Rep. Sander Levin (D-Mich.) has proposed an alternative to the annual review of China's human rights and trade record. Levin argues that his plan is a middle ground between those who "just say no" to China and those who "just say yes."

In fact, the commissions, reports and reforms urged by Levin essentially duplicate existing government procedures and add no leverage to current policy. They present no new remedies regardless of the severity of the offense or violation. And nothing in the Levin proposal changes the fact that if Congress grants China permanent Normal Trade Relations, the U.S. gives away its most important leverage with respect to China, and our trade relationship with the world's largest and most authoritarian country will be governed entirely by World Trade Organization (WTO) rules: International law will prohibit the United States from using trade sanctions in response to China's abuses of human rights, workers' rights and the environment, no matter how horrendous those abuses may be.

If Congress votes against permanent Normal Trade Relations, by contrast, trade relations between the United States and China will continue to be controlled by rules contained in various bilateral trade agreements that have been in effect since 1979, even if China joins the WTO; the U.S. will maintain its annual reviews and the ability to use economic pressure in response to China's human rights and trade violations; and China, as a WTO member, will be required under international law to grant the United States substantially the same economic benefits it grants to our competitors.

After examining the Levin proposal and other options, Rep. Dick Gephardt rejected the possibility of a viable alternative to the current annual review and declared his opposition to permanent Normal Trade Relations for China. He concluded:

"America should not trust the Chinese government to make progress on its own and unilaterally surrender our nation's ability to influence Chinese policy through trade. At the end of the day, maintaining the annual trade review remains the best way to keep the pressure on the Chinese government to reform its human rights policies."

The Levin Plan Has No Teeth

In place of the annual review, Levin has proposed the following:

• A congressional-executive commission on China would investigate and report on allegations of human rights abuses, China's noncompliance with WTO commitments and violations of core labor standards. The commission would issue an annual report and recommendations for action to Congress and the administration.

The U.S. State Department already investigates and reports on violations of human and labor rights in its annual human rights reports, and the U.S. Trade Representative has an obligation to investigate and report on China's trade compliance in its annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. These reports, which have consistently and repeatedly found deteriorating human rights conditions in China and massive noncompliance with existing trade agreements, have had little impact because they include no remedies or sanctions.

The proposed commission will also not be able to recommend trade sanctions because such sanctions would be illegal under WTO rules. The commission will therefore serve as little more than window dressing for existing government functions, and will provide no meaningful way to move the Chinese government toward respect for international law.

• The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) would be used to review China's compliance with WTO rules on an annual basis; most countries are subject to a TPRM only every few years.

Most countries are subject to a TPRM every few years. The Levin proposal would review China's compliance on an annual basis. To create such an annual review would require writing special provisions into China's WTO accession protocol, and it is not clear that this is achievable. Even if it could be done, the annual TPRM would create no new remedy for China's noncompliance with trade rules and would contain no automatic review of human rights or labor practices. Under WTO rules, the TPRM is explicitly separate from any sanction or remedy procedure.

• The anti-import surge provisions of the 1999 U.S.-China bilateral agreement would be put into legislation, and U.S. trade laws would be strengthened consistent with WTO rules.

U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky has stated that section 125 of the 1974 Trade Law gives the president the power he needs to invoke the anti-import surge provisions contained in the U.S.-China agreement. Section 125 allows the president maximum discretion, thus allowing him to implement a product-specific safeguard when needed, but equally allowing him to ignore the need for a product-specific safeguard. Levin does not explain how his legislation would constrain this broad discretion. Without such a constraint, there is no guarantee that U.S. workers and industries will benefit from the product-specific safeguard.

While strengthening U.S. safeguard protection is a step in the right direction, the United States will gain little real benefit from such a reform if these measures are still subject to WTO discipline.

• The administration would support the creation of a working group on labor rights at the WTO, and create a special task force to enforce the existing ban on imports made with prison labor (section 307 of the Tariff Act).

Creation of a working group on labor rights at the WTO is already the official position of the U.S. government as mandated by Congress.

The administration has made numerous efforts to enforce the ban on imports made with prison labor in China. For the past three years the Chinese government has not allowed U.S. customs officials to investigate eight suspected prison labor sites. It is unclear how a new task force will have more success.

• The United States would pursue institutional reforms at the WTO to enhance its transparency and public accessibility.

These institutional reforms are already being put forward by the United States at the WTO. It is ironic that the proposal instructs the administration to continue to pursue these reforms while endorsing the accession of a new member that will make the success of these reforms virtually impossible. Once China becomes a member of the WTO, its representatives will vigorously oppose these changes.

The Levin Proposal Does Not Substitute for Annual Review and the Threat of Sanctions

There is no reason to believe that diplomacy alone can move the Chinese government. Although the annual review process has not been utilized as effectively as it could be, the credible threat of trade sanctions has proven an important tool for pressuring the Chinese government to reform.

According to the U.S. State Department, in the 1990s nearly 40 percent of political prisoner releases took place during the second quarter of each year in the lead-up to the congressional decision to renew Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for China. This was especially evident during the 1990-1994 period, before the Clinton administration "de-linked" human rights from trade policy, when the outcome of the annual congressional vote was in doubt and China ran the risk of losing MFN.

Administration officials have recognized the effectiveness of sanctions in dealing with China. For example, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky told the Senate Finance Committee in 1996:

"The 1992 Market Access Memorandum of Understanding...could not be brought to conclusion without the U.S. having threatened, at the time, very substantial sanctions against China....It was in China's own interest to have a bilateral textile agreement with us....Yet, were we able to bring them to the table meaningfully without the threat of sanctions? No....Would China conclude any meaningful agreement with us without the threat of sanctions? No."

Sue Esserman, then General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative, made a similar point before the House Ways and Means trade subcommittee in June 1998:

"Progress in the trade area is best achieved by continuing work with China, and the use of targeted trade sanctions when necessary."

Instead, the Levin proposal would give Congress a set of review and reporting mechanisms that provide no meaningful pressure to improve human rights in China.