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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

July 20, 2000, Thursday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 6960 words

HEADLINE: TESTIMONY July 20, 2000 JAMES MCCARTHY GENERAL MANAGER , CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION SENATE AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY ENERGY COST AND AGRICULTURE

BODY:
July 20, 2000 Written Statement of James McCarthy General Manager, CITGO Petroleum Corporation Before the Senate Agriculture Committee Good morning. I am Jim McCarthy, General Manager, Government and Public Affairs at CITGO Petroleum Corporation. CITGO is a U. S. corporation headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Our roots extend back to the early 1900's as Cities Service Company. While our products are marketed throughout most of the U.S., we primarily serve those regions east of the Rockies. We own and/or operate a network of modern refineries in Houston, Corpus Christi, Texas, Lake Charles, Louisiana, and Lemont, Illinois. In addition, we own asphalt refineries in Paulsboro, New Jersey and Savannah, Georgia. To get our products to where the American public needs them, we own one of the nation's most extensive systems of petroleum storage terminals. According to the latest data available, CITGO is the second largest marketer of gasoline in the United States with 10.3 % share of the market.(1) I am pleased and honored to have the opportunity to speak before the Senate Agriculture Committee about gasoline supply and price, as well as the overall issue of providing the energy that is so critical to the American farmer and to this nation's economic well-being. CITGO and the rest of the refining, marketing and transportation industry share your concern regarding the recent spike in energy prices. CITGO empathizes with those families whose household budgets felt the impact of the rapidly rising gasoline prices in the Chicago and Milwaukee markets. It is our sincerest hope that a sound, cohesive national energy policy emerges from hearings such as this. What America needs is an energy policy that ensures the quality of life that the American people expect and deserve. I'd like first to discuss the key factors contributing to the current situation. I will conclude by discussing a positive and constructive path forward based on solid economics--one that ensures the clean, affordable fuels that are necessary to this nation's well-being. The oil and gas industry has done an excellent job of providing cleaner fuels at an affordable price. As a result, Americans have access to inexpensive transportation fuels; a fact that has contributed to our overall high standard of living. In fact, using constant 1999 dollars, the average retail price of gasoline, including taxes, decreased from $2.27 a gallon in 1918 to $1.16 a gallon in 1999, according to research by Cambridge Energy Research Associates, (CERA) one of the world's leading energy research firms.(2) Unfortunately, American's ability to have dependable supplies of transportation fuels when and how they want it is in jeopardy as a result of our energy and regulatory policy. The situation we saw earlier this summer is a classic study of the relationship of supply, demand and price. In a free market system, the price of a commodity like gasoline is not so much a factor of the cost of manufacturing and delivering the finished product, but rather the relationship between consumers' demand for a product and manufacturers' ability to supply it to the marketplace. In the current situation, the price of gasoline in the Midwest was driven up by the inability to manufacture and deliver the products to the marketplace to meet consumers' demand. Once again, the consumer has been forced to pay for the hidden impact of actions taken over the course of several decades--primarily by the EPA. For background, I want to briefly discuss the key factors that have contributed to the recent situation. Both the recently disclosed June 5, internal DOE memorandum and the June 16, 2000, Congressional Research Service memorandum(3), attributed the price swings to the following five factors: - Higher crude oil prices. Refiners' crude acquisition costs have risen by the equivalent of 30 cents per gallon as compared to one year ago and 48 cents per gallon as compared to year and a half ago. - Special Fuel Formulations. Reformulated gasoline or RFG is required in numerous areas designated by EPA as ozone non- attainment areas. About 30 percent of the gasoline sold in the United States is RFG, including the Chicago and Milwaukee markets. In the Midwest, however, refiners use ethanol instead of MTBE (the additive used in most other RFG areas to meet the oxygen requirements of the RFG programs). This means that RFG from the rest of the country cannot be shipped to the Midwest if additional supplies are needed. Refiners must ship a special blend stock used to make RFG in the Midwest, called RBOB, which is very difficult to manufacture. Let me tell you what happened at CITGO's Lemont, Illinois, refinery--one of the six refineries in the area. During the first two months of this year, our refinery produced more RFG than in 1999. But as we began making the new Phase II RBOB, which was mandated by EPA regulations, we quickly fell behind last year's production because it was more difficult to blend than we had anticipated. It has taken until June for us to learn how to efficiently blend this product and catch up with last year's RBOB production levels. So ethanol is not the cause of the magnitude of the recent price spike, but rather the fact that ethanol requires the use of Phase II RBOB which, is not fungible with other Reformulated Gasolines. - Low inventories. According to the Department of Energy's. Energy Information Agency (EIA), crude oil and gasoline inventories started the summer driving season at extremely low levels. These lower inventories are the result of converting to EPA's Phase II RFG "summer" specifications. To convert to the tighter specifications of the new summer grade RFG II, refiners, as well as terminals, virtually empty their storage tanks to minimize the time required to convert the tanks to be ready for the summer driving season. In their website, EIA states that there is the equivalent of only two days' of consumption in available inventory. When supplies are this low, any disruption results in price increases. - Operational problems. Two pipelines serving the upper Midwest have experienced operational problems, at the time when refinery and terminal inventories were low This prevented these low inventories from being replenished. As stated in DOE's just issued "Primer on Gasoline Pricing," disruptions such as these in a tight regional market have the potential to lead to significant price increase--as evidenced in the upper Midwest in recent weeks. This was further exacerbated when the Mobil Joliet refinery was slow coming up after a turnaround, and the Clark Blue Island Refinery experienced a power outage that has left it essentially inoperable. Both these refinery outages reduced the availability of gasoline in the Midwest. Finally, just this month, the ship channel through which we receive crude oil and ship out finished products at our Lake Charles refinery was blocked because of a freak accident disrupting our ability to ship products to all markets. - Patented RFG Process. A recent federal court ruling that Unocal has a valid patent on a blend formulation related to the new summer RFG has caused RFG production to be scaled back at several refineries. For instance, CITGO's Lake Charles refinery has the ability to produce about 15,000 barrels per day of summer grade RFG, but to avoid the patent issue, we have cut production to about 4,000 barrels per day. The Congressional Research Service memorandum concludes that about "25 cents of the regional price increase is due to transportation difficulties and another 25 cents, roughly estimated, could be due to the unique RFG situation in Chicago/Milwaukee." The inescapable fact is that the U.S. pipeline and distribution system was designed to handle a half dozen grades of gasoline. Today, it has to cope with more than 3 dozen grades of "boutique" gasoline. Keep in mind that no refinery can manufacture all of these fuels, so they have to be shipped all over the country to where they are needed. Each of these fuels has to be kept separate from the time they are manufactured--separate pipeline shipments, separate tankage, separate compartments on barges and trucks. Daniel Yergen has rightly called this the "Balkanization of America." Refiners can no longer substitute fuels from areas of abundant supply into areas of insufficient supply because they are literally different fuels. What we have is a hodgepodge of fuels mandated by different state regulators, which has unintentionally constrained manufacturers' ability to refine and supply gasoline to the marketplace. See attachment #1 Let's look specifically at the Midwest. PADD II, which includes the Chicago and Milwaukee markets, is a net consumer of gasoline. In 1998, for instance, PADD II consumed almost 475,000 barrels per day more gasoline than the refineries in that area could manufacture. According to the just-released National Petroleum Council's report, in order to have supply meet the demand in PADD II, 350,000 barrels per day had to be shipped in from the Gulf Coast, primarily by pipeline, and another 160,000 barrels per day had to be shipped in from the East Coast. It is clear to see that a supply problem in the Midwest, the Gulf Coast or the East Coast has a definite impact as product is pulled from one region to fill shortages in another. In my hometown of Tulsa, we are experiencing a situation that graphically illustrates this point. Like many other regions, Tulsa has experienced in recent weeks sharp increases in gasoline prices. Here's why: our local regulators have entered into an agreement with EPA so that a special gasoline with 8.2 Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) is sold in Tulsa county during summer months. Tulsa is the only area in the nation where this particular gasoline is sold. As a result, no refiner manufactures it, but rather two different gasolines are mixed together to meet the 8.2 specification. Most of these two kinds of gasoline come from refineries on the Gulf Coast and are transported by pipeline to Tulsa. That was not a problem in 1999. Unfortunately, since last year, 98 counties in East Texas that are along the pipeline that connects Tulsa to the Gulf Coast refineries now require one of the gasolines that is blended to make Tulsa's fuel. That increased demand from motorists in the Texas counties caused an increase in the price of gasoline in our Tulsa market when the summer driving season began. Once again, this is a simple case of the relationship of supply, demand and price. This is a recurring theme around our country. As local regulators create new and different gasolines, refiners no longer have the flexibility to quickly shift supply to the areas of greatest need. The result is that situations that previously could have been corrected very quickly, take much longer for the system to correct. This longer correction time creates shortages, which in turn creates price spikes. The delicate balance of the supply and demand system can be upset by the slightest disruption. This price and supply situation is not the first such occurrence in this nation, nor, unfortunately, will it be the last unless industry warnings are heeded. Similar situations arose in 1989 with the advent of EPA's regional RVP regulations, again in 1995 when Phase I RFG was introduced and again in 1999. According to industry expert Trilby Lundberg(4), despite persistent industry warnings, "We are in a nightmare of patchwork environmental regulations which will wreak havoc with gasoline supply and price stability. The wide variety of regulations affecting formulas has created wide price disparities around the country and made the distribution of gasoline more problematic." The important point to recognize is that the root cause of the current price and supply situation stems from the unfortunate fact that this nation's only energy policy is driven by the Environmental Protection Agency. In reality, it's not a policy at all but a jumble of regulations and requirements that has been added to every year since the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970. Unfortunately, this jumble of regulations fails to take into consideration the American people's needs or the refiners' ability to produce and distribute this increasingly complex range of products. It's a refiner's nightmare--one that is now beginning to affect the American people. And it appears there is no end in sight. We are already faced with the next wave --EPA's requirements for ultra-low sulfur gasoline and diesel specifications. I am very concerned that the EPA is, again, not listening to the warnings of the oil industry as to the potential for inadequate supplies of products resulting from their recent Tier 2 gasoline regulations and their proposed diesel sulfur regulations. Unless the EPA changes it's approach I expect to see many future disruptions in supply with resultant price increases. The end result of these and the host of other EPA regulations staring us in the face ensure that more refiners, unable to afford the capital investment required to comply with these regulations, will drop out, further tightening supply. Clearly, unless we develop a cohesive energy policy--one that considers this nation's energy needs, the sustainability of affordable energy in America is in serious jeopardy. Meeting Tier 2 gasoline regulations will be expensive, about $8 billion for the industry, and will present a significant challenge to refiners. There are a number of factors that could have implications on supply. Because of the high capital costs, it is likely that some refiners will be unable to justify the investments, and will simply shut down. Most others, because of the high cost of conventional desulfurization technology, will use new and unproven technologies to reduce the sulfur content of fuels. These new technologies, while being less costly, will have limited commercial experience and will likely result in more initial operating problems and increase the risk for supply disruptions. In order to meet the deadline of 2004-06 required by the EPA, the industry will face significant hurdles to obtain the necessary permits, engineering and construction resources, and hardware to complete the work on time. If the EPA does not properly facilitate the permitting process or if other regulations, like the proposed diesel sulfur regulations or a ban on MTBE, overlap the Tier 2 work, then we are on a course for disaster. Fuel supply disruptions could be experienced for long periods of time, leading to fundamentally higher prices at the pump. Likewise, I am deeply concerned about the EPA's proposed diesel fuel sulfur rule. I have strong doubts that it will be possible to consistently maintain needed supplies of diesel within the 15 ppm sulfur level cap proposed in this rule. With the current distribution system, it will be extremely difficult to deliver diesel with a 15 ppm cap to consumers and maintain the integrity of the sulfur level of the product. Diesel must share a distribution system with other products that have significantly higher sulfur levels. I believe that due to the high cost to produce 15 ppm sulfur diesel, many refiners will choose not to participate in the on-highway diesel market or will limit their production to lower volumes than they manufacture today. Some will be forced to simply go out of business. This could drastically reduce the supplies of diesel and supply disruptions and price spikes could well be the norm. The bottom line is that the sulfur level for on-highway diesel being proposed by the EPA is too low and the timing is too soon. Similar health and environmental benefits can be obtained from a more reasonable 50 ppm sulfur cap. Nevertheless, the EPA arbitrarily selected the NOx tail pipe emission standards for the proposed diesel sulfur without the technology to support the standard. The engine manufacturers don't have the after treatment technology today to meet the standard and the oil industry doesn't have the desulfurization technology to reduce sulfur to the levels being required by proposal in a cost-effective manner. Next year the EPA plans to propose yet another rule to lower the sulfur content of off-road diesel. Here again with the manufacturing, supply and distribution issues already mentioned, the supply of off road diesel will likely drop and prices will increase for the agricultural community. CITGO believes that a new Regulatory Policy is urgently needed to maintain the supply of the petroleum products that keep the nation moving, and to ensure the continued viability of the nation's petroleum refining system. The coordinated implementation and integration of environmental rules and regulations is absolutely necessary to ensure that U.S. energy needs are met. Higher energy prices that disrupt the American consumers' budgets can be avoided with a correction in the direction of regulatory policy. The current "command and control" regulatory system is ill suited to address the nation's remaining environmental concerns in a practical way. New rules covering air emissions and fuel formulations are wrecking havoc on the nation's petroleum refineries. These new rules are on top of the over 120 health and environmental rules that have already been imposed on the refining and marketing industry. Government agencies at all levels must adopt processes to analyze and prioritize risks, and then subject proposed solutions for the highest risks to a thorough cost/benefit analysis. Comprehensive reform legislation has been under discussion in Congress for several years but no progress has occurred. Adding regulations that are not cost effective on top of existing rules damages the refining industry's ability to compete in world markets. Many major petroleum companies are divesting refining and marketing assets because of their low profitability, others are merging operations or entering into partnerships to maintain economic viability. The current regulatory direction will cause the U.S. to be dependent on even greater percentages of imported motor fuels. The government can reduce the potential for market volatility by making environmental regulations more reasonable and workable. Improved regulations would give companies more flexibility to adjust to problems that may have temporary impacts on supply and price. This applies especially to fuels regulations, including EPA's new diesel sulfur proposal, which sets a standard beyond what the technology will support. Congress should mandate and police federal agencies' adoption of these principles: 1. Prioritization: Regulations should address the greatest concerns first. So much improvement has been made in the petroleum industry, that many have questioned whether the greatest concerns aren't really from other sectors. 2. Use Current Data: Regulatory priorities and risk assessments must be based on sound science and the most current data. This would include allowing time for the benefits of existing rules to be realized before imposing new regulatory programs addressing the same concern. No regulation should be finalized unless a favorable risk assessment using the best science and a realistic cost benefit analysis demonstrates that the most reasonable regulatory alternative has been selected. When performing regulatory analysis based on technologies that have not been commercially proven, the level of uncertainty surrounding costs and performance should receive careful evaluation. 3. Cost/Benefit Analysis: The current regulatory system is inefficient and outdated. Some recent environmental rules have costs that are far in excess of expected benefits. A new system that carefully balances the total anticipated cost of compliance (capital plus maintenance) over a specified time frame against the total anticipated benefits to be derived from implementation over the same time frame will provide a framework to ensure a strong and competitive economy. 4. Stakeholder Involvement: State and local governments should have a more active role in setting environmental priorities and enforcement. In addition, regulators must identify all "sources" of a particular concern and include those sources in their rulemaking even if they are beyond the scope of the current "regulated community" or "sources." 5. Flexibility: Regulations should set performance requirements, but allow for the creation of innovative solutions to reach those goals. The regulated community is in a better position to find solutions to environmental/health concerns. In addition, regulations must provide adequate lead-time for scoping, technical option evaluation, design, engineering, financing, permit acquisition, equipment procurement, field construction, and start-up. Four years is the minimum time necessary after finalization of requirements for implementation of significant refining industry investment. The required lead-time can be longer as the magnitude of the investment increases. 6. Accountability: Each regulation should include an automatic sunset provision that can be overridden, if necessary. Each of the regulations would be subject to a "post implementation audit" to determine the effectiveness of the regulation as compared to the initial identification, prioritization and cost/benefit analysis. Environmental policymakers are responsible to society at large-- of which the business community is a vital part. The responsibility of policymakers extends not only to devising laws and regulations that improve public health and the environmental, but also to determining their impact on the nation's economic and energy resources. Politics and not science drives too many of our nation's regulatory policies and priorities. For example, EPA is charged with ensuring a healthy environment for all citizens. The responsibility for energy supplies falls, however, to the DOE, whose advice is frequently ignored by the EPA. The DOE and EPA should equally share responsibility for new fuel policy that can be cost effectively manufactured and distributed throughout the nation. These agencies should also heed petroleum industry advice on fuel policy. Specific Recommendations: - Harmonize Regulations - Fuel quality changes and the necessary investment must be appropriately sequenced with minimum overlap. The Tier 2 Rule gasoline sulfur reduction and other product specification changes should not be mandated for implementation in the same time frame, otherwise permitting, engineering, and construction resource constraints will likely result in higher costs, inability to meet the mandated schedules, and product supply disturbances. Other environmental regulations, such as the Refinery MACT phase II rule, should likewise be sequenced with other similar pollutant control rules as well as fuel regulations. Without regulatory harmony many refining and marketing companies will quit the business leading to more regional supply shortages. While not overlapping the implementation requirements, the EPA should finalize the timing and specifications for on- and off- highway diesel sulfur reduction and MTBE use as soon as possible. Potential efficiencies exist for providing support facilities common to these programs and gasoline sulfur reduction. - Regulatory Certainty - Regulations should include certainty in scope, timing, and requirements, to allow the refining and distribution industries to make effective investment decisions. Regulations that introduce uncertainty into the outlook for required product qualities or product demands will increase the hesitancy of individual companies to invest. For example, the Tier 2 Rule includes an expectation that the EPA will develop a future provision dealing with gasoline sulfur cap flexibility during processing unit downtimes. Until the flexibility that such a provision might provide is known, refiners are unable to plan effectively for necessary facilities. Likewise, the EPA should clarify its position on individual state fuel requirements. Currently there is potential for state action that could undermine the Tier 2 Rule credit banking and trading provisions, and this potential creates uncertainty for investment planning. - Very Low Sulfur Gasoline and Diesel Requirements - Requirements for reducing gasoline or on-highway diesel sulfur below 30 ppm average should not be imposed until significantly more study can be completed to provide a basis for sound conclusions about the cost, benefit, producibility, and deliverability of products with very low sulfur levels. There is a significant risk of inadequate supplies should on-highway diesel sulfur levels below 30 ppm be mandated. - Driveability Index - The current DI specification should not be changed until additional study can provide a sound basis for thorough analysis of the cost effectiveness and potential impacts on supply of any change. Refinery modeling in this study predicts high cost to reduce average DI. While there may be potential to lower this cost by reducing testing and operational variability, this potential is not sufficiently understood to support sound regulatory analysis. - Environmental Justice - The EPA should be prepared to promptly address and resolve environmental justice claims that arise during the permitting process. The EPA should support state and local agency decisions where environmental justice issues have been addressed during the permitting process. - Emission Offsets - A portion of the emissions reduction resulting from use of lower sulfur fuels should be allowed as an offset to the stationary source emissions resulting from the new facilities required to produce the lower sulfur fuels. The EPA, state and local agencies, and industry members should work jointly to identify additional action steps to provide timely permitting while continuing progress toward meeting environmental goals. - EPA Enforcement Policy - The requirements for New Source Review (NSR) should not be retroactively reinterpreted. The EPA Enforcement Division should recognize the validity of netting refinery-generated internal offsets against emissions from new facilities, as discussed in the Tier 2 Rule preamble. Use of agency guideline documents with unjustified reviews of past applications of NSR or second guessing past permit decisions will affect the ability to acquire new permits necessary to meet product demand and regulatory requirements. - National Fuel Specification - One set of national fuel specifications will greatly simplify the manufacture and distribution of gasoline and other necessary products. Congress should pass legislation restricting states and localities from establishing separate fuel specifications. States and localities that are considering localized restrictive fuel requirements, such as lower sulfur and limitations on MTBE use, must recognize that these requirements will increase cost and reduce the reliability of product supplies. I sincerely hope that the concerns that I have expressed will serve as a warning, and that the appropriate action is taken to ensure that this nation does not face a protracted period of product outages and volatile prices. I believe, if government and industry work together to implement sound regulations, this nation can have both clean air and adequate supplies of clean fuels. Thank you.

LOAD-DATE: July 28, 2000, Friday




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