LEXIS-NEXIS® Congressional Universe-Document

Search Terms: health information privacy, House or Senate or Joint

Document 4 of 45.

July 20, 2000, Thursday

SECTION: PREPARED TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 5489 words

HEADLINE: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF HAROLD COXSON, ESQ. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR AND PENSIONS

SUBJECT - GENETIC INFORMATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

BODY:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, I appreciate the invitation to testify before the Committee regarding genetic information discrimination in the workplace. My name is Hai Coxson. I am a Shareholder in the national labor and employment law firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. and a Principal in the firm's government relations subsidiary Ogletree Governmental Affairs, Inc. based in Washington, DC. Our firm has 14 offices in 8 states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands. We represent employers throughout the country in all aspects of workplace law, including matters relating to employment discrimination under state and federal statutes. Our emphasis is on counseling employers with regard to their obligations under these laws and preventative methods of avoiding workplace disputes and litigation. Our emphasis in Ogletree Governmental Affairs is on helping to shape public policy decisions by Congress and the Executive Branch, and inform decision makers in matters relating to labor and employment law. I appear today as an individual witness,1 not as a representative or spokesman for any client, business organization or group. For one reason, most of the trade associations with whom I have worked over the years simply have not developed policy positions in the area of genetic information discrimination. This is due largely to the fact that in practice employers do not generally require genetic testing nor base employment decisions on genetic information. Simply stated, there is no reliable empirical data that employers broadly engage in genetic testing nor is there evidence of widespread employment discrimination based on genetic information. That is true, as well, of our firm's clients from whom there has been little demand for development of genetic discrimination policies or counseling in the area of genetic discrimination.

That is not to say, however, that as new forms of genetic technologies become better known and more widely available that problems will not arise. Admittedly, there is an increasing body of anecdotal evidence especially over the Internet concerning denials of insurance coverage, failures to hire, and refusals to be examined for fear of disclosure of genetic information. Our law firm's advice to clients, as reflected in the attached article by Ogletree, Deakins shareholder Burton Fishman in the May/June 2000 issue of HR Advisor (Attachment 1), is that no employer should seek or be in possession of, such information. Even if the information could pertain to employment, it is far too remote to be a reliable factor for making an employment-related decision. And the practical reality is that most employers aren't even able to track down whether a chronic absentee is fudging his FMLA slips, let alone wanting to learn about exotic tests regarding asymptomatic future potentialities of medical conditions. It is also our advice to clients, that employers should develop workplace policies now which establish the general principle of nondiscrimination based on genetic information, especially in the event that such information inadvertently comes into the employer's possession. Finally, we advise that should such information come into an employer's possession, that the employer adhere to the medical records requirements of the ADA. We emphasize, however, that employers should not even want such information.

For the past two years, I have had the privilege of serving as a member of the National Conference of State Legislatures' Blue Ribbon Panel (read "pro bono") on Genetic Technologies, which I suppose accounts for my invitation to testify at today's hearing. I emphasize, however, that I do not appear today on behalf of the Panel nor do I speak for the National Conference of State Legislatures. The Panel's mission, and more specifically that of the Employment Issues Subcommittee chaired by former ACLU attorney Louis Maltby, is to help develop a model policy framework for state legislative action. Our efforts are still very much a work in progress largely due to the enormous complexity of the subject. We have wrestled with many of the same policy issues that will be considered by this Committee and ultimately by the full Congress with regard to genetic information discrimination and genetic privacy. There are no easy answers. One thing on which we all agree is a firm commitment to the basic principle that workers should not be exposed to genetic information discrimination in employment, much less in other aspects of society.

My testimony today will focus on three areas. First, the experience of the twenty-one (21) state legislatures which have enacted workplace genetic information discrimination laws may be instructive to this Committee's consideration of federal legislation. In particular, I want to bring to the Committee's attention the recent experience in Michigan, which was the twenty-first state to enact such a law. Without endorsing the Michigan statute in its entirety, I would recommend for this Committee's consideration the process by which the Michigan legislature and the Governor's office reached nearly unanimous bipartisan consensus, working with the stakeholders through the Michigan Commission on Genetic Privacy and Progress. The Michigan legislature's end result of bipartisan consensus and enactment of legislation was well worth the relatively short 16-month process.

Second, my testimony will focus on the reach of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") to claims of employment discrimination based on genetic makeup and genetic information. ADA coverage of genetic discrimination is far from certain, despite the EEOC's 1995 Guidance Memorandum and subsequent statements by EEOC Chair Paul Miller. It may well be that should the Committee decide to move forward with genetic discrimination legislation, and if such discrimination is not definitively covered already by the "regarded as" disabled basis for ADA coverage, a preferable vehicle would be to amend the ADA rather than enact a separate, freestanding law solely devoted to genetic discrimination. Other alternatives, such as medical record privacy legislation, should be considered as well, since the origin of any problem related to employment decisions based on genetic information is the dissemination of such confidential information in the first place. Frankly, Americans polled on the subject have expressed concern with the misuse of genetic information, where the underlying basis for that concern seems to be protection of confidentially and an individual's privacy from unauthorized dissemination. Here again, existing law may address this concern. The ADA currently contains restrictions on medical examinations and inquiries, and protections for medical records privacy, which some courts have interpreted as being enforceable under the ADA even for non-disabled individuals.

Finally, my testimony will consider some of the specific employment- related concerns raised by S. 1332, the "Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and Employment Act." The thrust of my testimony in this regard will be simply to raise questions concerning the scope of the legislation, its enforcement provisions, and potential conflicts with other laws. Why, for example, should the legislation allow claimants to circumvent the well-established screening and conciliation procedures of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in pursuing a genetics-based claim of employment discrimination? And what about genetics-based employment discrimination is it that entitles asymptomatic individuals not currently, and hopefully never, disabled, to receive openended, uncapped damages in civil litigation beyond those damages available to currently disabled individuals under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or other aggrieved individuals on the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, or age under other federal employment discrimination laws? Why is this legislation applicable to all workplaces without regard to the size of the business or number of employees, when all other federal employment discrimination laws are applicable only to employers with 15 or more employees? I do not profess to have answers to the questions raised, nor am I even certain that I have raised all of the questions. I believe strongly, however, that before acting precipitously on this or any other genetic information discrimination legislation, the Committee should carefully consider the over-breadth of the legislation's definitions, the potential conflicts with other laws, its open-ended liability, and other concerns. I would urge that the is be clone through additional hearings and perhaps even the establishment of a commission to study the issue, hopefully with the assistance of representatives from all of the major stakeholders. The goal should be, if possible, the type of bipartisan consensus which the Michigan legislature achieved this year after adopting such a process.

STATE LEGISLATION

Laws in twenty-one (21) states prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of genetic information; those states and the date of legislative enactment are Arizona (1997), California (1998), Connecticut (1997), Delaware (1998), Illinois (1997), Iowa (1997), Kansas (1999), Maine (1998), Missouri (1998), Michigan (2000), Nevada (1999), New Hampshire (1995), New Jersey (1996), New York (1996), North Carolina (1997), Oklahoma (1998), Oregon (1995), Rhode Island (1992) Texas ( 1997), Vermont (1997), and Wisconsin ( 1991).

Nineteen (19) states, many of them the same states which have enacted the above-referenced employment discrimination laws, have also enacted genetic privacy laws: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. Although New Jersey was the first state to enact comprehensive workplace anti-discrimination legislation in 1996, based on genetic information rather than genetic testing, most state laws have been enacted over the past three years. The majority of those laws are narrow in scope, much narrower than the proposed federal bill S.1322, including the most recently enacted legislation in Michigan (2000). The Michigan experience is instructive.

With no clear consensus in the Michigan legislature as to the scope or even desirability of enacting genetic information legislation, and with nearly two-dozen partisan genetic bills introduced on various aspects of genetic privacy and protection from genetic discrimination, the Michigan Commission on Genetic Privacy and Progress ("Commission") was created on September 26, 1997 by Executive Order 1997-14. The Commission's charge, in relevant part, was as follows:

1. The commission shall recommend model state statutory and administrative policies that protect the privacy of genetic information, prevent discrimination based upon such genetic information in the areas of employment, health care, health care insurance, and government recordkeeping, or regulate certain uses of genetic information so as to safeguard the interests of the people of the state of Michigan.

4 ....recommend state policies concerning access to genetic information and the conditions for the release of genetic information by any person or organization, including government.

5 .... recommend state policies concerning the receipt and management of genetic information from any person or organization, including government, and conditions for the use of genetic information by such recipients.

The 11-member Commission conducted a series of public forums in seven cities across the state, including a video conference in an additional three cities. Among other sources of information,the Commission drew upon the findings of a joint University of Michigan/Michigan State University genome policy project, as well as information from a wide variety of state, national, and international private and govemmental organizations.

On February 5, 1999, the Commission issued its Report, with recommendations in the areas of privacy; ownership of genetic information; collection, use and storage; discrimination; in health insurance and employment; definitions of genetic testing and genetic information; education; research; informed consent; and telemedicine and access. A copy of the Commission Report will be submitted for the record of this hearing. In addition, it may be found at www. mdch.state.mi.us/mcgpp/final.

One year later, the Michigan legislature passed a series of eight bills, including a bill on workplace genetic information privacy, by a combined vote of 1,146 to 0 !

Among the most contentious issues in the genetic information debate is the concept of "genetic exceptionalism." That is, the personally identifiable data encrypted in the human genome is so fundamentally different from other health information that it cannot be treated the same, or given the same protections, as laws governing medical record privacy generally. It requires exceptional legal protections. The Michigan experience concluded differently and, based on the recommendations of the Commission, the Michigan legislature unanimously passed three bipartisan bills strengthening health information privacy laws and protecting genetic information the same as other health and medical records. Also instructive with respect to the current federal legislation, Michigan enacted genetic discrimination legislation on a unanimous, bipartisan basis that contained a narrow definition of genetic information and genetic testing which excluded medical histories, physical examinations, and other non-DNA tests.

Although not endorsing the Michigan legislation, I believe that this Committee can be instructed by the Michigan experience. Anything that results in a 1,146-0 vote in a politically divided legislative body simply cannot be all bad. Would that this Congress be able to anywhere near approach such bipartisan unanimity on genetic information discrimination legislation!

GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE ADA

An employer's ability to engage in genetic testing and to use the results of such testing in making various types of employment decisions, may already be limited in a number of ways by the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 42 U.S.C. ' 12101, et seq. Genetic testing is a medical examination and the ADA contains specific provisions limiting the manner in which an employer may conduct medical examinations and inquiries. Also, while a person with a genetic marker or defect probably would not be considered as having an actual "disability" (or a record of a "disability") as the term is defined under the statute, if an employer makes an employment decision based upon an individual's genetic characteristics, then the person may be able to claim that he or she was regarded as having a"disability" and, hence, covered under the provisions of the statute.

Limitations on Genetic Testing in the Workplace The ADA contains specific provisions dealing with the ability of an employer to request or obtain medical information or to require medical examinations. The ADA prohibits absolutely any medical inquiries or medical examinations at the pre-offer stage of the employment application process. 42 U.S.C. ' 12112(d)(2)(A). Genetic screening clearly constitutes a medical inquiry or examination and, hence, the ADA would prohibit an employer, for example, from requiring all job applicants to undergo genetic screening.

Once an offer of employment has been made, the employer may condition that offer upon the successful completion of a medical examination. Id. at ' 12112(d)(3). This so-called conditional offer medical examination specifically is authorized under the ADA and the statute contains no limitations upon the scope of such an examination. Hence, the ADA, at this stage of the employment process, would not prohibit or limit the ability of an employer to engage in genetic screening.

To give a conditional offer examination, however, an employer must satisfy three requirements. First, the examination must be given to all entering employees regardless of disability. Id. at ' 12112(d)(3)(A). Second, the information obtained must be collected and maintained in a confidential manner. 42 U.S.C. ' 12112(d)(3)(B).2 Third, the statute requires that the results of any medical examination may be used only in accordance with the non-discrimination requirements of the statute. Id. ' 12112(d)(3)(C). Generally, this requirement means that an employer may revoke a conditional offer of employment only if the results of the medical examination demonstrate that the individual cannot perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

Finally, the ADA limits an employer's ability to conduct medical examinations or make medical inquiries of current employees to those circumstances where the examination or inquiry can be shown to be "job related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. ' 12112(b)(4)(A). This standard has been interpreted by the EEOC as relating to an employee's present ability to perform the job. See. 29 C.F.R. App. ' 1630.10 (there should be "a fit between job criteria and an applicant's (or employee's) actual ability to do the job"). Because genetic testing normally addresses what may occur in the future, not an individual's actual ability to perform specific job tasks, it remains problematic whether the ADA would allow genetic testing of current employees under the "job relatedness" standard.3

The current trend of judicial decisions recognizes that non-disabled individuals may enforce the statute's restrictions on medical inquiries.4 Hence, even if an individual with a genetic marker or defect is not deemed to be "disabled" within the definition of the ADA, the statue still protects the person from being required to undergo genetic testing unless the testing complies with the above requirements.

Are Persons with Genetic Disorders "Disabled" Under the ADA?

Whether an individual with a genetic defect or trait would be considered "disabled" under the ADA, turns upon the specific definition of"disability" set forth in the statute. The ADA contains a three-part definition of the term. First, a person may be "disabled" if the individual has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 42 U.S.C. ' 12102(a)(A). A person with a genetic trait indicating that the individual has a predisposition to develop a certain type of disease or illness, such as breast cancer, sickle cell anemia, or Huntington's disease, in all likelihood, would not come under this first definition inasmuch as the individual has no present impairment that would substantially limit any major life activities. Rather, the individual has a genetic condition or marker indicating that, in the future, the person is likely to develop an impairment that would substantially limit a major life activity.6

The second part of the ADA definition covers individuals who have a record of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. ' 12102(2)(B). As noted above, a genetic defect or marker is an indication that an individual might develop a future impairment; it is not a marker or record of a past impairment. Hence, the record of impairment prong of the ADA definition of "disability" is not likely to lead to coverage under the ADA for individuals with genetic defects.

The ADA definition of disability, however, is not limited to an assessment of the individual's actual or past physical or mental condition. The third part of the ADA definition of"disability" being "regarded as" having an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities - focuses upon the attitude and perceptions of others. Id. ' 12102(2)(C). Thus, an individual with no actual (or record of an) impairment still may be deemed to be "disabled" under the ADA if other persons perceive or regard that individual as having an impairment that would substantially limit a major life activity.

The EEOC in its March 1995 Interpretative Guidance on the definition of"disability" under the ADA stated that genetic discrimination could be covered under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA definition of disability.6 Thus, if an employer refuses to employ an individual with a genetic marker or defect that indicates the likelihood of the individual developing breast cancer, it may be argued that the employer has perceived the individual as having an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of working.7

Importantly, the EEOC has recognized that an employer's perception that an individual may not be able to perform a particular job does not necessarily mean that the individual has been regarded as being disabled. The employer's perception must limit the person in a broad range or class of jobs. 29 C.F.R. App. ' 1630.20). Thus, if an employer determined that a job applicant with a genetic defect or marker indicating susceptibility to cancer could not work in a particular job involving the use of cancer-causing chemicals, the employer would not have regarded the person as being disabled. In this case, the employer perceived the person as being limited from performing only one particular type of work - not working in general. On the other hand, if an employer refuses to employ the individual with the genetic defect based upon the perception that the person was disqualified not only from working with particular chemicals, but also from working in any job, then the employer regarded the individual as substantially limited in the major life activity of working and, hence, disabled.

It may be said that the third prong of the ADA's definition of disability - being regarded as having a disability - produces a number of anomalies because an employee or job applicant with a genetic defect may or may not be covered by the statute depending upon the subjective views of the employer. In one circumstance, the individual may be deemed disabled, but in another situation with a different employer, the person may not be able to establish statutory coverage. What may seem to be an anomaly in the legislation, however, actually is a result consistent with the purposes of the ADA, which is to prohibit discrimination on the basis of "disability," not necessarily on the basis of an individual's health condition. As the Supreme Court recognized last year in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Congress passed the ADA to prohibit discrimination against a particular segment of our society - persons with disabilities - who have been shut out of the opportunities available to the majority of so-called able-bodied persons.

In general, therefore, under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA, employers must not base employment decisions involving individuals with genetic disorders based upon myths, fears, or stereotypes, but rather upon the person's ability to perform specific required job tasks, with or without reasonable accommodation, in a safe manner.8 ADA's charges now pending before the EEOC will provide additional guidance with regard to the ADA's application to genetic information discrimination.

THE GENETIC NONDISCRIMINATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT ACT, S.1322

First, let me commend the original sponsor of S. 1322, Senator Daschle, for his desire to be proactive in protecting individuals from genetic information discrimination. Let me also assure proponents of the legislation that we have no disagreement in principle as to protection of individuals on the basis of genetic privacy. In fact, I know of no one on this Committee, or among the members of the business community whom I represent in private practice, who does not share in the commitment to nondiscrimination in employment based on genetic information. The issue is how best to achieve that goal without at the same time creating an overly broad, litigation-driven system, when a narrower, privacy-oriented approach might suffice, at least initially until there is some greater empirical evidence that a problem exists calling for a more stringent approach.

In particular, based on my experience in counseling employers with regard to the existing plethora of workplace laws and regulations, I am loathe to recommend the path of "genetic exceptionalism" through the enactment of yet another employment discrimination law, when perhaps an amendment to the ADA or application of medical information privacy laws may be a more suitable, and equally effective, substitute.

I am especially concerned about the potential for litigation abuse which may arise under this legislation. I have witnessed first hand the unintended legal consequences of well-intentioned workplace laws, where employers who cannot win on summary judgment because of material factual issues in dispute are forced to settle employment discrimination claims at all costs to avoid potentially adverse jury verdicts and excessive awards. I am concerned that this legislation, with an overly broad definition of genetic information and unlimited liability for compensatory and punitive damages, may actually serve to foster litigation and workplace disputes. I know that is not the sponsors' intention.

Why then should the legislation avoid the EEOC's procedures of testing the sufficiency of employment discrimination charges prior to ligation, and instead allow claimants of genetic discrimination to proceed directly into court? Why should claimants with genetic discrimination charges be entitled to punitive and compensatory damages greater than those available to most other claimants of employment discrimination, including those who are actually disabled? Why is there no time limitation on the filing of an action, as there is for charges filed with the EEOC under other employment discrimination laws? Why is there not protection from liability or defense for employers who inadvertently receive genetic information, for example in routine health insurance claims, or who innocently receive unsolicited information concerning family histories, or in the language of S. 1322, "information about the occurrence of a disease or disorder in family members"? Is that employer presumptively, therefore, held strictly liable for any adverse employment action even for cause or based on performance? Certainly in the eyes of a jury, and without the filter of an agency such as the EEOC to screen non- meritorious charges, the employer will be hard pressed to demonstrate that the information was not an unlawful factor in the employment decision, especially one involving an individual with a life- threatening genetic marker who is likely to evoke the empathy of a jury. What about exceptions for situations where genetic information may be "job related and consistent with business necessity," which is the ADA standard for post-offer medical examinations and inquiries?

These are a few of the issues I hope will be addressed by this Committee in its consideration of S. 1322. I hope the Committee also will consider alternative forms of genetic protections in the workplace, including greater reliance on existing laws as well as on medical records privacy legislation. Finally, whatever the Committee's final decision may be with regard to genetic information legislation, I hope that it will be subject to the same scrutiny and based on the same careful consideration as that which preceded the passage of legislation by the Michigan legislature.

CONCLUSION

We are all committed to the protection of an individual's right to the privacy of genetic information. Such information should not be used as the basis for employment-related decisions. There is no disagreement on that principle. The remarkable advances of the Human Genome Project should be the source of hope for the world's population, not of fear or anxiety that such information will be misused. Individuals should be encouraged to seek genetic testing without concern that, as a result, they may suffer loss of privacy or loss of employment. Absent such assurances, we may experience the ultimate irony: opening the book of life, but no one willing to take advantage of its teachings.

FOOTNOTES:

1 In preparing this statement, the author gratefully acknowledges consultation with Jonathan Mook, Esq., author of two of the leading treatises on the Americans with Disabilities Act: ADA: Employee Rights and Employer Obligations, and ADA: Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities. The author also appreciates the assistance ofCheye Calvo of the National Conference of State Legislatures, who has closely examined the Michigan law, and its process of enactment.

2 The ADA authorizes disclosure ofmedical information obtained from a conditional medical examination only in the following circumstances: To supervisors and managers who need to be informed about necessary restrictions on the work duties of the employee and any necessary accommodation; To first aid and safety personnel, and; To government officials investigating compliance with the ADA

42 U.S.C. ' 12112(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii).

3 An exception may arise where federal regulations, such as those promulgated by OSHA, would require an employer to engage in medical monitoring of employees. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. ' 655(c)(7) (providing for the monitoring of employee exposure for employee safety).

4 See Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 188 F.3d 964 (Sth Cir. 1999); Griffin v. Steel Tech, Inc., 160 F.3d 591,594 (10th Cir. 1998); Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Health Services, 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999).

5 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), there has been some discussion as to whether or not an argument could be fashioned that genetic disorders may constitute actual disabilities under the statute. The Bragdon case involved an individual with asymptomatic HIV, whom the Supreme Court held was covered under the ADA because the person had an impairment that substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, emphasized that the term "asymptomatic" HIV, in reality, is a misnomer. From the moment of infection with the HIV virus, the body exhibits a number of medical symptoms, although those symptoms may be relatively few and not overtly manifest. Thus, even in the asymptomatic HIV stage, the virus still is thriving within a person's lymph nodes and is causing "immediately abnormalities in a person's blood." 118 S.Ct. at 224. A person with a genetic disorder may exhibit no such abnormalities and, hence, as a practical matter would not be considered to have any actual physical impairment. Thus, the reasoning that the Supreme Court used to classify HIV-positive individuals, even those with asymptomatic HIV, as disabled may not be applicable to individuals possessing genetic indications of disease.

6 The EEOC has opined that the ADA "applies to individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders. Covered entities that discriminate against individuals on the basis of such genetic information are regarding the individuals as having impairments that substantially limit a major life activity. Those individuals, therefore, are covered by the third part of the.definition of"'disability.'" EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA), 902.8(a) (1995).

7 The EEOC has taken the position that "working" may be a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. ' 1630.2(i). However, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, called into question the deference that should be accorded to the EEOC's position.

8 We should recognize, however, that there may be perfectly valid and nondiscriminatory reasons for an employer to consider an employee's genetic information in order to ensure that the employee is working in an environment that would not exacerbate the employee's genetic predisposition to an illness or other health condition. The ADA recognizes that an employer may impose the qualification standard that an employee not pose a "direct threat" to the health or safety of others in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. ' 12113(3). The EEOC has expanded this statutory definition to include the individual with a disability. 29 C.F.K ' 1630.2(0. Protection of a worker may mean that for his or her health and the safety of others, the individual should not be assigned to a job. Recently, however, in Echazabel v. Chevron, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11399 (9th Cir. May 23, 2000), the Ninth Circuit refused to interpret the direct threat standard as being applicable to the health or safety of the individual.

END

LOAD-DATE: July 25, 2000

Document 4 of 45.


Search Terms: health information privacy, House or Senate or Joint
To narrow your search, please enter a word or phrase: