*How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model**

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A schematic model of political belief systems based on recent research in social and cognitive psychology is developed. We show that schema theory has the ability *to bridge the gaps among* the major competing approaches to the study of mass belief systems as well as provide direction for new research on the structure and functioning of political beliefs. An initial test of the theory, done with Q methodology, is reported and the results provide consistent support for the general predictions of schema theory as applied to political beliefs.

In the study of belief systems there has recently been a sharp increase in the number of writings critical of "paradigmatic" understandings, and there is a growing lack of consensus in the literature about the meaning of key concepts (Bennett, 1977). To some extent, this confusion has been generated by research from basically two different perspectives. Some theorists advocate a "sociological" view that emphasizes the "social" origins of mass belief systems and focuses on the constraint or structure among specific issue positions (e.g., Converse, 1964; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). Others offer a "psychological" perspective that stresses the individualistic origins of belief systems and that concentrates on the structure between specific issue positions and more general political ideas (e.g., Lane, 1973; Marcus, Tabb, and Sullivan, 1974; Jackson and Marcus, 1975; and Thomas, 1978). Despite their differences, these two perspectives have shared a common concern with the question of whether people think *ideologically*. Yet, recently even this shared focus has come under fire. Kinder (1982), for one, has argued that, since the great bulk of research indicates that most people do not think ideologically, we should abandon our focus on the ideology question and concentrate instead on how people actually think about politics.

In this paper we do just that. Specifically we propose a schematic model of how people organize their beliefs about the political world. While this model by no means resolves the debate between the sociological and psychological approaches to political belief systems, it does provide a basis for integrating certain aspects of the two frameworks. More

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important, it also leads us to consider phenomena generally not dealt with by the traditional literature on mass belief systems. Once we have outlined our approach we proceed to specify a means of testing our theory that draws heavily on Q methodology. Finally, we review our initial efforts to test some of the aspects of the model.

Schema Theory

In recent years a substantial metatheoretical shift has taken place in the study of social cognition. The mainstream of social psychology has moved away from cognitive consistency theories and their assumption that people seek cognitive consistency and hence are "rationalizing, motivating, face-saving, and justifying" (Taylor, 1981, p.192). From this heavily motivational view of people, a different perspective has gradually evolved: that of people as "cognitive misers" who have a limited capacity for dealing with information, and thus must use cues and previously stored knowledge to reach judgments and decisions as accurately and efficiently as possible. This is not to say that people are simply "cold" information processors who always handle information in a rational, orderly fashion. On the contrary, this view implies that, because people have a limited capacity, they are often forced to make decisions and judgments on the basis of scanty data that may be "haphazardly combined and strongly influenced by preconceptions" (Taylor, 1981, p. 194).

This paradigmatic shift in perspectives has led psychologists to focus more on how knowledge is stored and how such stored information subsequently influences the perceptual process. In such efforts, the concept of a "schema" has played a central role (Neisser, 1976; Markus, 1977; Hastie, 1981; and Taylor and Crocker, 1981). A schema may be defined as a cognitive structure of "organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances" that guides "the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information" (Fiske and Linville, 1980, p. 543). For example, a schema of the role of "candidate" might include very general beliefs about the goals of candidates along with more specific information about the particular activities that candidates engage in to get elected. For our purposes, we assume that schemas are content specific (Taylor and Crocker, 1981), and that different types of schemas may therefore be identified according to the nature of their content.

Schemas perform a variety of functions. First, they lend organization to an individual's experience in the sense that people order the elements of their environment to reflect the structure of relevant schemas. Second, schemas influence "what information will be encoded or retrieved from memory" (Taylor and Crocker, 1981, p. 98). Third, the structure of a schema constitutes a basis for "filling in" missing information and thus

going beyond the information given (Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977). Fourth, schemas provide a means for solving problems by supplying short cuts or heuristics that simplify the problem-solving process. Finally, by generating expectations against which reality is compared, schemas provide a basis for evaluating one's experiences (Taylor and Crocker, 1981).

It is also useful to have some understanding of a schema's structure. In the most basic sense, the structure of a schema must define the domain of relevant information and provide a means of organizing that information in some consistent fashion (Fiske, 1981). One organizational property that all schemas are expected to share is "a pyramidal structure, hierarchically organized with more abstract or general information at the top and categories of more specific information nested within the general categories" (Taylor and Crocker, 1981, p. 92; also see: Cantor and Mischel, 1979; Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977). Thus schemas process or structure information at different levels of abstraction. In addition to a hierarchical structure, the elements of a schema may also reflect other organizational properties. For example, person schemas may be based on categorical systems having to do with race, sex, or a variety of other social categories, and balance may be an important organizing principle for schemas heavily laden with affect, such as those involving interpersonal relations (Taylor and Crocker, 1981). Finally, it is important to recognize that schemas are not necessarily isolated cognitive structures. Rather, they may be linked with one another through a rich network of hierarchical relationships in which individual schemas are "embedded" in one another so that the higher-order, more abstract schemas are characterized in terms of their more concrete, lower-order constituents (Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977; Hastie, 1981).

To this point we have not yet considered affect—an element traditionally important to the study of political belief systems. In this regard, it is critical to recognize that schemas are technically cognitive structures for which neither affect nor value relevancy is a necessary precondition for their activation (Fiske and Linville, 1980; Taylor and Crocker, 1981, p. 125). As cognitive misers people often make inferences, judgments, and predictions in what are essentially unvalenced situations. Yet, although affect may not be essential to the functioning of schemas, neither is it necessarily irrelevant. Some schemas—though certainly not all—represent affectively laden structures of knowledge, and thus they are able to cue affective, as well as cognitive, interpretations of a situation (Fiske, 1981). Unfortunately, at this time the interplay between affect and cognition in the functioning and structure of schemas is just beginning to come under the scrutiny of social psychologists, and thus there is little direct empirical evidence to guide our own efforts. Nonetheless, it is useful to note that

affect may well stimulate the development of schemas, heighten their saliency, and influence their use (Fiske, 1982; Markus and Smith, 1981).

Schemas and the Study of Political Belief Systems

Our suggestion that the study of political belief systems be approached from the perspective of schema theory is not a totally original one. Other political scientists have also argued that the schema concept might profitably be applied to the way people organize their political ideas (Axelrod, 1973; Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Graber, 1982; Kinder, 1982; Lodge and Wahlke, 1982; Sears and Citrin, 1982). Yet, missing from most of these previous formulations is a comprehensive justification for applying the concept specifically to mass belief systems and clear directives as to how political schemas might be empirically studied. We address each of these areas here.

Benefits of the Schema Concept

An application of schema theory does two things that Bennett (1977) has suggested might be useful in alleviating the paradigmatic crisis that currently characterizes the study of mass belief systems: it helps to *bridge the gaps among* previous conceptualizations of the nature and structure of mass belief systems, and it provides a theoretical basis for understanding certain phenomena essentially beyond the confines of traditional treatments. Specifically, the schema concept is by no means incompatible with those previously used in conceptualizations of mass belief systems (Conover and Feldman, 1980). In terms of the elements of a mass belief system, an individual's more abstract or general schemas would be analogous to what others have referred to as a "core belief system" (Lane, 1973), "general ideological dimensions" (Jackson and Marcus, 1975), "general political orientations" (Thomas, 1978) and "ideological principles" (Marcus et al., 1974). Similarly, while it is inappropriate to think of a single-issue position as constituting a schema, it is reasonable to conceptualize the perspective a person takes on related issues as an emotionally laden, concrete schema toward a specific policy area.[1] Thus the general elements of a political belief system can be thought of in terms of schemas that vary in their specificity and level of abstraction.

The structure of a belief system can also be described in schematic terms. Belief system structure has traditionally been conceptualized in terms of "constraint": the functional interdependence among idea elements (Converse, 1964). From the perspective of schema theory, a schema in and of itself constitutes a "constrained" or organized set of information. Thus, even when people's schemas are isolated from one another,

[1] Sears and Citrin (1982) suggest precisely this in their conceptualization of a tax-revolt schema.

they can be said to have organized, albeit "atomized," ways of looking at the political world.[2]

Finally, previous accounts of the development of belief systems are also compatible with our model. Traditional sociological perspectives e.g., Converse, 1964) emphasize the role of the environment in structuring belief systems. In contrast, various "psychological" treatments (e.g., Lane, 1973) have focused on the manner in which internal mechanisms structure beliefs. A schematic model integrates these two perspectives: a schema develops as a consequence of interaction with the environment, and subsequently as an existing internal structure it influences the way new information is organized, thus shaping its own further development (Neisser, 1976).

More important, not only does schema theory provide a conciliatory view of the psychological and sociological conceptions of a political belief system, it also broadens the range of phenomena likely to be dealt with and understood within a belief system framework. In particular, the schema concept is inextricably linked to models of the perceptual process (Fiske and Linville, 1980, p. 546). This necessary link between structure and process has been neglected—if not ignored—by those who study political belief systems. Despite the fact that Converse (1964) cast his seminal work in dynamic terms, political scientists have concentrated on identifying the structure of belief systems without giving sufficient attention to the full range of effects that structure might have on the perceptual process. When political scientists have considered the perceptual effects of a belief system, they have focused almost exclusively on evaluations: for example, how a voter's beliefs influence his or her evaluation of a candidate. Yet, as is evident from our review of a schema's functions, political schemas presumably have a range of effects much wider than simply the structuring of evaluations. Thus one very important consequence of adopting a schema theory approach is that it provides a framework within which political scientists are likely to consider a variety of linkages between the structure of beliefs and the perceptual process.

A second consequence of applying schema theory to the study of how people organize political beliefs is that it focuses attention on the cognitive structure of political beliefs. Recall, although some schemas may be tinged with affect, they are, nonetheless, *cognitive* structures of knowledge. As such, they draw attention to those aspects of information

[2] This is not to suggest that all people have organized ways of looking at all facets of the political world. Some people are "aschematic" (i.e., they lack organized beliefs) with respect to certain areas of politics. But, saying that someone is aschematic is quite different from arguing that they have an organized, but isolated, way of looking at that part of the political world.

processing that are essentially cognitive or nonmotivational in nature. People, in effect, make many judgments and inferences on strictly cognitive grounds (Taylor and Crocker, 1981). In contrast, the traditional approach to political belief systems concentrates heavily on the affective structure of beliefs (Lodge and Wahlke, 1982), and the motivational biases that may influence the impact of those beliefs on evaluations. Thus a schematic view of the structure of political beliefs would result in a greater consideration of the cognitive functions that belief systems perform.

Finally, schema theory is also compatible with a more diverse, richer view of the structure of political beliefs. From traditional perspectives, a highly constrained belief system is expected to fit a relatively simple model of bipolar, liberal-conservative structure. In contrast, schema theory allows for several possibilities. First, liberal and conservative views of politics may be structured very differently, rather than being bipolar to one another (Conover and Feldman, 1981). Second, schema theory is consistent with the idea of several distinct liberal (or conservative) perspectives, each of which may focus on different aspects of the political world. Third, in a more general sense, schema theory suggests that people may employ a variety of organizing principles in structuring their beliefs. Some may organize their schemas around party and race, while others may order their political beliefs according to values such as "individualism" and "equalitarianism" (Kinder, 1982). Finally, schema theory forces us to broaden our notion of what constitutes a structured belief system; people can have very organized, but atomized, ways of viewing the political world.

Political Schemas

In applying schema theory to the study of political belief systems, two important points must be kept in mind. First, while some aspects of political knowledge may be relatively low in affect (e.g., ideas about how Congress functions), those types of information relevant to political belief systems are likely to be affectively loaded (Sears and Citrin, 1982, p. 76). For example, schemas centered on concepts like "freedom" should be heavily flavored by affect and therefore capable of triggering emotional as well as cognitive reactions (Fiske, 1982). Moreover, such emotionally laden schemas are expected to play an important role in explaining what has come to be called "symbolic" politics (for an elaboration on the role of schemas in symbolic politics, see Sears and Citrin, 1982).

Second, most of the social cognition literature deals with consensual schemas—knowledge structures that people are expected to share. As a consequence, relatively little attention has been paid to the individual differences that may characterize the availability and use of schemas (Fiske and Kinder, 1981). Yet there is likely to be a great deal of

variability between people in terms of the political schemas that they possess and the manner in which such schemas are used (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Lodge and Wahlke, 1982). Thus any analysis of political schemas must be careful to take into account the variation in the range of political schemas that are available to particular individuals.

With this in mind, we can consider what form—in terms of content and level of abstraction—political schemas are likely to take. First, with respect to content, there are a variety of domains about which people may have developed political schemas (e.g., the self, political parties, and Congress). But we would argue that the domains *most relevant* in defining a belief system are those that broadly concern the functioning of government and the definition of public problems. In this regard, previous research (e.g., Converse, 1964) indicates that domestic and foreign affairs constitute two major domains of stimuli about which people have political beliefs. Furthermore, with regard to the domestic domain, evidence (Knoke, 1979) suggests that beliefs are structured according to whether they involve economic matters, racial affairs, or social concerns. Thus a schematic view of political belief systems should take into account schemas that concern all four of these domains. Second, schemas differ not only in their domains but also in their levels of abstraction. In principle, it is possible that a person might have several schemas concerning the same domain, but at different levels of abstraction. Consequently, it is essential to examine political schemas at different levels of abstraction.

Measuring Political Schemas

The empirical study of schemas has lagged behind theorizing in the sense that there is no consensus on how schemas ought to be measured (Fiske and Linville, 1980). Most social psychological studies have linked the measurement of schemas to some aspect of information processing (for a review of some of these methods see Ostrom, Pryor and Simpson, 1981). For example, in one measurement procedure people are given a list of information to read and then later asked to recall what they have seen. Presumably, the organization of the information in the subject's recall will parallel its structure in their memory. Most recent studies of political schemas (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Lodge and Wahlke, 1982) have tended to adopt this general approach (an exception is Sears and Citrin, 1982).

In contrast, there have been relatively few efforts to measure schemas independent of their processing functions (Fiske and Linville, 1980; Taylor, 1981; Taylor and Fiske, 1981). What studies there have been (Cantor and Mischel, 1979; Markus, 1977; Markus and Smith, 1981) suggest that one way of measuring political schemas independently of information processing is for the researcher to define the possible range

of content (i.e., the elements) for each domain and at differing levels of abstraction, and then allow the respondents to identify, through some sort of rating task, the nature of the schemas that are most relevant to their own particular way of looking at that portion of the political world. We pursue this research strategy through the use of Q methodology.

Q methodology is a general approach to the study of attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that is based on an examination of relationships among people rather than among variables (for a review of Q methodology see Brown, 1980). Q analysis emphasizes the discovery of patterns that characterize some subset of the respondents instead of examining extent to which an hypothesized construct or relationship describes all members of the sample. Theory or prior research guides the selection of stimuli for the analysis, but the ways in which subjects can respond to the stimuli are left largely unstructured. The central data-collection instrument in Q methodology is the Q sort in which subjects are presented with a large number of stimuli or statements from a particular domain. They are then instructed to divide the statements into a number of categories ranging from, for example, most strongly disagree through neutral to most strongly agree. The next step is to compute a correlation matrix among the Q sorts, or in other words, among people. To simplify the data matrix and examine common patterns of sorting the stimuli, the correlation matrix is factor analyzed and the initial factors rotated to a final solution. Two strategies are available to interpret the results: the factor loadings point to the *individuals* who best define the factors, and the factor scores indicate which *statements* or stimuli are most characteristic of each factor (Brown, 1980).

From our perspective, Q methodology provides an excellent means of assessing political schemas. As researchers, we are able to specify the possible range of political schemas by identifying the nature of stimuli present in different domains and at varying levels of abstraction. The individual is then allowed to reveal through the rating procedure the manner in which he or she personally structures those stimuli. By asking the respondents to rate the statements according to whether they agree strongly, are neutral, or disagree strongly we have allowed them to reveal both the affective and cognitive structure they lend to that domain of stimuli: the critical dimensions of affective structure—valence and intensity (Fiske, 1981)—are explicit in their ratings, while the essential elements of cognitive organization are implicit in the overall pattern of the ratings.[3] In addition, unlike more traditional ways of measuring beliefs Q meth-

[3] While we argue that Q methodology does reveal elements of both cognitive and affective structure, it does not do so in a way that allows us to easily separate the two. This is not a major concern for us, however, since our interest lies in assessing the overall (both cognitive and affective) patterns of belief organization.

odology can identify the stimuli from a domain that are most *salient* to an individual.

While it might be interesting to identify idiosyncratic forms of structure, it is probably more useful to specify common patterns of schematic organization since one function of patterns of political belief is the communication of shared meaning in society. In this regard, the factors represent a common way of structuring the stimuli from a specific domain; in essence they define schemas shared among some portion of the respondents. The nature of these shared schemas can be determined by examining the factor scores and thereby identifying the statements or stimuli most useful in defining the schema. Furthermore, given that the factor loadings are the correlations between each individual Q sort and the general pattern defined by the factor, they can be interpreted as representing the extent to which a particular schema characterizes an individual's responses to the stimuli making up that domain. Significant positive loadings can be taken as an indication that the individual has the shared schema defined by that factor; significant negative loadings can be interpreted as meaning that the person has a schema that is the mirror image of that defined by the factor. Finally, if a subject fails to have a statistically significant loading on any of the factors derived for that Q sort it would indicate that the person did not have a well-developed schema for that area—at least not one that was shared by some other subjects in the analysis. We use the term *aschematic* to refer to such an individual.

Data

As an initial test of our schematic model of political belief systems, we administered a set of six Q sorts to 59 students in introductory political science courses. This sample of students had the following demographic and political composition: 66% male; 95% white; 38% upper middle class, 48% middle class, 7% lower middle class, and 10% poor/working class (self-identification); 36% attend religious services weekly or more often, 43% do so occasionally, and 21% never do so; 30% liberal, 50% moderate, and 20% conservative; 35% Democratic, 28% independent, and 37% Republican; and finally, 52% do not read the newspaper or watch the evening news regularly. Thus, while our sample is relatively homogeneous in terms of social background (i.e., class and education), it is considerably more diverse in terms of political ideology and interest. Clearly, respondents who differed more in their social background would be necessary were we primarily interested in examining the development of political schemas. However, given that our focus is on studying the schematic structure of political beliefs, and given that our sample does vary substantially on key political variables, this group is adequate for an initial testing of our theory and methods. This

is especially true given that the representativeness of the respondents is not nearly as crucial in Q methodology as it is in more traditional forms of analysis. Much more important in Q methodology is the sample of statements chosen to represent the possible stimuli within a particular domain (Brown, 1980).

Six Q sorts were used to measure schematic structure. In each case, they were based on a "forced distribution" that required respondents to place a certain number of statements in each response category (e.g., "strongly agree"). Some may object that this creates a structure where none exists. However, evidence suggests that (1) the specific shape of the Q sort distribution makes little or no difference to the results, (2) even forced choice distributions allow enormous freedom to sort statements in an idiosyncratic manner (over 40 statements were used in each Q sort), (3) there is evidence that forced distribution Q sorts have very high test-retest reliabilities, and (4) the forced distribution encourages the respondents to make distinctions among the stimuli that they are capable of but may not recognize (Brown, 1980). In part, our analysis will help us to resolve this issue since, if we have "manufactured" schemas where none in fact exist, such structures will not necessarily be interrelated in a meaningful fashion.

With this in mind, let us review the nature of the six Q sorts used in the analysis. First, there are four Q sorts, each of which is designed to represent one of the four major domains of content typically thought to comprise political belief systems: economic, racial, social, and foreign affairs. The statements in all four of these Q sorts were formulated at a relatively "subordinate" level of abstraction; they deal with the nature of social and individual problems in that domain and their implications for public action. These four Q sorts, however, are not pitched at the lowest possible level of abstraction; they do *not* concern specific policy proposals or issues. Second, there is one Q sort with statements structured to represent a middle level of abstraction in which basic ideological principles and more general preferences for government action were considered. This Q sort is not specific to a particular domain of content; rather in its generality it encompasses the broader sphere of political activity. Third, there is one Q sort designed to tap a "superordinate" level of abstraction in which general beliefs about human nature and social interaction are assessed. Taken together, these six Q sorts span the various domains of content as well as the basic levels of abstraction a typical political belief system might encompass. Finally, let us note that the stimuli composing each Q sort were selected according to our own notions of what belonged in the domain, as well as extensive examinations of previous work.

The respondents were also asked about their positions on eleven specific issues spanning all four domains of content.[4] We interpret these issue positions as representing the most specific, concrete elements of a political belief system. Furthermore, while such issue positions do not constitute schemas in and of themselves, they should be structured by an individual's schemas.

The economic, social, and foreign-affairs Q sorts were given at one session, while the racial, ideological principles, and basic human philosophy Q sorts were administered at a session one week later. Contamination across levels of abstraction was thus minimized, as was contamination between the economic and racial Q sorts—two areas we thought might be highly related. Finally, a questionnaire containing the issue questions was self-administered by the students during a class period three weeks apart from the Q sort sessions.

In analyzing the Q sorts, we employed a principal-components solution in which the maximum off-diagonal correlation was used as an initial communality estimate.[5] In determining how many factors to rotate, we used two criteria: the scree-test (Cattell, 1965) and the requirement that there be at last two significant loadings on the factor (Brown, 1980). Finally, the solutions were rotated obliquely, thus allowing correlated factors to emerge where appropriate. In general, we found that oblique rotations result in simpler patterns of loading then orthogonal ones.

Findings

Nature of the Political Schemas

Let us begin by considering the nature of the political schemas revealed by our Q sort analysis. The factors that emerged for each Q sort have been labeled according to our interpretations of the patterns apparent in the factor scores (see Table 1). By examining those statements that appear most positively and most negatively on a factor we were able to infer the nature of the perspective or schema defined by each factor. The Appendix provides a more detailed description of each schema as well as a listing of statements with the most extreme factor scores.

First, for our purposes, perhaps the most important aspect of these results is that for each combination of domain and level of abstraction we uncovered at least two—and in some instances more—shared schemas for structuring the *same* political information. In several domains, for example, there are two distinctly different conservative perspectives, while

[4] The specific issue position items were drawn from National Election Studies of the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) General Social Surveys.

[5] We used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) factor program in our analysis.

TABLE 1

The Nature of Political Schemas

Schema	Number Loading on Factor	% of Sample Loading Positive	% of Sample Loading Negative	% of Sample Aschematic	Correlations between Factors
I. Basic human philosophy				15.2	
A. Altruistic-positive (F_{11})	29	47.5	1.7		r_{12} = .25; r_{23} = .24
B. Hobbesian-Freudian (F_{12})	10	16.9	0		r_{13} = .30; r_{24} = .09
C. Individualistic (F_{13})	11	18.6	0		r_{14} = .25; r_{34} = .14
D. Altruistic-complex (F_{14})	6	8.5	1.7		
II. Ideological principles				15.2	
A. Neoconservativism (F_{21})	30	49.2	1.7		r_{12} = .20
B. Free-market conservativism (F_{22})	14	22.0	1.7		r_{13} = .21
C. Democratic socialism (F_{23})	10	16.9	0		r_{14} = .11
III. Economic beliefs				8.5	
A. Value of free enterprise (F_{31})	28	45.8	1.7		r_{12} = .21
B. Society's responsibility for inequities (F_{32})	15	25.4	0		r_{13} = .44
C. Value of self-reliance (F_{33})	17	27.1	1.7		r_{23} = .04

TABLE 1 continued

Schema	Number Loading on Factor	% of Sample Loading Positive	% of Sample Loading Negative	% of Sample Aschematic	Correlations between Factors
IV. Racial beliefs				5.1	
A. Liberal integrationism (F_{41})	46	76.3	1.7		r_{12} = .24
B. Conservative integrationism (F_{42})	15	23.7	3.4		
V. Social beliefs				6.8	
A. Religious-liberal sex roles (F_{51})	41	69.5	0		r_{12} = .11
B. Liberal sex roles-nonreligious (F_{52})	27	40.7	5.1		
VI. Foreign-affairs beliefs				20.3	
A. Internationalism-nonmilitaristic (F_{61})	20	32.2	1.7		r_{12} = -.10
B. Nationalism-ethnocentric (F_{62})	20	33.9	0		r_{13} = .08
C. Isolationism-nonmilitaristic (F_{63})	7	5.8	6.8		r_{23} = .16

in others there are viewpoints that mix liberal and conservative ideas. Moreover, at least 10% of the respondents (6 people) significantly load on each factor, and in many instances fully a quarter of the sample share the schema.[6] Thus by no means are the schemas we have identified purely idiosyncratic structures.

Second, an examination of the correlations among the factors within a Q sort provides some idea of the distinctiveness of these schemas. A high correlation among two factors indicates that the schemas defined by the factors are related or share a good deal in common. Alternatively, a low correlation between factors implies that the two schemas are relatively independent; that is, they have very little meaning in common. As detailed in Table 1, in most cases the correlations among the derived factors range from being moderate to nonexistent. The one major exception to this pattern occurs in the economic beliefs Q sort. There we find two related, but distinct, conservative schemas ($r = .44$ for factors 1 and 3) as well as one liberal schema. Thus in most Q sorts, the various schemas can be described as being relatively independent or neutral with regard to one another.

Third, there is only one really bipolar factor on which substantial numbers of people load both positively and negatively. That factor—F63—can be thought of as defining two schemas that are mirror images of one another; one is an isolationism–nonmilitaristic schema while the other one (defined by negative loadings on the factor) is an internationalism–militaristic schema. For the remaining factors, there are relatively few negative loadings, suggesting that each schema defines a single, distinct perspective (as opposed to two perspectives).[7] This lack of bipolarity is critical because it casts serious doubts on traditional conceptualizations of political belief systems, which tend to assume that people structure their beliefs in terms of one or two bipolar structures—typically labeled liberal-conservative dimensions (Asher, 1980). Furthermore, this lack of bipolarity is quite consistent with the recent findings that people do not view either political parties (Weisberg, 1980) or liberal-conservative labels (Conover and Feldman, 1981) from a bipolar perspective.

Fourth, it is interesting to note that for most of the Q sorts there are a number of individuals who do not load on any factor (i.e., aschematics). They are lowest for the Q sorts dealing with what one would expect to be very familiar information: social and racial beliefs. Similarly, the number of aschematics is highest in an area where

[6] Several people in each Q sort had significant loadings on two of the extracted factors. This indicates that their schema for that domain combines two different ways of structuring the relevant political information and beliefs.

[7] This lack of bipolarity is also evident in the correlations among factors: there is only one negative correlation, which is not sizeable.

Americans are notorious for their lack of information and well-developed beliefs: foreign affairs. Finally, it is important to recognize that the tendency to be aschematic does not appear to be a general one; only 12 percent of the subjects are aschematic in more than one area.[8]

In summary, our analysis indicates that people who are by no means political elites do have identifiable, shared ways of organizing political information at abstract as well as relatively concrete levels. Furthermore, within any given domain and level of abstraction, there are several distinct, relatively independent schemas or ways of structuring the same information, that often cannot be labeled in simple liberal-conservative terms. These facts undermine those theories that depict the structure of political beliefs strictly in terms of bipolar, liberal-conservative dimensions. People simply do not view the political world from opposite sides of the same dimension, nor do they necessarily see it in liberal-conservative terms. Instead, they bring distinct and varied perspectives to bear on the political information that they receive. Finally, our results should not be interpreted as identifying the full range of political schemas. Future studies involving different kinds of people are expected to uncover schemas not employed by our subjects.[9]

Structure of the Political Schemas

To this point, we have demonstrated that individuals do have different schemas that they use to structure certain types of information. This does not indicate, however, that people have integrated belief systems; rather, all that it shows is that individuals have atomized perspectives. Yet for many people this may be more than enough for them to structure the limited amounts of political information that they encounter in their daily lives. Much of the mass public simply may not need a broad-based ideology in order to organize their political worlds (Kinder, 1982). In contrast, others may require more integrated structures for processing political information. Thus it is useful to illustrate that some people do relate their schemas to one another.

[8] Some caution must be used in interpreting the aschematic percentage. Technically it means only that people do not have a schema that is shared by other respondents in our analysis. They still might have a very idiosyncratic schema for dealing with the information. Test-retest data would provide one way of distinguishing the truly aschematic respondents from those with simply idiosyncratic patterns of organization. Presumably, those with idiosyncratic structures would correlate with themselves over time, while aschematics would not.

[9] Similarly, a more diverse sample might also be useful in exploring the determinants of various schemas. Given the relative homogeneity of our sample, such an investigation would not have been very fruitful in this case. However, even a preliminary analysis using this sample does indicate that people holding different schemas do differ significantly in the groups they identify with and the values they hold.

In order to do so, however, it is necessary to shift from considering the individual Q sorts to a focus on their interrelationships: a move that leads us to depart from traditional Q sort analysis. Specifically, by correlating an individual's factor loadings across factors we gain some indication of the shared patterns of structure characterizing relations between schemas.[10] A significant positive correlation indicates that a person having the first schema also tends to have the second one; a nonsignificant correlation means that the schemas are relatively independent; and a significant negative correlation can be interpreted as meaning that a person who holds the first schema tends not to have the second one.[11] Given our interest in identifying patterns of schematic structure, we will focus primarily on the positive correlations since they indicate which schemas tend to go with one another.

Presented in Table 2 are the correlations between the factor loadings of the respondents on each of the seventeen factors or schemas we have identified. Let us first note that the pattern of correlations between domains (as defined by the Q sorts) varies depending on the particular schema a person holds. For example, looking at the pattern of correlations between the economic and the racial beliefs schemas, we find that, for individuals having the "value of free enterprise" schema (F31), economic and racial beliefs are relatively independent of one another. In contrast, for people who organize their economic beliefs differently, the economic and racial domains are clearly linked to one another; subjects with a "society's responsibility for inequities" schema (F32) tend to have a "liberal integrationism" schema (F41), while those with a "value of self-reliance" schema (F33) tend to view racial matters from the perspective of a "conservative integrationists" schema (F42). To take a second example, for those with a "free-market conservatism" schema (F22) ideological principles are essentially independent of the schemas used to organize both racial matters and foreign affairs, while there are clear relationships between the two domains for subjects who structure their ideological principles differently.

This finding that the relationships across domains often vary depending on an individual's particular schemas has important implications. Methodologically, it suggests that it may be quite misleading to simply look at the relationships among attitudes in two domains. Because people relate domains together in different ways, substantial relationships may

[10] Using correlations between factor loadings as a measure of schematic structure makes sense only if (as we have done) the factors being correlated are from different Q sorts. Correlations between factor loadings for factors from the same Q sort would produce spurious results.

[11] The interpretation of a significant negative correlation differs where F63—the one bipolar factor—is concerned. There a negative correlation means that people who have the "mirror image" of F63 (those who load negatively on F63) tend to have the second schema.

TABLE 2

The Structure of Political Schemas

Schema	Basic Human Philosophy				Ideological Principles			Economic Beliefs			Racial Beliefs		Social Beliefs	
	F_{11}	F_{12}	F_{13}	F_{14}	F_{21}	F_{22}	F_{23}	F_{31}	F_{32}	F_{33}	F_{41}	F_{42}	F_{51}	F_{52}
I. Basic human philosophy														
A. Altruistic-positive (F_{11})														
B. Hobbesian-Freudian (F_{12})														
C. Individualistic (F_{13})														
D. Altruistic-complex (F_{14})														
II. Ideological principles														
A. Neoconservativism (F_{21})	.30**	-.21*	.30**	-.16										
B. Free-market conservativism (F_{22})	-.14	.23**	.07	-.37**										
C. Democratic socialism (F_{23})	.19*	-.06	-.49**	.30**										
III. Economic beliefs														
A. Value of free enterprise (F_{31})	.04	.25**	-.14	-.31**	.12	.51**	-.34**							
B. Society's responsibility for inequities (F_{32})	.25**	-.17*	-.21**	.50**	-.13	-.33**	.64**							
C. Value of self-reliance (F_{33})	-.18*	-.06	.53**	-.27**	.32**	.04	-.55**							

TABLE 2 continued

Schema	Basic Human Philosophy				Ideological Principles			Economic Beliefs			Racial Beliefs		Social Beliefs	
	F_{11}	F_{12}	F_{13}	F_{14}	F_{21}	F_{22}	F_{23}	F_{31}	F_{32}	F_{33}	F_{41}	F_{42}	F_{51}	F_{52}
IV. Racial beliefs														
A. Liberal integrationism (F_{41})	.27**	-.11	-.31**	.04	-.28**	.07	.38**	-.08	.39**	-.38**				
B. Conservative integrationism (F_{42})	-.19*	.04	.43**	-.13	.28**	.06	-.52**	.11	-.41**	.50**				
V. Social beliefs														
A. Religious-liberal sex roles (F_{51})	.30**	-.32*	.12	.40**	.32**	-.40**	-.10	-.21**	.34**	.004	-.06	.08		
B. Liberal sex roles-nonreligious (F_{52})	-.03	.05	-.22**	-.26**	-.17*	.06	.38**	-.08	.11	-.15	.34**	-.35*		
VI. Foreign-affairs beliefs														
A. Internationalism-nonmilitaristic (F_{61})	.27**	-.17*	-.35**	.25*	-.13	-.12	.60**	-.14	.48**	-.53**	.47**	-.63**	-.08	.36**
B. Nationalism-ethnocentric (F_{62})	-.16	.30**	.20*	-.14	.13	.06	-.48**	.04	-.31**	.54**	-.27**	.45**	.17	-.32**
C. Isolationism-nonmilitaristic (F_{63})	-.06	-.14	-.03	.08	-.21*	-.16	.21*	-.38**	.32**	-.15	.10	-.08	.04	.22**

NOTE: Entries are Pearson product-moment correlations.
* = ($p \leq .1$). ** ($p \leq .05$).

be hidden or washed out when such differences are ignored. Theoretically, this finding indicates that people have very different ways of looking at politics. Some people see two domains of politics from the perspective of relatively independent schemas; others with different schemas will view the same domains as being quite related.

Moreover, not only do people relate the various domains of political information in different ways, but they also do so in a substantively meaningful fashion and a structurally hierarchial pattern. If we focus on the relationships of the superordinate schemas with those identified at both the middle and the subordinate levels, then we find evidence of a hierarchial structure in which the specific schemas are embedded in the more general, higher-level ones. For example, one generally conservative perspective is illustrated by people who view human nature from the perspective of a "Hobbesian-Freudian" (F_{12}) schema. They tend to adopt a "free-market conservativism" (F_{22}) view when dealing with general ideological information, and at the level of more specific beliefs they organize economic information in terms of the "value of free enterprise" (F_{31}), and foreign affairs information in terms of a "nationalism-ethnocentric" (F_{62}) schema. In contrast, a second, distinctly different conservative perspective is found among those individuals having an "individualistic" schema (F_{13}) at the superordinate level. Finally, the embedding pattern that characterizes the relationships among schemas becomes even more apparent when we move down a level and look at how the "ideological principles" schemas structure more specific information.

It is also of some use to consider the negative correlations in Table 2 since they indicate which schemas are not likely to be found together in the same belief structure. When such correlations are examined the patterns of hierarchical structure become clearer and the substantive nature of the perspectives defined by the schemas more apparent. For example, the basically liberal perspective of those with a "democratic socialism" (F_{23}) schema is made even more distinct by the recognition that such people definitely tend *not* to structure their economic beliefs in terms of the values of either "free enterprise" (F_{31}) or "self-reliance" (F_{33}); nor do they order their racial beliefs according to a "conservative integrationists" (F_{42}) perspective, or their foreign affairs beliefs in terms of a "nationalism-ethnocentric" (F_{62}) schema. Similarly, the essentially conservative perspective of those viewing human nature in "individualistic" (F_{13}) terms becomes quite clear when the negative correlations in each of the other domains are taken into account.

In summary, not only do individuals have a wide variety of schemas, but many people also link their schemas together in what appears to be a meaningful hierarchial fashion. Overall, there is evidence of two basically conservative—but decidedly different—perspectives, one essen-

tially liberal orientation, and several viewpoints that mix liberal and conservative ideas. Furthermore, people relate schemas to one another in very different ways, depending on the nature of their schemas. For some people, two domains may be very related to one another, while for others they are quite independent.

Schemas and Specific Issue Positions

To this point, our analysis has neglected two important elements. We have given no consideration to specific issue positions—the elements of a belief system that are often the basic unit of analysis in traditional examinations of political belief systems. Nor have we directed any attention to the functions that political schemas perform—this despite our own argument that process and structure ought to be considered together. In this section, we attempt to rectify both of these omissions by considering how various schemas are related to specific issue positions. While this analysis does not represent a true illustration of the dynamic functioning of political schemas, it is certainly more than what some might call a simple tautological demonstration. By showing that the structure of schemas is in fact related to the evaluation of more specific issues in the same domain, we lend considerable support to the idea that our Q sort analysis has actually uncovered meaningful patterns of schematic structure.

The subjects' factor loadings on the 17 schemas were correlated with their issue positions on four issues, one from each of the major domains of political content: should the government improve living standards, school integration, marijuana use, and defense spending (see Table 3).[12] In each case, the issue scales range from a low of 1 for what would typically be considered the liberal response to a high of 7 for the most extreme conservative response: people should take care of themselves, the government should stay out of school integration, penalties should be higher for marijuana use, and defense spending should be increased. In this analysis, significant positive correlations can be interpreted as meaning that individuals who hold a particular schema tend to adopt the conservative position on specific issues, while a significant negative correlation indicates that people with the schema tend to take a liberal stand on specific issues.

People's political schemas are definitely related to the positions that they take on specific issues as we see in Table 3. To begin with, conservative issue positions tend to be associated with schemas that represent a conservative perspective on some domain of political infor-

[12] The four issues were chosen because they tend to represent the middle range of correlation; they are not the issues most correlated with the schemas, but neither are they the ones least correlated.

TABLE 3

The Structure of Political Schemas and Specific Issue Positions

Schema		Government Improve Standard of Living	School Integration	Marijuana Use	Defense Spending
I.	Basic human philosophy				
	A. Altruistic-positive (F_{11})	-.17	-.11	.23**	.10
	B. Hobbesian-Freudian (F_{12})	.01	.16	-.15	.00
	C. Individualistic (F_{13})	.26**	.10	.12	.15
	D. Altruistic-complex (F_{14})	-.43**	-.21*	-.01	-.02
II.	Ideological principles				
	A. Neoconservativism (F_{21})	.00	.10	.23**	.33**
	B. Free-market conservativism (F_{22})	.49**	.14	-.02	.17
	C. Democratic socialism (F_{23})	-.55**	-.33**	-.23**	-.18*
III.	Economic beliefs				
	A. Value of free enterprise (F_{31})	.33**	.13	.08	-.04
	B. Society's responsibility for inequities (F_{32})	-.65**	-.36**	-.04	-.09
	C. Value of self-reliance (F_{33})	.53**	.41**	.17	.35**

TABLE 3 continued

Schema		Government Improve Standard of Living	School Integration	Marijuana Use	Defense Spending
IV.	Racial beliefs				
	A. Liberal integrationism (F_{41})	-.35**	-.44**	.01	-.15
	B. Conservative integrationism (F_{42})	.44**	.52**	.17	.14
V.	Social beliefs				
	A. Religious-liberal sex roles (F_{51})	-.23**	-.13	.28**	.16
	B. Liberal sex roles-nonreligious (F_{52})	-.11	-.02	-.20*	-.22**
VI.	Foreign-affairs beliefs				
	A. Internationalism-nonmilitaristic (F_{61})	-.53*	-.30**	-.17	-.27**
	B. Nationalism-ethnocentric (F_{62})	.34**	.41**	.36**	.33**
	C. Isolationism-nonmilitaristic (F_{63})	-.21*	-.21*	-.28*	-.57**

NOTE: Entries are Pearson product-moment correlations.
* = ($p \leq .1$). ** = ($p \leq .05$).

mation, while liberal stands on the issues are related to so-called liberal schemas. Next, the pattern of significant relationships for a particular schema tends to be consistent *across* issues (i.e., liberal schemas tend to be associated with liberal issue positions). The one major exception to this pattern is the religious/liberal sex-roles schema; people having that schema tend to have a liberal position on the standard-of-living issue and a conservative position on marijuana use. Yet such a pattern makes sense when it is recognized that this schema combines a conservative religious perspective with a liberal view of some, but not all, social matters.

Finally, those schemas most relevant to the domain of an issue tend to have some of the strongest correlations with the issue positions. Thus, for example, the three economic belief schemas are all strongly related to stands on the standard-of-living issue, and the racial beliefs schemas are the strongest correlates of positions on school integration. This is not to say, however, that there are not strong correlations between certain schemas and issues basically outside their domain. Indeed, there are substantial correlations between the foreign affairs schemas and all three domestic issues. On one hand, such correlations may indicate real substantive links between domains traditionally thought to be independent. It is certainly plausible that basic beliefs about our own culture vis-a-vis others (i.e., feelings of nationalism and ethnocentrism) may well be related to issues of race and economics within our society. On the other hand, these correlations may be spurious ones created by the relationship of the foreign affairs schemas to other very basic schemas. To test this possibility, however, we must shift our attention away from the structural linkages between political schemas and specific issue positions to a multivariate analysis and a more traditional focus on our ability to predict specific issue positions.

We ran stepwise regression analyses in which we regressed the subjects' stands on the 11 issues on their factor loadings for the 17 schemas (see Table 4). As can be seen, we do very well in predicting specific issue positions for most of the economic issues and the defense spending issue; the multiple R's are quite large for those issues, particularly when one takes into account the relatively low reliabilities of the issue questions.[13] The schemas do slightly less well in predicting positions on the two racial issues, and the least well of all on the four social issues. But this poor performance on the social issues is not altogether unexpected; because the subjects are relatively similar for many of the

[13] Analysis by Erikson (1979), for one, indicates that the issue-position scales may contain a substantial degree of random measurement error. Therefore if an issue scale had a reliability of .7, for example, an estimated R^2 from a regression on that scale of .4 (40% explained variance) would actually represent .4/.7, or 57% of the systematic variation in the issue scale explained.

TABLE 4

Multiple Regression Analysis: Specific Issue Positions on Political Schemas

Schema	Govt. Activity	Standard of Living	Health Insur.	Income Differences	Sch. Integr.	Preferential Treatment	Marijuana Use	Rights of Accused	Porno-graphy	Abor-tion	Defense Spending
I. Basic human philosophy											
A. Altruistic-positive (F_{11})							.300				
B. Hobbesian-Freudian (F_{12})			-.207								
C. Individualistic (F_{13})											
D. Altruistic-complex (F_{14})	-.225										
II. Ideological principles											
A. Neoconservativism (F_{21})											
B. Free-market conservativism (F_{22})	.569	.330	.627	.330							-.257
C. Democratic socialism (F_{23})											
III. Economic beliefs											
A. Value of free enterprise (F_{31})											
B. Society's responsibility for inequities (F_{32})		-.331				-.365					.297
C. Value of self-reliance (F_{33})		.226									

TABLE 4 continued

Schema	Govt. Activity	Standard of Living	Health Insur.	Income Differences	Sch. Integr.	Preferential Treatment	Marijuana Use	Rights of Accused	Porno-graphy	Abor-tion	Defense Spending
IV. Racial beliefs											
A. Liberal integrationism (F_{41})			-.324								
B. Conservative integrationism (F_{42})				.476	.523	.401					
V. Social beliefs											
A. Religious-liberal sex roles (F_{51})									.344		
B. Liberal sex roles-nonreligious (F_{52})										-.385	
VI. Foreign-affairs beliefs											
A. Internationalism-nonmilitaristic (F_{61})		-.219						-.563			
B. Nationalism-ethnocentric (F_{62})							.412				
C. Isolationism-nonmilitaristic (F_{63})											-.551
Multiple R	.68	.78	.66	.59	.52	.64	.47	.56	.34	.39	.68
Multiple R^2	.47	.61	.43	.35	.27	.40	.22	.32	.12	.15	.46

NOTE: Entries are standardized regression coefficients significant at the .05 level.

dimensions of social beliefs, the two social beliefs schemas overlap considerably, thus reducing our ability to discriminate among people for issues in that domain. Nonetheless, despite the relatively low level of explanation for the social issues, overall the schemas do very well in predicting specific issue positions.

Furthermore, we again find that "liberal" schemas tend to contribute to liberal issue positions and vice versa, with only a few apparent exceptions. First, those with "free-market conservativism" schemas (F22) tend to oppose increases in defense spending. However, given the emphasis that we would expect such individuals to place on reduced governmental spending and a balanced budget, such a finding is not especially inconsistent with how we would expect schemas to structure issue positions. A second, more difficult anomaly to reconcile is the finding that people with a "Hobbesian-Freudian" view tend to support a federal health insurance program. This link inexplicably goes against the basically conservative perspective characterizing these subjects on other issues and schemas.

Looking at the domain of the schemas, we generally find further support for our earlier analysis. Again, the schemas most useful for predicting issue positions tend to be those most germane to the domain of the specific issue. For example, the racial schemas are the best predictors of positions on the two racial questions. Similarly, the economic isues are best predicted from the general ideological and economic schemas, with the racial schemas playing a role on several of the issues. However, the influence of the racial schemas on economic issue positions is quite consistent with recent research indicating the centrality of race to American belief systems (see Kinder, 1982). The one interesting exception seems to be social issues where we find that the foreign affairs schemas are relatively strong predictors. In effect, they seem to be picking up differences in social outlooks not identified by the social beliefs schemas. Moreover, as suggested earlier, this finding raises the possibility that there are important substantive linkages between basic beliefs on foreign affairs and those concerning other domains. At a fundamental level, then, our beliefs about other cultures may very well be tied to our beliefs about other races and our sense of morality.

In summary, the schemas that we have identified are related to specific issue positions—the most concrete elements of a political belief system—in meaningful ways. While true experiments demonstrating the information-processing effects of schemas might be more persuasive, these findings can nonetheless be interpreted as evidence that schemas do structure the evaluation of specific policies. In addition, from a more traditional perspective, we find that we can use information about whether or not people have particular schemas to successfully predict their positions on specific issues.

Conclusions

In this paper we have both developed a schematic model to explain the ways in which people organize the political world and tested a general strategy for the empirical study of political schemas. We have argued that schema theory provides a useful basis for the study of mass belief systems, in particular, because it allows for a more complete specification of the diverse structures assumed by political beliefs. Our empirical analysis using Q methodology found consistent support for the utility of a schematic model of political belief systems. In each of the six domains analyzed, we found multiple, distinct schemas representing different ways of organizing information in that substantive area. Some of these were liberal schemas and others were conservative ones, *but* the liberal perspectives in a domain were not simply reflections of the conservative viewpoints. Moreover, for most of our subjects the schemas we identified were related to each other in ways indicative of substantial belief system organization. While we would hesitate to label such organization as an ideology, we readily interpret it as evidence that fairly average people may have relatively complex, interrelated ways of structuring their political world. These findings suggest that people organize their political worlds in richer and more diverse ways than implied by the traditional approaches to mass belief systems.

In conclusion, we believe that a schematic model of the organization of political information holds a great deal of promise. People may not necessarily structure their political worlds according to abstract ideological principles, but they do organize their beliefs. Furthermore, they do so in many ways. It is no longer sufficient to look for elements of a simple liberal-conservative structure; rather, as researchers, we must recognize that there are a number of distinct, often unrelated, perspectives on politics. Specifying the nature of those perspectives and exploring their impact on political perception represents an important, and challenging, research agenda for the future.

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APPENDIX

Listed are the 17 schemas and, for illustrative purposes, the two statements with the most extreme positive-factor scores and the two statements with the most extreme negative scores. It is critical to remember that the naming of the factors was based on the full array of positive and negative rankings of statements; in some instances the meaning of the factors may not be at all clear from the limited number of statements presented. A complete record on the results of the six factor analyses can be obtained by request from the authors.

I. *BASIC HUMAN PHILOSOPHY*

A. *Altruistic-positive:* People are seen as being basically good, trusting, and willing to help each other; altruism is considered important.

+1. You can't put a price tag on human life.
+2. If you act in good faith toward people, most all of them will reciprocate with fairness toward you.
−1. All in all, it is better to be important and dishonest than to be humble and honest.
−2. An individual's responsibility for the welfare of others extends no further than the boundaries of his or her immediate circle of friends.

B. *Hobbesian-Freudian:* A view of people as self-interested, untrustworthy, and difficult to understand.

+1. It's a rare person who will go against the crowd.
+2. People are too complex to ever be fully understood.
−1. The average person has an accurate understanding of the reasons for their behavior.
−2. People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better off lying.

C. *Individualistic:* Success and failure in life is a matter of personal initiative; people deserve what they get.

+1. If people try hard enough they can usually reach their goals.
+2. You can't put a price tag on human life.
−1. All in all, it is better to be important and dishonest than to be humble and honest.
−2. Our success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our own control.

D. *Altruistic-complex:* People are basically self-interested and difficult to understand, but they still have an obligation to the community as a whole.

+1. You can't put a price tag on human life.
+2. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
−1. All in all, it is better to be important and dishonest than to be humble and honest.
−2. The average person has an accurate understanding of the reasons for their behavior.

II. *IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES*

A. *Neoconservativism:* Big government is seen as a necessary evil needed to maintain law and order; existing customs and institutions are important.

+1. The maintenance of law and order is essential to the sound development of society.
+2. Society can be improved by ideas.
−1. There should be no interference with business and trade.
−2. A better society can only be realized through a radical change of the present social structure.

B. *Free-market conservativism.* A basic antigovernment view that stresses the need for freedom in order to pursue business interests.

+1. A great deal of government interference can only lead to bureaucracy and economic stagnation.
+2. If freedom of enterprise is restricted other freedoms will disappear.
−1. A great deal of government interference leads to planning and therefore a more efficient economy.
−2. Efficient, large-scale production requires government intervention.

C. *Democratic socialism.* A view in which change is perceived as a necessary and positive element in society. The existence of social classes is viewed as a detriment to society.

+1. Society can be improved by ideas.
+2. The maintenance of law and order is essential to the sound development of society.
−1. The existence of social classes is necessary for the welfare of all.
−2. In present-day society, social classes no longer form an important social conflict.

III. *ECONOMIC BELIEFS*

A. *Value of free enterprise.* A focus on the positive value of competition, big business, and profit-making.

+1. Private ownership of property is as important to a good society as freedom.

+2. Competition leads to better performance and a desire for excellence.
−1. People would still work as hard at their jobs even if everyone earned the same amount.
−2. Private ownership of property has often done mankind more harm than good.

B. *Society's responsibility for inequities:* Antibusiness viewpoint that sees society as sharing in the responsibility for social inequities.

+1. Too often in society, success is defined just in terms of how much money you make.
+2. Society needs to work harder to ensure real equality of opportunity.
−1. Currently opportunities for advancement are about as equal as they need to be.
−2. Business and industry are generally fair and honest with the public.

C. *Value of self-reliance:* A conservative view that focuses on the individual causes of poverty.

+1. Some people who don't get ahead in life tend to blame the system, when they really have only themselves to fault.
+2. Competition leads to better performance and a desire for excellence.
−1. The poor are poor because the wealthy and powerful keep them poor.
−2. Competition, whether in school, work, or business is often wasteful and destructive.

IV. *RACIAL BELIEFS*

A. *Liberal integrationism.* A view that favors integration at both a public (social) level as well as at a personal (individual) level.

+1. There is nothing wrong with blacks and whites being close personal friends
+2. It is certainly proper for blacks and whites to be acquaintances.
−1. A person should not invite a member of another race to dinner at his or her home.
−2. There should be no blacks serving on the city council.

B. *Conservative integrationists.* A view that supports integration at the public level, but opposes it at a close personal level. Also, there is some tendency not to perceive the existence of discrimination.

+1. People should be willing to take orders from a black police officer.
+2. It is certainly proper for blacks and whites to be acquaintances.
−1. It is quite all right for blacks and whites to date each other.
−2. When two qualified people, one black and the other white, are considered for the same job, the black won't get the job no matter how hard he or she tries.

V. *SOCIAL BELIEFS*

A. *Religious-liberal sex roles.* An emphasis on the importance of religious faith, with some tendency towards liberal sexual attitudes.

+1. There is nothing wrong with a married woman working even if she has a husband capable of supporting her.
+2. Religious commitment gives life a purpose it would not otherwise have.
−1. The Bible is not the actual word of God; it is simply an ancient book of fables, legends, and history recorded by humans.
−2. There is no survival of any kind after death.

B. *Liberal sex roles-nonreligious.* Definitely nonreligious with an emphasis on liberal sexual attitudes.

+1. There is no reason why a man should lose respect for a woman if they have sexual relations before marriage.
+2. If you lead a good and decent life it is not necessary to go to church.
−1. Every explanation of man and the world is incomplete unless it takes account of God's will.
−2. The story of creation as recorded in Genesis is literally true.

VI. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS BELIEFS*

A. *Internationalism-nonmilitaristic.* A stress on world—as opposed to U.S.—interests and the avoidance of war whenever possible.

+1. All human beings are of equal importance.

+2. International disputes should be settled without war.
−1. We should be willing to fight for our country whether it is in the right or wrong.
−2. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength.

B. *Nationalism–ethnocentric.* A basically nationalistic view with some militaristic overtones.
+1. It is only natural and right for people to feel that their country is better than any other.
+2. All human beings are of equal importance.
−1. Our country is probably no better than many others.
−2. The United States should limit itself to defensive weapons only.

C. *Isolationism–nonmilitaristic.* A heavy emphasis on staying uninvolved in world affairs, with nonmilitaristic overtones.
+1. George Washington's advice to stay out of agreements with foreign powers is just as wise now as it was when he was alive.
+2. We shouldn't risk our happiness and well-being by getting involved with other countries.
−1. The United States should go out of its way to lend a helping hand to all countries.
−2. The biblical command against killing does not apply to warfare.

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