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Capitol
Comment 242 - Class Action Torts and Federalism
Before Congress adjourns for its summer recess, the House Judiciary
Committee is set to consider legislation designed to enhance federal
"diversity jurisdiction" over class-action liability cases. The purpose of
H.R. 1875, the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act, is to make it
easier for defendants in multi-state class-action torts to transfer their
cases from state courts to federal court. Interestingly, the proposed class action diversity bill is supported by
many of the same forces -- namely, conservative Republicans and the
business community -- that have applauded the transfer of power from
Washington to the state capitols. On the other hand, those who wish to
preserve the dominance of state courts in class-actions -- namely, trial
lawyers and their allies in the Democratic party -- are generally among
the most consistent champions of federal supremacy vis-a-vis the states.
Both sides understand, however, that large-scale tort litigation has
become a full-blown substitute for economic regulation. And given a
choice, American businesses would rather be regulated by federal courts.
Plaintiff attorneys prefer state courts, mainly because of the
opportunities for forum shopping that state jurisdiction affords. Which
course best serves the public? Class-action tort law as a form of
regulation. It was only last February that former Clinton
Administration Labor Secretary Robert Reich informed readers of USA
Today that "the era of big government may be over, but the era of
regulation through litigation has just begun."1
But in fact, regulation through litigation has been going on since at
least the 1960s. Then, legal scholars began promoting the idea that tort
litigation should no longer be viewed strictly as a mechanism for forcing
at-fault parties to compensate the losses of those whom they harmed, but
rather as a way to force businesses to alter practices bearing on matters
as varied as product design, marketing, hiring and promotion, worker
health and safety, and the natural environment. Liberal judges helped
facilitate the regulation-through-litigation movement by repudiating and
replacing legal rules and theories that had been entrenched for
decades. A persuasive case can be made that the trend toward regulation through
litigation is a dangerous assault on the Constitution’s separation of
powers. Nevertheless, the trend is gaining momentum, so much so that as a
practical matter, the relevant question, at least for the time being, is
not whether regulation through litigation is constitutional, but whether
de facto regulation of large national industries should occur under the
aegis of federal courts rather than state courts. The latter, after all,
are the traditional venue for tort litigation. But problems arise when
state courts regulate business through the medium of the class-action
lawsuit. Consider the case of Rosen v. Primus Automotive Financial
Services.2 Attorneys representing a plaintiff class
consisting of millions of motorists filed suit in a Minnesota district
court, contending that auto leasing companies should be required to pay
interest to consumers on their security deposits. The district court’s
ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor applies not only to any Minnesotan who
pays a security deposit in connection with an auto lease, but to millions
of people in 43 other states as well. Perhaps requiring interest payments
on security deposits is good public policy, but should one state court be
allowed to make that decision for virtually the entire country? In effect, regulation through litigation in state courts allows jurors
in one state to impose local values on the citizens of other states. A
state that wished to increase competition in the auto leasing industry by
attracting more firms to the market might decide that legally mandated
interest payments on security deposits would run counter to that
objective. Furthermore, apart from impinging on other states’ sovereignty,
allowing fifty state courts to regulate interstate commerce can only
result in a patchwork regulatory regime characterized by uncertainty and
inefficiency. A federal court would be more inclined to balance competing
state interests, and to promote consistency and uniformity -- the sine
qua non of any regulatory regime. Class-action jurisdiction and the Constitution.
Nowadays, "federalism" is usually invoked by partisans who wish
to advance the cause of state and local authority over that of the
national government. Indeed, there is no shortage of recent cases that
illustrate the tendency of federal courts to intrude into precisely the
sort of social policy issues that the Constitution leaves to the states.
But apart from insisting that Congress refrain from extra-constitutional
meddling in social policy, a proper understanding of federalism also
acknowledges the substantial role that the Constitution’s Framers
envisioned for the national government in managing the country’s economic
affairs. Much of the impetus for the Constitutional convention of 1787 can
be traced to the woeful state of interstate commerce and trade under the
Articles of Confederation. It is no small matter that the Framers
conferred upon Congress an explicit authority over "commerce … among the
several states." The Framers wanted the national government to correct the
enervating tendency of states to behave toward each other in ways that are
predatory, protectionist, or otherwise self-serving. There is no reason to
think such conduct is less likely to occur today than in the eighteenth
century. Thus, for state courts to preside over regulation-by-litigation
is to invite the very economic pathologies that the federal Constitution
was written in part to prevent. As it becomes more and more a form of regulation, tort law will
inexorably lose its jurisprudential trappings and become more "political"
-- that is, more susceptible to structural tinkering designed to benefit
special interests, much like conventional regulatory regimes and tax
codes. The folly of transforming tort law into a de facto national
regulatory system will be mitigated if interstate class action litigation
is administered under federal auspices. Americans rejected the
anti-federalist position on economic regulation more than two centuries
ago, for good reason, and to good effect -- we should do the same today.
1Robert Reich, "Litigation is out,
regulation is in," USA Today, February 11, 1999. 2No. CT 98-002733 (Minn. filed June 23,
1999).
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