THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT THIS CR ISSUE GO TO
Next Hit Forward Next Document New CR Search
Prev Hit Back Prev Document HomePage
Hit List Best Sections Daily Digest Help
Doc Contents
When it comes to education, the nation's children deserve the best help we
[Page: S3808] GPO's PDF
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself and Mr. SCHUMER):
S. 825. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow small business employers a credit against income tax for em ployee health insur ance expenses paid o r incurred by the employer; to the Committee on Finance.
SMALL BUSINESS TAX CREDIT FOR HEALTH INSURAN CE FOR LOW-INCOME WORKERS Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise today on tax day to introduce a new le gislative proposal to help small businesses afford quality health insurance for their low-i ncome work ers. The number of uninsured is at an all-time high. More than 43 million people, including 11 million children, lack health insurance coverage. Worke rs in smal l firms are significantly more likely to be uninsured than workers in larger firms. Nationally, 34 percent of workers in small businesses with less than 10 employees are uninsured. This compares to the national average for all workers which is 18.2 percent. In Illinois, 183,781 workers in a small business in 1997 went without health insurance. For low-income workers t he situation was even worse. Nationally, 41.3 percent of workers earning less than $16,000 were uninsured. Again in Illinois, 112,770 working for less than $16,000 in small businesses were uninsured.
This situation is deteriorating. Recent studies show that the number of small businesses offering health insurance has been declin ing. In 19 96, 52 percent of small businesses offered their employees health insurance benefits. This level had fallen to 47 percent by 1998. For the smallest firms, those with 3-9 workers, the percentage of employees covered by employer-sponsored health insurance fell from 36 pe rcent in 1 996 to 31 percent in 1998.
Only 39 percent of small businesses with a significant percentage of low-income employees offer employer-sponsored health insurance--such companies are half as likely to offer health benefits as are companies that have only a small proportion of low-income employees.
One of the main reasons for this decline in
employer-sponsored health insurance is cost. Small businesses pay on average 30 percent more
for health insurance than larger
fir ms and cos ts are
increasing more rapidly for small businesses causing them to drop health
insurance benefits.
&n
Bea ring all this in mind, I am introducing a bill that recognizes that the most concentrated pool of Americans without health insurance are low-income workers in small businesses (0-9 employees). The bill provides tax credits to small business es when they provide health insurance to those low-in come worke rs. The bill provides a tax credit of up to $600 for an indi vidual policy for a worker making up to $16,000/yr. and a tax credit of up to $1,200 fo r a fam ily policy for a worker making up to $16,000/yr. The tax credit is valued at 60 pe rcent o f what the employer contributes for the individual's health insurance, or 70 percent of what th e employer contributes for a family policy, to the maximum of $600 and $1,200 for self-only and family policies respectively.
The proposal does not undermine the employer-based health insurance market, and doe s not unde rmine the protections and advantages that are available to group purchasers. Instead it is designed to help small businesses to provide quality health insurance benefits for th eir employ ees.
By Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. ENZI, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KERRY, Mr. KYL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Ms. COLLINS, Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. VOINOVICH, and Mr. DEWINE):
S.J. Res. 19. A joint resolution requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.
ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADM. KIMMEL AND MAJ. GEN. SHORT ON RETIRED LISTS
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today with my colleague from Delaware, Senator BIDEN, and on behalf of Senator THURMOND, Senator HELMS, Senator DOMENICI, Senator SPECTER, Senator STEVENS, and 15 other of our colleagues, to reintroduce a resolution whose intent to redress a grave injustice, one that haunts us from the tribulations of World War II.
The matter of which I speak concerns the reputations of two of the most accomplished officers who served in Pacific theater during that war: Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short.
They were the two senior commanders of U.S. military forces deployed in the Pacific at the time of the disastrous surprise December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. In the immediate aftermath of the attack they were unfairly and publicly charged with dereliction of duty and blamed as singularly responsible for the success of that attack. In short, as we all know today, they were scapegoated.
What is most unforgivable is that after the end of World War II, this scapegoating was given a near permanent veneer when the President of the United States declined to advance Admiral Kimmel and General Short on the retired list to their highest ranks of wartime command--an honor that was given to every other senior commander who served in wartime positions above his regular grade.
That decision to exclude only these two officers was made despite the fact that wartime investigations had already exonerated those commanders of the dereliction of duty charge and criticized the War and Navy Departments for failings that contributed to the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Mr. President, let me repeat this fact: Admiral Kimmel and General Short were the only two flag and general rank officers from World War II excluded from advancement on the military's retired list. That fact alone perpetuates the myth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were derelict in their duty and singularly responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
The scapegoating of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was one of the great injustices that occurred within our own ranks during World War II. The motivation behind our resolution today is to recognize and correct this injustice.
Our resolution calls upon the President of the United States posthumously to advance on the retirement lists Admiral Kimmel and General Short to the grades of this highest wartime commands. In adopting this resolution, the Senate would communicate its recognition of the injustice done to them and call upon the President to take corrective action. Such a statement by the Senate would do much to remove the stigma of blame that so unfairly burdens the reputations of these two officers. It is a correction consistent with our military's tradition of honor, and it is one long overdue.
Mr. President, the facts that constitute the case of Admiral Kimmel and General Short have been remarkably documented. Since the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, there have been no less than nine official governmental investigations and reports, and one inquiry conducted by a special Joint Congressional Committee.
[Page: S3809] GPO's PDF
Perhaps the most flawed, and unfortunately most influential investigation, was that of the Roberts Commission. Less than 6 weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, in a hastily prepared report to the President, the commission accused Kimmel and Short of dereliction of duty--a charge that was immediately and highly publicized.
Adm. William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of this Commission, later disavowed its report, stating that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were ``martyred'' and ``if they had been brought to trial, they would have been cleared of the charge.''
Later, Adm. J.O. Richardson, who was Admiral Kimmel's predecessor as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote:
In the impression that the Roberts Commission created in the minds of the American people, and in the way it was drawn up for that specific purpose, I believe that the report of the Roberts Commission was the most unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest document ever printed by the Government Printing Office.
Subsequent investigations provided clear evidence that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were unfairly singled out for blame. These reports include those presented by a 1944 Navy Court of Inquiry, the 1944 Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation, a 1946 Joint Congressional Committee, and more recently a 1991 Army Board for the Correction of Military Records and report prepared by the Department of Defense in 1995. The findings of these official reports can be summarized as four principal points.
First, there is ample evidence that the Hawaiian commanders were not provided vital intelligence that they needed, and that was available in Washington prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Their senior commanders had critical information about Japanese intentions, plans, and actions, but neighter passed this on nor took issue nor attempted to correct the disposition of forces under Kimmel's and Short's commands in response to the information they attained.
Second, the disposition of forces in Hawaii were proper and consistent with the information made available to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
In my review of this case, I was most struck by the honor and integrity demonstrated by Gen. George Marshall who was Army Chief of Staff at the time of the attack. On November 27, 1941, General Short interpreted a vaguely written war warning message sent from the high command in Washington as suggesting the need to defend against sabotage. Consequently, he concentrated his aircraft away from perimeter roads to protect them, thus inadvertently increasing their vulnerability to air attack. When he reported his preparations to the General Staff in Washington, the General Staff took no steps to clarify the reality of the situation.
In 1946 before a Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster General Marshall testified that he was responsible for ensuring the proper disposition of General Short's forces. He acknowledged that he must have received General Short's report, which would have been his opportunity to issue a corrective message, and that he failed to do so.
Mr. President, General Marshall's integrity and sense of responsibility is a model for all of us. I only wish it had been able to have greater influence over the case of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
A third theme of these investigations concerned the failure of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy to properly manage the flow of intelligence. The Dorn Report completed in 1995 for the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the request of Senator THURMOND, stated that the handling of intelligence in Washington during the time leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor was characterized by, among other faults, ineptitude, limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of clarification and followup.
The bottom line is that poor command decisions and inefficient management structures and procedures blocked the flow of essential intelligence from Washington to the Hawaiian commanders.
The fourth and most important theme that permeates the aforementioned reports is that blame for the disaster at Pearl Harbor cannot be placed only upon the Hawaiian commanders. Some of these reports completely absolved these two officers. While others found them to have made errors in judgment, all the reports subsequent to the Roberts Commission cleared Admiral Kimmel and General Short of the charge of dereliction of duty and underscored the rollout of a broad failure by the entire chain of command.
And, Mr. President, all those reports identified significant failures and shortcomings of the senior authorities in Washington that contributed significantly--if not predominantly--to the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
The Dorn Report put it best, stating that ``responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.''
Mr. President, let me add one poignant fact about two of these investigations. The conclusions of the 1944 Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board--that Kimmel's and Short's forces had been properly disposed according to the information available to them and that their superiors had failed to share important intelligence--were kept secret on the grounds that citing the existence of this intelligence would have been detrimental to the war effort.
Be that as it may, there is no longer any reason to perpetuate the cruel myth that Kimmel and Short were singularly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. To do so is not only unfair, it tarnishes our Nation's military honor. For reasons unexplainable to me, this scapegoating of Admiral Kimmel and General Short has survived the cleansing tides of history.
This issue of fairness and justice has been raised not only by General Short and Admiral Kimmel and their surviving families today, but also by numerous senior officers and public organizations around the country.
Mr. President, allow me to submit for the RECORD a letter endorsing our resolution from five living former naval officers who served at the very pinnacle of military responsibility. They are former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer and Adm. William J. Crowe; and former Chiefs of Naval Operations Adm. J.L. Holloway III, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, and Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost.
I also submit a similar letter from Senator Robert Dole, one of our most distinguished colleagues, who as we all know served heroically in World War II.
The efforts of these and other officers have been complemented by the initiatives of many public organizations who have called for posthumous advancement of Kimmel and Short.
I submit for the RECORD a copy of the VFW's Resolution Number 441 passed last August calling for the advancement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
Mr. President, Admiral Kimmel and General Short remain unjustly stigmatized by our Nation's failure to treat them in the same manner with which we treated their peers. To redress this wrong would be fully consistent with this Nation's sense of justice. As I said earlier, after 58 years, this correction is long overdue.
The message of our joint resolution is about justice, equity, and honor. Its purpose is to redress an historic wrong, to ensure that these two officers are treated fairly and with the dignity and honor they deserve, and to ensure that justice and fairness fully permeate the memory and lessons learned from the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. In the largest sense, passage of this resolution will restore the honor of the United States in this issue.
I urge my colleagues to support this joint resolution.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the joint resolution and the documents to which I have referred.
There being no objection, the materials was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Whereas Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, formerly the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, had an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in the United States Navy prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor;
Whereas Major General Walter C. Short, formerly the Commander of the United States Army Hawaiian Department, had an excellent and unassailable record throughout
[Page: S3810] GPO's PDF
Whereas numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were not provided necessary and critical intelligence that was available, that foretold of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that would have alerted them to prepare for the attack, including such essential communiques as the Japanese Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of September 24, 1941, and the message sent from the Imperial Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador in the United States from December 6-7, 1941, known as the Fourteen-Part Message;
Whereas on December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were relieved of their commands and returned to their permanent ranks of rear admiral and major general;
Whereas Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of the investigating commission known as the Roberts Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short of ``dereliction of duty'' only six weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report maintaining that ``these two officers were martyred'' and ``if they had been brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the charge'';
Whereas on October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the grounds that his military decisions and the disposition of his forces at the time of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor were proper ``by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor''; criticized the higher command for not sharing with Admiral Kimmel ``during the very critical period of 26 November to 7 December 1941, important information . . . regarding the Japanese situation''; and, concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome was attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the naval service;
THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT THIS CR ISSUE GO TO
Next Hit Forward Next Document New CR Search
Prev Hit Back Prev Document HomePage
Hit List Best Sections Daily Digest Help
Doc Contents