The United States must approve permanent
normal trade relations (PNTR) status for China in order
for the U.S. to receive the benefits of China’s accession to
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
If China accedes to the WTO and the U.S.
Congress does not pass legislation granting China PNTR, it is
expected that the Administration would invoke its right of
"non-application" under Article XIII of the WTO Agreement, as
has been done with respect to other countries subject to the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This would be done at the time China
formally accedes to the WTO. Even though China would become a
WTO member, the United States would not treat China as a WTO
member. Moreover, China would not be required to treat the
United States as a WTO member.
Without PNTR, an historic opportunity would
be jeopardized for U.S. companies and their workers. The terms
of the landmark U.S.-China bilateral agreement concluded in
November and all other terms of China’s WTO accession package
would not apply to U.S.-China trade and investment, except to
the extent that existing bilateral agreements make the WTO
agreement terms binding between the two countries.
While the U.S. would receive some modest
benefits, such as tariff cuts, under the terms of the 1980
bilateral agreement between the United States and China, many
of the hard-fought concessions by the Chinese are not covered
by this agreement. For example, China’s agreement to eliminate
forced technology transfer and investment requirements would
not be extended to the United States. Nothing in the 1980
agreement requires the Chinese government to ensure that its
state-owned and state-invested enterprises make their
purchases solely on commercial terms, while China agreed to
this commitment in the WTO accession agreement. Without PNTR,
U.S. companies would not benefit from China’s agreements to
allow distribution rights for foreign companies and to allow
investment in telecom and Internet services. Additionally, the
U.S. would not have access to WTO dispute settlement for
China.
Annual NTR Extension is Not Sufficient
Article I of the GATT requires that WTO
members provide "unconditional" MFN treatment to other WTO
members. This principle is a cornerstone of the WTO and an
open global trading system.
Some argue that the U.S. can meet this
unconditional MFN obligation, and thus be entitled to China’s
WTO concessions, as long as Congress renews NTR on a continual
basis. Under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of
1974, China’s MFN status is tied to annual Presidential
findings or waivers regarding freedom of emigration, which can
be overridden by Congress through a joint resolution of
disapproval. Continued annual renewal of China’s NTR status
would violate WTO rules because it would be conditional
(on freedom of emigration per the Jackson Vanik Amendment) and
discriminatory (requiring procedures for China that are
not applied to other WTO members). Approval for
permanent NTR is necessary to meet the WTO’s
unconditional MFN obligation.