	0.78613
Allied Governmental Unit Membership	-0.06356

### **Allied Washington Resources Index**

Factor Loadings

	<b>1</b>
Allied Professional Lobbyists	0.94795
Allied DC Office	0.98184
Allied Hired Outside Counsel	0.60342
Allied PACs	0.95430

### **Inside the Beltway Issue Saliency Index**

Factor Loadings

	<b>1</b>
Floor	0.81902
House	0.86061
Witness Testimony	0.74812
National Journal	0.91260

NOTE: Indexes were constructed with a principal-components analysis of the variables listed. The factor loadings, or eigenvectors, are presented for the first factor for each index.