LEXIS-NEXIS® Congressional Universe-Document
LEXIS-NEXIS® Congressional
Copyright 1999 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
March 9, 1999, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 3884 words
HEADLINE: TESTIMONY March 09, 1999 KENNETH M. MEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS TRANSPORTATION FISCAL 2000 TRANSPORTATION APPROPRIATIONS
BODY:
Statement of The Honorable Kenneth M. Mead Inspector General U.S. Department
of Transportation March 9, 1999 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on financing and cost control
issues within the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Various proposals have recommended a more stable source
of funding for the agency by seeking alternative means or techniques of
financing FAA. Regardless of the final policy decisions made on FAA's financing
system, FAA must achieve cost control over its Operations and modernization
budgets and hold managers accountable for achieving results. FAA's budget has
increased nearly 70 percent from Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 to 1999. Based on FAA's
estimates, by the year 2004 these requirements will be over $12 billion, or 27
percent greater than FY 1999.
FAA's budget requirements continue to increase largely due to the rising costs
in FAA's Operations account. This account represents 57 percent of FAA's FY
1999 budget and is expected to grow to nearly $7.6 billion, or about 62 percent
of FAA's budget, by FY 2004. Due to budget constraints and rising costs of
operations, other programs have seen their funding levels either reduced or
held relatively constant. For example, FAA's Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account has declined from 27 percent of FAA's total budget in FY 1992 to 21
percent in FY 1999. FAA's Budget by Program (FY 1988-2004) (available on hard
copy only). In addition, FAA faces significant risks in meeting all operations
cost increases within the projected revenue base.
For example, FAA is currently facing a funding shortfall of approximately $284
million in its FY 1999 Operations budget which will require cuts in both safety
and non-safety programs. An important message of our testimony today is that
regardless of the financing alternatives adopted by Congress, a stable source
of funding for FAA is only part of the solution. Over the years, we have
reported on the need for FAA to strengthen controls over its operations and
modernization costs, and develop human resource systems and policies that are
based on accountability for achieving results. Our statement today will
address: - proposed changes in financing FAA activities and airport
infrastructure needs; - increases in operations costs that will need to be
contained in order to
fund other critical agency functions; and - actions needed to improve fiscal
management and accountability within the agency. Proposed Changes in Financing
FAA Activities and Airport Infrastructure Needs. Recent proposals have
recommended alternative methods for financing FAA by granting the agency more
liberal budgetary treatment. These proposals include shielding the agency from
discretionary caps and creating budgetary firewalls that guarantee floors for
spending on FAA programs. This type of budgetary treatment would, in essence,
allow FAA access to all revenue generated by the Airport and Airway
Trust Fund, thus linking
aviation revenue to
aviation spending. Presumably, FAA would still be subject to the Appropriations
process, but the dollars appropriated would not have to compete with funding
demands for other agencies such as the Coast Guard or Amtrak. Financing
Proposals Could Meet FAA's Short Term Needs. We estimate that FAA would be able
to meet its estimated annual budgetary requirements at
least through FY 2004 without user fees or a contribution from the General
Fund by having access to all
Trust Fund revenue, interest, and the uncommitted carry over balance. This estimate is
based on the Administration's proposed revenue and expenditures, which could
change substantially during the agency's upcoming reauthorization cycle.
However, FAA may not be able to rely on the uncommitted
Trust Fund balance 1 for future funding. For example, when the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) received similar budgetary treatment under provisions of
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) 2 , Congress
reduced the beginning balance in the Highway
Trust Fund and restricted the agency from earning interest on the
Fund. Without access to the uncommitted carryover balance, or interest earned on the
Aviation Trust Fund, FAA would be unable to meet its budgetary
requirements as early as FY 2000 because the agency's expenditures exceed
projected revenue. As shown in the following table, FAA projects that revenue
generated through excise taxes will total $52 billion in FYs 2000 through 2004,
3 while expenditures for the same period will total $56.3 billion - a net
shortfall of $4.3 billion. This shortfall could be larger if Congress
funds F&E or Airport Improvement Program (AIP) accounts at levels higher than budget
estimates. We expect that during FAA's reauthorization cycle this year F&E and AIP funding levels will exceed the Administration's estimates. In that
case, FAA would have to receive contributions from the General
Fund, impose user fees, and/or request an increase in
aviation excise taxes. Estimated Effect of Proposed Budgetary Treatment FY 2000
Through
FY 2004 ($ in billions) (available on hard copy only). 1 FAA estimates that
the
Trust Fund will have an uncommitted carry over balance of $6.7 billion at the close of FY
1999. This balance is largely a result of General
Fund contributions to FAA's Budget and interest earned on the
Trust Fund. Over the Last 3 years, the General
Fund has contributed an average of 31 percent of FAA's budget. 2 Under provisions
of TEA-21, FHWA is funded via the Highway
Trust Fund with no contribution from the General
Fund. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA), on the other hand, still relies on
General
Fund contribution. 3 Excise taxes, which consist of passenger ticket taxes,
passenger flight segment taxes, international arrival/departure taxes, frequent
flyer taxes, waybill
freight and mail taxes, and various fuel taxes represent the majority of FAA's
current revenues. Funding Airport Infrastructure Needs. Another issue that win
be addressed in FAA's Reauthorization Bill is the Administration's proposal to
raise passenger facility charges (PFCs). Although not deposited in the
Trust Fund, PFCs have increasingly represented a significant source of funding for airport
improvements since being enacted in 1992. FAA estimates that for calendar years
1998 and 1999, PFC collections will be between $1.3 and $1.4 billion each year.
Under the Administration's proposed change, airports could raise the per
passenger PFC rate from $3 to $5 and raise the corresponding cap per trip from
$12 to $20. FAA estimates that the proposed change could result in PFC
collections of about $2.2 billion per year (an $800 million increase over current PFC collections). However, it is unlikely
that passengers will make a distinction between PFCs and excise taxes.
Currently, passengers already pay an 8 percent ticket tax on. the base price of
a ticket and a $2 tax per segment flown. AIP and PFC Levels (chart available
on hard copy only). The President's Budget for FY 2000 also assumes collection
of approximately $7 billion in user fees with $1.5 billion of these fees being
collected in FY 2000. However, in our opinion, implementation of a cost-based
user fee system by FY 2000 is highly optimistic. First, the proposed user fee
system will require a sophisticated cost accounting system to be in place and
operating. Second, the system must have
accurate and complete underlying data. Third, the system must fairly allocate
costs among users. FAA has much work to do to accomplish these tasks. FAA is
in the process of developing the required cost accounting system but does not
anticipate it to be fully operational in all lines of business until March
2001. Regardless of whether or not user fees are adopted, FAA needs a good cost
accounting system to make sound management decisions such as identifying which
systems are too expensive to operate. Increases in Operations Costs Will Need
to be Contained in Order to
Fund Other Critical Functions. Regardless of the method and mix chosen by Congress
to finance FAA, it is critical that the agency do more to control the costs of
its operations. Operations costs represent the largest portion of FAA's budget,
growing at an average rate of 6.2 percent
a year over the past 3 years. In comparison, the U.S. Coast Guard's operations
budget has grown at an average rate of 3.2 percent during the same period.
Operations costs are primarily payroll driven, representing 75 percent of FAA's
Operations budget. Since 1994, FAA's payroll costs have increased by 21 percent
although the number of on- board employees has increased by only 3 percent over
the same period. This is primarily due to Government-wide cost-of-living
increases and the high-grade levels of FAA's safety-related workforces. FAA
estimates that for FY 2000, payroll costs will exceed $4.5 billion, or
approximately 9 percent more than FY 1999. FAA's FY 2000 Operations Budget
(chart available on hard copy only). Operations costs
will increase further as a result of a new pay system for air traffic
controllers. The new system bases controller pay on the complexity of the
operations they manage as well as the volume of air traffic they control. The
new system should allow the agency to attract and retain qualified personnel at
key locations. However, the costs associated with the new system will be
significant. FAA estimates that the new pay system will require approximately
$1 billion in additional funding over 5 years beginning in FY 1999. These
additional costs take into account productivity gains that FAA was able to
quantify, such as savings from reducing the number of supervisors. However,
other cost savings, such as reducing overtime by better matching controller
staffing to air traffic patterns, have not yet been quantified. In our
opinion, it is important that FAA quantify, to the extent
practical, productivity gains included in the new pay system in order to
determine if the $7.6 billion budgeted for operations in the outyears (FY 2004)
will be sufficient or could potentially be reduced. Determining the extent and
amount of offsetting productivity gains is even more important since similar
pay systems may be developed in current negotiations with FAA's two other
largest national unions. Recognizing this fact this Subcommittee directed FAA
to submit a report by December 31, 1998, explaining in detail the dollar impact
in FY 1999 and the programs and activities being reduced or deferred in FY 1999
to finance the new agreement. As of March 5, 1999, the report was in the final
steps of executive review and had not yet been filed. Payroll is not the only
expense increasing FAA operations costs. For
example, FAA estimates that National Air Space (NAS) Handoff requirements 4 by
FY 2000 will increase 67 percent over FY 1998 requirements because of
variations in the type, number, and costs of new systems coming on-line. As
more systems are commissioned, FAA will require more funding for NAS Handoff
activities. Rising, Operations Costs Crowd Out Other Critical Agency
Functions. FAA faces significant risks in meeting operations cost increases
while, at the same time and within the projected revenue base, funding other
agency requirements such as its modernization program or the AIP. Operations
cost increases have already begun
"crowding out" other critical agency functions. For example, in the President's FY 2000
Budget the Administration increased FAA's Operations budget for
FYs 2000 through 2003 by $1.1 billion over the President's FY 1999 Budget
submission for that same period. The Operations budget was increased even
though FAA's total budget for that period was reduced by over $400 million. As
illustrated in the table below, this increase was funded by reducing (or
crowding out) F&E, AIP, and RE&D budgets for the period by $900 million, $400 million, and $200 million,
respectively. 4 NAS Handoff costs are the costs of maintaining a system after
it has been commissioned - essentially handing off funding for the system from F&E to Operations. These costs are in addition to the operating and maintenance
costs associated with existing systems that have not been replaced or phased
out. Revised Proposed Funding Levels For the Period FY 2000 Through 2003 ($
in billions) (chart available on hard copy only). Operations costs will
continue to crowd out other critical agency functions. As shown in the
following graph, the Operations portion of FAA's total budget from 2000 through
2004 is forecast to grow at the expense of the F&E, AIP, and RE&D budgets. Percentage of FAA's Total Budget by Appropriation (chart available
on hard copy only). Rising costs of operations may be even greater than
reported because activities normally related to operations are, in some cases,
financed using F&E
funds. F&E
funds are used to finance many operations-related activities, including salaries,
employee relocations, and new system maintenance. For example, maintenance
costs for newly commissioned systems are charged to F&E for up to
1 year following the year of commissioning. Although FAA procedures permit this
method of accounting, the method understates the true cost of operations.
Using F&E
funds for these activities also influences the amount of
funds available for new systems and equipment. For example, in FY 1999 the
Department plans to pay for the Essential Air Service Program. 5 by
reprogramming or switching $50 million from F&E
funds. Furthermore, unexpected factors (such as schedule slippages and unanticipated
cost increases in acquisitions) reduce F&E
funds available for other NAS projects which in turn further delays FAA's overall
modernization efforts. FAA's modernization program has historically experienced
cost overruns and schedule delays of large proportions. FAA has recently had
some success in fielding new systems on schedule, such as the
Display System Replacement. Further, new HOST computers have been delivered to
19 centers, and controllers at 10 of those centers are now using them to
control air traffic on a full-time basis. However, recent acquisitions critical
to FAA's NAS modernization efforts are experiencing problems with software
development and human factors issues with associated schedule slippage and cost
growth. These unanticipated costs must come from F&E
funds initially targeted for other NAS projects. - Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS) 6 Lifecycle costs identified by FAA for WAAS have grown from $1.4
billion in 1994 to more than $3 billion as of the end of February 1999. On
January 5, 1999, FAA also revised the implementation schedule for WAAS to allow
more time to complete development of a critical software safety package that
monitors, corrects, and verifies the performance of WAAS. As a result the
commissioning date for Phase I WAAS has been rescheduled from July 1999 to
September 2000, a 14 month slip. Resolution of the software issues and its
final schedule will likely result in additional program cost growth. 5 The
Essential Air Service Program provides Government subsidized airline service to
rural and isolated communities. Funding for the Program has historically been
made through General
Fund contributions. 6 WAAS is a program to augment the Department of Defense's
Global Positioning System to provide the capability to navigate in the enroute
environment and allow precision approaches to some airports in the continental
United States. - Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) 7
Based on preliminary estimates, we project that deployment of full STARS could
be delayed as much as 30
months in order to resolve all known and anticipated human factors changes.
Further, as the following graph depicts, program costs could increase by at
least $290 million to address changing requirements, potentially increasing the
total program cost to $1.23 billion. STARS Spending Profile With Estimated
Additional Funding Requirements (chart available on hard copy only). Actions
Needed to Improve Fiscal Management and Accountability. It is important that
FAA control costs to stay within budgets that are not expected to keep pace
with the growth in operations costs. Improvements in fiscal management and
management accountability will help mitigate significant funding shortfalls.
For example, FAA is currently facing a funding shortfall of approximately $284
millions 8 in its FY 1999 Operations budget. Most of this shortfall ($204
million) is
in Air Traffic Services resulting, in part from the new controller pay system
that FAA did not budget for and increases in NAS Handoff requirements. FAA
proposes transferring $17 million to Air Traffic Services from the Regulation
and Certification, Security, and Airports lines of business which already face
funding shortfalls of their own. 7 STARS will replace controller and
maintenance workstations with color displays as well as computer software and
processors at over 170 terminal air traffic control facilities. 8 The amount
by which FAA requirements exceeded enacted amounts. Air Traffic Services is
proposing to absorb its shortfall primarily through reductions in system
support and redundancy activities (such as reducing leased telecommunications
and reducing maintenance technician training). FAA believes these reductions
will not affect safety; however, the reductions may affect system
reliability and performance.
Aviation Regulation and Certification, facing more than a $30 million shortfall, plans
to reduce employment levels including safety inspectors, delay some
certification work activities, and reduce technical training. Likewise, Civil
Aviation Security, with more than a $10 million shortfall, win delay hiring and defer
implementation of the airport vulnerability assessment program. The funding
shortfall in FY 1999 illustrates the potential impact that uncontained
operations costs will have on other critical agency functions and missions. It
further serves to illustrate the need for FAA to develop realistic cost
projections and determine offsetting productivity gains in order to monitor and
control costs against predetermined budgets. FAA is well aware of these
problems and is working hard toward correcting them. However, FAA will need
some basic tools. First,
FAA needs good financial data and reports. Since 1992, we have been unable to
provide an unqualified opinion on FAA's financial statements because of serious
weaknesses in the agency's accounting systems. For example, FAA has been unable
to provide supporting cost documentation to substantiate the $2.1 billion
recorded in the work-in-process account for air traffic control modernization.
We were also unable to substantiate the acquisitions costs of real property
(land and buildings) reported at $2.5 billion. In addition, FAA recognizes the
reported $4.1 billion acquisition value for its equipment is materially
understated. We have preliminarily identified that the value for five of the
most costly equipment systems currently in operation needs to be increased by
at least $1 billion. The total understatement for all equipment could be as
much as $10 billion. When FAA is able to correct these
accounting system weaknesses, we will be able to render an opinion on FAA's
financial statements. More importantly, FAA will need accurate financial data
to support the agency's proposed cost-based user fee system. We want to
emphasize that FAA is working hard to correct this problem. Second, FAA needs
a reliable cost accounting system Regardless of whether or not a cost-based
user fee system is implemented, FAA needs a cost accounting system to make
sound financial and managerial decisions. For instance, a reliable cost
accounting system will enable FAA to determine which systems are too expensive
to maintain and which programs are too labor intensive to be cost effective.
Further, a cost accounting system will help FAA identify where its costs are so
the agency can manage its programs more efficiently. However, FAA has
experienced schedule slippages and shifting requirements in trying to develop
and deploy a new cost accounting system. The original schedule for the system
called for full implementation by October 1, 1998. FAA later revised its
implementation goals into two stages - an initial system by December 31, 1998
and a fully operational system by March 31, 1999. A newly revised schedule now
estimates that the system will not be fully implemented in all lines of
business until March 2001. However, even if FAA is successful in meeting this
date, the cost accounting system will not provide accurate information for
sound decision making until the underlying financial data are correct. Third,
FAA needs human resource systems and policies that are based on accountability
for
Performance. Personnel reform granted the agency flexibility in creating a new
human resource system unique to the agency's needs. FAA has used this
flexibility and developed new compensation systems but the effectiveness of
these programs now depends on improving organizational and individual
performance and accountability (key tenets of reform). Regardless of the
financing alternatives adopted by Congress, a stable source of funding for FAA
is only part of the solution. Ultimately, FAA must spend and manage whatever
resources it receives more efficiently than it has in the past. For example,
according to FAA's preliminary disposition of modernization projects for
capitalization, FAA identified more than $2.5 billion in modernization projects
that have been terminated without even being deployed since the onset of the
modernization program in 1982. This represents nearly 10 percent of the $25
billion appropriated by Congress through FY 1998 for FAA's modernization
efforts. Recent audits of FAA programs, such as permanent change of station
moves, familiarization flights, employee buyouts, labor agreements, and
personnel reform have also recommended ways to strengthen management
accountability and effective decision making. Without improvements in fiscal
management and management accountability for controlling costs, FAA's budget
requests win grow larger. FAA must develop the fiscal and management tools it
needs to operate like a business. These include: Good financial data and
reports for - ensuring a clean (unqualified) financial opinion, and -
developing a means for substantiating acquisition costs of real property and
equipment. A reliable cost accounting system for - determining which systems
are too expensive to operate or which programs are too labor intensive to be
cost effective, and -
identifying and measuring costs in both Operations and F&E accounts so sound financial decisions can be made that either control or
reduce operations costs. Implementing performance based human resource systems
and policies for - quantifying productivity gains associated with new pay
systems to determine if outyear Operations budgets are sufficient or can be
reduced, and - identifying the expected outcomes of new personnel reform
initiatives and developing a means for measuring their results. Mr. Chairman,
that concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions from the
Subcommittee.
LOAD-DATE: March 11, 1999