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Copyright 1999 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.  
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony

July 21, 1999

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

LENGTH: 3104 words

HEADLINE: TESTIMONY July 21, 1999 THOMAS L. BANTLE HOUSE JUDICIARY CLASS ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT AND PENDING BILLS

BODY:
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS L. BANTLE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S CONGRESS WATCH BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY REGARDING H.R. 2005, TO ESTABLISH A STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR DURABLE GOODS USED IN A TRADE OR BUSINESS July 21, 1999 Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Conyers, and members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear today in opposition to H.R. 2005, to Establish a Statute of Repose for Durable Goods Used in a Trade or Business. Because of the bill's extraordinary elimination of workers' access to the courts to seek compensation for injuries cause by defective products, I will concentrate on that provision of the bill. Equally unsettling is the bill's radical interference with the traditional authority, under our federal system, of state legislatures and state court judges and juries in civil cases. H.R. 2005 would preempt state law to create a new federal law of products liability that would discriminate against working people injured or killed on the job by defective older products by arbitrarily cutting off the responsibility of a manufacturer for its defective products when the product is 18 years old. The bill provides that no civil action for damage to property arising out of an accident involving a durable good may be filed against the manufacturer or seller of the product more than 18 years after the durable good was delivered to its first purchaser or lessee. No civil action for damages for death or personal injury arising out of an accident involving a durable good may be filed against the manufacturer or seller of the durable good more than 18 years after the durable good was delivered to its first purchaser or lessee if the injured person is eligible to receive workers' compensation, and the injury does not involve a toxic harm. There are a few exceptions. The bill does not provide a statute of repose for passenger vehicles, boats, aircraft, and trains used primarily to transport passengers for hire. If a defendant made an express warranty in writing that the safety or life expectancy of a specific product was longer than 18 years, the bill does not apply until the expiration of that warranty. And the bill does not affect the shorter statute of repose established by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. 40101 note). Shifting the Costs of Defective Products to Workers and Their Families Mr. Chairman, this bill would shift the burden of defective products from the manufacturers who designed, built, and profited from them to the worker who is injured by them. The bill would return us to 19th Century doctrine that employees should not recover for work place injuries because they assume the risks inherent in the workplace when they take their jobs. The bill would reverse a century of state tort jurisprudence that fashioned doctrines holding manufacturers responsible for the injury their products cause because they have a greater ability than the injured person to know if a product is safe, to design and build it so that it is safe, and to insure against losses caused by a product. This bill proposes to unfairly shift the risk of defective products to workers. It does not propose that the products be required to have a warning prominently stamped on them saying "Do not use this product after July 21, 2017, because it will be 18 years old and the manufacturers will no long be responsible for its design or manufacture." No, it simply takes remedies away from workers who use defective products if the durable good is more than 18 years old, whether the worker knows the age of the product or not. For instance, under the bill, a construction worker injured by a defective crane that was just one day older than 18 years would have no legal recourse whatsoever against the machinery manufacturer -- even if the manufacturer knew the crane was still in wide use, knew that the crane was subject to malfunction, and had a way to fix the defect, but still failed to warn the users or take any steps to remedy the problem. What could possibly be the justification for stripping workers of their ability to be fully compensated for injuries? On its website, the Association for Manufacturing Technology, one of the bills' proponents claims the bill will: Promote American Competitiveness. Reduce Transaction Costs Without Hurting Workers. Promote Fairness. I will rebut each of these assertions. H.R. 2005 Will Not Promote American Competitiveness Although competitiveness is a popular catchword, this bill will not affect American competitiveness. Global manufacturers and domestic manufacturers are all subject to the same state tort laws when their defective products injure workers in the United States. Similarly, domestic companies have the benefit of the liability limitations in foreign countries. In an open world marketplace, this bill does not affect global competitiveness. Indeed, the Association for Manufacturing Technology's own 1998 Product Liability Survey confirms that there is no liability crisis threatening American manufacturers. The survey of their members indicates that only six products liability cases were tried in 1998 and the plaintiff won in only one case, receiving an award of $215,000, a substantial, but not overwhelming sum. Sixty percent of the claims were settled and 35 percent were dropped without any payment. The survey noted that the average liability insurance premium for its machine tool building firms was down 31 percent from 1997, continuing the downward trend that began in 1987. This bill is a drastic "solution" to a nonexistent problem. Workers Will Be Hurt: Workers' Compensation Alone is an Inadequate Remedy The bill's proponents say, in effect, "Don't worry. The bill only applies to workers who will receive workers compensation." The implication that injured workers won't be financially hurt only shows that the bill's proponents haven't had to support a family on workers' compensation benefits. As Chairman Hyde pointed out in a hearing last month, workers' compensation is a tradeoff -- a small payment, but without a requirement to prove fault. Workers' compensation laws allow for only partial recovery from employers -- usually only medical costs and limited disability payments to cover lost wages. Although each state law is different, many states provide workers with only a few years of disability payments for a permanent, lifetime injury. They do not provide compensation for non-economic damages such as loss of fertility, loss of a limb, permanent disfigurement and other non- monetary losses. Every reputable study continues to show that workers' compensation does not make injured workers whole. For example, a 1998 study of California's workers' compensation systems by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice concluded "that workers who suffer workplace injuries resulting in a permanent disability experience large and sustained wage losses." Workers' compensation benefits cushion workers from reduced wages and time away from work only for a short period after the injury. Because wage losses persist and because benefit payments run out, benefits compensate slightly less than 40 percent of workers' full losses over a five-year period after the accident (RAND Research Brief summarizing research published as Compensating Permanent Workplace Injuries: A Study of the California System, by Mark A. Peterson, Robert T. Reville, and Rachel Kaganoff Stern, with Peter S. Barth, RAND, 1998). To claim that cutting off recoveries other than workers' compensation doesn't hurt workers is simply false. Who will be hurt by this bill? Injured workers whose cases would be barred under the proposed bill. For example: Frankie Martin, a Vietnam War Veteran and employee of the State of New York at the Central Islip Psychiatric Laundry facility, was injured on the job by a 33-year-old defective ironing machine. Mr. Martin lost all four fingers of his left hand after it became caught in the machine's chain and sprocket system. Though Mr. Martin received a small workers' compensation award, he subsequently sued the manufacturer of the machine for defective design and failure to warn of the defect. The matter was settled for $250,000, significantly more than his workers' compensation award. (Martin v. American Laundry Machinery Inc., Supreme Court, Suffolk County, NY, Index # 92-7429.) Joseph Curiel was severely injured by a 34-year-old defective tin- finishing machine at United State Steel's facility in Pittsburgh, PA. Mr. Curiel's leg was caught and trapped in the machine for 45 minutes and he suffered multiple fractures to his leg. He had to undergo eleven separate surgeries before trial and will need an ankle fusion and knee replacement in the future. Mr. Curiel was awarded $2.1 million in his suit against the manufacturer. (Curiel v. Wean United, Inc and Clark Controller Company, Contra Costa County, CA, No. 27842.) George Navarro, a 60-year-old steelworker from Pittsburgh, was injured at a U.S. Steel plant by a defective tin-making machine which was more than 20 years old. Mr. Navarro's hands were crushed when they were caught between two rollers of the machine as he tried to remedy a problem of solution splashing from the machine. He was left with no use of his left hand and only limited use of his right. His case against the manufacturer was settled, before trial, for $800,000. (Navarro v. Pannier Corporation, Wean United, Inc. and Westinghouse Corporation, Contra Costa County Superior Court, No. C 88-04037.) Kanya Shimizu, a 22-year old student and agricultural trainee, was severely injured while using a defective corn roller mill, more than 20 years old, at his employer's feed lot. Mr. Shimizu's hand was pulled into the corn roller and doctors were forced to amputate. His case against the manufacturer of the machine settled before trial for $875,000. (Shimizu v. Bluffton Agri-Industrial Corporation, et al., Santa Clara County, CA, No. 706885.) These are just a few examples. There are thousands of workplace injuries caused each year in this country by defective products, many of them over 18 years old. This bill is not only unfair to injured workers and their families, but it forces the workers' compensation system to subsidize the costs that should be charged to the manufacturers of older defective equipment. Under state workers' compensation laws, if a third party is found responsible for causing an injury, the cost of any workers' compensation or employer-paid health benefits paid to the injured party are reimbursed out of the settlement with or judgment against that third party. This reimbursement policy ensures that employers and workers' compensation systems do not subsidize manufacturers of defective products. By shifting the cost of injury to workers and employers, this bill removes the legal and financial incentive that the manufacturers of durable workplace machinery currently have to ensure that their products remain safe throughout their useful lives. The Statutes of Repose Bill Unfairly Singles Out Workers and Takes Away Fundamental Rights H.R. 2005 unfairly discriminates against workers. If a bystander were injured by the same defective older product that a worker, the bystander could still sue the manufacturer and receive full compensation, since their injuries would not be covered by workers' compensation and hence not barred by this federal statute of repose. For example, if a 24-year-old elevator malfunctions and crashes, killing the building's custodian and a visitor to the building, the visitor's survivors could bring a civil action against the manufacturer of the elevator. The family of the custodian, killed while on the job, could not receive anything in addition to survivors' benefits under workers' compensation - even if they would otherwise be able to bring a suit under their state's wrongful death statute. Moreover, while the bill would eliminate employer suits for property damages, employers would still be able to sue a manufacturer of a defective product covered by the statute of repose to recover commercial losses, such as loss of sales, caused by the defective product, if allowed by state law. It is only workers who are totally shut out by the bill. An even more fundamental fairness issue is demonstrated by the fact that in almost half the states that enacted statutes of repose in products liability actions (including Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah), the highest state courts have overturned state- imposed statutes of repose as violative of their state constitutions. At least ten states have found that these arbitrary cut-off dates for manufacturers' liability for defective products are inconsistent with the state's dues process or equal protection clauses, or the state's constitutional requirement that the courts be open to injured people to seek redress. In Alabama, that court held that the state's ten year statute of repose was arbitrary and violated the "fundamental principle of fairness" that limited "the power of the government to infringe upon individual rights." Lankford v. Sullivan, Long and Hagerty, 416 So.2d 996 (Ala. 1982). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that the right to recover for personal injury is "an important substantive right" and that the state's twelve year statute of repose was inherently unreasonable because it "eliminates a plaintiff's cause of action before the wrong may reasonably be discovered" and unfair because it discriminated between classes of injured plaintiffs, barring the claims of those injured by defective products but not those harmed by other tortious conduct. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983). The "harshness" of an absolute "date-of-use" statute of repose was noted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, which overturned that state's twelve year limitation because of its constitutional concern "about statutes which arbitrarily deny one class of persons important substantive rights to life and safety which are available to other persons." Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W. 2d 319 (N.D. 1986). Another 27 states have chosen not to shut the courthouse door to those injured by defective products by never adopting or repealing statutes of repose. These states include the home states of many members of the Judiciary Committee including: Arkansas, California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin. This bill would overturn the determinations of all these state legislatures and courts without any demonstration of the need for federal intervention. Asbestos Claims May Be Preempted by the Bill In addition to the deliberate elimination of workers' rights contemplated by the bills' proponents, the bill may also inadvertently wipe out the legal rights of workers harmed by asbestos. Asbestos was a part of many durable goods. The personal injury section of the bill contains an exception for injuries caused by "toxic harm," but toxic harm is not defined, leaving substantial uncertainty to whether courts will consider asbestos a toxin that causes "toxic harm." Without a definition, its meaning will be determined on a case by case basis and there is considerable uncertainty whether asbestos would be treated, as a matter of law, as a toxic substance. As stated in a 1964 Journal of the American Medical Association article, "Asbestos is not currently considered a toxic substance since it does not produce systemic poisoning." Instead, it is a naturally-occurring mineral which causes a slowly progressive fibrotic reaction in the lungs that can induce cancer, often 30 to 40 years after inhalation. Thus, this loosely-drafted exception may not provide any protection to workers with asbestosis and related diseases. Because many asbestos exposures occurred over 18 years ago, and H.R. 2005 would apply to injuries that occurred before the date of enactment of the bill, this legislation could effectively wipe out virtually all asbestos exposure cases. Conclusion: The Real Agenda of this Bill is to Federalize Tort Law, Making it Easier to Diminish Corporate Responsibility Like all federal products liability bills introduced over the past 16 years, H.R. 2005 would represent a major interference with the traditional authority of state legislatures and state court judges and juries in civil cases. Tort law has been the province of the states since this country began. Such preemption of the proper role the states has been strongly opposed by the Conference of Chief Justices in past testimony. It was stated best by the Honorable Stanley Feldman, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Arizona, who has told Congress that "tort remedies must lie with State courts and legislatures, which are most aware of and best suited to determine the social and economic impact of present law on their own communities." The genius of American state tort law has been its ability to evolve to meet changing risks and changing societal norms about acceptable corporate and personal behavior. In this evolution, some state legislatures have decided that they wish to cut off manufacturers' liability for older products after a certain date. But most others have not. But proponents of all so-called "tort reform" legislation find state tort law inconsistent, uncertain, and unpredictable. They seek ways to limit their liability. In a continuing attack on consumers' rights to safe products, the same coalition that supports this bill has worked over the past decade to whittle away the ability of injured persons to be fairly compensated. Failing in their sweeping attacks on state courts earlier this decade, their new approach is to nibble away at consumer protections, federalizing remedies industry by industry, starting with general aviation in 1994, biomaterials last year, and Y2K defects this year. Now they seek to abolish or limit consumers' rights, remedy by remedy (witness today's hearings on class actions and this statute of repose bill). In sum, there is no crisis and thus no basis for fundamentally altering the American federal system of jurisprudence by intruding into matters traditionally governed by state legislatures and state courts. There is no justification for this unfair denial of rights, leaving workers and their families without full compensation for their injuries. I urge the Committee to reject this unfair and unwise legislation. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify on this important matter.

LOAD-DATE: July 26, 1999




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