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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

June 14, 2000, Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 2147 words

HEADLINE: TESTIMONY June 14, 2000 PETER G. FITZGERALD SENATOR HOUSE JUDICIARY AIRLINE HUBS; UNITED US AIR MERGER

BODY:
Peter G. Fitzgerald United States Senator Illinois Statement Submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives Concerning The State of Competition in the Airline Industry Washington, D.C. June 14, 2000 Introduction Chairman Hyde, Representative Conyers, and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss competition-or the lack of competition-in the airline industry, a subject that is very important to my constituents in Illinois. Chairman Hyde, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you personally for your consistent leadership on this issue, and for your foresight in convening this hearing. United-US Airways Merger Given the recent announcement by UAL, the parent company of number-one ranked United Airlines, that it intends to purchase US Airways, the sixth largest U.S. airline, the timing of this hearing could not be better. If approved, this would be the biggest airline consolidation in U.S. history, leaving United with control of about 27 percent of all flights in the U.S. market-almost double the market share of its next largest competitor, American Airlines. Needless to say, a deal of this size raises serious questions about how it will affect competition. With one less competitor in the marketplace, and with United controlling so many coveted routes, will fares go up? Will service to less profitable destinations be cut back or eliminated? Will smaller competitors be squeezed out of markets and airports? Will air travelers have more choices, or fewer? Will such a merger force other airlines to follow suit, resulting in three or four "mega airlines" that dominate the U.S. market? These are all relevant questions, but the overarching question is this: Is United s merger with US Airways in the flying public s best interest? Because I am concerned that the friendly skies are becoming too cozy from a competitive standpoint, I join Chairman Hyde in calling on the Department of Justice to conduct a rigorous examination of this proposed consolidation. Third Chicago Airport Mr. Chairman, as you know, I am no stranger to aviation issues. Since being elected to the Illinois State Senate in 1992, I have supported building a third airport in the Chicago area. I support a third airport because I believe O Hare International Airport-which serves as a major hub for both United and American- has reached its capacity. In other words, it s out of room. It simply cannot handle any more flights without exacerbating already intolerable delays. In April of this year, the Federal Aviation Administration reported that only about two-thirds of flights into O Hare arrived on time, and only about 70 percent of flights departed on time. So while O Hare may no longer be the world s busiest airport, it remains one of the most delay plagued in the country. And there is a hefty price tag attached to these delays-for business travelers, in terms of wasted time sitting on the tarmac waiting to take off, or in the air circling the airport waiting to land, and for the airlines themselves, in terms of wasted fuel, exhausted and angry passengers, and additional overhead expenses. Unfortunately, I am afraid these problems are only going to get worse. Despite my opposition in the Senate-and your opposition, Mr. Chairman, in the House-Congress this year passed legislation, signed into law by President Clinton in April, phasing out the cap on the number of flights allowed to take off and land at O Hare. This cap, known as the High Density Rule, was put in place by the Federal Aviation Administration in 1969 to limit delays. The result of lifting the flight restrictions is predictable. The Chicago Tribune reported in April that, by the end of this summer, "air traffic in and out of O Hare could expand as much as 20 percent, adding 500 flights to the current 2,500 a day." And the number of flights at O Hare will only increase when the flight caps are completely removed by the summer of 2002. All of this, of course, comes on top of the Federal Aviation Administration s recent projection that the number of passengers traveling aboard commercial airlines will increase exponentially over the next decade, growing from 664.5 million in 1999 to more than 1 billion in 2011. If O Hare cannot manage its current load of flights, how on earth can it possibly expect to absorb the additional flights that will be required to meet future air travel demand? The answer is it can t. O Hare is out of capacity, and a third Chicago-area airport needs to be built, and needs to be built soon. SOC Report So what is stopping the State of Illinois from building a third Chicago-area airport, an airport that has been in the planning stages for over 15 years? The answer may be the influence of the airlines themselves. A recent report by the Suburban O Hare Commission (SOC), a group representing more than one million residents who live in communities surrounding O Hare, alleges that there is a lack of competition at O Hare and other major airports due to the airlines efforts to preserve and expand their "monopoly power" at "Fortress Hub" airports. The report, entitled "If You Build It, We Won t Come: The Collective Refusal of the Major Airlines to Compete in the Chicago Air Travel Market," provides credible evidence that there is a de facto agreement among the "Big Seven" airlines that each airline will stay out of the other s Fortress Hub cities. According to this report, conspiring to carve up the market in this way violates federal antitrust laws and costs the nation s air travelers billions of dollars each year in artificially high air fares. The SOC report also alleges that the airlines tacit agreement not to compete in each other s Fortress Hub markets explains why sixteen airlines signed a letter to then-Illinois Governor Jim Edgar on January 17, 1995, saying, essentially, if you build a third airport, we won t use it. With O Hare at or near capacity, and with United and American controlling over 80 percent of all flights at O Hare, you would think the other airlines would be falling all over themselves for a chance to compete in the Chicago market. The fact that the airlines are fighting to block additional capacity-and all but ensure United and American s dominance in Chicago-leads me to believe that, as far as real competition is concerned, they are merely keeping up appearances. Conclusion In closing, I would like to thank the members of the Suburban O Hare Commission for producing this report and bringing it to Congress attention. The Suburban O Hare Commission s report and the proposed consolidation of United and US Airways offer Congress, this committee, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Transportation an excellent opportunity to examine the state of competition in the airline industry, in individual markets, and at individual airports. If it is found that competition is lacking, it may be necessary for Congress to intervene with legislation to ensure that vigorous competition is able to flourish in every market and at every airport. Thank you, Chairman Hyde and members of the committee, for this opportunity to present my views. I look forward to working with the Committee as this issue develops.

LOAD-DATE: June 19, 2000, Monday




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