/www.house.gov/jec/stud-jul.gif">
The Impact of the Welfare State on Small Business and the American
Entrepreneur
Executive Summary
This is the fourth in a series of Joint Economic Committee (JEC)
studies I have commissioned on the effects of the modern Welfare State on
various aspects of the American economy and society. This study focuses on
the impact of excessive government activity on small business and
entrepreneurs.
This series of JEC studies has consistently found that a level of
federal spending in excess of about 17.5 percent is associated with slower
economic and income growth, and higher rates of poverty. This new JEC
study explores the impact of excessive government on the nerve center of a
market economy -- small business and entrepreneurs.
The study documents how excessive government overburdens small business
and entrepreneurs under mounds of taxation and red tape. Because of their
pivotal role in a market economy, the hampering of small business and
entrepreneurs not only directly limits their ability to produce, but also
exerts a serious drag on economic growth throughout the entire economy.
Furthermore, the costs of complying with government regulation tends to
impose disproportionate costs on small business relative to big business.
This results from the fact that for a small business, the cost of
complying with a government regulation tends to be higher relative to the
size of its assets, workforce, or output. In the case of small business,
regulatory costs tend to be spread over a relatively smaller output,
meaning that their cost per unit is higher than average.
The study also finds that taxes can also play an important role
undermining small business output and employment growth. Together, higher
taxes and over-regulation can be a devastating combination. The study
notes that this excessive burden of taxes and regulations derailed the
"small business express" underlying much of the prosperity of the 1980s.
Excessive federal spending and taxation undermines the vitality of
private firms and reduces economic growth. According to the findings of
this study, a $100 billion reduction in federal spending growth would
boost economic growth by $35-38 billion annually. This lost economic
output translates into slower growth in worker compensation and lower
living standards over time.
I am pleased to make this study available to Congress and the public,
and hope it contributes to an informed discussion of economic issues.
Jim Saxton Vice-Chairman Joint Economic Committee July 1996
The Impact of the Welfare State on Small Business and the American
Entrepreneur
by Lowell Gallaway and Richard Vedder
The most significant economic question of the twentieth century has
been, "Can a nation spend itself into affluence?" Put differently, that
question translates into, "Does the demand for goods and services
(represented by "spending") create its own supply?" During the middle half
of the century, the answer provided by the conventional wisdom, both
economic and political, was an affirmative. However, as the twentieth
century is winding down, increasingly it is being realized that we cannot
"spend" ourselves rich, especially through the device of government
spending. Instead, we are rediscovering the idea that the only path to
economic well-being is through the supply-side of the economy. In short,
if it is economic abundance we want, we must produce ourselves rich.
In the three previous studies in this series, the implications of
increased Federal Government spending for the health of the American
economy have been explored. The conclusions of the three reports have been
quite consistent. Beyond some critical level of Federal Government
spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), additional
spending is counterproductive. It inhibits the ability of the American
economy to produce goods and services. That critical level of spending is
about 17.5 percent of GDP, about twenty percent less than current levels
of Federal outlays.
I. The Role of the Entrepreneur
In this, the fourth such report, we turn to an exploration of how
Federal Government activity affects the actions of those who are center
stage in the organization of the production of commodities, entrepreneurs
and the business organizations they command. It is in the entrepreneurial
sector that the critical economic decisions are made -- what to produce
and what and how much of various inputs to employ in the process. In so
doing, entrepreneurs must forecast the potential demand for their products
and future prices of the inputs they require. This is a risky undertaking.
Risky is the appropriate word. Entrepreneurs are people who take chances,
who expose themselves to the possibility of failure.
The Entrepreneur and Profits
But what is the measure of lack of success in these endeavors? Nothing
more than the so-called "bottom-line" - profits - whatever is left over
after the output has been sold and expenses paid, including taxes.
Profits, particularly in the corporate sector, have become an important
issue very recently. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has focused on them
as an explanation for the sluggish growth (or, in some cases, actual
decline) in the earnings of workers in the United States. The basic
implication of the Secretary's claims is that increases in corporate
profits mean decreases in earnings. This view of the world is a
redistributionist one that attempts to use corporate profits as an excuse
for the behavior of earnings.[1]
To buttress this position, the claim is often made that profits are at
nearly all time record high levels. This is an interesting assertion. When
corporate profits, either before tax or after tax, are expressed as a
percentage of the cost of producing output and compared over time, almost
the opposite seems to be true. This is indicated in Figure 1, which
graphically displays measures of corporate profitability during the
post-World War II era. Clearly, there is a downward trend in corporate
profits as a share of the cost of output.
Click here to
see Figure 1.
Profits and Federal Government Spending
Given the already documented longer term slowing of economic growth
that we have attributed to excessive Federal spending, the decline in the
corporate profit share of national income could well be another
manifestation of the fiscal drag imposed by an out-sized Federal
Government. As a first step in exploring this possibility, we examine the
statistical linkage between corporate profits and the percentage rate of
change in GDP in the United States. The results are shown in Panel A of
Table 1. They indicate the presence of a strong positive
relationship between the corporate profit share of the cost of producing
output and GDP growth.
Next, we turn to the statistical linkage between corporate profits and
the percentage growth in the average productivity of labor. The results
are provided in Panel B of Table 1. They, too, indicate a statistically
significant positive relationship between the profit share of
income and growth in labor productivity. Since labor earnings are very
closely associated with productivity levels,[2]
this implies that workers' earnings and the profit share of income are
also positively associated, both being the product of a similar set of
factors.
Click here to
see Table 1.
The association between the corporate profit component of income and
the average output of labor is an important one. It provides the
connection between corporate profits, growth in GDP, and the impact of
excessive Federal Government spending. In the second report of this
series, the impact of Federal Government spending on the average product
of labor was documented, with the conclusion being that Federal spending
that exceeds 17.42 percent of GDP has a negative effect on the
productivity of labor.
In that report, we picked up the story of productivity change beginning
in 1973. We will do the same here, assuming that Federal spending is set
at the critical level of the mid-seventeen percent range and held there
through 1994. Based on this assumption, we then create a hypothetical
average productivity of labor date series and, from it, calculate
hypothetical percentage rates of change in average productivity.
Once this has been done, the difference between the hypothetical and
actual rates of change in labor productivity can be translated into an
impact on Gross Domestic Product by doing, in order, the following:
- Multiply each year's rate of productivity change difference by
0.5387 (the regression coefficient reported in Panel B, Table 1). This
produces a hypothetical change in the corporate profit share of
income data series.
- Using the results of step #1, calculate a hypothetical corporate
profit share of national income for each year.
- Calculate the difference between the hypothetical and actual
corporate profit shares.
- Multiply this difference by 1.2108 (the regression coefficient from
Panel A of Table 1). This produces a hypothetical change in the rate of
growth in GDP data series.
- Using the result of step #4, calculate a hypothetical GDP series
based on the assumption that Federal Government spending is maintained
in the mid-seventeen percent of GDP range.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of both the actual and hypothetical GDP
series (indexed so that 1973 = 100) over the years 1973-1994. As the
magnitude of Federal spending departs further and further from the
optimal, subsequent to 1973, the actual level of GDP falls below the
hypothetical by greater and greater amounts through 1982. At that point,
hypothetical GDP was 14 percent greater than the observed level. Following
1982, the gap drops to about nine percent for the years 1984-1988, but
then begins to rise, averaging about 12 percent during the period
1988-1994. Currently, it stands at about ten percent.
Click here to
see Figure 2.
The Impact of Federal Spending Restraint
In our earlier studies, we evaluated the impact of restraining Federal
Government spending by $100 billion. From the second of these, we know
that $100 billion of spending restraint would produce an increase of the
average productivity of labor of 0.8 percent. Tracking the effect of this
through the corporate profit share of income and the rate of growth in GDP
(using the regression coefficients from Table 1) yields an estimated
increase in GDP of 0.52 percent.[3] At
1994 levels of real GDP, this amounts to about $35 billion, quite
consistent with our earlier estimate of a $38 billion increase in GDP that
would result from $100 billion of spending restraint.
How Government Inhibits Entrepreneurship
So much for the technical side of the relationship between Federal
Government spending and the actions of entrepreneurs. We now will explore
some of the specifics of how the overburden of government inhibits the
capacity to function of those who organize the process of production. The
very sense of the word entrepreneur is that it describes persons of
imagination and energy who are willing to take risks in the hope of making
profits. Success in these endeavors turns on their being able to institute
new and different ways of combining inputs to generate the goods and
services that a nation and its people desire.
Constraints on the freedom of people to be entrepreneurial interfere
with this mechanism and reduce the total level of national output. This is
where government enters the picture. In a prescient fashion, Alexis de
Tocqueville saw the future of the modern state as one in which government
"covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules,
minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most
energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will
of man is not shattered, bent and guided; men are seldom forced by it to
act, but they are constantly refrained from acting. Such a power does not
destroy, but it prevents existence; it . . . compresses, enervates,
extinguishes . . ."[4] In
short, it dampens the entrepreneurial spirit. It drags the economy down,
slowing its rate of growth.
The Special Case of Small Business
To be sure, the entrepreneurial types have the capacity to respond and
adjust to the various government rules and regulations they encounter.
However, this can be done only at some cost and, ultimately, it is these
costs which apply the brakes to the system. A classic illustration of this
is provided by some of the experience of the small business sector of the
American economy in recent years. We begin by pointing out that small
businesses are a major source of jobs, especially new ones, in the
American economy. It is large businesses that downsize their labor
force. Small businesses create jobs and grow in size.
To put this issue in perspective, consider the pattern of job growth in
the United States since 1973. Between 1973 and 1981, both years containing
a business cycle peak, 15,323,000 additional jobs were created.[5] At
the same time, the civilian non-institutionalized, working-age population
grew by 23,034,000. Thus, 0.67 jobs were added for every additional person
considered available to work. See Table 2 for details. Move on to the
period 1981-1989.[6] In
this interval, 16,945,000 additional jobs were created, not that much
different from the 1973-1981 period. However, the working-age population
grew by only 16,263,000 between 1981 and 1989, meaning that 1.04
additional jobs were available per person added to the working-age
population. After 1989, things are fairly similar to the 1973-1981 period.
Between 1989 and 1995, the working age population grew by 12,191,000 and
employment increased by 7,558,000. This translates into an increase of
0.62 jobs per addition to the civilian non-institutional population aged
16 and over.
Click here to
see Table 2.
Why the differences in the rates of job creation in these periods? The
answer lies in changes over time in the costs per worker associated with
the burden of government regulations affecting typical small business
enterprises. A 1992 Joint Economic Committee minority staff study
documented the nature of fluctuations in the cost of government
regulations during the years 1982-1992.[7]
Figure 3 displays those changes in a graphic fashion. Through 1989, the
real cost of government mandates and regulations fell by about eight
percent. This is almost exactly the interval in which the remarkable job
growth of the 1980s took place. However, between 1989 and 1992, they rose
by slightly more than one-third, prompting the following conclusion:[8]
"A combination of government mandates, regulations, and
taxes significantly altered the potential profitability of small
business firms subsequent to 1989. In the process, the great job
creation machine that fueled the economic boom of the 1980s was
derailed, contributing very substantially to the lower rates of growth
in employment, total output, and wage rates in the American
economy."
Click here to
see Figure 3.
Given that firms that employ fewer than 100 employees account for more
than half of total employment in the United States, the link between the
pattern of variation in the costs created by the impact of government
regulations on small business and both the acceleration of job growth in
the 1980s and its slowing in the 1990s is obvious. The bottom line in this
respect is clear. Anything that destroys the profitability of small
business enterprises ultimately lowers overall living standards and erodes
the economic vitality of the United States.
Exacerbating the impact of regulation on the small business
entrepreneur is the fact that, on average, regulatory burdens are greater
the smaller the business enterprise. Thomas Hopkins estimates that, in
1992, the regulatory burden per worker in businesses employing 500 or more
employees was $2,921. For enterprises with 20 to 499 workers, however, it
was $5,195; and for firms with fewer than 20 employees, $5,545.[9] See
Figure 4.
Click here to
see Figure 4.
The Minimum Wage Controversy
One of the major factors in the post-1989 increase in the regulatory
burden borne by small businesses was the minimum wage increases that took
place in April, 1990, and April, 1991. The minimum wage is a hoary example
of government's mandating a particular private economic decision, in this
case the wage rate that many employers must pay to certain workers.
Much of the rhetoric associated with advocacy of minimum wage increases
focuses on doing something for the poor. Ironically, though, the
recent historic record indicates that very little good has resulted from
minimum wage increases, at least for the poor. This is not that
surprising. To begin, very few of the poor of working age have full-time
jobs (only 9.2 percent). Slightly more than another thirty percent work
part-time, but almost three-fifths do not work at all.[10]
The truth is most people who earn the minimum wage are not poor. A
majority of minimum wage workers are either young persons living in
nonpoor families or they are second or third earners in a household -- not
the primary breadwinner. Many come from relatively prosperous middle-class
families.[11]
Evidence confirming the lack of impact of minimum-wage increases on
levels of poverty is readily available. After a series of minimum wage
increases beginning in 1974, when the basic rate was increased from $1.60
to $2.00 an hour, and ending in 1981 with a rate of $3.35, the poverty
rate climbed from 11.1 percent of the population to 14.0 percent. From
then until 1990, there were no further increases. The poverty rate? It
fell to 12.8 percent. Subsequent to the 1990 and 1991 increases, which
took the rate to $4.25 an hour, the poverty rate climbed to as high as
14.5 percent.
A likely explanation for the increase in the poverty rate
following rises in the minimum wage is the employment (or unemployment)
effects arising from the higher labor costs produced by a heightened
minimum wage. The sequence of minimum wage changes that began in 1974
followed a six-year hiatus in which there had been no change. The first
rise took place on May 1, 1974, and almost immediately the unemployment
rate began to rise. From the very low five percent range during the early
months of 1974, the unemployment rate surged to the 7.8 percent level by
the end of the year. Another increase took place on January 1, 1975, and
the unemployment rate continued to climb. For all of 1975, it averaged 8.5
percent, compared to 5.6 percent for 1974.
Click here to
see Figure 5.
An accident, perhaps? We think not. A similar situation occurred in
1990, when, after a period in which the minimum wage had not increased
since 1981, it was raised by more than 10 percent on April 1, 1990. In the
six months prior to that change, 802,000 additional jobs had been created.
In the six months following, 352,000 jobs were lost. See Figure 5. There
are other examples of the same phenomenon at work, one being during the
Great Depression of the 1930s. (See Box 1)
Box 1
Minimum Wages in the Great Depression
A powerful example of the impact of the minimum wage comes
from the pre-Fair Labor Standards Act portion of the 1930s. In fact,
instead of describing the early 1930s as the Great Depression, we could
describe them as a period of high wages and low employment.[1] Much
of the public policy analysis of the time focused on the importance of
maintaining purchasing power by keeping wage rates high.[2]
Herbert Hoover argued vigorously against any reduction in money wages at
the outset of the Great Depression. At the conclusion of its renowned
"first hundred days," Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal made a strong
commitment to the same principle. The National Industrial Recovery Act,
passed in June 1933, required that a minimum wage be included in any
industrial code. As it evolved, the actual minimum wage was generally
about 40 cents an hour.[3] This
was remarkable, since a 40 cent-an-hour minimum wage represented
more than 90 percent of the average hourly wage.[4] The
impact on wage rates was dramatic, driving them upward by almost 20
percent in the last half of 1933.[5] The
timing of this surge was unfortunate. From March to July, the
unemployment rate had fallen by a full 5 percentage points, indicating
that an economic recovery had begun.[6]
These data understate the impact of the codes on employment. In
addition to the minimum wage provisions, the codes contained maximum
hours requirements. They generally were set at 40 hours per week, below
the average work week of the time.[7]
Consequently, as unemployment rates stopped declining, the average work
week fell by 13 percent between June and December 1933.[8]
Over the next 15 months, unemployment rose slightly, standing at 23.5
percent in October 1934. The following year saw a slight improvement,
but unemployment still measured nearly 22 percent in October 1935. By
this time, the National Industrial Recovery Act had passed from the
scene, having been declared unconstitutional earlier in the year by the
Supreme Court. In the absence of the Act's minimum wage provisions,
employment conditions improved dramatically. By may of 1937, the
unemployment rate had fallen to almost 12 percent. Again, all the
evidence points to the same conclusion: If we introduce a wage shock in
the form of a hike in the minimum wage, unemployment rises; if we allow
the minimum wage to fall from the effects of inflation or court rulings,
unemployment falls.[9]
__________
Notes
1. For a fuller description of the nature and character of the Great
Depression in America, see our Out of Work: Unemployment and
Government in Twentieth Century America (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1993) and Murray Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Kansas
City: Sheed and Ward, 1963).
2. Herbert Hoover had a particular fascination with this notion. See
our Out of Work, pp. 89-97. for details.
3. As the industry codes under the National Recovery Administration
were approved, the agreed-upon minimum wages clustered about the 40-cent
figure. They were not uniform, though. There often were special, i. e.,
lower, minimums for women and Southern workers. The key features of 109
different approved codes are described in "Summary of Permanent Codes
Adopted Under National Industrial Recovery Act Up to November 8, 1933,"
Monthly Labor Review, December 1933, pp. 1333-1343.
4. The estimate of average hourly earnings in the
United States for June 1933 is 43.5 cents. Monthly Labor Review,
September 1933, p. 728.
5. By December 1933, the average hourly wage had risen by 19.3
percent from the previous June and stood at 51.9 cents. The driving up
of average wage rates by the introduction of the 1933 minimum wage is
recognized in the economics literature. See Paul A. Samuelson and Robert
M. Solow, "Analytic Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy," American
Economic Review, May 1960, pp. 177-194; and Michael M. Weinstein,
The Great Depression Revisited, Karl Brunner, ed. (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), or Weinstein's Recovery and Redistribution
Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, 1933-1936 (New York:
Elsevier, 1980).
6. The monthly estimates of unemployment rates are taken from our
Out of Work, Table 5.1, p. 77. The accompanying text explains how
the estimates were derived.
7. An examination of the approved codes described in
the December 1933 issue of the Monthly Labor Review reveals a
very broad agreement on the 40 hour figure.
8. In June 1933 the average workweek was estimated to be 43.3 hours.
By December, it was down to 37.7 hours. See, respectively, Monthly
Labor Review, September 1933, p. 728, and Monthly Labor
Review, March 1934, p. 798.
9. The subsequent rise in unemployment in late 1937 and 1938
reflected a wage shock of another sort, largely resulting from the
implementation of the National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security
Act, and other 1935 legislation that passed constitutional muster in
1937. See our Out of Work, chapter 7.
An additional consideration in the case of the minimum wage is the
distribution of its employment effects. They are borne disproportionately
by particular groups in the economy. Figure 6 shows the relationship
between the minimum wage rate (in 1994 dollars throughout) and the
excess unemployment of teenagers. Excess unemployment is simply the
difference between the unemployment rate for teenagers and the overall
unemployment rate for the economy.[12]
The correspondence between the two data series is striking.[13]
Higher minimum wages increase the gap between the teenage and overall
unemployment rates.
Click here to
see Figure 6.
A Special Mandate: The Davis-Bacon Act
Very significantly, the same relationship holds between the real
minimum wage rate and the overall unemployment rate for non-whites. This
is consistent with a growing body of evidence that indicates that the
employment effects of government intervention in labor markets are
disproportionately concentrated among non-whites.[14] A
special case in point is the impact of the Davis-Bacon Act. The
Davis-Bacon legislation was enacted in 1931 and requires the paying of
prevailing wage rates on Federally funded
construction projects. Historically, prevailing wage rates have been defined
in terms of the trade-union wage scales that exist in an area. Thus, the
ultimate impact of Davis-Bacon is the equivalent of a minimum wage rate, a
high one to be sure, for a certain class of construction workers. In a
recent analysis of the impact of the Davis-Bacon legislation on non-white
unemployment, we found that, since 1930 (before Davis-Bacon), the
difference between black and white unemployment in the construction
industry has increased from 1.2 percentage points to about five percentage
points in 1990.(See Box 2)
Box 2
The Personal Side of Davis-Bacon
Often, minority workers lack job skills simply because they
have been denied on-the-job training. Being inexperienced, they are
relatively less productive, perhaps performing ten dollars an hour worth
of services instead of the twenty dollars provided highly experienced
workers. Black contractors wanting to hire blacks simply cannot
afford to do so, since worker productivity is far below the very high
minimum wage set by Davis-Bacon.
To illustrate, Art Pearson, a black man who began his career as an
electrician in 1956, later starting his own contracting business says,
"The Davis-Bacon Act puts me between a rock and a hard place . . . I
would like to be able to hire workers and pay them different rates,
based on how good they are. I would pay some people more than what is
currently the prevailing
wage rate, and others
less, depending on how good they are . . . I would also want to have
some workers cross over, do some electrician work, some laborer work,
some other work . . . The Davis-Bacon Act prevents me from doing any of
this."[1]
In a similar vein, the President of the Bay Area Black Contractors
Association, Chris Albert, tells a story about a young high school
graduate who begged him for a job working as an electrician on a public
housing project. Albert said, "I can't hire you because . . . I can't
afford to hire another trainee," since he had to pay Davis-Bacon wages.
The young man returned saying he would work below prevailing wages, saying he wanted to
end a life of dealing in drugs. Albert reluctantly said, "No," and two
days later the young man was shot to death.
While on the subject of public housing projects, some of the
strongest support for repealing Davis-Bacon comes from minority
residents in public housing projects, who would like to have maintenance
work performed at modest wages by their own residents, a move that would
achieve three objectives. First, it would provide them income. Second,
it would teach work skills and discipline. Third, it would improve the
quality of their housing. A resident of the Abbottsford project in
Philadelphia, Dorothy Harrell, notes that, "Even though our residents
would be happy to perform unskilled and semi-skilled work for $8 or $10
an hour, the Davis-Bacon Act forces the contractors to pay the prevailing wage . . . A general
laborer's wage right now is $25.65 . . ." Major renovation of the over
half-century old facilities is soon to begin, but it is likely that the
residents who live there cannot join in the construction project despite
the many advantages of allowing their participation.
__________
Notes
1. We are indebted to the Institute for Justice for
providing us with these quotes from various people regarding how they
perceive the Davis-Bacon legislation.
II. Regulatory Effects in General
Our findings with respect to the impact of wage-setting activities of
the Federal Government can be generalized to all Federal regulatory
activity. Higher governmentally mandated wage rates increase the costs to
employers of hiring workers. The same is true of other government
regulations. In effect, the costs implicit in their implementation can be
viewed as a tax on the hiring of resource inputs. The magnitude of these
costs, or implicit taxes, at the Federal level is immense and growing.
Table 3 provides data in this regard.
Click here to
see Table 3.
These costs are more than just implicit taxes. They also represent
spending that is under the effective control of government. What
government regulatory mandates do is disguise the true size of the
government's role in the economy. If we added the regulatory burden
attributable to the Federal Government to actual Federal spending, the
Federal share of GDP would rise to almost one-third.
A very significant aspect of the regulatory cost of the Federal
Government is a marked change in its growth compared to increases in
actual Federal spending. Over the periods 1977-1981 and 1981-1989 the
costs of Federal regulation, as estimated by Hopkins and Robert Genetski,
rose at about half the rate at which Federal spending grew. However, in
the five years following 1989, Federal regulatory costs grew at a
significantly faster pace than Federal spending.[15]
See Table 3 and Figure 7. Increasingly, it seems, the Federal impact on
the American economy is becoming more heavily weighted in the direction of
regulations and mandates.
Why the increase in the relative importance of regulations and
mandates? Very simple: they differ from the more normal approach to
government activity by substituting constraints on the way in which
private individuals or companies conduct their affairs for the direct
collection of tax revenues that are then distributed by government
agencies to finance social programs. This approach has some appealing
features for legislators. Faced with rising public resentment about the
level of taxation and the very size of government, it is becoming more
difficult for elected representatives to use the conventional tax and
spend approach to expand government programs beyond their present levels.
By mandating how other people spend their money, though, they can
accomplish the same thing with no apparent increase in the size of
government or the burden of taxation.
Click here to
see Figure 7.
Of course, this is an illusion. As we have already discussed,
regulations and mandates impose burdens that represent hidden taxes
in the American economy, taxes that become additional costs to business
enterprises. There are a limited number of ways in which businesses can
respond to such cost increases. Either they can raise prices, reduce other
costs, such as wages, or do some combination of these things. For example,
in 1991, a substantial part of the adjustment was made through reductions
in profits. Before-tax profits for nonfinancial corporate businesses as a
percentage of the total gross domestic product they produce, fell to lower
levels than all but three other years since 1946.[16]
The significance of low profits is profound. They are a leading
indicator of the movement of the unemployment rate. Lower corporate
profits this year portend higher unemployment rates in future years. The
precise quantitative relationship is shown by the regression results
reported in Table 4.[17]
Click here to
see Table 4.
The linkage between movements in profits and unemployment is a simple
one. For example, say the government requires a design change in a
product, such as automobiles. Either the company will have to change its
level of usage of labor and capital or buy more inputs from other
businesses to satisfy the new mandate. Unless any additional costs are
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, profits will be
squeezed. In the short term, profits, being merely what is left over after
all the other bills have been paid, will adjust freely to reflect the
impact of any new government regulations. In the longer term, though,
businesses will seek to rearrange their affairs in a way that will move
the level of profits back towards normal. If this cannot be done, the
ultimate adjustment is to simply close the doors and cease operation. The
longer term adjustment usually takes the form of reducing employee
compensation by some combination of lowering money wage rates or employing
fewer workers, thus the connection between the level of profitability this
year and unemployment rates in subsequent years.
Of course, it might appear that many of these mandates and regulations
will increase the real incomes of workers. However, that will not be the
case. The nature of the longer term adjustment that characterizes labor
markets in America is such that these additional costs of doing business
will be shifted ultimately to workers through a reduction in their real
wage rate, either by businesses raising prices or slowing the rate of
growth in money wages. There is no free lunch that government can
hand out to workers. In the end, at best, employees will simply exchange
one form of compensation for another, irregardless of their preferences in
this respect.
Worse yet for workers, they are likely to bear the brunt of the costs
of mandates and regulations that do not directly enhance employee
compensation. More and more, people are realizing that the costs of
achieving many so-called social goals that have become popular is
quite expensive in terms of jobs that may be lost. Of course, workers have
the option of saving those jobs by accepting lower rates of pay, or by
agreeing to forego any wage increases while the prices of the goods and
services they buy increase. Either way, they pay the bill by suffering a
loss of real income.[18]
Therein lies the ultimate problem with regulations and mandates. The
shifting of their costs to workers is subtle and goes largely
unrecognized. However, the end result is likely to prove unpopular and,
when it does, it becomes the rallying point for a new set of government
initiatives designed to deal with the problem of a lack of growth in real
wages. In short, the unwanted consequences of one set of government
interventions become the rationale for another round of the same thing.
Unfortunately, this may go on almost in perpetuity. (See Box 3)
Box 3
The Experience of the States
The major theme of this series of reports is that high
levels of Federal Government spending reduce the volume of economic
activity. A possible criticism of this finding is that it is based on
time-series data and, therefore, could represent nothing more than a
statistical artifact. However, there is an alternative source of
information that does not have the characteristics of time series
information and its associated possible statistical problems, namely,
data for the various states. These can be used in a cross-section
fashion to explore the relationship between size of government and
economic activity.
Click here
to see Figure.
Much research has been done along the lines of exploring the impact
of state government on economic growth, with the emphasis being on
levels of taxation rather than spending.[1]
However, since almost all states have balanced budget requirements,
taxes and spending are almost synonymous. This body of research has
created a "new" conventional wisdom that emphasizes the debilitating
effect of high state taxes on state economic growth. This has replaced
an earlier consensus which held that taxes didn't matter in this regard.
A very recent Joint Economic Committee Staff Report presents technical
and graphic evidence that is remarkably consistent with the argument
that we have been making at the Federal level. The data contained in
that report show that the 25 low-tax states, measured by an average of
state and local taxes per $1,000 of personal income in fiscal years 1965
and 1992, had a real per-capita income growth rate between 1965 and 1993
that was 32 percent greater than the growth rate for the 25 high-tax
states. See Figure B-1. This is quite consistent with our findings with
respect to the relationship between current levels of Federal spending
and economic performance.
__________
1. Some examples of these newer studies are Robert J. Genetski and
Young D. Chin, "The Impact of State and Local Income Taxes on Economic
Growth" (Chicago: Harris Bank, November 3, 1978); Richard K. Vedder,
State and Local Government Economic Development Strategies: A Supply
Side Perspective, Staff Study, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of
the U.S. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981); L. Jay
Harris, "The effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth: A Time
Series-Cross-Section Approach," Review of Economics and
Statistics, November 1985; Victor Canto and Robert Webb, "The Effect
of State Fiscal Policy on State Relative Economic Performance,"
Southern Economic Journal July 1987; and Alaaeddin Mofidi and Joe
A. Stone, "Do State and Local Taxes Affect Economic Growth," Review
of Economics and Statistics, November 1990. This literature is
summarized in Richard K. Vedder, State and Local Taxation and
Economic Growth: Lessons for Federal Tax Reform, Joint Economic
Committee Staff Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1995).
III. Conclusions
In this study, we have demonstrated the following:
- An oversized Federal Government, defined as one which spends more
than about 17.5 percent of GDP, has contributed to a significant decline
in the corporate profit share of national output.
- The fall in corporate profitability has had the effect of reducing
the rate of economic growth in the United States. As of 1994, this had
led to GDP being approximately ten percent less than it otherwise would
have been.
- Federal spending restraint of $100 billion dollars would increase
current GDP by an amount that is quite consistent with our earlier
estimate of $38 billion.
- The dollar volume of the cost of Federal Government regulations and
mandates has been increasing more rapidly relative to Federal spending
since 1989.
- Small businesses bear a disproportionate share of the cost of
Federal Government regulations and mandates.
- The costs of regulations and mandates leads to inefficiencies in the
production of goods and services that are translated into lower levels
of national income, compensation of workers, and/or employment.
Collectively, these findings present another perspective with respect
to the impact of Federal Government spending that is in excess of the
threshold spending level beyond which additional government expenditures
are counterproductive in terms of economic growth.
_________________________
About the Authors:
Lowell E. Gallaway is research fellow at the
Independent Institute and distinguished professor of economics, Ohio
University. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Ohio State
University. He has been staff economist, Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress of the U.S.; chief, Analytic Studies Section, Social Security
Administration; and has taught at the Colorado State University, Lund
University, University of Minnesota, University of New South Wales,
University of North Carolina, University of Pennsylvania and University
of Texas.
Richard K. Vedder is research fellow at the Independent
Institute and distinguished professor of economics and faculty
associate, Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University. He received
his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Illinois. He has taught at
the University of Colorado, Claremont Men's College, and MARA Institute
of Technology.
NOTE: This paper is the fourth in a series of
studies on the impact of the welfare state. The other three papers are
entitled The Impact of the Welfare State on the American
Economy (December 1995), The Impact of the Welfare State
on Workers (March 1996), and The Impact of the Welfare
State on America's Children (May 1996).
Endnotes
1. In the second report in this series, The Impact of
the Welfare State on Workers, March 1996, we analyzed the validity of
this notion and found it to be an inappropriate paradigm for explaining
the relationship between corporate profits and the earnings of workers.
2. This is demonstrated in The Impact of the Welfare State on
Workers, op. cit.
3. This is obtained by multiplying the increase in productivity of 0.8
percent by 0.5387 to obtain the increase in the corporate share of output.
This is then multiplied by 1.2108 to produce the percentage change in GDP.
The values 0.5387 and 1.2108 are the regression coefficients reported in
Table 1.
4. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II, Book
IV, Chapter 6, p. 319.
5. The employment numbers used here are taken from the monthly Current
Population Survey used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to estimate labor
force characteristics.
6. 1989 is not quite a business cycle peak, but it probably represents
peak conditions more appropriately than 1990.
7. Lowell Gallaway and Gary Anderson, Derailing the Small Business
Job Express, Joint Economic Committee Minority Staff Study, November
7, 1962; reprinted (with revisions) as "The Impact of Recent Regulations
on Small Business Job Creation," Journal of Regulation and Social
Cost, March 1993, pp. 27-61.
8. Derailing ... , op. cit., p. 28.
9. These data are reported in Thomas Hopkins' Regulatory Costs in
Profile, Policy Study, Center for the Study of American Business,
forthcoming.
10. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Poverty in the United States:
1992, Current Population Reports, P-60 (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1993).
11. Based on Current Population Survey data. See The Low-Wage
Workforce (Washington, DC: Employment Policies Institute Foundation,
1994), especially Tables 2, 6, and 10.
12. The use of alternative statistical techniques (e. g., regression
analysis) confirms the finding, and the relationship is highly significant
in a statistical sense.
13. The question of the impact of minimum wages has
become a controversial one very recently. David Card and Alan Krueger have
been the primary contributors to an attempt to discredit the conventional
wisdom that increasing minimum wages has negative effects on employment.
See their Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum
Wage (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) and "Minimum
Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania," American Economic Review, September 1994, pp.
772-193. There are a number of studies that contradict the Card-Krueger
position and serious questions have been raised about the reliability of
some of their data sources. See, inter alia, David Neumark and
William Wachser (responding to an earlier Card-Krueger paper), "Employment
Effects of Minimum and Subminimum Wage Panel Data on State Minimum Wage
Laws," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1992, pp.
55-81.
14. Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, "Racial Differences in
Unemployment, 1890-1990," Journal of Economic History, September 1992,
pp. 696-702. For other discussion of this issue, see Edna Bonacich,
"Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States:
A Split Labor Market Interpretation," American Sociological Review,
February 1976, pp. 34-51; Robert Higgs, Competition and Coercion:
Blacks in the American Economy, 1865-1914 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1977); and Gerald D. Jaynes, "The Labor Market Status of
Black Americans, 1939-1985," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall
1990, pp. 9-24.
15. For these calculations, we use National Income and
Product Account (NIPA) estimates of Federal spending so that our data are
for calendar years in both cases. The data on the dollar cost of Federal
regulations are reported in Cost of Government Day (Washington, DC:
Americans for Tax Reform, 1996), p. 16. The total volume of regulatory
costs includes Hopkins' estimates, obtained from Profiles of Regulatory
Costs, available from the U.S. Small Business Administration, plus
Genetski's estimate of $20 billion a year in regulatory costs attributable
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
16. Those three years are 1980-1982.
17. This relationship is quite consistent with one we report in our
book, Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in Twentieth Century
America (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1993). There, we related
unemployment to what we call the adjusted real wage rate. In most aspects,
this measure is the obverse of the corporate profit share of output.
18. As a general proposition, we estimate that about
85 percent of any tax on employment, either explicit or implicit, will be
shifted to workers in the form of reduced compensation. The remainder of
the adjustment will take place on the employment side of labor markets.
See our Concealed Costs: The Real Impact of the Administration's Health
Care Plan on the Economy (Washington, DC: American Legislative
Exchange Council, 1994), pp. 13-17.
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