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February 17, 2000, Thursday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 19148 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: FISCAL YEAR 2001 DEFENSE BUDGET

CHAIRED BY: REP. FLOYD SPENCE (R-SC)

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

TIME: 9:35 A.M. (EST) DATE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2000

WITNESSES: GEN. WESLEY CLARK, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

BODY:
REP. SPENCE: The committee will please be in order. Today the committee continues its review of the Fiscal Year 2001 budget request, focusing on how it addresses the needs of our unified commanders-in- chief. Our witness this morning is General Wesley K. Clark, commander-in-chief, United States European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who will testify on the challenges he faces within his area of responsibility, and in particular the situation in the Balkans.

Before we begin, I must note that this is likely to be General Clark's last official appearance before this committee as a commander- in-chief. In April, General Joseph Ralston, currently serving as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will assume General Clark's position. Let me take this opportunity to thank you, General Clark, for your long and distinguished service to this country.

I've known you personally for a long time, and I appreciate your friendship and your commitment -- your service to your country. Your tenure as the commander-in-chief, United States European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe was indeed, we might say, historic, as you commanded the combined military forces of the United States and NATO during the alliance's first military campaign. I think I speak for the entire committee in wishing you well in whatever you're involved in in the future. When General Clark appeared before the committee last March, the United States and NATO were on the verge of military operations in Kosovo. At that time, I expressed concern that the United States was about to become entangled in a situation that did not directly threaten United States vital national security interests, and therefore did not warrant the introduction of United States ground forces into another open-ended peacekeeping mission.

Since then, that exact scenario has come to pass. The United States and its allies conducted a 78-day air campaign against Yugoslavia, followed by the introduction of United States and allied ground forces in Kosovo in a peacekeeping operation that has no set timetable or perceptible exit strategy.

Last year I noted that declining defense budgets and personnel strength, along with an already demanding pace of operations, not only in Bosnia but around the globe, would greatly compound the cost and implications of a long-term Kosovo deployment. One year later, we can quantify those costs and implications.

According to the Department of Defense recent Kosovo after-action report, Operation Allied Force was the equivalent of a major theater war for much of the Air Force, including some key air assets such as tactical aircraft, airlift aircraft, and refueling tankers. The report noted, and I quote, "The high demand for these aircraft was met by deploying aircraft from the forces assigned to commanders-in-chief of theaters outside Europe," unquote.

Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan told this committee that Allied Force was executed at the expense of statewide units whose readiness fell 10 percent in 1999 alone over the previous year. These are the very forces that would have been needed had a major theater conflict erupted in either the Persian Gulf or Korea.

The introduction of ground forces to a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and the continuing mission in Bosnia has also had a significant negative impact on the Army. Last November, the commanders of the two divisions conducting peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the 10th Mountain Division in Bosnia and the 1st Infantry Division in Kosovo, both declared their units C-4, the lowest readiness rating possible.

While the Army's briefing paper on this matter stated this was strictly a, quote, "bookkeeping accountability issue," unquote, the fact remains that two of our 10 active Army divisions remain engaged in long-term, open-ended peacekeeping operations that detract from their war-time missions. Whether these units would actually be able to disengage from the Balkans to conduct a major theater conflict remains an open question.

How long the United States will remain in the Balkans also remains an open question. While our soldiers, by all accounts, continue to do a superb job in both Bosnia and Kosovo, they are, to quote General Shelton, "just that, soldiers -- soldiers first and foremost," unquote. General Shelton also told this committee that he remains concerned about "the continued slow progress in civil implementation in Bosnia and the glacial pace of progress in Kosovo." And I'm quoting him. I share his concerns.

I look forward to receiving an update from General Clark on these matters, as well as the broad array of challenges facing the European Command today. But before turning to General Clark, I'd like to recognize the committee's ranking member, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he'd like to make.

REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO): Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I join you in welcoming our witness today, General Wesley Clark, the commander-in-chief, United States European Command. First, General Clark, I'd like to say thank you for your dedicated service to our great nation. You serve with distinction in very, very trying circumstances. I know I speak for my colleagues in saying thanks and wishing you well in your future endeavors. General, I also know and I am convinced that history will treat you very well. So thank you for your service and for being with us today in sharing your thoughts.

Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for holding this hearing. Given our substantial commitment of forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, it's imperative that we be kept informed about the events taking place in that region and in other locations where military forces might be deployed. And General Clark, I share your view that ending the conflict (and the cleansing?) of the Balkans is critical to protecting stability in Europe and it does support our national interest.

I remain convinced that the United States's NATO allies have responsibility to end the atrocities being committed in the former Yugoslavia and to prevent the violence from spreading. I'm also concerned about the implementations (sic/means implications) of our participation in the Balkans on the future of NATO. A failure of NATO to respond there would weaken NATO and its credibility as a force capable of preserving European security.

Most of us think of NATO as a military organization that provided peace and stability on the European continent during the last half of the 20th century. We remember that American involvement was essential to the success of that mission. And frankly, Mr. Chairman, I see no less involvement in the 21st century. We must remain engaged to protect our national security interests worldwide.

In the United States effort to stabilize the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo, we've learned lessons that I think will have considerable utility for our future peacekeeping interventions. We've learned that peacekeeping forces should be seen as impartial. Kosovo also teaches the importance of having military personnel trained to perform the non-combat functions associated with peacekeeping. And General Clark, I'll appreciate your assessment about how well our forces are doing in performing peacekeeping missions, maintaining our neutrality, particularly in Kosovo.

Our military participation in Bosnia and Kosovo has also taught us a number of lessons that are useful in assessing how we should employ our forces in the future. For example, our operations have highlighted the mismatch between the force structure needed to fight two major theater wars and that required for peacekeeping operations.

In an operational sense, Kosovo operations have revealed the limited ability of mechanized units for peacekeeping operations, while it's imperative to quickly deploy self-sustaining, operationally ready support aircraft. Bosnia and Kosovo operations have also shown an increasing trend toward active reserve component force integration as a routine way of doing business.

General, I'll be interested to learn your views about what we have learned from our military participation in the Balkans and how those lessons are being incorporated into EUCOM's future operational plans. While this hearing may focus on our activities in the Balkans, I don't want to lose sight of the large geographical responsibilities of General Clark in what remains the (remaining?) part of the world that EUCOM has jurisdiction over, some 89 countries.

Finally, I'd be remiss if I did not acknowledge the outstanding efforts of our military forces in the EUCOM theater. In my various visits to the field, I continue to be awed by the professional performance of our uniformed personnel. They're dedicated and talented and willing to accept the challenges that they face daily. They should know that we here in Congress and on this committee understand and appreciate what they do.

General Clark, we look forward to receiving your testimony. And again, we thank you for your excellent and exemplary service to our nation.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you, Mr. Skelton. Before we begin, I'd like to again apologize for the lax attendance today. As I told you earlier, General Clark, the Congress is not in session today, and so many of our members felt the urge to go home to their districts. But we still have the quality players here this morning and we'll be pleased to listen to you and your remarks. Incidentally, any written statements you might have will be submitted for the record, and you can proceed as you'd like.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton. Thank you for the very kind remarks about our soldiers and the kind remarks about me personally. I want to tell you, it's been a great honor to have served in this position, to have had your trust and confidence. And I also want to say that I'm honored to appear before this committee formally or informally at any time, no matter how many members are present. It's just a great pleasure to be here and have a chance to talk about these very important issues with you.

I think that our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines and their families have done a great job in the European theater, and we really appreciate the support of this committee. We couldn't do that job without you. The increases in the defense budget that we saw last year and in this year's budget submission are positive changes of direction. While they don't meet all the requirements, they certainly meet the most pressing needs and they send a very, very strong and welcome signal to the men and women in uniform and their families that the Congress and the American people care about them, respect what they're doing and value their service.

This is a time of historic opportunity, but also it's a period of great challenges for us in Europe. And we've got a plethora of issues working over there, not all of which are purely military issues, but they do affect security. We've got the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We've got international terrorism, organized crime, which is continuing to make inroads, drug trafficking, refugee flows, and, of course, the instability fueled by ethnic and regional conflict.

Our efforts in Bosnia continue to show progressive markers of success. It's a result of training and team work with our NATO allies, engagement with many coalition partners through Partnership for Peace, and superb performance by our troops. I visit them frequently there in Bosnia, as many of you have. I think their morale is excellent. It's high. They know that they're doing something important, that they're making a difference. And they understand the key leadership role that they have as American troops inside the NATO- led stabilization force.

I believe our continued military presence in Bosnia is necessary to deter renewed conflict, to maintain the secure environment while civil implementation continues, and to implement to Dayton Accords sufficiently to allow progressive steps toward a normalization of the situation there.

Periodic reviews of the size and composition of the stabilization force are conducted. Adjustments are made based on the results of this review. And I want to just report to the committee that, as a result of the review we made last year, we've reduced the size of that force from some 30,000 down to some 20,000 by the end of March. That will take the American contribution down from what it was at 6,900. We went 10 percent off that to 6,200. We're moving now and at 4,600. That's 3,900 troops, 700 others, in theater to help the headquarters work. So we are in the process of making some substantial reductions there.

The situation in Kosovo, though, is challenging and difficult in a different way, because there is no legal agreement between the parties that will determine the political future yet. What we have is in essence a cease-fire, a U.N. mandate to be there, and NATO leadership on the ground in the Kosovo force. There's no civil government, no really organized police forces, and there has been significant destruction of homes, infrastructure, and widespread violence and crime.

Today we have 44,000 allied troops and partner troops serving with KFOR, including 5,900 Americans. For comparison purposes, Italy and Germany are providing over 5,500 troops to the operation, and a German four-star general is currently the commander on the ground. Seventeen non-NATO nations contribute 7,500 troops. Our allies and partners are contributing approximately 85 percent of the troops to this operation.

Now, as I said, we're operating under the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 and a military-technical agreement that we concluded between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What we're doing there is deterring renewed hostilities. We're working to establish and maintain a secure environment, get the refugees and displaced persons back home, and implement the full provisions of the military-technical agreement with the Serbs and the undertaking on demilitarization that we signed with the KLA.

I think the military implementation has gone quite smoothly. The Serb forces completed their withdrawal. The Kosovo Liberation Army has demilitarized. It's been transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps. We've done a great deal of work to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo over the winter. Food supplies and distribution are good. The United Nations mission there has had some trouble with electric power, but by and large we've been successful.

On the other hand, we do have to note that we are working hard with the United Nations to support their civil implementation measures. And they have been hamstrung by lack of resources, lack of personnel and staff, and the very real complexities of going into what is essentially a bare-bones administrative environment and then trying to establish that administration in the aftermath of a very bitter, divisive conflict. So they've worked under some very adverse circumstances.

Much has been made about the lack of police officers, civil police officers. And we've estimated we need some 6,000. The United Nations has authorized about 4,800. And in reality, we only have about 2,000 on the ground. We receive additional flows, and yet they depart. These police officers are very, very important.

But I want to make it clear what a significant problem this poses for our allies. The United States -- these are civilian police officers, and the United States has contributed some 20 percent of the total. But there are no reserve pools and organizations of police. By their very nature, they are local. They are established and funded to support municipalities and localities throughout the world. So when a mission like this comes up, it's very difficult to receive those forces.

This is why we've been so extraordinarily grateful to Italy, which has been generous in providing the Italian carabinieri to the mission in Bosnia and the mission in Kosovo. And we're hopeful that other nations will be able to provide similar forces, such as France's gendarmeries, some of whom have served in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, the absence of a strong international police force does put a greater load on our KFOR soldiers. They are performing duties for which they have not received the full training that the police officers would have. And it is a significant concern for us.

Turning now to readiness, let me just say that our operational tempo continues at a record pace. We're essentially doing normal peacetime tempo for the force, and especially for our (corps?) in two divisions. We're using simulators and down-range training. But we have the commitments there that do keep our forces busy. We have a brigade now in preparation to roll over in Kosovo to replace the forces in Task Force Falcon in the June time period.

We've worked very hard in EUCOM to improve quality of life. It directly affects readiness, retention, values, family life, morale and mission accomplishment. And our biggest problem in quality of life remains the deplorable condition of barracks and housing. Some 11,000 family quarters were built in the early 1950s and have never been renovated.

Thanks to recent budget increases, our components are planning to meet the DOD time line for housing standards. However, we have been significantly underfunded in real property maintenance for decades. Thousands of our troops currently are living in deplorable conditions, and they'll leave long before these conditions are improved.

Another key quality-of-life issue is education. We work very hard with the Department of Defense school system to improve the education in our theater. Families in Europe simply don't have the educational alternatives available in the continental United States. And building a world-class school system is a vital quality-of-life issue.

So what I'd like to just say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is we've got great men and women in our armed forces over there. We've got tremendous support from the families who are on the go and supporting their husbands and spouses on a daily basis. This is a smaller and leaner command, and probably more heavily tasked than at any time in our history. And I just want to express to you my pride and appreciation and satisfaction for the work of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and their leadership in the U.S. European Command and to tell you how grateful we are for the support of this committee.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here this morning. I look forward to answering your questions.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you very much. I'll skip my opportunity to ask questions right now and proceed to Mr. Skelton.

REP. SKELTON: General, there's been some discussion as to whether the other NATO allies are ponying up to the bar in their military expenditures and in the size, maintenance and supply of their forces, which, of course, leaves a disproportionate amount of responsibility on American shoulders. Would you care to comment on this for us?

GEN. CLARK: Well, Congressman, I'd like to just tell you that I think that we have received some very, very strong support from our allies. Every nation in NATO, including the United States took a peace dividend when the Cold War ended, and everyone's level of defense spending fell as a proportion of gross domestic product. It was true in the United States. It was true in Europe. In Bosnia today, of the 23,000 troops on the ground, we've got 4,600. In Kosovo, of the 45,000 troops there, we've got roughly 15 percent. So I think the allies are pulling their load in terms of the actual presence of troops on the ground. They've expressed a new resolve following the Kosovo conflict to increase their contribution to the security in Europe through the concept of European security and defense identity. In the EU presidency meeting, the summit held in Helsinki in December, they committed to the headline goal of a 60,000 person European core sized force that could be committed and sustained for up to one year.

So, I think there is clearly resolve there to do more -- either to put more resources in or be more efficient. They are contributing on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia. And I think that we should all work together. And I believe that it's certainly their intent to do more in the future.

REP. SKELTON: Thank you.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Bartlett.

REP. BARTLETT: Thank you very much. General Clark, preceding our involvement in Kosovo, there were numerous news reports in this country of mass executions and perhaps hundreds of thousands of people that were being killed there. Now that we're there, I'd like to ask you how many graves have we found and how many of them contain civilians that we killed?

GEN. CLARK: Let me cover it this way. First of all, when we watched the situation unfolding starting in April of 98, we saw that there was a totally non-proportionate use of force against the civil populace by the Serb police and increasingly the Serb military authorities. We saw the infusion of the same paramilitary gangs and thugs that had done the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. We saw in the summer of 1998 a village-smashing campaign that made 350,000 to 400,000 Albanians homeless. They remain homeless today.

I don't have any casualty figures for that. But I will tell you that when I went into Belgrade in October of 98, following Dick Holbrooke's visit there, I did talk to the generals and they said, "You stopped us from killing these people. Why?" And I said, "Because in 20th century Europe, this is not the way we deal with political problems." So they knew very well what they were doing.

In mid-January of last year, I got a call from Ambassador Bill Walker, who was the OSCE verification head on the ground in Kosovo. It was a Saturday morning and I was at the golf course. And he said, "Wes, I'm looking at 45 bodies in a ditch. I've seen massacres in Central America. I know what a massacre is when I see it, and this is a massacre. These people are farmers. I'm looking at their boots, their clothes and their hands. These aren't soldiers."

We watched the build-up of Serb forces and paramilitaries from January through the start of the air campaign. Before we dropped the first bomb, ethnic cleansing was underway again in Kosovo. The same pattern we had seen in Bosnia. The military surrounds the village. Police go in and pull out the high-profile suspects, lead them off. Families never see them again. Paramilitary thugs go in and say "We're going to run you out of your house unless you give us all your valuables." People pay up, and then they get run out of the houses anyway. As they leave, the military and police are there to kick them out of the house and make sure they keep going. There were a lot of reports of shoeless people with blankets wrapped around them fleeing down the streets from villages like Srbica and Golubovac before we dropped the first bomb.

We watched the columns moving out. It's a long way of answering the question, I know that. But I think it has to be put in context because I don't believe that NATO had to stand by and wait for another Bosnia, the fourth war in a decade, repeat the same pattern of ethnic cleansing.

Now, what we do believe is that there are about 10,000 people buried in mass graves. And I don't know whether that's an accurate figure or not. A number of the -- some 80 percent of the graves have never been explored, or have not been explored yet, and we know, through many different means, that the Serbs did several different, took several different measures to conceal the results of their crimes. So, I have no idea how many there were. We know that there were about 100,000 men that were unaccounted for. As I recall, we said at the time "unaccounted for." There were people living under their floorboards, hiding out in the hills, coming back at night, sneaking around behind the Serbs when they went through the houses.

Human Rights Watch says that 500 civilians were killed throughout all of Yugoslavia in the NATO air campaign. We don't have any way of substantiating that figure. NATO doesn't have any way of going into Serbia and asking how many were killed. But I think the one thing that is clear is that any civilian casualties that resulted from NATO actions were purely accidental. They were the result of actions fully in keeping with international law, proportionate use of force, and a legal approval process of the targets, whereas what we saw on the other side was a policy that deliberately targeted civilians.

MR. BARTLETT: Ten graves would be ten too many, of course, but I think that what we found was far, far less graves than we were led to believe that we were going to find. I appreciate your response. Thank you.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Sisisky.

REP. SISISKY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just add to what my colleague said about your command and how proud we were to have you in command there.

You recited what NATO Secretary General George Robinson stressed in his first defense ministers' meeting. I have understood, and we were in Munich together, there was some embarrassment upon our European allies of not having the equipment, they didn't realize. And of course some discussion went on about the rapid deployment force. Strangely enough, one of the biggest allies is cutting their budget, defense budget this year like three percent, I think that's the figure. Also, in Kosovo, they're not living up to their promise on the police force. You can verify that or not, I think I'm correct in that. I do believe that they were supposed to do a joint star and didn't participate in that, which is extremely important, and you may talk about that.

As you know, General Clark, I've been a great supporter of NATO. I think it's a thing that we really need. Every year, except last year I believe, we've fought off amendments in here for burden sharing. I'm here to tell you that I've heard more talk of that now than at any time in the 18 years that I've been in Congress. There are some people that are very upset about all of this happening now. I can't for the life of me, talking about a rapid deployment force inside the European Union, outside of NATO. I don't mind the rapid deployment. I think it would be the greatest thing that could happen, of Europeans being able to marshall 60,000 troops to go in and put out a fire somewhere. But how are they going to do it with NATO? They can't participate with NATO. In my opinion, they won't put up the money to do it. They're talking about the lift. They're talking about very expensive tools to do this.

And I asked the question of the secretary general, I said, "Who is going to do the command and control?" And he said, "Well, NATO." I said, "Well, who is going to do the intelligence?" "Well, I'd guess it would be NATO." Well, if they're going to do all that, why isn't it in NATO? I just seems to me, and I'm telling you, if that thing takes place and they do not participate, I'm afraid that this will be the beginning of the end of NATO and it would be a shame for that to happen.

So, I hope they heed it, and I hope you, General, and I know you understand, you know, would tell them right now that something has got to give. And I'll just let you reply back to me on some of the things. I've got some others, too.

GEN. CLARK: Well, Congressman, I think that it's a political imperative on both sides of the Atlantic, that Europe do more to assume its burdens. So, the real challenges are how to do this in a way that either improves the efficiency of the European resource employed or increases, ideally, the European resources that are put to work there, without decoupling the trans-Atlantic linkage that has given NATO its unique strength and character.

The Europeans believed that the way to proceed to do this was to produce a headline goal, something that they could rally popular imagination with and gain additional resourcing. And, this is the strategy. As they've told us repeatedly, rhetoric precedes resourcing. So you've got to get the momentum up and the rhetoric and then we'll get the resourcing to do this. In the meantime, of course, we want to be sure that in doing the rhetoric and the resourcing, that we haven't undercut NATO.

I think we've got good recognition of the issues out there among the members of the European community. Obviously, inside the European Union there are different views from one nation to another about how they would wire the structure and all the details down in the European Union. We're working that and we're working with them, formally and informally in Europe, through NATO, and in bilateral channels to help shape this outcome. So, I think there is some momentum that would, that would help resolve the burden-sharing issue that we feel in this country.

But I have to say, speaking as an American who has lived in Europe now for three years, that it's clear that the United States has vital interests there, that when we're engaged in Europe, it's not only that we're doing this on behalf of our European allies, we're doing it in our own interests.

REP. SISISKY: Absolutely.

GEN. CLARK: And these countries, of course, know it very well. And so, it's a matter of keeping all of the diverse political forces in balance, and then working to evolve a new transparency and a new structure for cooperation between the European Union and NATO which answers European aspirations towards greater EU integration, and at the same time leaves strengthened the trans-Atlantic linkage. It's a challenge.

REP. SISISKY: Mr. Chairman, can I just ask one more question on this, since we don't have a big crowd?

REP. SPENCE: Yes.

REP. SISISKY: Do you believe this will strengthen NATO? Do you honestly believe that this can strengthen NATO, or do you think it will weaken NATO, as I said I think will happen?

GEN. CLARK: There are concerns on both sides, but I would answer the question this way. Given the concerns about burden-sharing in this country, and the vast outpouring of sentiment that followed the Kosovo air operation in Europe about the American role, I think an increased European contribution is a necessity in order to strengthen NATO. So now it's a matter of working the particulars of how do we get this contribution.

Secretary General Solana of the Western European Union, who is the high commissioner of the EU's common foreign and security policy has said that in the event of any crisis that NATO would have the first consideration as to whether it wanted to solve this crisis, that if NATO didn't, then there would still be a request for NATO assets, and only as a last resort would there be a need for an autonomous EU operation. I think Secretary General Solana's statement went a long, has gone a long way to reassure people on both sides of the Atlantic that this effort can, and if properly resourced will strengthen NATO.

REP. SISISKY: Thank you. Maybe we'll have a second round.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Pickett.

REP. PICKETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Clark, I want to join my colleagues in recognizing you for your distinguished career and your long, loyal service to our country, and we deeply thank you for all you've done and wish you well in your future.

And what I'm gonna ask you is kind a first cousins to what you were just dealing with with Congressman Sisisky, but I'd like to get you to maybe go a little bit further on this issue of NATO and what it means to the security of the united states. You know, my district, that includes Norfolk, has the only NATO command outside of Europe, and I frequently have the opportunity to go there and talk with some of the folks there and get their views. So, I'm a, as Congressman Sisisky has already said, I'm a very strong believer in the value of NATO to our nation.

But for 50 years now, we've been working at this military alliance, and I know that the people that have gone before you have learned and created a huge amount about the ability to bring together this many nations and work effectively in a collective way to preserve peace. It hasn't always been easy. And may times I get asked the question in my district by people, why is it that we are involved in NATO? Why do we spend money? Why do we have troops over there? What difference does it make to us that the Europeans can't settle their own quarrels?

Would you just take a moment and take off your military hat -- I'd like your personal professional opinion about the value of NATO to the security of the U.S., about what NATO may be without, or could be without the U.S., about how important it is that we take advantage of this wonderful alliance that has been built into a structure that probably can't be duplicated anywhere else in the world? Would you just maybe touch on some of this so I can take it back and say this is why we participate, our nation participates in NATO?

GEN. CLARK: Sir, I would tell you that first we have vital interests in Europe. And that's the reality that we have to recognize. We went to war twice in the 20th century because we didn't want Europe dominated by a power hostile to the United States. We learned our lesson after World War II and said we had to stay there and be sure that it wasn't under the domination of a hostile power. That's why we kept our troops there.

Those vital interests today are expressed by the population of Europe, 500 million people. A GDP as great as our own. Two U.N. Security Council permanent seats -- meaning two vetoes. Three million U.S. jobs dependent on European countries, three million European jobs dependent on U.S. companies -- $250 billion in trade flowing back and forth. It's the place where our values are best matched and reinforced in the world. It's where we get our diplomatic leverage if we want to try to do good work anywhere in the world.

With the United States and Europe, it's not just that we're producing 50 percent of all the goods in the world, it's that we are able to shape events globally. That's why we have vital interests there. We have interests in stability. We have interests in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have interests in preventing trans-national problems. And all of us understand very well what the significance would be if the process of democracy and reform should falter or fail in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

And so to guard those vital interests in Europe, it's proved essential to keep the bona fides of American power and influence there. That's our 100,000 service member commitment in the European area. And we're knitted together with our allies and partners there in a very powerful, subtle and effective institution: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It's a proven structure which enables dialogue, consultation, problem- solving and consensus to emerge.

I think the simplest way to understand the value of this is to contrast the way that nations in the West approached their interests and the way that Russia has historically approached its interests. Some two years ago, when Mr. Primakov was the foreign minister of Russia, he told his diplomats: "You must understand," he said, "that Russia has no permanent friends, only permanent interests." It's a very 19th-century concept.

That's not what the United States and Europe are about today. We have permanent friends. We work to make sure that we have convergent and common interests. That's what globalization is all about and that's what NATO gives us in the security field. And that security field is the fundamental underpinning for the prosperity and progress in Europe -- in Western Europe and increasingly in Eastern Europe. I hope that helps.

REP. PICKETT: Just one thing, I'd like to add, if I could follow up just one thing, Mr. Chairman, very briefly, is what would NATO be without the United States?

GEN. CLARK: I don't think that NATO would be the same organization without the United States because it wouldn't have the full access to American resources, American credibility, American global reach and it would become instead a much less potent, more limited organization.

I think that you have to reach back to the 1940s when NATO was established -- and in 1951, when that headquarters over there that I command was put together -- to recognize that when Stalin's army was facing Europe, Europeans knew they couldn't confront without the backing from the United States.

Today there is no Red Army facing Europe. But there are many subtle and ambiguous challenges. And it's the linkage across the Atlantic, the reach-back into the United States -- which is still the "Arsenal of Democracy" in the world -- that gives NATO its unique character. It can't be the same without American participation and American leadership.

REP. PICKETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you, Mr. Pickett. Let me ask you a question right now while we are here, General. Putting on your other hat -- European Commander instead of NATO. What drift do you see in your area of responsibility in the next years?

GEN. CLARK: Mr. Chairman, I'm very concerned about the situation on the ground in the Balkans. You know, we're dealing there, in Bosnia and Kosovo, with a force of Serb hypernationalism under the leadership of the indicted president of Yugoslavia, Mr. Milosevic. He's been to war four times in 10 years. He's still in power. We did not destroy the Serb military. When it pulled out of Kosovo, the whole world saw that it had been in hiding and basically most of it recovered intact. It's in training today.

We're looking at potential flashpoints in Montenegro. We're looking at repeated statements by some Serb generals that they'll be coming back into Kosovo -- a violation of the Military-Technical Annex which we would have to respond to with military force. And we know that there's still Milosevic's meddling going on in Bosnia- Herzegovina.

So the key to peaceful resolution and a successful exist from this region for U.S. forces and for the forces of NATO is democratization in Yugoslavia and Milosevic's appearance at the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. That's the first concern. We have to deal with the issue of the Balkans.

Beyond that, of course, there are various states in the region who are busy acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. There is international terrorism from various sources which has financial backing, supporters, safehouses, and sometimes undertakes operations in areas in which our troops live in this region.

And there are the many unforeseen contingencies which could require our troops to respond in Africa in non-combatant evacuation operations or elsewhere which could pose a threat to our troops.

I think the simple message is that there are new challenges out there, and we've got to have a ready and able force to meet them.

REP. SPENCE: That's my next question. Do you think we have the capability of adequately addressing these threats we have? And when you consider the weapons of mass destruction, the terrorism and all the other things, too, not just the kind of limited type war we had with -- in Kosovo.

GEN. CLARK: Mr. Chairman, first let me tell you that with respect to the readiness of the forces that we have in European theater, we have always sought to have the highest possible readiness for our forces. This is a function of the overall prioritization within the Department of Defense. And as you know, sometimes the land forces over there are not prioritized to the same level as the Reserve forces in the United States or the forces that would be deployed to someplace like Korea.

Nevertheless, I think the new chief of staff of the Army, General Shinseki, has a program underway to increase the manning of the forces and this is the single greatest thing we can do for our land forces. The air forces are in good shape. We demonstrated their prowess during Operation Allied Force.

They're recovering their training which was interrupted during the campaign, and they've got some minor maintenance problems. They're in good shape.

The Marine forces have continued to augment their capabilities for command and control and their presence in the theater. The naval forces are in excellent shape, although the naval forces are hard- stretched worldwide as you know. And we'd like to have full-time presence in the Mediterranean of a carrier -- a battle group, an MEU at all times. And sometimes we just can't have it and meet U.S. commitments worldwide. Those are matters that really fall under the responsibility of General Shelton and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But I think our forces are in good shape today.

The ground forces are working very hard to maintain the commitment in Kosovo and to maintain their war-fighting skills. But we have a good program for this. And our forces I believe are doing an excellent job there.

With respect to the other challenges that you suggest -- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I think it's very significant that NATO did address this in its strategic concept which was approved at the Washington Summit. A Proliferation Center is being established at NATO headquarters to help share information on proliferation tendencies. And really this is the most important thing we can do at this stage -- to build understanding and consensus with our NATO allies of what this threat really is.

Italy and Germany are cooperating with the United States to move ahead in the MEADS program which would provide an anti-cruise and short-range, intermediate-range ballistic missile capability. I think that program is very important. And we are also working to make sure that each of the governments in the regions understand, on a case by case basis, when there are proliferant activities going on in that region.

With respect to international terrorism, there's been a lot of cooperation, done mostly on a bilateral basis in this AOR. But our forces stand ready to respond, either after an emergency or if necessary in some other manner, and augmented as appropriately by the forces here in the United States.

REP. SPENCE: I think one of my main concerns is we're working on MEADS and missile defense and all that kind of thing. But they aren't deployed. And right now is what I'm worried about -- is if something would happen of that nature, we'd be hard-pressed. Mr. Taylor.

REP. GENE TAYLOR (D-MS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, General Clark, for being here. I'm going to embarrass you a little bit. You talked about your open retirement, you can make a lot of money so you can be generous. The most valuable thing any of us have is our time. And for the past 30-something years you have been incredibly generous with your time for our nation. So I wouldn't worry about it from now on. Just keep doing what you're doing, and I hope you continue to serve our nation in some capacity.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you very much.

REP. TAYLOR: A couple of real interesting observations from the most recent trip over to Bosnia and Kosovo. And I'd hope you can elaborate on them, because at one of the houses that the Special Forces use to gather intelligence but also act as the local policemen in some of the smaller communities, the observation was made by one of the Special Forces sergeants that particularly in Kosovo, he said, whose law am I enforcing?

And you had done a -- I thought -- me a great favor a few years back of explaining the complexities of what we're trying to do there. For the first time in these people's history is letting them have honest policemen; for the first time in their history letting them have an honest judge. You know, and starting from scratch to do all these things that we as Americans have come to take for granted that those folks have never known. And so it's a heck of a challenge.

If one of the things we're obviously trying to do is establish the rule of law as opposed to the rule of man, this certainly complicates it in the case of Kosovo, because again, whose law -- are they still a province of Serbia? So I would hope you could get to that.

The other thing -- that there was a published report while I was over there, and if you could elaborate on it, I'd appreciate it. It perked my interest when it was attributed to you that maybe as a nation we should look at moving our forces in Europe farther east. That maybe now that we have accomplished after 50 years what the Truman administration set out to do, as far as the stability of Germany, it's done now, so maybe that should be moved farther east to bring that stability to those folks.

The third thing that I would appreciate you commenting on is - - and it goes back to the conversation with that sergeant. And again, we as a nation have invested a great deal in him, he as an individual has invested a great deal of his time. He says, "You know, I'm not really -- this isn't what I trained to do." He says "Quite frankly, maybe some civil affairs type guy ought to be doing what I'm doing."

And it hit me that my first reaction is he's probably right. Probably we would be better served with some lovable old country boys from the Guard or Reserve over there out there building good will. But the flip side is should things go sour, that Special Forces sergeant is going to be a hell of a lot better protecting himself than those lovable country boys we called from the Guard or Reserve.

How do we do both? And how do we further integrate the Guard and the Reserve into this mission, because there are some things that they can uniquely bring to the table and it certainly would be to the benefit of the regular force to get a breather every now and then from what is going to be the ongoing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. So I would hope you could talk about those three things.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you, sir, for those comments. And let me turn to those questions. First, with respect to the law, of course, there were problems with both the Albanian law and the Serb law. And essentially Bernard Kushner -- this is a U.N. matter. He had to go back and take pieces out of both to establish some sort of just law.

The issue was: could he as a U.N. administrator disregard the Serb law that was imposed in 1989? And he has used the pieces of it that were applicable and the pieces that are not he has disregarded. So I think it's a complicated issue, it's not a simple issue.

But he has moved to a point, a judicial group, who are starting to undertake the judicial investigations and the trials pursuant to establishing the rule of law there. So a long way to go on this issue, and a lot of work has to be done.

You asked should we move our forces for basing purposes further east. Many people have suggested informally that if the problem is a matter of op tempo -- of deploying in and out of Germany for these ground forces -- that considering the base infrastructure that's being established there, it would be possible to deploy forces on a temporary or extended hardship period for six to 12 months in these regions, rather than having all the families move in.

That has not been studied in any formal way to the best of my knowledge. It's just an idea that's been talked about informally. I think it warrants a lot of study before we should move into something like this. But it is a potential answer to the issue of the rotation of the troops and the op tempo and the train-up in and out, and so forth.

And finally, you asked about the Guard and Reserve and how to take advantage of their capabilities and still have the kind of protection and overall force capability we get from active components. I think we're moving in a step-by-step fashion in this regard.

Of course, from the very beginning, we've had Guard and Reserve forces in there on the ground, because as you stated, they have some unique skills and capabilities. There's nothing like being able to bring Reserve and Guardsmen who are in uniform but who really are city environmental engineers, electrical generator experts and can really provide the on-the-scene supervision and assistance, teaching and coaching that's required.

We're moving beyond that now. And in Bosnia, in the next few weeks, at the end of this month in fact, we'll be moving in the 49th Armored Division Headquarters -- Texas Army National Guard -- to assume command of the multinational division NOR (ph) mission.

They've been through an extensive train-up period. It has been a hardship on personnel in the Guard and some have requested relief from the hardship. Others have volunteered -- fought to get into the unit. They're going to go there -- and this will be the first mission we've put a National Guard Headquarters in like this, ever. So we're going to go step-by-step through this and see if we can't get a better balance, a better distribution of forces to make the best use of the strengths of the respective components.

REP. TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman, one quick follow-up. In your capacity, if you were asked by this committee or any other committee of Congress if it would be worthwhile for the United States to lift the sanctions on Serbia, what would your answer be?

GEN. CLARK: My view would be that we should target the sanctions as directly as possible against those who are the war criminals and their supporters inside Serbia and do as much as we can to help the democratic opposition and the people of Serbia to survive.

NATO's never been anti-Serb. We've been anti-Milosevic. And so what I would hope that we're doing at the current time is looking very carefully at how we can effectively target travel restrictions and other punitive measures against Milosevic, Boidenic (ph), the new minister of defense, Shainevic (ph), another coordinator for Kosovo, and all of their relationships -- their family, their supporters, their lieutenants -- on down their chain of command and make this a much more focused effort than simply a broad-based effort directed against Yugoslavia.

I'm hopeful that that work is underway now.

REP. TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you. Mr. Kuykendall.

REP. STEVEN KUYKENDALL (R-CA): General, there were several items you touched on in your comments that have to do with our ability to work with our NATO allies. And maybe if you could just elaborate some on them. I know we are getting requests for a substantial amount of MILCON work in Kosovo and other areas in the Bosnia area. That's one area that I would like some comments on. To me, if we are building permanent-type structures and facilities in the European theater, it would certainly behoove us to try to have the Europeans build them and pay the bills, since more than likely they're going to still be there long after we decide that we need to move forces other places or draw down our force because we no longer need them in those regions. However, they may need them. So, what's the likelihood of getting any increased European support to help pay the bill for these new facilities, even though we may be temporarily the first occupants of them?

The second one, on -- you touched on police, the ability to bring in new police officers, to get civilian police. If you would elaborate some on that, because to me that's the more likely role we ought to be getting to very quickly as soon as we can, and getting our combat forces back out so they can be combat forces again rather than being policemen. And do we need to reach out to the United States and get our own civilian police more involved in that, to see if we can have more -- I mean, we have got some great police agencies in this nation and great training agencies, both -- you know, whether it's a sheriffs academy or a police academy, to train people how to be a civilian police officer. What kind of thoughts do you have on trying to expand it? Because I think expanding that local police force also transfers the cost to domestic force, and it also makes it a force that's responsive to the domestic issue without having international implications of our military forces.

And then finally just a general comment. I have talked to some of the other legislators from other parts of European countries, asking them, you know, how soon can you buy the equipment you need to bring it up to our standards so that you can operate more evenly with us and not rely on us. Have you gotten any feedback from your level through the military channels that they are experiencing any success in kind of moving it up the food chain, whether it be, you know, Britain or Germany or France or Italy or whoever, to upgrade their equipment, buy more airlift, buy more tankers, buy all that equipment? I know that's four questions, but I figured I'd just give them all to you at once, and you can kind of take them one by one.

The overall thrust of the whole picture for me though is we are a vital component of NATO. NATO wouldn't be anywhere near what it is without us. However, whenever we are dealing in small regional conflicts within the continental restraint of where NATO is located, we should certainly try to enhance their capability to deal with it, whether it's in civilian police, local facilities, local forces, and have our forces truly be the backup, not necessarily the hammer. And I think if you keep pushing these lines we may achieve that over time. But that's why I would like to have some comments on those different areas. Thank you.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you very much, congressman. First of all, with respect to the structures that are being built in Kosovo and Bosnia, those are five-year structures; they are not considered permanent structures. There's a rule in the alliance that the nation that uses it has to pay for it. And of course all the other nations there would like NATO infrastructure funding as well when they build things, and they haven't gotten them. So essentially we set the standard of living for our own troops. There's been a recent series of articles in the British press complaining that we blew down too many Serb barracks and British troops have had to live in tents, and it was the fault of the United States Air Force and the NATO airmen who didn't coordinate with the British on the ground during the air campaign, and that's why they are living in tents. But the simple fact is we wanted our people to live better than that, we paid for it out of operations and maintenance funding, and that's how that was done.

I don't think we are going to get European support necessarily to endorse the standards we want for our own troops, and I think we are going to have just recognize it and accept it. It's part of taking care of our troops, the quality of life, the high morale, that gives us the great armed forces that we have. And I support what's been done there. I think it was a smart move at Camp Bondsteel to put that facility up. And other nations have seen it, and they have been very, very admiring of the foresight and dedication of the Americans in that respect.

In terms of the police officers, the problems are, as I said, most countries in most cases there are no reserve police. There are no pools of police that can be brought in unlike deployable military units. Police are local people who are organized and equipped to deal with local problems, and normally nations don't have any more than they need. And sometimes they have less. And so when you go out with the call for police, you get retired people or people who are bored with their jobs or whatever, and you can get people like this. But you don't get them in the number and with the ease with which military forces can be deployed. This is why I have been recommending to the Europeans, including recommending to Dr. Solana, that the next EU headline goal should be the establishment of deployable police units like the Italian carabinieri or the French gendarmarie, so that they can come in and do something to supplement military forces rather than simply do the same thing that NATO military forces are doing.

With respect to the training programs, we do have police training going on in Kosovo. The first class had graduated; the second class is about to graduate. But it is a difficult operating environment. What you have to have is echelon capabilities of police -- not only the local guy on the beat, but you have got to have units that can respond to civil disturbances, and you need SWAT teams. That training takes a lot of time, it takes a lot of backing, and it takes a lot of courage on the interim administrative structures that we are setting up because they are going to be going against organized crime, which has been prevalent in the region for decades. So that's going to be difficult.

I am not sure what the pace of allied equipment acquisition is. I have seen no change in that pace. Another member mentioned the JSTARS program. This has been the highest requirement procurement objective of the SACLANT and SACEUR for at least five years, yet we can't seem to get agreement on this. So that would be the place to start, I would believe, on JSTARS. There's discussion about European tankers and discussion of airlift; to my knowledge, pen hasn't been put to paper on contracts on those proposals.

I would like to say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, if I could, on this question and your response, it is important that Europeans enhance their capability to deal within NATO with these small regional conflicts. But because the United States does have vital interests at stake in Europe, I think the United States will always want to be engaged in some way. The essence of burden sharing in NATO has been shared risks, shared burdens, and shared benefits. And so as we work to adjust the relative portion of burdens, I would hope that we would still keep in mind the important United States interests at stake there, and the fact that, as we found pre-1996 in Bosnia, when allies perceive that the United States is trying to advance its interests, but avoiding the risks and burdens that are shared by others, diplomacy is not effective. And so I think we have got very good leverage in Kosovo right now where the Europeans are providing 85 percent of the force, and I think that's an appropriate distribution of the burdens, and I welcome what our European allies have done, and also, sir, your very excellent questions.

REP. KUYKENDALL: I -- just to finish on that, I -- the point is not so much I think we should not be part of NATO -- I do -- I have a strong commitment to that aspect of it. But there is a real big disproportion between our capability and even many of our NATO allies, and we need to get them closer to ours, so that whenever we are doing these operations we can at least have better interoperability between the two forces, and not this disproportionate peace in one area or another in order to even deliver the fight where we want to deliver it. Thank you very much.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Bateman?

REP. BATEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me join my colleagues in commending General Clark for an outstanding, even illustrious, career of service to our country. You have every reason to be proud of your record, and we are proud of you.

I want to return to the question that I guess was first posed by Mr. Sisisky and picked up on by others. The Helsinki agreement among the European Union of a 60,000-person rapid reaction force is to me deeply troubling. I heard you refer to it as a headline goal. But, you know -- and I heard you refer to it as you have got to get the rhetoric done before you can do anything. If this is purely a rhetorical army or force, it is not going to do any good. If it is in fact going to be a 60,000 force not subject to the command of the NATO commander or Atlantic Council, but subject to the will or the whims of the European parliament, and notwithstanding the encouraging quote from Mr. Solana, I look upon it as being virtually an abrogation of European responsibility to NATO. None of them have announced any plan to increase their military budgets or their defense budgets. Some have announced that they are going to decrease them.

So if you are talking about a 60,000-person force under the control of the European Union, you have diminished, potentially at least -- and I think a very high risk -- you have diminished the capability that ought to belong to NATO. In addition, could have the complicating factor of the NATO alliance, now 19 nations I believe, with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- operates by consensus. I don't know how in the name of heaven the European parliament operates and who will be making the decisions as to whether that 60,000 force did or did not cooperate with a NATO consensus within the Atlantic Council, especially when you have got the French to deal with. And let me say this American is very, very aggravated when the president of France goes to Beijing and says he is seeking a strategic partnership with China to counteract American hegemony. I am not sure that's an ally I am totally willing to depend upon, especially when I think it is a French initiative to create this European Union military capability that may be more rhetorical and a headline goal. But I see nothing constructive in it for NATO.

GEN. CLARK: The issues that you raise come on a number of levels. On the political and policy levels, as a U.S. commander testifying here in front of you, I should not address those issues.

I can tell you that we are going to do everything we can to work with the increased resolve that we see in Europe to carry more of the burden. We are going to try to shape this in the most constructive way possible to strengthen the transatlantic relationship. But ultimately these are not military questions. They are political and policy questions, and will have to be dealt with at that level. And in that regard, you can only ask of the men and women in uniform that they do their best to raise the issues in the appropriate channels and to work to handle the military coordination, deconfliction and prioritization in the most appropriate ways to advance the instructions they've been given. That's what we are doing.

REP. BATEMAN: Mr. Chairman, if I might? General, I have no quarrel whatsoever with you on this matter, and I recognize in fact that the policy responsibility is at a pay grade that's higher than either of us. But let me ask you this very briefly -- I think it will be a brief answer. I am going to the meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Assembly, leaving in fact tomorrow. Am I going to embarrass you or our country if I say to our NATO parliamentarians what I just said to you?

GEN. CLARK: Sir, I believe that they would expect and seek that you give your honest and candid views and perceptions. They have a great deal of respect for the American legislative process and for the role of the Congress in NATO decision-making. I know this because a number of them have told me, and I have attended these NAA meetings myself. And so I would just strongly endorse the idea that views should be given candidly and openly -- that's what this forum is about.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you. Ms. Tauscher.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, General Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, I want to add my voice to the chorus of my colleagues who want to thank you for your exemplary service over these many decades. I also want to recognize the other Clark, Mrs. Clark, who will be retiring too, and I wish you Godspeed in your new lives. And the families of American military will be missing Mrs. Clark. She has done a tremendous job over many years, and I want to thank you for the partnership that you gave this country.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you.

REP. TAUSCHER: I know that you and Sir George Robertson have worked for quite a while to re-engage the Russians, and I know that you should be congratulated for yesterday's announcement that they are resuming relations with NATO. Can you tell us a little bit about what you think that portends for us in the short term in Europe?

GEN. CLARK: I think what we are going to see is a step-by-step process of broadening the dialogue. They did return to the Permanent Joint Council in NATO, and the cooperation on the ground between American, Russian and NATO and Russian troops in Kosovo and Bosnia has been fine. What we haven't had is the ability to engage in a broader dialogue at the political level in NATO in the Permanent Joint Council. I think this will open the way for that. I am waiting to hear the details of the discussion myself. I hope that this means that the Russians will indeed permit the opening of the NATO liaison office in Moscow, which has been subject to some discussion over a period of years.

REP. TAUSCHER: What is your feeling about soon-to-be-President Putin's relationships with the West? Do you think that this is one of his ways of showing that he is anxious to reinvigorate the relationship?

GEN. CLARK: I think that the record on Vladimir Putin remains to be written. What he has shown thus far is he's an energetic man who had ordered the use of force. He is known to have been associated with some reformers. He's appeared to some to be pragmatic, someone that can be dealt with. He's appeared to others to be hard core, ideologically driven, and a student of the old school. I think it's a record that remains to be written. But I do think that Russia is an important actor in matters of European security, and their perceptions and concerns will remain a matter of great interest and concern to the West, and we will all benefit from dialogue and cooperation if we can attain it.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you again for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SPENCE: The next member is Mr. McIntyre.

REP. MCINTYRE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Clark, I too want to commend you on your strong leadership, especially under extremely difficult circumstances in the past year. As you may recall, I had the opportunity to be with you the week of Christmas with Secretary Cohen and enjoyed seeing you aboard the U.S.S. Battan (ph) in Naples, and the next day in Bosnia. I also enjoyed being able to go spend time with the troops in Macedonia and Kosovo. And it was a great opportunity to be with the 2,500 Marines from Camp LeJeune on the U.S. Battan (ph), the 500 soldiers mainly who are doing a lot of the police work you described today are over in Kosovo, as well as others from Pope Air Force Base, and Seymour Johnson and Cherry Point, all of which are in Eastern North Carolina.

I was very impressed with the facilities at Camp Bondsteel that you've also mentioned today, and I do believe they have helped the morale of the troops. And although we were there only for a short time, literally a couple of days before Christmas, it was quite evident for those who were away from home for the very first time, and others who had to be away from home during the holidays, how much it meant to them.

I want to ask you three questions which you may be able to answer fairly briefly. First, following up on Representative Taylor's question about the National Guard, how dependent are we upon the Reserve and Guard in the European theater? I know they have done a marvelous job. Can we even handle the variety of responsibilities we have in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia without their help? I know we also have a lot of National Guard units that have been deployed from North Carolina and from other states as well. And you talk about their importance in your report.

Secondly, do you see our presence in Bosnia overall being further reduced? You mentioned on page 12 of your statement that the U.S. reduction is anticipated to go from 6,100 troops to 3,900 in April. And if you do see further reduction, when would you anticipate that? Would it be another year away? I know this issue is going to keep coming up here.

And then, third, you mentioned weapons of mass destruction, primarily in Syria and Libya, in your report. How serious is the threat in Europe? Are there any European nations that are maybe just under the radar screen that we also need to be looking at concerning weapons of mass destruction? Thank you.

GEN. CLARK: Well, first let me answer and tell you that the National Guard and Reserve are vital in the work that we're doing in Europe. We need them over there to help man the joint contact teams on an individual basis. We use them in our deployments. California in particular is running a major and has run a major exercise with Ukraine in the past and has very strong relationships.

The state partnership program is an excellent tool for strengthening the western orientation and the reform of the militaries in these countries. So the National Guard and Reserve are vital, and we're very grateful for the work of the people in these organizations who give up their own personal lives so often to come and work with us in Europe.

The next round of reductions in Bosnia-Herzegovina hasn't been determined yet. We're going to have to wait until we get to the level of the 20,000 figure. That's to be reached on the 1st of April. We look at the election results and assess progress over the summer. My guess would be that in August, when it's time for the next six-month review, we'll have some look at the effectiveness of that force structure. Before then, it would be premature to make any promises or commitments about further reductions.

Inside Europe itself, there remains concern about proliferation. Some elements of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military-industrial complex remain in Europe, active, engaged in proliferating weapons, and in some cases weapons of mass destruction, worldwide. We've also looked very carefully at Yugoslavia. You may know that Yugoslavia had chemical weapons for a long time. There were consistent rumors that they had been employed in Bosnia. We heard some rumors that they'd been employed in Kosovo as well. And they do have a production as well as a use capability in Yugoslavia. I'd say that's the most significant proliferation threat in Europe at this time.

REP. MCINTYRE: Thank you very much.

GEN. CLARK: And, sir, thank you for being with us in seeing the troops over there at Christmas.

REP. MCINTYRE: Yes, sir. It was a great experience. Thank you, sir.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Buyer.

REP. STEVE BUYER (R-IN): Thank you, General Clark, for being here. And let me also add my accolades to my colleagues' to your devotion and your admirable service to the country.

I have several questions for you. One, we have a (brigade?) set of equipment for the Marine Corps in Norway, in the (caves?). How long is that going to be there? What's the plan? I'm curious. It's good cold-weather training, but explain that one to me.

The issue on the Guard and Reserve; I was an attentive listener, but I do have concerns and would ask, from your position, do you see the Guard and Reserve -- I don't know whether you agree with this statement or not -- being used -- instead of the augmentation of the active units as a combat multiplier, they're being used as surrogates and substitutes. So I'd ask for your comment on that.

And last, we went through a difficult time period with Bosnia in the civil implementation of the Dayton Accords to set these benchmarks of success. And I would ask -- and I know we're touching into the policy arena, and I don't want to get you in trouble here, but the importance about these benchmarks of success being realistic is important because it can be tied to the drawdown and when we see that exit.

So I'll ask for your competent opinion based on your experience. How long do you think we're going to be tied into the Balkans? I had, four or five years ago, believed when the ink dried on the Dayton Accords that we would be there for a generation. And so long as you have the leaders in the peace or leaders in the war, they will continue to focus on their differences rather than that which brings them together. So I would ask for your advice.

GEN. CLARK: With respect to the brigade set of equipment in Norway, to the best of my knowledge, there are no plans to do anything with that brigade set of equipment. It's there in response to a NATO agreement and to a U.S. commitment to be prepared to take action on NATO's northern flank in the event of an Article V contingency.

NATO is still an Article V collective defense organization, first and foremost, and the presence of that brigade set of equipment is extraordinarily important in terms of the perceptions of Europeans, and particularly the perceptions of Scandinavians, to the commitment of the United States to their future security. To the best of my knowledge, there's no discussion and no plans underway to do anything with that set of equipment.

The Guard and Reserve are being used, of course, as augmentation. The 49th Armored Division is the first time we've put a major unit headquarters in to do something an active component headquarters could have done. Now, this is a headquarters that's been trained carefully. It has been augmented by active component personnel who are necessary to fill out its skill and competence knowledge set. But I think that what we're going to be looking for increasingly is the opportunity to use Guard and Reserve forces to perform essential military functions if they are available and they can be used when active forces are not available.

With respect to the benchmarks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think the problem is that the solution to Bosnia-Herzegovina is not on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The solution to Kosovo is not exclusively on the ground in Kosovo. It's a regional problem, and it originates in Belgrade from the use of Serb nationalist symbology and logic, rhetoric, and pressures by Milosevic in an effort to retain or enhance his political power.

He's fueled these conflicts throughout the Balkans. As long as he's there, people in the region understand very well that they're not safe. Until he's taken to trial, until democracy proceeds into Serbia, we're not going to see a resolution of the problem. There's been important work done in Bulgaria, in Romania, in Macedonia. Albania is doing its best. But even these separate countries recognize what Milosevic's presence and continued presence in Belgrade means for regional security. It is a problem.

REP. BUYER: I'm sorry. Am I to be left with the impression that, irrespective of the benchmarks, whether they're detailed or place you in a comfort zone, it doesn't matter so long as Milosevic is there, that we're going to continue our presence so long as Milosevic is there? I mean, we've done that before all around the country -- excuse me, all around the world.

GEN. CLARK: You promised you weren't going to get me into a policy issue and get me in trouble, but let me go ahead out on a limb on this one and answer it with my personal convictions on this. We'll use the benchmarks, of course, and we'll do everything we can to withdraw forces and cut down the size of the force to the greatest extent, consistent with continuing to meet the missions and obligations that we have there.

But we're not going to be able to complete that mission and wipe our hands of responsibilities overall for regional security in that area until the regime in Belgrade is replaced by a democratic regime that's able to undertake to meet its obligations under the Helsinki Act and others. So I'm not ruling out the possibility of further reductions, nor would I say that we shouldn't use benchmarks. We just have to proceed step by step, because there's still a threat.

REP. BUYER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SPENCE: Next we call on Mr. Sherwood.

REP. SHERWOOD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Clark, I too need to thank you for your service to our country. And I want to thank you today for reminding us, as I think needed to be done, of the seriousness of the Milosevic problem and that this crisis, this whole region, won't be resolved until we continue to address that.

I very well understand that we tend to ask you questions because of our interest that are policy and not execution. But bringing your -- I have two questions, really, and the first is, bringing your experience as the NATO commander to bear and your recent experience of a major conflict in the Balkans and its drawdown on our resources, our ammunition, our equipment, its further wearing out of our old equipment, do you think that we are processing that information to the best of our ability up through the budget process?

And I'm always concerned about the position of our commanders with their responsibility to their men and their responsibility also to the perception of the president's budget. And I'm very concerned if we're bringing all that information to the top on where we need to be to protect ourselves in the world and our doctrine of being able to fight two conflicts. And my limited experience leads me to believe that's pretty doubtful. And I'd like your comment on that.

The second question that I have; when I was in Bosnia and Naples on a readiness hearing and talking to your people that I was just extremely impressed with, I learned that one of the hard things about readiness is that we're having a little attrition in our junior or mid-range NCOs and officers. And one of the things that came up in that briefing was that they were very concerned about the quality of the DOD schools for their children. And it would seem to me that we owe our military the best schools in the world. And I would ask you if that's getting the attention it deserves.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you very much, Congressman. Let me say first, I think in terms of discussing the wear-out and the obsolescence of the equipment, you're basically referring to the recapitalization process. And that is a concern for all of us in the field, because we do see the equipment aging. We know that older equipment takes more intensive effort to keep it running, to make it operationally capable. The C-5 aircraft is a perfect example of that now. But the tank fleet is getting older out there. The truck fleet is old. The CH-47 fleet is difficult. Even the F-15s and F-16s are aging.

So this is a problem that's well-recognized in DOD. I couldn't tell you the specifics of the commitment to this within the budgetary process, because those decisions, those analyses, are really done by the service chiefs and their staffs here in Washington. But I will tell you that we've made from the field our concerns about this very clear in discussions in service channels and elsewhere.

Secondly, with respect to the DOD school system, it is a very important quality-of-life effort for our families, and we appreciate your reference to this and your attention to it on your trip over there, sir. And I'd like to just tell you that I think there are a number of areas in the education field that can be worked without more resources. Some of it is a matter of helping parents and local administrators do what's best in that specific area.

We've made some remarkable progress in the last six months in breaking down the bureaucratic restrictions in the DOD school systems and returning greater authority into Europe and inevitably down to or eventually down to the superintendents on the ground and principals who need it. I think that's very important. There are still resourcing needs out there, and we've talked about these in every meeting of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in the Pentagon, which is the way that, as a commander-in-chief, I get my needs articulated.

Essentially, we should be working the DOD school system to meet the same goals that the president laid out for the American school system. But, of course, the DOD school system is not funded and resourced by the Department of Education, and money that's provided for DOD schools comes at the expense of readiness or pay or other things. It is difficult.

I want to express my appreciation to the secretary of Defense and his staff, because they have listened over the last two years as we've asked for increased resourcing in this area. What we hope to do is get to a pupil-to-teacher ratio of 18 to 1 for all of our students. It's not all funded yet, but we are starting to move in this direction. I think we've funded grades one through four. We moved into -- eventually we're going to have, in the next two or three years, whole-day kindergarten. That's a very important initiative that was funded.

What we don't have fully are what we call program-based staffing to make sure we have the right counselors, guidance counselors and other specialists out in all the schools. We don't have all of the developmental preschool that we'd like to have. There are a number of U.S.-available programs that are not available overseas, such as the WIC program. And there are some additional technology applications.

In addition, we're facing a major crunch on real property maintenance in the DOD school system. If you talk to the civilian leadership in these school districts, they'll tell you they like about -- it's about a 25-year basis, and they put about 4 percent of their construction costs allocated against repairs. We're not even 25 percent of that in the DOD system, just because we're part of the overall backlog of real property maintenance. So there are a number of important things that could be done in the DOD school system, and I'd just like to underscore that we think this is a very, very important issue for the welfare of our families and ultimately for the maintenance of the force.

REP. SHERWOOD: Thank you very much, General.

REP. SPENCE: Mrs. Fowler.

REP. TILLIE FOWLER (R-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General, for being here today. And I hope I don't repeat some of the questions you've already had; I'll try not to. I read through your statement. I had missed it in the beginning, but I read through it with interest and had a couple of questions. I know my friend, Mr. Buyer, asked one of them.

But I'm interested in the fact that one of the things we said we would do in the beginning was to train and equipment the Bosnian military. And I would like to know how that is going; that if SFOR troops were not in Bosnia, how would these regional forces fare there? What's your opinion of that? I heard you say earlier that we'll probably have to keep some presence there as long as Milosevic is in power.

And I know, in reading your statement, you say that we're going to be there indefinitely; initially expected to last no more than a year, but we're likely to remain for the indefinite future. I was one of the ones sitting there when you told us several years ago that we'd only be there a year. And I'd like to get us out sooner rather than later, but it sounds like we're going to be there for the long term.

I'm also concerned about in Kosovo; again today in the Washington Post there's another article, and every day you see it in the news and on television, the continued killings that are occurring there. We've had over 200,000 Serbs who now have left Kosovo since the NATO troops came in, because it appears that KFOR is not able really to enforce the peace there. And I read something the other day that said, "Oh, we've made great progress. We're now only averaging one killing a day." To me, that's not good news.

I was in Kosovo last year, saw the Serb houses being burned, saw people who had just been injured in a bombing in a market, and I'm deeply concerned. And again, in reading your testimony, it sounds like, as you said, we're there for the indefinite period also and the options don't appear very good. Three hundred of the 2,000 U.N. police forces have already left because of low morale and the difficulty of enforcing the police, so we're going backwards rather than forward. We're getting more police in there, so our military is having to provide not just peacekeeping but law enforcement at great cost.

I'd like to know what the costs to date have been for our presence in Kosovo. And then I know we've got a $2.2 billion request coming in a supplemental, plus another $2 billion, I believe, for the 2001 budget. I'm trying to get some handle on what are we spending, at what cost to our overall defense readiness, to meet other challenges around the world. And what to date has been what we have spent in Bosnia to date, the cost of that?

GEN. CLARK: First, let me address the train-and-equip issue and tell you that the train-and-equip program has gone quite well. It is underway. It is doing unit training now. We have a training area down at Glamec (ph), and it's proven a very effective means of bringing consensus and rationality to the armament buildup or containing the armament buildup in the region. That is to say, the Bosniaks understand that we are there with this train-and-equip program. It's helped us to be able to capture the rest of their own force-building efforts and keep them under control and within the bounds of the Dayton agreement. So I think it's been effective.

I don't -- I'm not able to tell you how long we're going to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but as we've said, indefinite doesn't mean infinite. It's just that we want to have a success-based strategy and not a time-based strategy.

In Kosovo itself, I'm not sure about the UNHCR figures that you referenced. I saw those in the newspaper this morning also. I can tell you that we took a survey in September. We went county by county in Kosovo. We counted noses. We found that there were 100,000 Serbs remaining. There's continuous traffic in and out of Kosovo. The Serb traffic is escorted out. We've seen in the multinational brigade east sector, where the American forces are, actually a buildup of Serbs. We've had Serb families coming in and telling us they're coming back into Kosovo because the conditions of life are too hard on them outside of Kosovo, in Yugoslavia. They're not taken care of at all, so they're coming back in. So I would have to check that figure and understand the context of it before I could endorse that.

There are police problems. And, yes, this is a difficult situation. Our troops are doing a magnificent job there, though, and we very much appreciate your support for our troops there and the encouragement that members of the United States Congress have given to other organizations, and other allies to help generate larger police presences is welcomed. And I can tell you, from talking to the allies and the other organizations there, they're trying to take action on this to get the police in there. It is a problem.

With respect to the funding issue, we have spent, as I said, basically OMA money. It's been about $270 million worth of work thus far, from '99 OMA dollars, to construct the base in Bondsteel and in Monti (ph) in Kosovo. I can't tell you what the overall cost of the deployment and the activities have been for the troops. I will provide that information for you for the record.

REP. FOWLER: Thank you, because I think, you know, it's in the billions and it's growing, you know, much larger than it was, it appears, in Bosnia. And it's going to continue to at a time when we do have other concerns around the world. And I am deeply concerned that our European allies are not doing their share. While we have interests in that region, theirs are much greater. And I don't think we're doing what we need to do to get them to step up to the plate.

The European Union has a greater GDP than we do and they have more troops in uniform than we do when you combine them all. And yet they aren't willing to step up and do more of their fair share. They've got to come up technologically, we understand. But peacekeeping is a different matter. So hopefully we can continue

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you, Ms. Fowler. Mr. Reyes.

REP. REYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, it's good to see you again. And I want to tell you that like my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, we deeply appreciate your service, and also the service of your beautiful wife, and we want to thank you for that and wish you well in your next career. And hopefully it will have, your next career will have something to do with service to our country because you have done than in an exemplary manner. So, thank you for your service.

There are a lot of questions that I'd like to ask you. And I've always been impressed by your candor and your frankness, under probably the most difficult circumstances, as I've seen you several times dealing with Bosnia and Milosevic and the Kosovo operation and all of those kinds of things, but I'm curious this morning if you would give us your perspective or observations on Montenegro. It, you know, in a region that has so many wild cards, this is one that I think really cuts across in terms of what it could do to the region as well. There are just -- and I know we've had this conversation, but just to remind you, the people that talk to me about Bosnia and the Balkans and all are of two different opinions. One, we have no interests there, we should get out of there. The second one is kind of a frustration by itself, that we're dealing with this region in a piecemeal fashion.

And, so, if you would comment on Montenegro and then any observations you might have about the frustration of dealing with this region of the world in a piecemeal manner, I would appreciate it.

GEN. CLARK: Congressman, I think that there is a significant challenge to Mr. Jukanovic in Montenegro. As you know, he has been a political adversary of Milosevic's team in Montenegro, and he defeated Mr. Momir Bruodavic (ph) there in an election, and really from the time he took over he's been threatened and bullied in some way.

Today what we find in Montenegro is virtually a total economic embargo by Serbia to prevent the flow of agricultural products and other items into Montenegro from Serbia, and of course that's their major trading partner. We find a continuous build-up of police, special police forces, politically screened to be only supportive to Milosevic. We find a deployment of military forces to the Albanian border with Montenegro and periodic restrictions on traffic. An occupation by military and police forces in the vicinity of Podgoric airfield, and overall a step-by-step process is underway to tighten Milosevic's capacity to take preemptive action against Mr. Jukanovic. Whether he will do so or not remains unclear. I certainly don't know one way or the other, and we haven't seen yet the indications of the intent to act. What we've seen is the build-up of the capability to act, and it's been a very pronounced and significant build-up.

Mr. Jukanovic has received support and endorsement from the West. He's trying to establish a democratic regime there that's a Western- oriented market economy. He's put the Deutsche mark in as his second currency. It's driving the Yugoslav dinar out of circulation. He is receiving some Western advice and encouragement, because obviously we'd like to see democracy proceed. No one wants to see Montenegro -- in the West, that I know of, wants to see Montenegro independent because we're hoping that it will point the way to democracy in Yugoslavia. That having been said, it's clear that we have to look both at the specific areas of crisis in this region, and we have to look at the region as a whole.

But with respect to your statement about frustration of dealing piecemeal with the problems, I would just suggest to Mr. Milosevic and others of his supporters who might overhear this conversation that it's very clear that the patience of Western leadership is limited. He's had a decade of trouble-making. He's an indicted war criminal. He knows very well what the West's capabilities are.

REP. REYES: Thank you, General. And I'm going to, I'm looking forward to visiting with the 49th during the Easter break. In fact, I'll be there for Easter. I'm assuming you're going to be in that region still.

GEN. CLARK: Absolutely.

REP. REYES: I look forward to seeing you there, General.

GEN. CLARK: Yes sir.

REP. REYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SPENCE: All the members present have had one round of questioning but there's some of us still left. General, are you available to us for further time?

GEN. CLARK: Yes sir, I am.

REP. SPENCE: Okay. Then I'll call on Mr. Skelton.

REP. SKELTON: I only have one other question, General. It deals with the American pursuit of a missile defense. Have you had the opportunity to learn the attitude of our NATO allies regarding our national missile defense?

GEN. CLARK: Yes sir, I have. And there is concern in NATO among the American move toward the decision to deploy a national missile defense system. I think that concern is driven by several factors. Number one, they don't see the same threat that we see, so they don't see the urgency of this. To address that factor, we're trying to provide them information, and we have done so.

Number two, they are concerned about the impact of a U.S. change to the structure of strategic stability for them. They've lived under a system of deterrence -- NATO doctrine 14-slant-3, flexible response is what kept us safe during the Cold War, but essentially they would recognize it as something we call "mutual assured destruction." And their concern that any move that would offset that and at the same time cause in the anti-ballistic missile treaty which would be necessary would upset the program of deterrence, minimum deterrence of mutual assured destruction, however it might be labeled, that's in place and has kept them safe. That might necessitate in their turn increased military expenditures, diversion of resources to their own missile defense, or to offensive systems. And they're concerned about how, therefore, the U.S. move would affect their move.

There is a body of opinion out there that says that defenses can't work, and they're listening to this dialogue go on and wondering if defenses don't work and if these other nations then add to their offensive capability, what does that do to their security?

So, there are a number of strands of thought that are in play. There's an on-going dialogue and consultation. I'm confident that we can work through and resolve this. But I do think we have to be aware that there are European reservations.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Bateman.

REP. HERBERT BATEMAN (R-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, I have a specific question, and I ask your counsel. On the Goldwater-Nickles, as a CINC, did it work? Did it work for you? And, my counsel I ask of you is, if it did not, would your recommendation be that it's worthy of examination of oversight? I can hold a hearing and I can look at it. If it did work, great. If it didn't work, what reforms or recommendations would you have? And if I did that, I would do it, I'd ask you to come back and testify after your retirement.

GEN. CLARK: It's a very important question that you've asked. I think many elements of Goldwater-Nickles worked well during the campaign. Perhaps there are some who would say that some elements did not work as well. On balance, I worked, I think I had very good support from all the nations of NATO, and I worked with General Hugh Shelton and General Joe Ralston on a daily, hourly, and sometimes minute-by-minute basis. And I was very appreciative of the support that I received.

The detailed issues here probably are worthy of examination. I don't know whether the right mechanism would be a hearing or whatever. I would certainly defer to you on that. But I do think that it's important after an operation like this to take stock of important, really, landmark legislation like Goldwater-Nickles, to be sure that we've learned all the lessons that need to be learned and either validated or modified as appropriate.

REP. BATEMAN: Would the gentleman yield at that point? It has been suggested, General, that the joint requirement which has attached to this legislation, which requires a three-year assignment, which one year of which can be waived, it has been suggested to me that a solid 22-months assignment might be just as well, and serve for the education of that individual just as well as a three-year assignment or one which is a two-year with the third year a waiver. Do you have a judgment on that?

GEN. CLARK: I believe that we need to provide as much flexibility as possible for the military personnel system to be able to meet the many different demands that face officers in their career progression through the ranks. That has to be balanced against the time in place and the stability that we seek in the assignment. We wouldn't want a lot of churning through these important jobs.

That having been said, I probably come down on the side of some increased flexibility, depending on the job, the individual, the activities in play at the time, and greater reliance on the chain of command to make the appropriate recommendations for such flexibility.

REP. BATEMAN: How about such wording as "no less than 22 months"? Would that be any better?

GEN. CLARK: I would have to, the precise nature of the wording is probably not something that I can best tell you. Does that mean there's no exception to the 22 months and so it's the same and it just becomes a 22-month tour? Or does that mean it's the baseline and there's still an exception? I can't -- I would argue for the greatest possible flexibility and leaving it to the commanders and the staff --

REP. BATEMAN: The problem is, is one year enough to give someone experience in a joint billet so that later on their progression, when they become a four-star general or admiral they'll have that joint feeling? You see, originally it was intended to have three years with a one-year waiver, and I would hesitate to cut it back to a year because you just learn the job in a about a year.

GEN. CLARK: As I have been engaged in this debate from a distance, it applies primarily to Korea, as I understand it.

REP. BATEMAN: No. It applies many, many places. Many, many places.

GEN. CLARK: I would suggest that in general you'd like to have people on the job more than a year. A two-year tour is the ideal tour. Three years is an outside. Three years is better for family stability. It's probably not as good in terms of career development. It's probably too long. But there may be cases such as in a conflict or in Korea where the intensity of the activity, the nature of the issues is such that a 12-month tour would make you very, very joint qualified indeed. And I would like to see the flexibility offered to the leadership of the armed forces to be able, on a case-by-case basis, to make those calls.

REP. BATEMAN: That helps. Thanks so much.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Taylor.

REP. TAYLOR: General, thanks again for sticking around this long. In your previous capacity you were the commander of SouthCom.

And, obviously, you became very much involved in what goes on down there. Congress, in the next few weeks, will be voting on a, anywhere from $1.3 to $2 billion aid package for Colombia. It's going to involve at the least 30 Black Hawks, 30 Super Hueys. The question then becomes, where does the training occur? Do we bring their pilots here? Do our pilots go there? Do we have to send American military mechanics down there to maintain them?

So obviously this is something that does very much involve the sending of America's sons and daughters into a very hostile environment. Based on your experience with SouthCom, what should our nation be asking of the Colombians in an effort to see to it that this is not just an effort in futility, that it's just not throwing a couple of silver bullets at a problem?

And I will point out a couple of inconsistencies that I see that I wish you to comment on. In the few trips I've had down there, you see that apparently the guys who are doing the fighting for the Colombian military is that poor conscript out there. If you're from the right side of the tracks, you don't serve at all. If you're from someplace in between you can get a nice shiny helmet and a pair of white spats and you get to serve in Bogota where it's fairly safe.

I sense amongst the business community a total lack of a sense of urgency. You know, the war is an inconvenience. They can't go hunting in the countryside the way they used to. It's not a threat to the national security.

And the third thing that I find particularly troubling and would like your thoughts on is if we are doing this ostensibly because of the war on drugs, how is it that apparently the paramilitaries are financed by the drug business and they are on the government side? The FARC, the ELN are apparently also in the drug business there against the government. How is it that we as a nation should resolve these fairly apparent inconsistencies if our efforts are supposed to be based on our desire to eradicate the drug problem down there that eventually becomes and American problem?

GEN. CLARK: Well, you've -- you're posing what is one of the most vexing and difficult policy issues facing the United States today, I believe. I watched the evolution of the drug situation during my tour as SouthCom commander. What I saw was a government that was inadequately mobilized and a population that was inadequately mobilized to deal with the challenges they faced. They didn't support their defense establishment or their police establishment adequately. They tolerated a high level of disorder, violence, and drug opportunities. They didn't have a tax structure that made the best use of their resources. And the differences in wealth, income level and background were such that the natural leaders of the society were able to protect themselves from the consequences of the ravages that were being spread on the majority of the people down there. That's what I saw when I was the SouthCom commander.

And I'm hopeful that the increased seriousness with which the United States is viewing the problem today, and the increased commitment of resources to address the drug issue and the problem, and all the problems that means for the region, will help give us the ability to work with the government of Colombia to enable them to take the necessary measures they must take to cope with this, with their own problems here.

This is a wealthy country. It's one of the oldest, most stable democracies in the hemisphere. It's a major trading partner. We're their major trading partner, and they do a lot of business with us. And they have historically liked the United States and liked to be in America. But they haven't, at least in my experience now, they have not mobilized the population and the resources that were necessary to come to grips with the problem.

And what we should achieve with our efforts is to help them get the mobilization they need so they as a government and the people of Colombia can deal with the violence.

I looked at the problem in military terms when I was in there, just by comparison with Vietnam. As I recall, it's about seven times the size of Vietnam -- Colombia is. When we were fighting the Vietnam War, we had over 400,000 Americans. We had a 500,000- man South Vietnamese Army, and a million-man militia force from South Vietnam mobilized to cover that country. We had 2200 helicopters.

Colombia hasn't mobilized its resources, doesn't have the assistance, the technology or the force structure needed to cope with its own terrain -- in military terms I'm answering that question.

I know this is not a military problem, but the environment is an enormous factor in this problem. And I think when we work to deal with the drug problem, we have to be aware that the money, the resources that we put in are leverage. It's important leverage, but the solution ultimately has to draw on the people and resources of Colombia itself.

REP. TAYLOR: Mr. Chairman, if I may. Getting back to that leverage, General, and you said it in one sentence better than I did in five minutes. What should we require the Colombians to do, given the fact that we obviously will be in a position to leverage something with this $2 billion aid package?

What specifically -- tell.

GEN. CLARK: I think there's a whole series of measures that governments do when they mobilize resources to go after a problem like this. There are book after book after book written on counterinsurgency doctrine, for example. It starts with mobilizing population and then mobilizing resources.

It's making people aware of the problem, providing selfless leadership to deal with the problem. It's going out and educating, training, equipping, providing security, following up on the leads, working it on an individual basis, a village by village basis, a neighborhood by neighborhood basis, to go to the source of the problem.

And that's what has to be done in a society like this to really change it. It's not a military problem, it's a social development problem with very important security dimensions to it, as I see it. But I want to say that -- and I should have said this at the outset. This really is not in my area. I defer to Charlie Wilhelm and to General Barry McCaffrey and the Joint Chiefs, because they're the ones who are living with this problem and working it on a day-by-day basis. I'm following it from a distance.

REP. TAYLOR: General, if I may, in respecting all that, if you are uncomfortable doing it here, I certainly understand because you're a gentleman and you would not do anything to, as you said, embarrass General Wilhelm. I as a member of Congress who am going to be involved in this debate in the next few weeks would truly welcome your thoughts as to what we specifically should ask of the Colombian government as benchmarks of their willingness to get serious about this before we start risking even more American lives and even more of America's resources.

And I'm going to make that request of you, and I would certainly welcome you doing that.

GEN. CLARK: May I provide an answer --

REP. TAYLOR: Absolutely.

GEN. CLARK: -- on the record here, and let me give it the balanced, thoughtful consideration that it warrants.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you. Mr. Bartlett.

REP. BARTLETT: Thank you very much, General. Thank you for your long years of service and thank you for your testimony today. You have been very responsive and extraordinarily informative in your testimony.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you very much.

REP. BARTLETT: As you know, you've come to experience a lot of expansion in the past two years. In addition, there is a distinct possibility that future peacekeeping missions may emerge from places such as Israel or the Congo, formerly Zaire.

I'm most concerned with the cumulative effect of strain placed on EUCOM. The most recent report from the president stated that NATO will continue operations in Kosovo, quote, "As long as necessary to meet the strategic and military objectives." Some suggest that might be as much as 50 years. And that, secondly, quote, "The U.S. military will remain deployed as long as necessary to provide for an initial stabilization period," end quote.

How can EuCom operations respond to new areas of crisis with such an undefined mission in Kosovo? Do you have some concerns?

GEN. CLARK: Well, we're looking very carefully at how to best meet the mission in Kosovo, because this is a mission that is essentially a division-level mission.

We have two divisions in Europe, each with two brigades, as you know. And most of one brigade is in on the ground. Another brigade is preparing. So we're in the process of trying to structure, well, what happens after the first infantry division that's there now completes its two brigades of deployment?

We're bringing in the first armored division. And then they're preparing their brigades. Now then, when we go back to the first infantry division or will we bring in a CONUS division to help us sustain this presence? So we are looking very carefully at this, and we are working on it.

I feel that if there are commitments in Israel, the Congo, or elsewhere and we don't have the resources to meet them in EuCom that we're going to go to the continental United States -- the sustained base of the Armed Forces -- and draw resources from there to do it.

So I think it's a total force problem, not just a European Command problem on this. Nevertheless, we are working very hard. We've got people who are very, very busy in this theater. I would also tell you that there are other response forces that are available, response forces that are not deployed in Kosovo.

We have, first, the 508 down at Vicenza which is an airborne combat team with the Joint Task Force Headquarters over it that's available to work. We have our Special Forces there, in the Special Forces under my commend in the U.S.-European theater. We have our air forces, who have their own reaction capability. And of course we have the Marines and others.

So we are far from being totally committed. We are working hard. And the families certainly feel the stress of the deployments. But I wouldn't want to give the impression that there is no response capability. There certainly is, and we're capable of responding to whatever contingencies might arise.

REP. BARTLETT: But you did state that there were meaningful additional responsibilities -- that you might have to call on supplemental support from outside EuCom.

GEN. CLARK: Yes, sir, I did.

REP. BARTLETT: Thank you, sir, and thank you for the kind remarks also.

REP. SPENCE: Mr. Bateman.

REP. BATEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Clark, I'd like to revisit Bosnia, unfortunately. The last time I was there, my recollection was that the circumstances were that the prime minister of the Serb Republic or Republic of Srpska had been removed by order of I guess the United Nations Command because he was looked upon as being unsatisfactory.

As a result of that action, the parliament of the Republic of Srpska insisted that they wouldn't have anybody else as the prime minister. There was significant unrest in some corridor where the decision was supposed to have been made as to how the jurisdiction would be determined. And I think basically the decision was to kick it down the road.

We then threw municipal elections, in which the people who formerly lived there and who were refugees were permitted to vote in the municipal elections and controlled the results of those elections. But the refugees still couldn't and didn't come home.

This to me borders upon almost an irrational exercise. Did we go about all of this wrong at Dayton and pull together and force an agreement for a multiethnic federation that has no basis in reality -- that we would have been better to have taken another path?

The policy questions -- I would respect your judgment.

GEN. CLARK: Well, very candidly, I would not want to see a move away from the Dayton Agreement. We got the best agreement that was achievable at Dayton in my view. And I believe that in Europe and certainly in the United States today multiethnicity is a fact of life.

When I went into Bosnia the first time after the Dayton Agreement was signed, I met with a high-ranking British officer who said: "These people will never live together." He said "This is phony, it won't work." It's been four years since that time right now. In fact, the people are living together.

We just had, over the last year, 70,000 minority returnees, most of them spontaneous. We're seeing preparations for return occurring now in the wintertime, which is traditionally not the season that anyone would work on. People -- Serbs, Bosniacs, Croats -- are all going back to their old homes. They're trying to fix 'em up and they're planning to move in there. Even in hardline Serb cities like Prijedor there are rumors of 10,000 Bosniac returnees coming this year.

It was always a case that the people generally got along satisfactorily in Bosnia. It was a multicultural society. But the ethnic distinctions were magnified and manipulated by the hardline politicians for their own selfish purposes. There's still some of that going on, and particularly from the Serb hardliners who are connected to Mr. Seselj and President Milosevic in Serbia.

But by and large, we are making progress there. Even Srebrenica is going to see Bosniac returns. And I would tell you that there are 20,000 Serbs who have returned over the past year to Sarajevo.

To me the refugee return is the key barometer of progress. And when people feel secure, they vote with their feet and they go home, where they want to be. So I think that's a good indicator of progress.

REP. BATEMAN: Well, that's the most optimistic and encouraging thing I've heard said about Bosnia-Herzegovina in a long time. And I'm certainly delighted to hear it. What can you tell us about Karadzic, or whatever his name is, who's the indicted war criminal who's still at large somewhere in Bosnia or Herzegovina?

GEN. CLARK: Mr. Karadzic was the former president of Republika of Srpska. He was indicted, he is at large. We don't know precisely where. We have general ideas and we occasionally get reports that he's moved from one position to another.

So as we've said before, when we encounter indicted war criminals, tactical situation permitting, we will detain them. We've continued our policy to do that. We've not encountered Karadzic in such a circumstance yet.

REP. BATEMAN: Good luck.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you.

REP. SPENCE: If there are no other questions, General, we've kept you a long time -- with these few people that we had, we've kept you for a long time. You've answered a variety of questions on all kinds of issues, many of them afield from where you are right now.

And we appreciate all your candor and your answers. And again, we appreciate your service. It's not over yet -- I don't want to count like it's over while you're still there doing the work. You've had a very difficult assignment, a historic assignment, as we've said before. But you handle it well, and I want you to know I appreciate that and the American people appreciate it. And many others do in this world, too. So I think you can leave this position with a lot of satisfaction for a job well done.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you.

REP. SPENCE: For what you've meant to us.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want you to know that I take these responsibilities very seriously. I do have a number of days left and I appreciate your consideration of that. I'm going to work till the very last minute to keep our troops safe over there and get the mission done.

REP. SPENCE: Thank you again.

GEN. CLARK: Thank you, sir.

REP. SPENCE: (Gavel.) The meeting is adjourned.

END

LOAD-DATE: February 18, 2000

Document 13 of 21.


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