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Copyright 1999 Federal News Service, Inc.  
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JUNE 30, 1999, WEDNESDAY

SECTION: IN THE NEWS

LENGTH: 5117 words

HEADLINE: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF
MICHAEL SALSBURY
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL
MCI WORLDCOM, INC.
BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

BODY:

 
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Hyde, and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to speak to you today about the far-sightedness of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, why that landmark statute is so much more than just a short-term experiment, and why it should be preserved just as important benefits to consumers are being realized. In particular, the provisions of H.R. 1685 and H.R. 1686 that would permit the Bell Companies to offer interLATA service before opening their local networks to competition would break Congress' 1996 promise to consumers, and to the telecom industry, to bring competition to one of the last remaining monopolies in America -- the local telephone market. These bills offer a legislative solution to a non-existent problem, while ignoring the real problem: that three years after the fact, the local markets for voice and data services are not yet open. The solution to that very real problem is vigorous enforcement of the law Congress already has enacted, not new legislation seeking to reverse the pro-competitive provisions applicable to the local telecom markets.
I am the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of MCI WorldCom. In addition to being a large long distance carrier, MCI WorldCom is the largest of the facilities-based competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") and, through its UUNET subsidiary, is one of the world's largest Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). More than anything else, except perhaps the singular vision and concerted efforts of entrepreneurs like Bill McGowan and Bernie Ebbers, MCI WorldCom owes much of its success -- and, indeed, its very existence -- to this nation's open and competitive telecommunications markets. These markets did not simply spring to life unassisted. It took the hard work of a whole host of policymakers -- from Congress, to the Reagan Justice Department, to the FCC, to a tenacious district court judge -- to pry open the previously closed, monopolistic markets for long distance services, information services, and telecommunications equipment. If nothing else, this history demonstrates that free markets do not always become free on their own. Often, government has a critical role to play in creating the necessary structure and ground rules that allow previously-closed markets to flourish with full competition.
The Telecommunications Act enhanced this legacy of competitive long distance telecommunications and information service markets by mandating the end to monopoly in the local market as well. Congress could have simply enacted, by itself, what is now Section 253 of the Act, which requires the state and local governments to remove barriers to entry in the telecommunications markets. But Congress wisely chose to go far beyond that simplistic approach. The '96 Act begins, as it must, by acknowledging the fundamental and undeniable advantages of local carrier incumbency -- from massive economies of scale and scope, to pervasive company name recognition. In order to break the local phone companies' chokehold over the infamous "last mile" to and from nearly every home and business in America, Section 251 of the Act creates multiple pathways for competitive providers to enter the local market. Whether on a pure facilities basis, or through unbundled network elements ("UNEs"), or through resale, the Act leaves it up to the individual competitor to select the most appropriate business model -- and then, simply, compete. The genius of the Act is that, once the incumbent LECs carry out their statutory obligations, many competitors will be able to use these pathways to devise new and innovative ways to provide low-cost, beneficial services to consumers.
Of course, it isn't quite as simple as that. Breaking the entrenched monopoly over the last mile is a formidable challenge to even the most nimble competitor. This is not surprising; after all, stretching back to the early 1980s, when the Reagan Justice Department crafted the landmark antitrust settlement decree that would become the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), it was well understood that the Bell Companies and GTE, left to their own devices, would do what any other business in their enviable position would do, namely, through a variety of anticompetitive practices, to first, foreclose competition in their own markets, while second, extend their monopolies into adjacent markets, such as long distance and information services. As a result, the MFJ created a virtual wall of separation between the Bell Companies' monopoly local services -- viewed by many then as a natural monopoly -- and the newly-competitive world of long distance services, information services, and customer premises equipment. The Bell Companies were forbidden to enter that competitive world unless and until they could demonstrate they would cause no significant harm to competition.
Now, fully fifteen years after the MFJ was first put into place, it is safe to say that the long distance market is robustly competitive. At last count, over twelve hundred companies -- from giants like AT&T, to mid-sized national facilities-based carriers, to the smallest resellers -- are busily competing head-on to provide every conceivable option in long distance services. Long distance rates have plummeted more than seventy percent in that span, and are falling further all the time. Where the Sunday afternoon phone call to a distant relative once was viewed as a momentous and wallet-sapping proposition, today MCI WorldCom charges only a nickel per minute. Innovations such as competitive collect calling services and "10-10" services also have been developed. It is a similar success story with regard to the telecommunications equipment and information services.
In passing the Telecommunications Act, Congress both recognized the salient pro-competitive lessons of the MFJ, and sought to go beyond them. It was no longer taken as gospel that consumers could never enjoy the fruits of competition in the local telephone market. Instead, Congress directed the FCC to establish rules that would end one of the last remaining monopolies in this country. In return, once the Bell Companies complied with those market-opening rules, they would no longer be limited by the long distance restrictions first imposed on them as part of the MFJ. Instead, the Bell Companies would be permitted to provide all long distance services -- including interLATA services -- within their home regions. It should be noted that, from day one, the Act has allowed the Bell Companies to provide local and long distance services anywhere outside their home regions, a significant opportunity that none of them has chosen to pursue. The Bell Companies hold the keys to long distance in their own hands -- once they decide to comply with the law, the remaining interLATA restrictions will be gone.
As with the breakup of AT&T, it has taken concerted action by policymakers to bring competition to a local telephone market where none has existed before. And, while the final battle over monopoly is far from won, at least we can see promise of victory from where we stand. As just one example, today there are 146 facilities-based CLECs, serving some 4.4 million customers. This compares to just 13 competitive local carriers before the Act was enacted into law.
Through the Telecommunications Act, Congress provided the critical tools designed to ensure that access to last mile facilities is made available to competitors. Congress rightly recognized that only competition delivers the best technologies, the best service, and the best prices to consumers. Thus, Section 251(c) requires, among other things, that incumbent LECs provide access to their network elements on an unbundled basis at cost-based rates. In this manner, the '96 Act ensures that new entrants will be able to use the incumbent LECs' local network where necessary, and that consumers would have the maximum possible competitive choices.

Competitors are obligated to pay the ILECs for every element, facility, and service they use. In MCI WorldCom's view, Congress struck just the right competitive balance three years ago. We have endured three long years of protracted litigation, which ultimately has culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the pro-competitive policy choices made by Congress, and carried out by the FCC. It would be a grave mistake to upset that delicate balance crafted by Congress and the Commission just as consumers are beginning to see the fruits of competition.
Some may be surprised to learn that the Internet is another singular example of government's successful affirmative efforts to create a vibrant free market where none existed before. The federal government, at first unintentionally, laid the groundwork for today's Internet through a variety of government-sponsored programs. In the late 1960s, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated its ARPA project, culminating in the so-called "ARPANET" backbone. Through the 1970s and early 1980s, the Defense Department administered the ARPANET and allowed certain users of other research and academic networks, such as CSNET, to interconnect and utilize the ARPANET resources. In 1986, the National Science Foundation started up its own NSFNET backbone and chose the "TCP/IP" protocol -- developed by Vint Cerf, now of MCI WorldCom, and Bob Kahn -- the very lingua franca of the Internet. The government also ramped up its management role and bore many of the costs of deploying and maintaining the backbone infrastructure. Some ten years later, in 1995, the government officially abandoned its Appropriate Use Policy, under which the NSFNET could not be used for commercial purposes. Instead, the government ceased federal funding and privatized the NSFNET, leaving it open to any consumer or business to begin developing whatever commercial or non-commercial applications they chose. Without those efforts, the Internet would not exist today.
The end results of the government's overt decision to create and nurture the Internet space? The Internet is different from anything else we human beings have ever witnessed before. At some basic level, each of us is aware that the Internet already holds the key to our future. Its ability as a public "network of networks" to ubiquitously reach and connect everyone -- from customers, employees, and suppliers to friends and family -- is changing how we do everything. Consumer demand for services provided via the Internet appears unquenchable. For example, demand for Internet bandwidth doubles every 3 or 4 months. That is astonishing. The Internet already accounts for 50 percent of the traffic on the world's communications networks. By some estimates, the Internet will soak up 90 percent of all bandwidth by 2003, and 99 percent by 2004. In just a few short years, the Internet has become, in the words of the Council of Economic Advisors, "the engine that drives our economy." On the supply side of the information services marketplace, business also is booming. For the past three years, MCI WorldCom has increased the capacity of its UUNET backbone by over 1,000 percent each year to handle peak traffic loads. Other backbone providers -- from AT&T to Sprint to PSINet to GTE -- also have increased their capacity, and still others -- such as Qwest, Level 3, and Williams -- are building entirely new nationwide networks designed specifically to handle Internet traffic. All in all, some forty-seven different backbone providers now are competing. As a result, all but three LATAs (194 out of 197) are served by 4 or more different Internet backbone providers, and the capacity of Internet backbone networks has exploded from only 1.2 terabits per second in 1996 to 21.7 terabits per second in 1999. You don't have know what a terabit is to understand that the capacity of the backbone networks have expanded twenty fold.
There also is good news with regard to one's ability to access the Internet. Consumers today reach the Internet almost exclusively through an ordinary telephone call, placed over ordinary copper lines. Because the incumbent LECs are required by the FCC to allow consumers to reach any ISP they choose, competition has flourished. In the case of MCI WorldCom, we offer dial-up access to the Internet through a local call to about 95 percent of the lines in the continental United States. UUNET alone has about 750 local points of presence all over the country. At last count, there were some 6,500 independent providers of Internet access, or ISPs, out there, through which more than 79 million Americans get their Internet service. Well over 90 percent of all Americans can choose from among four or more ISPs for local dial-up access, which is more than you can say for local telephone service. So, thanks again to the government's open market requirements, access to the Internet has become available ubiquitously to virtually all Americans.
The lesson here, regarding the long distance industry, the local marketplace, and the Internet, is what I would call the lesson of open platforms. Where policymakers create and maintain open markets, where a multiplicity of providers and users can interact in a myriad of mutually beneficial ways, all will derive the full benefits of competition. This openness feeds on itself, multiplying the effect still further. Like the Internet itself, open competition in the Internet backbone and Internet access is in the best interest of consumers and competitors alike. Just imagine, if you could, how history would have been changed profoundly if the two graduate students who created Mosaic -- the software underlying the world's first Web browser for Netscape -- had been prevented from bringing the fruits of their innovation to the open platform of the Internet. The list of such examples goes on and on.
As I'm sure you are aware, there now is considerable market demand for higher speed access to the Internet, beyond the capabilities of the normal dial-up connections familiar to all of us. The latest telephone capability to be deployed to residential and small business customers is called Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL"), a decade old technology that competition is finally forcing the ILECs to offer consumers. On the cable side, so-called cable modems provide a similar high-speed, broadband connection to consumers. The good news is that both capabilities are being deployed by ILECs, CLECs, and cable companies on an expedited basis. The bad news is that, unless MCI WorldCom and other competitors can buy or lease access to the last mile facilities and services of the incumbent monopolies -- both telephone and cable -- consumers will have little or no choice for high-speed Internet services. In this regard, MCI WorldCom is certainly supportive of the efforts of H.R. 1685 and H.R. 1686 to ensure that open broadband access is offered by cable providers and by local exchange providers. The lesson of open platforms can be applied to these monopolies by maintaining the pro-competitive provisions of the '96 Act with regard to the ILECs, and applying fundamental nondiscrimination, interconnection, and resale requirements with respect to the cable companies.
MCI WorldCom is certainly doing its part to bring the promised benefits of the Information Age to its customers. For starters, we tripled our local network capacity last year. Where we can reach our customers' premises with our own facilities, we are providing them with high-speed Internet access using DSL technology. UUNET, our Internet company, has mounted the first, and biggest, national deployment of broadband DSL access to data, starting with 400 points of presence (POPs) late last year, with the aggressive goal of reaching at least 1,000 POPs by the end of this year. We are expanding our consumer service trials and partnering with other data CLECs so that we can provide the same innovations to consumers and small businesses. As soon as we can get to them, we can hit the ground running with fast, reliable, affordable service. We are not just limiting ourselves to the telephone network; we are also readying our networks to provide service through cable modems the same way we enable ISPs to do so through DSL technologies. We are also investing in fixed wireless technologies so we can reach consumers in suburban and urban markets.
And it is not just my company that is providing these services on a competitive basis. Data CLECs like Covad, Northpoint, Rythms NetConnections, and others are all at the cutting edge of bring these advanced services to the consumer.
This competition brings with it more good news. Competition is causing the incumbents themselves to deploy broadband services. In fact, the ILECs are accelerating their DSL deployment plans as a result of competitive pressure from cable modems and data CLECs, far surpassing their original intentions and announcements. Wall Street analyst SG Cowen said just two months ago that "if recent activity is any indication, 1999 could be a strong year for last-mile technologies - cable and XDSL.... Cable operators have stepped up the pace of deploying high-speed data services, forcing the incumbent LECs to draw up ADSL plans." So, despite their protestations that they must have regulatory relief before they can deploy these advanced services in their territories, the Bell Companies are engaged in a massive rollout of these services.

The companies' own press releases speak volumes about what is actually happening in the marketplace: o In April of 1999, following an announcement that it would slash ADSL prices, SBC projected that its DSL deployment would reach 9.5 million homes by the end of this year.
- That same month, Bell Atlantic announced that 8 million homes in its region will have ADSL access in 1999 and increase to 16 million by 2000.
- Ameritech announced that it will have DSL service available to 70% of its customers by 2000.
- BellSouth will reach 5.1 million customers with DSL by the end of this year.
- US West is already offering its self-described "lightning fast" ADSL to 5.5 million customers in 40 cities across 14 states.
Only three years ago, the Yankee Group predicted that ADSL would be available to less than 4 million American homes by the year 2000. But, the above announcements mean that over 25 MILLION homes will be able to utilize DSL services by the end of 1999. That is quite an accomplishment. It is self-evident that competition is forcing the incumbents LECs to deploy DSL throughout their regions. In short, the Telecom Act is working.
Nonetheless, despite about the astounding achievements brought about by competitive markets, and the compelling need to create and maintain open platforms, we are now at a critical crossroads. Much of this hard-fought success hinges on keeping the last mile open to consumers, and open to competition. We have to resist the urge to excuse the incumbents from their competitive requirements under the Act, in exchange for their pie-in-the-sky promises of purported social good. In the past few months, the incumbent LECs have come up with some carefully-crafted myths they would have you believe to justify a rollback of the Telecommunications Act. None of them is true.
For example, the ILECs claim that maintaining and enforcing the Telecommunications Act's local competition provisions is tantamount to "regulating the Internet." This is nonsense. The Telecommunications Act's local competition provisions concern only the local telecommunications facilities and services that form the last mile between a customer and the telecom network. These facilities and services can be, and are, used for a variety of local telecommunications services, including traditional voice service, dial-up Internet access, and DSL service. The local competition provisions of the Telecom Act are necessary to keep Internet access from becoming completely dominated by the ILECs -- to the detriment of consumers, and the Internet itself.
The incumbent LECs next insist that competitors shouldn't be permitted to utilize the network elements underlying advanced services like DSL, or subscribe to DSL services from the ILECs at wholesale rates. It is obvious why the ILECs would want to eliminate the UNE and resale pathways -- this would force competitors to provide, install, and maintain their own advanced services facilities everywhere, a process that would take decades, cost billions, and strand much of the investment in local networks that consumers have already paid to the Bell Companies. In reality, however, competitors need all three competitive entry pathways promised by the Telecommunications Act in order to provide robust and ubiquitous DSL offerings. In particular, competitors such as MCI WorldCom need the UNE pathway to provide coverage for a nationwide customer base. The ILECs already own and control all central offices and remote terminals necessary to reach all potential customers, and enjoy considerable economies of scale, scope, and density, low-cost collocation in their own facilities, and unique access to Universal Service subsidies for high-cost residential customers. The resale of services and the leasing of facilities were instrumental in paving the way for facilities-based competition in the long distance industry -- why would we choose to abandon that successful model now? The ILECs also argue that they do not possess market power in the provision of "advanced services" such as DSL. The simple truth is that the ILECs have every monopoly-derived advantage in providing DSL service that they also enjoy in providing other local telecommunications services. DSL is a local transmission technology, compatible only with copper loops, and the ILECs obviously possess market power over local telecommunications services provided over copper loops. The infrastructure necessary to deploy DSL is exactly the same as is necessary to provide any other local telecommunications services. The ILECs continue to own and control all central offices needed to deploy DSL equipment and data transport facilities, all local loops needed to deploy DSL services, and all support systems needed to support DSL services. The ILECs also continue to have exclusive access to all residential customers. As DSL could eventually become the basic loop carrier technology of the 21st Century, the ILECs seek to extend their control over today's voice-dominated local loop to tomorrow's DSL-enabled loop.
Perhaps the single biggest myth perpetrated by the ILECs is that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was only about voice, not data. In reality, the Act includes both telecommunications services and information services, in a technology neutral manner. Indeed, there is no sustainable legal, or logical, distinction between "traditional" local services and "advanced" local services. The Act nowhere makes any such distinctions, and any attempt to define a local service based on the types of technologies it employs, or the types of functionalities it provides, makes no sense. From a technical standpoint, there is no feasible way of enforcing a "data" versus "voice" distinction. Data "bits" and voice "bits" look exactly the same from the network's perspective. As I mentioned previously, data is quickly overtaking voice; today at least half of all traffic on the public network is data. In four years, data will comprise up to 90 percent of all traffic on the public network.
Further, Section 271 of the Act includes an express prohibition on the Bell Companies' provision of interLATA information services, and refers to both telecommunications services and information services. In particular, Section 271(g)(2) grants a narrow exception to the general prohibition by authorizing the Bell Companies to provide Internet services to elementary and secondary schools. This exception would be wholly unnecessary if the Act did not already prohibit the Bell Companies from providing interLATA information services. Significantly, the Bell Companies never contested the FCC's 1996 ruling on this point, or sought review by a federal appellate court.
The Bell Companies also complain that they require interLATA relief in order to be able to provide DSL to consumers, especially in rural areas. In truth, the Section 271 prohibition on the provision of interLATA services is completely unrelated to the Bell Companies' ability to deploy local telecom services like DSL. US West told Congress earlier this year that deployment of DSL capability requires installation of ATM switches, and that the interLATA restriction makes DSL cost-prohibitive because it artificially compels US West to place an ATM switch in each LATA. However, my understanding is that ATM switches are relatively inexpensive, generally on the order of $20,000 to $30,000 each. And, if a provider has ten percent or more of the DSL traffic in a LATA, installation of an ATM switch is virtually a necessity. Perhaps for these reasons, US West already has either deployed, or announced immediate intentions to deploy, a total of 127 ATM switches, including at least one ATM switch in 23 of 27 LATAs in which US West provides service. US West's own actions show that no interLATA relief is required for US West to do what it is already doing: installing ATM switches to provide DSL services to US West's customers.
Further, any claims by the Bell Companies and GTE that they will provide advanced services to rural communities seems unlikely. The Bell Companies have always served predominantly urban and suburban markets, leaving most rural exchanges to the independents. This bias against operating in rural markets has only increased recently. In the past few years, US West has sold off over sixty of its local exchanges in the more rural areas of Washington, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Idaho. Last year, GTE announced plans to sell up to 8 percent, or 1.7 million access lines, of its local exchange operations, mostly in low-density rural areas. It is difficult to discern any commitment by these large ILECs to serve rural markets with DSL services. Moreover, in many cases, the smaller independent LECs are well ahead of the larger ILECs in deploying infrastructure and providing advanced services such as DSL. In fact, by the end of 1997, rural LECs had installed over 40,000 route miles of fiber optic cable in states like Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa.
Finally, any blanket exemption from the LATA requirements of the Act for all data transmissions is unwarranted as a matter of national policy. Congress, in crafting the 1996 Act, carefully designed the only legally sanctioned incentives system for the Bell Companies. When the Bell Companies meet their local competition obligations, they are free to enter the in-region interLATA market.

Elimination of even intrastate LATA boundaries for data telecommunications would completely undermine Section 271 by stifling the very incentives necessary to compel the Bell Companies to comply with the market-opening provisions of the Act. Excusing the Bell Companies from compliance with the fundamental interLATA requirements of the 1996 Act for data services would ignore the increasing convergence of voice and data, and the inability to exclude voice bits from data bits.
Enough debunking of myths. This country decided three years ago to reject the notion of natural monopolies in the local exchange, and to choose instead the path of free and open competition. In contrast, industrial policy, even in the pleasing guise of "deregulation," does not work. That form of government intervention is precisely what limits or even forecloses the opportunity for competition to develop -- hurting the very constituencies it purports to serve. Broadband deployment in all parts of the country -- urban, suburban, and rural -- can only be accomplished by fostering, not frustrating, the beginnings of real competition.
The way to do that is to make sure that last mile facilities are not closed off to competition. Again, all of the infrastructure advancements I just talked about are irrelevant if competitors cannot reach customers, and customers cannot reach the ISP or telecom vendor of their choice. Competitors like MCI WorldCom must have non- discriminatory access to last-mile incumbent facilities in order to provide advanced, innovative new services and technologies that benefit consumers everywhere. This is not a discretionary item. We have residential long distance customers everywhere in the country. These customers tell us they want new choices for local phone service and Internet access.
The investment community also is counting on Congress not to overturn the '96 Act. Wall Street has come to expect legal certainty to ensure that there is a competitive environment for broadband. Investors know that the Internet is an increasingly central component to business models for carriers, ISPs, electronic commerce, and the information technology industry, and that the ultimate resolution of the broadband access issue will fundamentally impact the way different industries' business plans develop in the Internet space. None of those plans, I assure you, will or can be realized through a closed network. The financial markets need the law to be maintained, just as competitors do. Reversing the antitrust-based principles, market rules, and safeguards set forth in the Act, and specifically designed to promote the development of competition, will only hinder broadband deployment and allow dominant incumbents, be they telcos or cable providers, to leverage their market power over the last mile to broadband access, and into the Internet.
In closing, I again appeal to you to safeguard the Information Age economy by enforcing the law and the principles of competition. Remember that incumbents have a long history of broken promises in connection with infrastructure programs and regulatory bargains. Nothing is worth the price of competition we have all fought so hard to win for American consumers. The Internet's phenomenal development has already demonstrated that Congress did the right thing in 1996 by focusing on opening up access to monopoly local distribution facilities. Policymakers will continue to play a critical role in enforcing the pro-competitive provisions of the Act, which hold the key to the future of broadband in America. To turn back now, and retreat from all the painstaking advances of the past three years, would be a disastrous blow to the future of telecommunications competition, and to the information economy that depends on it.
Thank you.
END


LOAD-DATE: July 1, 1999




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