Copyright 1999 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
May 12, 1999
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 10081 words
HEADLINE:
TESTIMONY May 12, 1999 DR. JAMES S. HOLT SENIOR ECONOMIST
SENATE JUDICIARY IMMIGRATION MEETING WORKFORCE NEEDS
BODY: Statement of Dr. James S. Holt on behalf of
the National Council of Agricultural Employers before the Immigration
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee May 12,1999 Mr. Chairman and
members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf
of the National Council of Agricultural Employers on public policy issues
related to the need to reform the H-2A alien agricultural worker program. The
National Council of Agricultural Employers (NCAE) is a Washington. D.C. based
national association representing growers and agricultural organizations on
agricultural labor and employment issues. NCAE's membership includes
agricultural employers in fifty states who employ approximately 75 percent of
the nation's hired farm work force. Its members include growers, farm
cooperatives, packers, processors and agricultural associations. NCAE was
actively involved in the legislative process that resulted in the enactment of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. NCAE's representation of
agricultural employers gives it the background and experience to provide
meaningful comments and insights into issues concerning immigration policy and
how it affects the employment practices of its members' businesses and the
availability of an adequate agricultural labor supply. My name is James S. Holt.
I am Senior Economist with the management labor law firm of McGuiness &
Williams and the Employment Policy Foundation in Washington D.C. I serve as a
consultant on labor and immigration matters to the NCAE. I am an agricultural
economist, and have spent my entire professional career dealing with labor,
human resource and immigration issues, primarily with respect to agriculture. I
served 16 years on the agricultural economics faculty of The Pennsylvania State
University, and for the past 20 years have been a consultant here in Washington
D.C. I also serve as a technical consultant to most of the current users of the
H-2A program and to employers and associations who are attempting to access the
program. Why is a program for the legal employment of alien agricultural workers
needed? While the United States agricultural industry is overwhelmingly an
industry of family farms and small businesses, it is also heavily dependent on
hired labor. More than 600,000 farms hire some labor during any given year.
Hired labor accounts, on average, for about $1 of every $8 of farm production
expenses. In the labor-intensive fruit, vegetable and horticultural sectors
hired labor costs average 25 to 35 percent of total production costs, and in
some individual commodities, the percentage is much higher. Even in
labor-intensive commodities, however, most of the production processes are
mechanized. Typically, the farm family and perhaps a few hired workers do all
the farm work most of the year. But large numbers of hired workers are needed
for short periods to perform certain very labor-intensive tasks such as
harvesting, thinning or pruning. In many crops these labor- intensive tasks,
particularly harvesting, must be performed during very brief windows of
opportunity, the timing of which can not be predicted with precision and which
is beyond growers' control. The availability of sufficient labor at the right
time to perform these labor- intensive functions can determine whether the farm
produces a saleable product for that growing season. The United States has some
of the best climatic and natural resources in the world for agricultural
production, and especially for the production of labor-intensive fruits,
vegetables and horticultural crops. In a world economy where all resources,
including labor, were mobile and there were no trade barriers so that all
countries could specialize in those commodities in which they have a comparative
advantage, the North American continent would be, as it in fact is, one of the
world's major producers of agricultural commodities, including fruits,
vegetables and horticultural specialties. During the last several decades,
markets for labor-intensive commodities have expanded dramatically in the United
States and throughout the world. This dramatic expansion has resulted from a
number of factors, including technological developments in transportation and
storage, increasing incomes both in the United States and worldwide, and changes
in consumers tastes and preferences which favor fruits and vegetables in the
diet. National markets for labor- intensive commodities, once protected by trade
barriers and the perishability of the commodities themselves, have now become
global markets, due to technological improvements and the strong drive for freer
trade that has occurred over the past two decades. Although it has been little
regarded in policy circles, U.S. farmers have participated fully in the dramatic
growth in domestic and world markets for labor-intensive agricultural
commodities. U.S. farm receipts from fruit and horticultural specialties have
more than doubled, and from vegetables more than tripled, since 1980.
Labor-intensive commodities are the fastest growing sector of U.S. agriculture.
At the same time, agricultural labor productivity has also continued to improve.
Therefore, while production of labor-intensive commodities has expanded
dramatically over the past two decades, average hired farm employment has
declined by about one quarter. But the expansion of labor-intensive agriculture
has created tens of thousands of new non-farm jobs for U.S. workers in the
upstream and downstream occupations that support the production and handling of
farm products. Aliens have always been a significant source of agricultural
labor in the United States. In particular, labor from Mexico has supported the
development of irrigated agriculture in the western states from the inception of
the industry. As the U.S. economy has expanded, millions of new job
opportunities have been generated. Domestic farmworkers have been freed from the
necessity to migrate by the extension of unemployment insurance to agricultural
workers in 1976. And, as the federal government has spent billions of dollars to
settle domestic migratory farmworkers out of the migrant stream and train them
for permanent jobs in their home communities, domestic farmworkers have moved
out of the hired agricultural work force, especially the migrant work force.
Alien workers, largely from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean have
replaced these domestic workers. Consequently, the U.S. agricultural work force
has become increasingly alien and increasingly undocumented. The U.S. Department
of Labor's National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS) in 1997 reported that 36
percent of seasonal agricultural workers working in the United States
self-identified as not authorized to work in the United States. This was an
increase from only about 12 percent a decade earlier. More than 70 percent of
the new seasonal agricultural labor force entrants in the 1997 NAWS report self
identified as not authorized to work. We expect that the 1998 survey, due out
shortly, will show significant increases in these percentages. Throughout this
period there has also been a legal alien agricultural worker admission program.
This program was enacted as the H-2 program in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952. In 1956 Congress attempted to streamline the program and redesigned
it H-2A. In recent years use of the H-2A program has declined to a low of
approximately 15,000 workers annually, although in the past two years the number
of admissions has increased substantially and will probably exceed 30,000
workers this year. The H-2A program has been used principally on the East Coast
in fruit, vegetables, tobacco and, until recently, sugar cane. The program's
structure and requirements evolved from government-to- government treaty
programs that preceded it. Over the years the program has become encrusted with
regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor and adverse legal decisions
generated by opponents of the program which have rendered it unworkable and
uneconomic for many agricultural employers who face labor shortages. Now that
government policy is eliminating the illegal alien work force, many growers are
caught between an unworkable and uneconomical H-2A program and the prospect of
insufficient labor to operate their businesses. The illegal alien seasonal
agricultural work force in the United States consists of two groups. Some are
aliens who have permanently immigrated to the United States and have found
employment in agriculture. Typically, these permanent immigrant illegal aliens
move into non- agricultural industries after they become settled in the United
States. The other component of the illegal alien seasonal agricultural work
force is non-immigrant migrant farmworkers who have homes and families in
Mexico. Many of them are small peasant farmers. The adult workers from these
families, usually males, migrate seasonally to the United States during the
summer months to do agricultural work. Anecdotal evidence suggests that until
recently the number of such migrant illegal alien farmworkers working was
substantial. Now, as a result of increasingly effective immigration control
policies, some of these migrants are finding it necessary to remain in the
United States during the off season for fear that they will not be able to get
back in or because of the high cost of doing so, while many others are finding
it impractical to continue their annual migration and are remaining in Mexico.
Congressional efforts to control illegal immigration began with the landmark
Immigration Control and Reform Act (IRCA) of 1986. The theory of IRCA was to
discourage illegal immigration by requiring employers to see documents
evidencing a legal right to work in the United States, and thereby removing the
"economic magnet" to illegal immigration. It did not work for at least three
reasons. One was that one of the motives for illegal immigration to the U.S. was
not simply to better one's welfare, but to survive, literally and figuratively.
This survival drive overwhelmed any fear of apprehension and deportation. The
second was that Congressional concern about invasion of privacy and 'big
brotherism' resulted in an employment documentation process that was so
compromised that it was easily evaded by document counterfeiting. The third was
that a serious effort to enforce IRCA, including the provisions against document
counterfeiting, was never mounted. The result was that IRCA had little impact on
the volume of illegal immigration, and a perverse impact on the hiring process.
Whereas previously an employer who suspected a prospective worker was illegal
may have been willing to risk refusing to hire that worker, with the
discrimination provision of IRCA an employer ran great risks in refusing to hire
any worker who had genuine appearing documents, even if the employer suspected
the worker was illegal. With the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (11R RA) in 1996, Congress recognized the failure
of IRCA. In I1RIRA Congress decided to test the conventional wisdom that it was
impossible to control illegal immigration at the border by vastly augmenting the
resources and personnel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for
border enforcement. The resources for interior enforcement of employer sanctions
provisions were also augmented. The result has clearly been to make the process
of illegal border crossing more expensive and dangerous. The anecdotal evidence
from farm labor contractors and agricultural employers across the United States
is that many prospective border crossers, especially migrant farmworkers and
prospective migrant farmworkers, have been unable to cross the border or have
made the calculation that the cost of doing so is too high based on their
prospective earnings in the U.S. We have received reports from all regions of
the United States of reduced numbers of workers and short crews, and this has
been one of the major factors leading to the labor shortages that were observed
in the 1997 season and to an even greater degree in the 1998 season. As INS
continues to ramp up its border enforcement personnel, these shortages appear to
be becoming more and more severe, and we expect significant shortages and crop
losses in some crops and some regions in the 1999 season. Increased border
enforcement has also had a perverse effect. It apparently has induced some alien
farmworkers, who in the past crossed the border illegally on a seasonal basis to
work in the United States during the agricultural season, to remain in the
United States during the off season for fear that they would not be able to get
back in the next year. Some of these workers eventually try to smuggle their
families in to join them. Many of these workers would prefer to maintain their
homes and families in Mexico and work seasonally in the United States, but
current immigration policies make this an unattractive option. IIRIRA also set
in motion the testing of a process, which many believe, is the only way to
effectively control the employment of illegal aliens. IIRIRA established a
program of pilot projects for verification of the authenticity of employment
authorization documents at the time of hire. These projects are about midway
through a four-year pilot phase. Presumably, at the end of that time Congress
will revisit the question of requiring mandatory document verification at the
time of hire. If and when this happens, there will be a real crisis in
agriculture, given the fact that upwards of 60 to 70 percent of the industry's
seasonal work force apparently has fraudulent documents. In addition to the
increasing effectiveness of border enforcement activities, additional INS
resources for enforcement of employer sanctions are increasing the frequency of
audits of I- 9 forms. The 1-9 form is the document completed by an employer and
employee at the time of hire on which the employer records the employment
verification documents the employee offers to verify the legal right to work in
the United States. Employers are required to accept the documents offered by the
worker if they reasonably appear on their face to be genuine, a test which
virtually all documents meet. However, when INS does an audit of the employer's
1-9 forms, the INS checks the authenticity of the employment authorization
documents against government data bases, something it is precluded by case law
and INS policy from doing at the request of an employer. At the conclusion of
the audit, the employer receives a list from the INS of the workers whose
documents have been determined to be invalid. Frequently, INS audits of
agricultural employers reveal that 60 to 70 percent of seasonal agricultural
workers have provided fraudulent documents. The employer is then required to
dismiss each employee on the list who cannot provide a valid employment
authorization document, something few workers can do. Independent of the effort
to improve immigration control, other forces are also affecting the agricultural
work place. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is under a congressional
mandate to reduce the amount of wage reporting to non-existent social security
accounts. Through its Enumeration Verification System (EVS), the Social Security
Administration is now checking employers' tax filing electronically within a
matter of days or weeks after they are filed to match names and social security
numbers reported by employers with those in the SSA data base. Employers receive
lists of mismatches with instructions to "correct the mistakes in reporting". Of
course, in most cases the mismatch is not a result of a mistake in reporting,
but a fraudulent number. When the employer engages the employee to "correct the
mistake," the employee disappears. It is not uncommon for employers to receive
lists of mismatches from the SSA containing 50 percent or more of the names,
which the employer reported to the SSA. Confronting the employees on these lists
can have devastating effects on an employer's work force. On the other hand,
employers are concerned about their future liability under the employer
sanctions provisions if they do not act on the SSA lists. The existence of lists
from the SSA that the employer had allegedly not acted upon was cited in a
recent INS prosecution of an agricultural employer for knowingly employing
illegal aliens. While the incidence of INS 1-9 audits is still relatively low,
very large numbers of agricultural employers are receiving lists of mismatched
numbers from the SSA. Thus, many agricultural employers have to confront for the
first time the reality of the legal status of their work force. Both the I-9
audits and the SSA verification program are having a churning effect on the
agricultural work force. Farmworkers with fraudulent documents are rarely picked
up and removed. Instead, the employer is required to dismiss them. In effect,
they are being chased from farmer to farmer as their employers receive SSA
reports or are audited by the INS. Increased border enforcement, increased
interior enforcement and increased SSA verification activity have led to
reductions in labor availability and destabilization of the agricultural work
force. These trends will continue. The increase in border enforcement personnel
authorized by 1IRIRA will not be complete until FY 2002. The SSA plans to
continue lowering its threshold for rejection of employer tax returns due to
name/number mismatches. These factors, coupled with the extraordinarily high
levels of non-agricultural employment, have resulted in increasing frequencies
of farm labor shortages and crop losses. The problem is rapt idly reaching
crisis proportions, and could easily do so in the 1999 growing season. Some
opponents of an alien agricultural worker program argue that a program is not
needed because employer sanctions cannot be effectively enforced no matter what
the government tries to do. The implication of this argument is that employers
should endure the uncertainties and potential economic catastrophe of losing a
work force, and workers should continue to endure the uncertainties of being
chased from job to job on a moment's notice. We find such reasoning
unacceptable. It is arguments for the status quo, which all agree is
unacceptable. Furthermore, it is unacceptable to refuse to address one public
policy problem because another accepted and enacted public policy will be
ineffective. We must honestly face the issues with which our policy of
immigration control and employer sanctions confronts us. We believe that calls
for a workable alien agricultural worker program. Are there viable alternatives
to an alien agricultural worker program? Opponents of the employment of an alien
agricultural worker program suggest there are ways to address the problem that
would result in the removal of the illegal alien agricultural work force other
than the legal admission of alien agricultural workers. One approach that is
suggested is that agricultural employers should be "left to compete in the labor
market just like other employers have to." Under this scenario, there would be
no alien guestworkers. To secure legal workers and remain in business,
agricultural employers would attract sufficient workers away from competing
non-agricultural employers by raising wages and benefits. Those who could not
afford to compete would go out of business or move their production outside the
United States. Meanwhile, according to this scenario, those domestic persons
remaining in farm work would enjoy higher wages and improved working conditions.
There are several observations one must make about this "solution". No informed
person seriously contends that wages, benefits and working conditions in
seasonal agricultural jobs can be raised sufficiently to attract workers away
from their permanent, non- agricultural in the numbers needed to replace the
illegal alien agricultural work force and maintain the economic competitiveness
of U.S. producers. Thus, this scenario predicates that U.S. agricultural
production would decline. In fact, given that the U.S. hired agricultural work
force is, by most estimates, about 70 percent illegal, it would decline
dramatically. Seasonal farm jobs have attributes that make them inherently non-
competitive with non- farm work. First and foremost is that they are seasonal.
Many workers who could do seasonal farm work accepted less than the average
field and livestock worker earnings of $6.98 per hour in 1998 because they
preferred the stability of a permanent job. Secondly, many seasonal farm jobs
are located in rural areas away from centers of population. Furthermore, to
extend the period of employment, workers must work at several such jobs in
different areas. That is, they must become migrants. It is highly unlikely that
many U.S. workers would be willing to become migrant farmworkers at any wage, or
that, as a matter of public policy, we would want to encourage them to do so. In
fact, the U.S. government has spent billions of dollars over the past several
decades attempting to settle domestic workers out of the migratory stream. The
success of these efforts is one of the factors that have led to the expansion in
illegal alien employment. In addition to seasonality and migrancy, most farm
jobs are subject to the viscissitudes of weather, both hot and cold, and require
physical strength and stamina. Thus, it is highly unlikely that a significant
domestic worker response would result even from substantial increases in wages
and benefits for seasonal farm work. However, substantial increases in current
U.S. farmworker wages and benefits can not occur for economic reasons. U.S.
growers are in competition in the markets for most agricultural commodities,
including most labor-intensive commodities, with actual and potential growers
around the globe. Since hired labor constitutes approximately 35 percent of
total production costs of labor- intensive agricultural commodities, and I in 8
dollars of production costs for agricultural commodities generally, substantial
increases in wage and/or benefit costs will have a substantial impact on
growers' over-all production costs. U.S. growers are in an economically
competitive equilibrium with foreign producers at approximately current
production costs. Growers with substantially higher costs can not compete. If
U.S. producers' production costs are forced up by, for example, restricting the
supply of labor, U.S. production will become uncompetitive in world markets
(including domestic markets in which foreign producers compete). U.S. producers
will begin to be forced out of business. In fact, U.S. producers will continue
to be forced out of business until the competition for domestic farmworkers has
diminished to the point where the remaining U.S. producers' production costs are
approximately at current global equilibrium levels. The end result of this
process will be that domestic farmworker wages and working conditions (and the
production costs of surviving producers) are at approximately current levels and
the volume of domestic production has declined sufficiently that there is no
longer upward pressure on domestic worker wages. These same global economic
forces, of course, affect all businesses. But non-agricultural employers have
some options for responding to domestic labor shortages that agricultural
employers do not have. Many non-agricultural employers can "foreign-source" the
labor- intensivecomponentsoftheirproductorservicewithoutlosingthegoodjob s.
Since agricultural production is tied to the land, the labor- intensive
functions of the agricultural production process cannot be foreign-sourced. We
cannot, for example, send the harvesting process or the thinning process
overseas. Either the entire product is grown, harvested, transported and in many
cases initially processed in the United States, or all these functions are done
somewhere else, although only one or two steps in the production process may be
highly labor-intensive. When the product is grown, harvested, transported and
processed somewhere else, all the jobs associated with these functions are
exported, not just the seasonal field jobs. These are the so-called 4 4upstream"
and "downstream" jobs that support, and are created by, the growing of
agricultural products. U.S. Department of Agriculture studies indicate that
there are about 3.1 such upstream and downstream jobs for every on-farm job.
Most of these upstream and downstream jobs are good" jobs, i.e. permanent,
average or better paying held by citizens and permanent residents. Thus, we
would be exporting about three times as many jobs of U.S. citizens and permanent
residents as we would farm jobs if we shut off access to alien agricultural
workers. Another suggestion has been that recruitment of welfare recipients and
the unemployed could replace the illegal aliens. Growers themselves, most
notably the Nisei Farmers League in the San Joaquin Valley have tried to augment
their labor supply by recruiting welfare recipients. While these efforts have
resulted in some former welfare recipients moving into jobs on farms, the
magnitude of this movement has been insignificant. In fact, welfare directors
suggest that the long term impact of welfare reform is likely to exacerbate
rather than reduce the shortage of domestic farm labor. Some seasonal
farmworkers currently depend on the combination of farm work in-season and
welfare assistance during the off-season. As limitations are set on persons'
lifetime welfare entitlement, this pattern will no longer be viable. Seasonal
farmworkers who supplement their earnings with welfare will be forced into
permanent non-agricultural jobs. Other attributes of seasonal farm work are also
deterrents. The preponderance of those now remaining on the welfare rolls are
single mothers with young children. Many are not physically capable of doing
farm work, do not have transportation into the rural areas and are occupied with
the care of young children. The unemployed also make, at best, a marginal
contribution to the hired farm work force. Currently, the U.S. is enjoying
historically low levels of unemployment and many labor markets are essentially
at or above full employment. However, relatively high unemployment rates in some
rural agricultural counties are often cited as evidence of an available labor
supply or even of a farmworker surplus. First it should be noted that labor
markets with a heavy presence of seasonal agriculture will always have higher
unemployment rates than labor markets with a higher proportion of year round
employment. By the very nature of the fact that farm work is seasonal, many
seasonal farmworkers spend a portion of the year unemployed. Second, unemployed
workers tend to share the same values as employed workers. They prefer permanent
employment that is not physically demanding and takes place in an inside
environment. They share an aversion to migrancy, and often have transportation
and other limitations that restrict their access to jobs. The coexistence of
unemployed workers and employers with labor shortages in the same labor markets
means only that we have a system that enables workers to exercise choices. Many
welfare recipients and unemployed workers can not or will not do agricultural
work. It is reasonable to expect an alien worker program to have a credible
mechanism to assure that domestic workers who are willing and able to do farm
work have first access to agricultural jobs, and that aliens do not displace
U.S. workers. It is not reasonable to expect or insist that welfare and
unemployment rolls fall to zero as a condition for the admission of alien
workers. A third alternative to alien workers often suggested is to replace
labor with technology, including mechanization. This argument holds that if
agricultural employers were denied access to alien labor they would have an
incentive to develop mechanization to replace the alien labor. Alternatively, it
is argued that the availability of alien labor retards mechanization and growth
in worker productivity. The argument that availability of alien labor creates a
disincentive for mechanization is belied by the history of the past two decades.
From 1980 to the present, the output of labor- intensive agricultural
commodities has risen dramatically while hired agricultural employment has
declined. The only way this could have happened is because of significant
agricultural labor productivity increases. Yet, this was also the period of
perhaps the greatest influx of alien farmworkers in our history. It does not
appear that there has been a great deal of increase in agricultural
mechanization in fruit and vegetable fanning since a spasm of innovation and
development in the 1960's and 1970's. Indeed, some of the mechanization
developed during that period, specifically mechanical apple harvesters, has
proven to be uneconomical in the long term because of tree damage as well as
fruit damage. Agricultural engineers claim the reason for this is the withdrawal
of support for agricultural mechanization research by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture following protests and litigation by farmworkers in California that
such research was taking away their jobs. But productivity increases can result
from many different factors, of which mechanization is only one. Smaller fruit
trees, which require less ladder climbing, trellised trees, and changes in the
way trees or vines are pruned are also technological developments which improve
labor productivity. The switch from boxes and small containers to bulk bins and
pallets in the field has significantly improved labor productivity of some
harvesting activities. Use of production techniques and crop varieties that
increase yields also improves field labor productivity by making harvesting and
other operations more efficient. These appear to be the techniques that farmers
have used to achieve the large productivity increases obtained in the 1980's and
1990's. The fact that there appears to have been a slowing in the pace of
mechanization itself does not mean that growth in worker productivity has
slowed. The argument that alien employment retards productivity increases is
also belied by logic. The incentive for the adoption of mechanization or any
other productivity increasing innovation is to reduce unit production costs. If
the innovation results in a net saving in production costs, it will be adopted.
It doesn't matter whether the dollar saved is a dollar of domestic worker wages
or a dollar of alien worker wages. On the other hand, if the innovation results
in a net increase in production costs, it will not be adopted. The only way one
can argue that a reduction in alien labor will increase the incentive to
mechanize is to argue that the reduction in alien labor will first increase
production costs. But if, as is argued elsewhere in this testimony, shifting
domestic market share to foreign producers' offsets the tendency for domestic
producers' costs to rise in response to a withdrawal of labor, the incentive for
additional domestic mechanization will never occur. In a global market, the
profitability of mechanization, just like the profitability of everything else,
is determined by global production costs, not by domestic production costs. A
fourth alternative to the importation of alien farmworkers, which has been
suggested, is the unionization of the farm work force. The implication of this
scenario is that unionization would augment the supply of legal seasonal
farmworkers and make alien farmworkers unnecessary. Alternatively, it is argued
that an alien agricultural worker program will make it more difficult for
domestic farmworkers to unionize and improve their economic welfare. First, it
should be noted that use of the H-2A program as a strike-breaking tool is
expressly prohibited. H-2A workers may not be employed in any opportunity that
is vacant because the former occupant of the job is on strike or involved in a
labor dispute. Secondly, there is no impediment to an H-2A worker becoming a
union member. Indeed, the H-2A program has been used for decades in unionized
citrus operations in Arizona. Recently, a farmworker union supported a grower's
H-2A application as a means of providing legal status for its own members. If an
employer seeking labor certification has a collective bargaining agreement and a
union shop, the H-2A aliens, like all other employees, can be required to pay
union dues and may become union members. But there is no reason to believe that
unionization will result in an increase in the availability of legal labor, nor,
indeed, any reason to believe that the membership of farmworker unions is more
legal than the rest of the agricultural work force. Farmworker unions and farm
employers are fishing out of the same labor force pool. The argument that
increased farmworker unionization will increase the supply of legal labor is
based on the supposition that farmworker union will be successful in negotiating
higher wages and more attractive working conditions than in nonunion settings,
and that this will attract more domestic legal labor. Yet wages and working
conditions in union and nonunion settings are not (and in competitive global
markets cannot be) significantly different. Furthermore, the same reasons
described above why higher wages and benefits for seasonal agricultural work,
even if they were economically feasible, would not attract significantly more
legal workers into seasonal agricultural work, are as applicable in a union
setting as in a nonunion setting. The reality is that an alien agricultural
worker program is probably union-neutral. Existence of such a program will
probably not make it significantly more difficult or easier to organize
farmworkers. Why does the H-2A program need to be reformed? There are two broad
reasons why the H-2A program needs to be reformed. First, the program is
administratively cumbersome and costly. Even at its present level of admission,
fewer than 30,000 workers annually, the program is nearly paralyzed. Secondly,
the program sets minimum wage and benefit standards for which many employers
cannot qualify or cannot afford. Therefore, the program's "worker protections"
are cosmetic. They "protect" only about 30,000 job opportunities in an
agricultural work force estimated at more than 2 million. The vast majority of
agricultural workers, legal and illegal, get little or no benefit from the H-2A
"protections." The first reason why the current H-2A program must be reformed is
that it is administratively cumbersome and costly. The regulations governing the
program cover 3' ) pages of the Code of Federal Regulations. ETA Handbook No.
398, the compendium of guidance on program operation, is more than 3 )00 pages.
Employers must apply for workers a minimum of 60 days in advance of the date
workers are needed. Applications, which often run more than a dozen pages, are
wordsmithed by employers, by the Labor Department and by legal services
attorneys. Endless discussions and arguments occur over sentences, phrases and
words. After all this fine tuning, workers see an abbreviated summary of the
order if they see anything at all. In hearings in Oregon this spring workers
often testified that they were referred to H-2A jobs without even being told the
wage rate that was offered. Each employer applicant goes through a prescribed
recruitment and advertising procedure, regardless of whether the same process
has been under-taken for the same occupation by another employer only days
earlier. The required advertising is strictly controlled by the regulations and
looks more like a legal notice than a help wanted ad. Increasingly, the Labor
Department is requiring that advertising be placed in major metropolitan
dailies, rather than the local newspapers that farm job seekers are most likely
to read, if they look for farm work in help wanted ads at all. The
advertisements rarely result in responses, yet they are repeated over and over
again, year in and year out. Certifications are required by law to be issued not
less than 20 days before the date of need. but the GAO reported in 1997 that
they were issued late more than 40 percent of the time. Even after all this, the
employer has no assurance that the "domestic" workers referred to it are, in
fact, legal. Most state job services refuse even to request employment
verification documents, much less verify that they are valid. It is the
experience of H-2A employers that a substantial and increasing proportion of the
"domestic" workers referred, and on the basis of which certification to employ
legal alien workers is denied, are in fact illegal aliens themselves. State
employment service officials have even been known to suggest to H-2A growers
that they should go back to employing illegal aliens and save themselves and the
employment service all the hassle. Finally, a high proportion of the workers
referred to H-2A employers and on the basis of which the employer is denied
labor certification for a job opportunity, either fail to report for work or
quit within a few hours or days. This then forces the employer to file with the
Labor Department for a "redetermination of need". Even though redeterminations
are usually processed within a few days, the petition and admission process
after redetermination means that aliens will, at best, arrive about two weeks
late. The second reason why reform is needed is that the current H-2A program
requires wage and benefit standards that are unreasonably rigid or not
economically feasible in many agricultural jobs, and effectively exclude those
jobs from participating in the H-2A program. The so-called AEWR is one such
standard. The AEWR is a minimum wage set on a state-by-state basis by
regulation, and is applicable to workers employed in job opportunities for which
an employer has received a labor certification. The AEVVR standard is unique to
the H- 2A program and does not exist in any other immigration or labor
certification program. It was established to create a minimum wage standard in
jobs where foreign workers were employed, because the federal minimum wage law
did not cover agriculture at that time. AEWRs were initially set at the level of
the then non-agricultural federal minimum wage. Over time, AEWRs were adjusted
by a variety of methodologies. Since 1987, each state's AEWR is set at the
average hourly earnings of field and livestock workers for the previous year in
the state or a small region of contiguous states. For the 1999 season, AEWRs
range from $6.21 per hour in Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi to $7.533 per
hour in Indiana, Illinois and Ohio. The average AEWR is $6.98 per hour. The AEWR
sets a minimum wage standard that makes it uneconomical to use the H-2A program
in many agricultural occupations. The AEWR standard, in effect, makes the
average wage in one year the minimum wage in the ensuing year. Since the AEWR is
set at the average of the wages for all agricultural workers in the state, it
will be above the actual wages paid for about half of the agricultural
employment in the state, and below the actual wage for about half of all
agricultural employment in the state. Obviously, this standard will not be a
deterrent in using the H- 2A program in occupations in which the actual wage is
above the average wage for all agricultural occupations. But it can be an
uncompetitive and unrealistic standard for an occupation in which the actual
wage is below the average of all agricultural wages in the state. Since, by
definition, half of all employment will always have an actual wage below the
average wage, this standard will always set an uncompetitive wage for some
occupations, no matter how much agricultural wages rise. Another example of an
unreasonably rigid standard is the requirement to provide housing. The current
H-2A program requires an employer to have housing for all the job opportunities
for which an employer applies for labor certification except those job
opportunities from which local workers will commute daily from their permanent
residences, and to provide that housing at no charge to the workers.
Agricultural employers are only required to provide housing to workers if they
participate in the H-2A program or use the Department of Labor's interstate
clearance system to recruit workers. Only a tiny fraction of U.S. agricultural
employers do either. The U.S. Department of Agriculture stopped reporting the
percentage of hired agricultural employment that included employer-provided
housing after 1995. But up to that time only about 15 percent of agricultural
employment included employer- provided housing, either free or at a charge.
Given that this percentage had remained relatively unchanged for many years, it
probably reflects current practice reasonably accurately. Since many employers
who provide housing do so only for year-round employees such as foremen and
supervisors, it is likely that the proportion of seasonal workers provided
housing is even lower. In other words, the vast majority of seasonal
agricultural workers currently arrange their own housing. Employer-provided
housing tends to be provided to seasonal workers only in those areas dependent
on migrant workers that are so remote that community- based housing is
unavailable. The requirement for employer-provided housing is one of the
greatest current obstacles to expanded use of the legal alien agricultural
worker program. Providing housing is extremely expensive. and there are many
other community obstacles to overcome as well. In areas where the housing stock
is already adequate to accommodate the seasonal agricultural work force,
agricultural employers are understandably reluctant to invest large sums to
construct employer- provided housing. Even where the housing stock is not
currently adequate, employers are reluctant to invest in housing unless there is
assurance of a workable program for securing labor to live in the housing. There
certainly can be no disputing the proposition that there must be adequate
housing for both domestic and alien seasonal agricultural workers. The policy
question then is under what conditions this housing should be employer-provided,
and in those circumstances how we get from where we are now to a situation where
there is adequate employer-provided housing. What reforms are needed? The H-2A
program must be reformed by modernizing and streamlining the administrative
processes, especially the procedures for domestic worker recruitment and the
labor market test, and eliminating those administrative requirements that add
cost or inflexibility to the program without providing any corresponding
benefits to domestic farmworkers. Rather than the cumbersome and antiquated
paper process of the interstate clearance system, and the expensive and
unproductive advertising that are now used to disseminate information about
available jobs and to recruit domestic workers, NCAE has suggested bringing
thisprocessintothe2l"century. We have suggested acomputerized farmworker
registry system modeled after the Labor Department's America's Job Bank and
America's Talent Bank systems. Domestic workers who were interested in seasonal
farm work would list themselves and their interests and experience with the
registry. They would indicate whether they were only interested in working
locally or whether they were also willing to consider work in other areas
and/or, if they choose, specify specific areas. Growers who wanted to
participate in the H-2A program would be required to list their jobs with the
registry. Job offers listed with the registry would be examined to assure they
included the required terms and conditions of employment, just as paperjob
orders are now scrutinized. If a job met the program requirements, the registry
would be searched to identify qualified workers who might be interested in
filling the job. Qualified workers would be provided with the information about
the job and asked if they were interested in taking the job. Information about
qualified domestic workers who had accepted the job would be provided to the
employer. To the extent that sufficient qualified workers could not be located
who were willing to accept the jobs, the employer would receive a "shortage
report" authorizing the employment of sufficient aliens to fill the unmet need.
Upon receipt of the shortage report the employer would be authorized to import
sufficient aliens to fill the employer's need or to employ H-2A aliens already
in the United States who were available for new assignments. In short, this
process would work exactly as the current job service recruitment system now
works in filling H-2A jobs, except that it would utilize 2 Is' century
technology rather than early 201h century technology. Employers who used the
registry and the Labor Department would be required to widely advertise the
existence of the registry to potential farmworkers. To assure that workers who
were referred through the registry were, in fact, legal workers, the registry
would check the validity of work authorization documents through the INS and the
Social Security Administration, before listing the worker on the registry. This
check would not obligate the worker to do anything more than show valid work
authorization documents, just as the law currently requires. The registry would
also presumably be able to assist workers whose documents did not pass the
validation check, but who were, in fact, authorized to work, to correct the
problem with their documents. Secondly, the program must be reformed to
establish realistic wage and benefit standards that will assure the economic
viability of the jobs as well as provide benefits to the workers. This essential
balance must be struck. To claim that wage and benefit standards "protect"
domestic workers when at those wage and benefit level do not exist and are not
economically competitive, is deceptive and ultimately harmful to farmworkers.
The AEWR must be replaced with a wage standard that is related to the
competitive market wage in the occupation. NCAE has suggested that the
prevailing wage in the occupation and area of employment be set
as the minimum wage for employers to qualify for legal alien agricultural labor.
In the H-2A program, the
prevailing wage is defined as the 51st
percentile of wages of workers in the occupation and area of employment. This
standard assures that employers who pay substandard wages are not permitted to
employ aliens, but sets a standard that is viable in a competitive market.
(Employers would still, of course, be subject to the federal, state or local
minimum wage, if higher.) The
prevailing wage in the occupation
and area of employment has widespread application and acceptance in other wage
regulation programs. For example, it is the minimum wage for federal contractors
under the Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts. It is difficult to understand
how the
prevailing wage standard could be good public policy in
one setting and bad public policy in another. A second reform that is needed is
to provide flexibility in the provision of housing. Flexibility is needed both
to enable employers to initially get into the program in order to provide legal
status for their current illegal work force, and to accommodate circumstances
where there is adequate housing in the community to accommodate the seasonal
farm work force. As noted above, only about 15 percent of agricultural
employment currently includes employer-provided housing, and the percentage is
probably lower for seasonal agricultural workers. For employers without housing,
a transition period is needed to enable employers to meet housing requirements.
If agricultural employers have a workable, functioning program for the legal
employment of alien workers, they (and their lenders) will have the confidence
to invest in additional housing. Such a transition period does not mean
lessening farmworker benefits. Most farmworkers are not now provided housing,
and any mechanism that increases the housing stock will benefit farmworkers. In
addition to a transition period, some assistance in financing farmworker housing
will be needed. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) has a program of low interest loans to assist farmers and community
organizations to provide in- season migrant housing. However, the regulations
governing the program preclude housing aliens in the housing and set
unrealistically restrictive standards for employer borrowers. The FmHA rules for
migrant housing programs needs to be reformed, or some other mechanism for
assisting in the funding of in-season migrant housing for domestic and alien
farmworkers must be found. Employers also face daunting community opposition
when trying to construct migrant farmworker housing. Even employers who were
willing and able to finance the housing have been prevented from constructing it
by community opposition. While there is widespread agreement that there should
be adequate housing for migrant workers, the not-in-my-backyard response quickly
arises when actual projects are proposed. This opposition can take the form of
restrictive zoning, unrealistic construction standards, or outright opposition
to the presence of migrant farmworkers. Some mechanism is needed to assist
farmers who want to construct migrant housing that meets federal migrant labor
camp standards on their own property to preempt local restrictions. Finally,
flexibility should exist in the way housing is required to be provided. The vast
majority of seasonal farmworkers are currently living off the farm. Some
agricultural communities have adequate housing for seasonal farmworkers, and
experience shows that many farmworkers prefer not to live on the farms. Some
communities do not have adequate housing for seasonal farmworkers, and in those
communities the housing stock must be increased. However, the current
requirement that the employer maintain a housing unit for every migrant worker,
whether or not the worker chooses to live in it, leads to the absurd situation
where employers must maintain vacant housing merely to meet the standard to
qualify for H-2A certification, while the workers live elsewhere. NCAE has
proposed that in communities where the housing stock is adequate to accommodate
the seasonal agricultural work force, that employers be allowed the option of
providing a monetary housing allowance in lieu of employer- provided housing.
This has been portrayed as reducing farmworker benefits. In fact, workers are
now living in this housing without the benefit of housing allowances. Clearly,
the provision of housing or a housing allowance will increase farmworker
benefits. A third reform that is needed is to amend the IIRIRA to assure that
the current agricultural work force can obtain legal status under the program.
NCAE would propose going even further and permitting aliens who have made a
commitment to working in the United States and complying with the law, and who
want to apply for permanent residency, to have a realistic opportunity to become
permanent residents. Under the current provisions of the IIRIRA, persons who
have accumulated 365 days or more in illegal status in the United States after
April 1998 are debarred from immigration benefits for a period of I 0 years.
Admission to the United States as an alien worker is one such immigration
benefit. Thus, this provision would debar most aliens who are currently in the
U.S. agricultural work force from participating in the H-2A program, reformed or
otherwise. Employers who choose to use the program would have to recruit a whole
new work force of persons who were not affected by the bar -- persons who had
not previously worked in the United States. This makes no sense whatsoever, and
would cause chaos in the agricultural industry as well as in the immigrant
community. Clearly, the logical solution is to provide a waiver of the IMRA bar
to aliens who wish to continue working as legal seasonal agricultural workers.
NCAE also feels that aliens who participate in the U.S. seasonal agricultural
work force, contribute to the U.S. economy, and abide by U.S. law, including the
requirements of the H-2A program while they are H-2A workers, should have a
realistic opportunity to move up into permanent agricultural work and greater
responsibilities and earnings, or to move up and out of the agricultural work
force if they so desire. For many participants in the seasonal agricultural work
force, seasonal agricultural work is an entry-level occupation. They ultimately
aspire to better Jobs in or out of agriculture. We believe it is unjust to
accept the work and dedication of alien farmworkers as seasonal agricultural
workers, but deny them the reasonable aspirations that accompany dedication to
this work. On the other hand, it is our belief, based on the close association
of our members with their farmworkers, that many persons who do farm work for a
period in the United States do not want to live here permanently, bring their
families here, or become permanent residents. They want to maintain their homes
and families in their native land. They look at employment in the United States
as a way of sustaining their families or launching a better life in their native
country. We believe that so long as the individuals are contributing,
law-abiding members of our community, both options should be open to them. What
will be the impact of a reformed H-2A program on farmworkers? For domestic
farmworkers, the reformed program will assure them first access to all
agricultural jobs before they are filled by legal alien labor. It will assure
that this access is real, by assuring that there is widespread and easy assess
to information about the available jobs. It will protect the wages in jobs
approved for the employment of aliens by making the
prevailing
wage the minimum wage - in effect a Davis-Bacon Act for farmworkers. It
will assure housing or housing allowance and transportation benefits to migrant
farmworkers who have no such assurance at present. In short, it will raise the
standards for domestic farmworkers in all H-2A- approved occupations. It will
also provide all of the above benefits for currently illegal alien farmworkers,
the majority of the seasonal agricultural work force. In addition, it will free
them from the fear, indignity and economic costs of apprehension and removal, or
of being thrown out of work on a moment's notice. It will also free them from
dependence on "coyotes" and the costs and physical dangers of illegal entry. For
domestic workers in the upstream and downstream jobs that are created and
sustained by U.S. agricultural production, it will assure the continuation and
growth in these employment opportunities. For agricultural employers, it will
assure them an adequate, legal work force if they are willing and able to meet
the requirements of the program. It will give employers the certainty that will
enable them to plan their businesses and make investments more effectively. Why
is a workable alien agricultural worker program good public policy? In the
absence of effective control of illegal immigration and enforcement of employer
sanctions, the status quo will continue - - illegal alien migration, little use
of the legal alien worker program, fewer protections for domestic and alien
farmworkers, crop losses due to shortages of workers, and vulnerability to
random INS enforcement action for employers. This will be true whether or not
the legal guestworker program is reformed, because without effective immigration
control and document verification, agricultural employers as well as all other
employers will continue to be confronted by a work force with valid appearing
documents and no practical way to know who is legal and who is not. No one can
defend or advocate for continuation of the status quo. The current system of
illegal immigration and an agricultural industry dependent on a fraudulently
documented work force is bad for employers, workers and the nation. If the
nation achieves reasonably effective control of illegal immigration and
enforcement of employer sanctions - which is the objective of current public
policy - then agricultural production in the United States, particularly of the
labor-intensive fruit, vegetables and horticultural commodities, will be
radically reduced. This scenario will result with attendant displacement of
domestic workers in upstream and downstream jobs, unless a workable agricultural
guestworker program exists. In conducting the public policy debate on creation
of a workable alien agricultural worker program, it is important to be realistic
about what the public policy options are and are not. The public policy options
are not between greater and lesser economic benefits for domestic farmworkers.
The level of wages and benefits that U.S. agriculture can sustain for all
farmworkers, domestic and alien, are largely determined in the global market
place. The public policy options we face are between a larger domestic
agricultural industry employing domestic and legal alien farmworkers and
providing greater employment opportunities for domestic off- farmworkers, and a
significantly smaller domestic agricultural industry and drastically fewer
employment opportunities for domestic off- farmworkers with a wholly domestic
farm work force. In either case, the level of economic returns to farmworkers
will be approximately the same, namely those economic returns that are
sustainable in the competitive global marketplace. The National Council of
Agricultural Employers believes the national interest is best served by
effective immigration control and a workable alien agricultural worker program
that enables the United States to realize its full potential for the production
of labor-intensive and other agricultural commodities in a competitive global
marketplace, and which supports a high level of employment for domestic workers
in upstream and downstream jobs while assuring reasonable protections for
domestic and alien farmworkers. The Council believes an alien agricultural
worker program that is workable and competitive for employers and that protects
access to jobs and the wages and working conditions of domestic farmworkers, and
that provides legal status, dignity and protections to alien farmworkers working
in the United States, is important to accomplish now. We, however, do not
believe it is the end of the job. We also believe that there are other important
public policy issues related to seasonal agricultural workers. Many individuals
and families that perform seasonal agricultural work face serious economic and
social problems that should be addressed. Seasonal farm work alone is not
sufficient to sustain a reasonable standard of living for most persons who
engage in farm work at any practicable wage rate. There are serious problems of
housing, medical care and child care for workers who migrate, especially with
families, and for persons who engage in intermittent employment or work for many
different employers. Many of these problems extend far beyond the work place. In
fact, for this component of our population, it is when they are not working that
these problems are most severe. Conclusion The National Council of Agricultural
Employers stands ready to work with domestic farmworker and immigrant groups not
only to develop a workable alien agricultural worker program, but to find
workable solutions to the social and economic problems of those employed in
seasonal farm work. During the past several months, NCAE has reached out to
worker, immigrant and church groups to explore solutions to these problems along
with our need for a stable legal work force. These issues should be addressed
now. Congress should not wait any longer to fix an indefensible status quo.
Agricultural employers and worker advocates should put their differences aside
and work jointly to solve these problems. This hearing presents an opportunity
to do that. Let's hope that we don't walk away from it. The economic and social
costs are too high.
LOAD-DATE: May 18, 1999