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rives wholly from the government and the small circle around the throne. Titus stresses the

[Page: S14547]  GPO's PDF

   Very seldom does the emperor act in a personal man ner. One such occasion was his criticism of the behavior of the Japanese army in Manchuria (the so-called Manchurian Incident). Another related to his role in connection with the capitulation at the end of World War II. Despite the atomic bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the cabinet was divided and could not come to a decision because the military members refused to surrender. Their motivation: the existence of the imperial system was not sufficiently guaranteed. In a very exceptional move, the emperor was brought in to make the decision. He took the risk, and decided for immediate capitulation.

   Thus the emphasis on the personal sec ret involvement of the emperor in the Khabarovsk trial account make it appear untrustworthy. The whole setup could be perceived as a source of arguments in favor of indicting the emperor. I remember at that time, writing to show the danger of national postwar judgments which could easily be misused for political purposes, and giving the Khabarovsk trial as an example. I must state now that the Japanese misbehavior as described in the judgment, has been confirmed by the recently disclosed American documents.

   Immunity from prosecution was granted in exchange for Japanese scientific findings concerning biological weapons, based on disgusting criminal research on human beings. We learn from these documents that it was considered a bargain: almost for nothing, information was obtained that had cost millions of dollars and thousands of human lives. The American authorities were worrying only about the prospect of the human outcry in the United States, which surely would have taken place if the American people had been informed about this ``deal.''

   The security that surrounds the military makes it possible for military behavior to deviate considerably from the prevailing public standard, but it is a danger to society when such deviation takes place. It leads gradually to contempt for the military, as witness the public attitude in connection with military behavior in the Vietnam war. The kind of military behavior that occurred in connection with the Japanese biological weapon atrocities can only contribute further to this attitude.

   Respect for what the Nuremberg judgment called ``the honorable profession of arms'' is needed. Military power is still indispensable in our present world to provide for peace and security, so it is desirable for it to be held in high esteem. Power which is despised may become dangerous. Moreover, only if the military is regarded with respect, will it attract the personnel it should have.

   The same is true of diplomatic service, which needs national and international respect. This respect will disappear if the service indulges in subversive activities, as the U.S. diplomatic mission did in Iran. That diplomatic misbehavior in Iran led to developments--the hostage crisis--which were disastrous for the whole world.

   The documents which have come to light inform us also of the use of biological weapons in the war against the Chinese people. The criminal warfare was not mentioned in the Tokyo indictment, and not discussed before the Military Tribunal. It was kept secret from the world. The immunity granted to the Japanese war criminals covered not only deadly research on living persons, but also the use of biological weapons against the Chinese. And all this so that the United States could obtain exclusive access to the information, ga ined at the cost of thousands of human lives.

   Knowledge about what kind of bargain was being struck in the biological weapons area may strengthen the perception of the repulsiveness of war. It may also show the danger of moral depravity, in peacetime, within the circles that have the instruments of military power in their hands.

   END NOTES

   1. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), pp. 19-21. This volume is a summary of the transcript of the Soviet trial in Khabarovsk, Siberia, Dec. 20-25, 1949, of 12 captured Japanese Army personnel charged with participation in the biological warfare program. For a later reference to the program see Outline History of Science and Technology in Japan, (``Nihon Kagaku Gijutsu-shi Taikei''), Vol. 25 (Medicine 2, 1967), pp. 309-10. This account states that the biological warfare program was organized in 1933 and that ``for special research on bacteria, members of the epidemic-prevention section shall be sent to Manchuria.'' It also stated that little was known about the program after the war since all records were said to have been destroyed and that the only evidence was that produced at the Khabarovsk trial. It did add, however, that there were reports that General Ishii had avoided prosecution by turning over his materials to U.S. authorities. I have not seen this volume and am indebted to John Dower, of the University of Wisconsin, who supplied the citation.

   2. Ienaga Saburo, The Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

   3. Although most U.S. documents and the Soviet trial summary give Ishii credit for originating the biological warfare program, it is possible that he was only the chosen instrument. There are references indicating interest in the program at higher levels. The ``staff officer'' of Ishii's Operations Division was Lieutenant Colonel Miyata, who in real life was Prince Takeda [1, p. 40]. Ishii's friend at court was Gen. Nagata Tetsuzan, long Japan's top military man [1, pp. 106, 295], while the orders establishing the two original units were reputedly issued by the Emperor [1, pp. 10, 104, 413].

   4. ``A Bruise--Terror of the 731 Corps,'' Tokyo Broadcasting System television documentary, produced by Yoshinaga Haruko, shown Nov. 2, 1976. It has also been screened in Europe but not in the United States. However, the Washington Post (Nov. 19, 1976) carried a lengthy news story describing the film. In an interview with Post reporter John Saar, Yoshinaga said five former members of the biological warfare unit told her they were promised complete protection in return for cooperation with U.S. authorities. ``All the important documents were given to the United States,'' she said.

   5. This ``top secret'' cable [C-52423] also reveals that the first of the biological warfare experts to be sent from Washington to Japan had already arrived, referring to ``Dr. Norbert H. Fell's letters via air courier to General Alden C. Waitt,'' who was then chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps.

   6. Cable from Washington to Tokyo on April 2, 1947, stating that Fell would leave for Japan on April 5. A cable from Tokyo to the War Department on June 30, 1947, warns that an ``aggressive prosecution will adversely affect U.S. interests'' and urges that Fell (presumably now returned to Washington) be shown recent cables because he is an expert and can appreciate the value of the Japanese BW material.

   7. Top secret Memorandum for the Record (May 6, 1947) indicated it was in response to ``War Department Radio W-94446 & SWNCC 351/1 and was signed ``RPM 26-6166''.

   8. ``Summary Report on B.W. Investigations.'' Dated Dec. 12, 1947, and addressed to General Alden C. Waitt.

   9. Dated july 1, 1947, and titled, ``Interrogation of Certain Japanese by Russian Prosecutor,'' this memo also lists some of the material already obtained, including a ``60 page report'' covering experiments on humans and notes that other data confirms, supplements and complements U.S. research and ``may suggest new fields for future research.'' Record Group No. 153, National Archives.

   10. This July 15, 1947, memo is addressed to Commander J.B. Cresap and signed ``Cecil F. Hubbert, member working party (SWNCC 351/2/D).''

   11. Undated and titled ``SFE 182/2,'' it was part of National Archives Record Group No. 153.

   12. ``Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China,'' Peking, 1952.

   13. Theodor Rosebury, Peace or Pestilence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949).

   14. In order to ascertain the Nationalist position on this issue after the passage of some 40 years, I checked with Taipei and am grateful to Lieutenant General Teng Shu-wei, of the Nationalist Defense Ministry's Medical Bureau, who searched the Taiwan archives. His report is in substantial agreement with the records of the People's Republic in Beijing, although less complete.

   15. Bungei Shunju 6, Aug. 1955; Jimbutsu O 2hrai (July 10, 1956).

   16. ``Terrible Modern Strategic War'' by Kimura Bumpei. I have not seen this book and am relying upon a brief description of it contained in a March 31, 1959, letter from Tokyo attorney Morikawa Kinju to A.L. Wirin, chief counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union in Los Angeles.

   17. Sunday Mainichi, No. 1628 (Jan. 27, 1952).

   18. ``Songo-Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever,'' report dated Nov. 13, 1947, based on interview with General Kitano Masaji and Dr. Kasahara Shiro.

   19. ``Feathers as Carriers of Biological Warfare Agents,'' Biological Department, Chemical Corps So and C Divisions (Dec. 15, 1950).

   20. Leroy D. Fothergill, M.D., ``Biological Warfare: Nature & Consequences,'' Texas State Journal of Medicine (Jan. 1964).

   21. New York Times (Nov. 26, 1969).

   22. Washington Post (Sept. 20, 1970).

   This article is based, in part, on an article by the author in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (P.O. Box W, Charlemont, MA 01339), 12:4, pp. 2-15.

   By Mr. SHELBY (for himself and Mr. BRYAN):

   S. 1903. A bill to amend the privacy pro visions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

   CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT

   Mr. SHELBY.

   Mr. President, I rise today to offer the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act '' for myself and Senator BRYAN. This bill would address the significant deficiencies in the Financial Services Modernization Act passed by this very body last week.

   Our bill would provide that consumers have (1) notice of the categories

[Page: S14548]  GPO's PDF

   I know some think that opt-in is extreme, but I have to tell you that is what the American people want. Over the past year I have learned a great deal about the activities of institutions sharing sensitive personal inf ormation. Ma ny may not be aware, but it had become a common practice for state department of motor vehicles to sell the drivers license information, in cluding name, height, weight, social security number, vehicle identification number, motor vehicle record and more. Some states even sold the digital photo image of each driver's license.

   I was not aware of this practice going on. When I learned about it and studied it a little closer, I found several groups who were outraged by this practice. One such group was Eagle Forum. Another such group was the ACLU. Still another group was the Free Congress Foundation. Before I knew it, there was an ad hoc coalition of groups not only supporting the issue of driver's license privacy, bu t demanding it.

   Thanks to the hard work of these groups, I was able to include an opt-in provision for people applying for drivers licenses at their state department of motor vehicles. That provision sailed through the Senate and then the House. That bill was signed into law by President Clinton. Despite significant lobbying by the direct marketing industry, not one member of the House or Senate took to the floor and said, ``I believe we should not allow consumers to choose whether or not their drivers license information, in cluding their picture, should be sold or traded

   away like an old suit.'' No, no one objected to the opt-in. As a result, I believe very strongly that Congress has already set the bar on this issue. Opt-in is not just reasonable, it is the right thing to do.

   Meanwhile, the ad hoc coalition, which is continuing to grow and includes every ideology from conservative to liberal, has signed on to four basic principles with regard to financial privacy. Th e principles include notice, access and consent, but also a requirement that weak federal laws not preempt stronger state laws. Our amendment incorporates those four basic principles.

   Now my basic question is this, why would anyone oppose this bill? Only if you believe the financial services industry cannot make money by doing business above the table and on the level for everyone to see in the ``sunshine'' if you will. If you believe that financial institutions make money only by deceiving their customers or leaving those customers in the dark, then maybe you should oppose this bill. I do not subscribe to such a belief.

   Industry will tell you that if they are required to include an opt-in, consumers will not, and therefore business will shut down. What does that tell you that consumers won't choose to opt-in? It means people don't want their information sha red. If that is such a problem, it seems to me the business would spend more time educating the consumer as to the benefits of information sha ring. That is where the burden to convince the consumer to buy the product should be--on the business.

   During the financial modernization debate, the financial industry, along with Citigroup communicated to Congress that they would not be able to operate or function appropriately with an opt-in requirement. I find that very difficult to comprehend, seeing as Citibank signed an agreement with their German affiliates in 1995 affording German citizens the opportunity to tell Citibank ``no,'' they did not want their personal dat a shared with third parties. I have a copy of the contract to prove it.

   Entitled, Agreement on ``Interterritorial Data Protection'' one can see this is an agreement on the sharing of customer information bet ween Citibank (South Dakota), referred in the document as CNA, and its German affiliates. On page two paragraph 4, entitled, Use of Subcontractors, Transmission of Data to Third Parties, number 2 reads:

   For marketing purposes, the transfer of personal dat a to third parties provided by the Card Service Companies (that is Citicorp of Germany and Citicorp Card Operations of Germany) is prohibited, except in those cases where such personal dat a is transferred to affiliated companies engaged in banking business in order to market financial services; the transfer of such data beyond the aforementioned scope to third parties, shall require the Card Service Companies' express approval. Such approval is limited to the scope of the Card Customers' consent as obtained on the application form.

   That ladies and gentlemen, is an opt-in to operate in Germany, by none other than Citigroup, the number one proponent of financial modernization. Now if they can offer financial privacy to individuals in Germany, why on God's green earth can't they agree to an opt-in here in America? Do Germans have special rights over Americans? I should hope not.

   Mr. President, simply put, this bill is what Americans want. This bill is workable as proven in the Citicorp agreement. The truth is that the American people do not understand the intricacies of banking law or securities regulation. They probably do not know or care much about affiliates or operating subsidiaries. What I do know, is that if you walked outside and polled people from New York City to Los Angeles, CA, and everywhere in between, they would not only understand financial privacy, 90 percent of them would demand financial privacy and the ability to tell an institution ``no.''

   Mr. President, in passing the financial modernization bill, Congress gave mammoth financial services companies significant expanded powers and unprecedented ability to collect, share, buy and sell a consumers nonpublic personal fin ancial information. Du ring the debate, many members promised they would address privacy, bu t only in a separate bill at a later time. Well, Mr. President, the time is now and the bill is the ``Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act .''

   The financial industry may have won the battle by keeping stronger financial privacy pro visions out of the financial modernization bill. But I assure you they have not won the war. They cannot win the war on financial privacy bec ause the American people just won't allow it.

   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the agreement on ``International Data Protection'' be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   Agreement on Interterritorial Data Protection

   BY AND BETWEEN
1..Citicorp Kartenservice GmbH, Wilhelm-Leuschner-Str. 32, 60329 Frankfurt/M, Germany (CKS)
2..Citicorp Card Operations GmbH, Bentheimer Stra be 118, 48529 Nordhorn, Germany (CCO)

   (CKS and CCO hereinafter collectively referred to as: Card Service Companies)

3..Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Attn.: Office of the President, 701 E. 60th Street North, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117 (CNA)
4..Citibank Privatkunden AG, Kasernenstra be 10, 40213 Du 4sseldorf, Germany (CIP)

   RECITAL

   1. CIP has unrestricted authority to engage in banking transactions. As a license of VISA International, CIP issues the Citibank Visa Card''. Additionally, since July 1st, 1995, CIP has been cooperating with the Deutsche Bahn AG in issuing the ``DB/Citibank BahnCard'' with a cash-free payment function--hereinafter referred to as ``DB/Citibank-BahnCard''--on the basis of a Co-Branding Agreement concluded between Deutsche Bahn AG and CIP on November 18th, 1994. After the conclusion of the Agreement, the co-branding business was extended to include the issuance of the DB/Citibank BahnCard without a cash-free payment function, known as BahnCard ``pure''.

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