Copyright 2000 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
FDCH Political Transcripts
July 20, 2000, Thursday
TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING
LENGTH: 28088 words
COMMITTEE:
CONSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
HEADLINE: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES CANADY (R-FL)
HOLDS HEARING ON BORN- ALIVE INFANTS PROTECTION ACT
LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
BODY:
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON THE
CONSTITUTION HOLDS HEARING ON BORN-ALIVE INFANTS PROTECTION
ACT OF 2000
JULY 20, 2000
SPEAKERS: U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES T. CANADY (R-FL), CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
HENRY J. HYDE (R-IL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ASA HUTCHINSON (R-AR)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SPENCER BACHUS (R-AL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
BOB GOODLATTE (R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BOB BARR (R-GA)
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM L. JENKINS (R-TN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LINDSEY
GRAHAM (R-SC)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MELVIN L. WATT (D-NC)
RANKING MEMBER
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MAXINE WATERS (D-CA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BARNEY FRANK (D-MA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN
CONYERS (D-MI)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JERROLD NADLER (D-NY)
PANEL I:
HADLEY ARKES
EDWARD NEY PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE
AMHERST COLLEGE
ALLISON BAKER
CHARLOTTESVILLE,
VIRGINIA
JILL STANEK
MOKENA, ILLINOIS
MATTHEW G.
HILE, PH.D.
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI
GIANNA JESSEN
FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE
PANEL II:
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES (D-OH)
PANEL III:
KENNETH THOMAS
LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY
AMERICAN LAW
DIVISION
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
GERARD V. BRADLEY
PROFESSOR OF LAW
NOTRE DAME LAW
SCHOOL
F. SESSIONS COLE, M.D.
PROFESSOR OF PEDIATRICS AND
CELL BIOLOGY
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
ST. LOUIS,
MISSOURI
WATSON BOWES JR., M.D.
PROFESSOR EMERITUS
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA MEDICAL SCHOOL
ROBERT GEORGE
MCCORMICK PROFESSOR OF
JURISPRUDENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
CANADY: The subcommittee will be in order.
This morning
the subcommittee on the constitution convenes to hear testimony concerning H.R.
4292, the Born Alive Infants Protection Act of 2000.
It has long been
accepted as a legal principle that infants who are born alive are persons
entitled to the protection of the law, and that a live birth occurs whenever an
infant, at any stage of development, is expelled from the mother's body and
displays any of several specific signs of life -- breathing, a heartbeat, or
definite movements of voluntary muscles.
Many states have statutes
that explicitly enshrine this principle as a matter of state law, and federal
courts have recognized the principle in interpreting federal criminal laws.
Recent changes in the legal and cultural landscape appear, however, to have
brought this well-settled principle into question.
Just weeks ago,
for example, in Stenberg v. Carhart, the United States Supreme Court struck down
a Nebraska law banning partial-birth abortion, a procedure in
which an abortionist delivers an unborn child's body until only the head remains
inside of the mother, punctures the back of the child's skull with scissors, and
sucks the child's brains out before completing the delivery. What was described
in Roe v. Wade as a right to abort "unborn children" has now been extended by
the Court to include the violent destruction of partially born children just
inches from birth.
The logical implications of the Stenberg Court's
holding are both obvious and disturbing. Consider what the Stenberg decision
means for a child who survives a botched abortion and is born alive. If the
right to abortion entails the right to kill without regard to whether the child
remains in the mother's womb, it would seem to follow that infants who are
marked for abortion but somehow survive have no legal right to appropriate
medical care, or any care at all.
And if a child born alive after a
botched abortion does not receive the protection of the law, what is to prevent
an abortionist from simply delivering a child and then killing it?
It has been successfully argued before the Supreme Court that
killing a partially-born child is -- at least in some cases -- necessary to
protect the health of the mother. An equally plausible argument might be made
that in some cases preservation of the mother's health requires that a child be
fully delivered before it is killed. If partial-birth abortion
is protected by the Constitution, why not "post-birth abortion?"
The
principle that born-alive infants are entitled to the protection of the law is
also being questioned in one of America's most prestigious universities.
Princeton University bioethicist Peter Singer argues that parents should have
the option to kill disabled or unhealthy newborn babies for a certain period
after birth. According to Professor Singer, and I quote, "a period of 28 days
after birth might be allowed before an infant is accepted as having the same
right to live as others," close quote.
The legal and moral confusion
that flows from these pernicious ideas is well illustrated by events that
happened last year in Cincinnati, Ohio, after a young woman learned she was
pregnant and sought the assistance of abortionist Dr. Martin Haskell, inventor
of one variation of the partial-birth abortion procedure. Dr.
Haskell performed the first step of the partial-birth abortion
procedure -- dilating the woman's cervix -- and she was to return the next day.
That evening the woman began experiencing severe abdominal pains and
reported to the emergency room. While she was being examined, she gave birth to
a baby girl. The attending physician placed the baby in a specimen dish -- like
any other substance that is removed from the body -- to be taken to the lab by a
medical technician. When the technician, Shelly Lowe, saw the baby girl in the
dish she was stunned when she saw the girl gasping for air.
The
doctors examined the baby and concluded it was unlikely she would survive. By
some estimates, the baby was born at 22 weeks, although some members of the
hospital staff believed she was older. Ms. Lowe then held the baby, whom she
named "Baby Hope," until the child died, wrapping her in a blanket and singing
to her as she stroked her cheeks. Surprisingly, Baby Hope lived for three hours,
without the benefit of an incubator or other intensive care, and breathing room
air, but her condition was not reassessed by the physicians.
And
although it is impossible to determine at this point whether a reassessment
would have made any difference in Baby Hope's ultimate survival, the lack of any
such reassessment, coupled with the attending physician's initial placement of
then-breathing Baby Hope in a specimen dish, at least raises serious questions
as to whether a similarly-situated infant who was wanted by her mother would
have received the same treatment. We will also hear testimony today at this
hearing regarding disturbing events at a hospital in Illinois.
H.R.
4292, the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2000, was designed to repudiate
the pernicious and destructive ideas that have brought the live-birth principle
into question, and to firmly establish that, for purposes of federal law, an
infant who is completely expelled or extracted from his or her mother and who is
alive is, indeed, a person under the law -- regardless of whether or not his or
her lung development is believed to be, or is in fact, sufficient to permit
long-term survival, and regardless of whether the baby survived an abortion.
The bill would not require medical personnel to provide medical
treatment that is not currently mandated under the applicable standard of care.
Instead, the bill would only insure that all born-alive infants -- regardless of
their age and regardless of the circumstances of their birth -- are treated the
same for purposes of federal law.
I now recognize Mr. Watt.
WATT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It may come as a surprise
to some people here that I want to start my comments this morning by commending
the chairman and -- of the subcommittee and the chairman of the full committee.
Their level of persistence on this issue leaves one feeling that they have to be
amazed and complementary of their commitment. They get slapped down by the
Supreme Court. It doesn't matter. They just bounce right back and find a new way
to approach the issue.
And as one who has been accused in life of
being persistent on some issues, I have to express my admiration for that. And I
think they're to be commended for that, in sticking to this and pursuing it.
I want to also commend the chairman for having this hearing today.
Hearings serve a very, very valuable purpose in our process, because they give
us the opportunity to get the opinions and perspectives and input of people from
outside the congressional system in the real world, and that's extremely
important to the legislative process and hearings serve a very, very valuable
purpose.
When, however, the hearing notice is accompanied or
followed shortly by a notice of a markup of the bill the next day, one leaves
feeling a little like maybe the hearing is more of a show and a charade than a
real effort to evaluate the pros and cons of the legislation that is being
considered and provide an opportunity to understand its real consequences and
evaluate whether it needs to be fixed here or there.
Now, this is a
short bill, it's one-page, I think, long. So, clearly, it can be read quickly.
We were about to take up a bill in the full committee yesterday where we got a
substitute at almost 6:00 the day before yesterday that was close to a hundred
pages long and asked to start a markup of the bill or the substitute the
following morning.
But I'm told that -- and I think the testimony
will actually bear this out, that there are some 15,000 sections of the U.S.
Code and over 57,000 sections of the Code of Federal Register, in which the
terms "person", "human being," "child" or "individual", are used. And while it's
nice to understand and try to accomplish the one singular purpose for which this
bill is introduced, we as legislators if we are not single-issue legislators,
have an obligation to the public to understand the consequences that a bill
would have in other context.
And I'm not sure that between now and
tomorrow I'll even have the opportunity to read the testimony of the witnesses
who testified today, much less look at the 15,000 sections of the U.S. Code or
57,000 sections of the Code of Federal Regulations and have any appreciation of
what this bill does for the totality of the law, as opposed to the singular
purpose for which this bill was introduced.
So, I'm trying to be
balanced. I want to applaud the persistence of my chairman. I want to applaud
the fact that we are having a hearing, whether it is for show purposes or for
charade purposes, it can certainly not do any harm. I'm not sure it's going to
be able to do a lot of good between now and tomorrow in a full understanding of
the bill as we move to a markup, which is scheduled tomorrow, but at least we're
having a hearing and I intend to sit right hear and listen to every word of
testimony and try to understand as best I can the implications of what is being
proposed and I certainly appreciate those witnesses who have given of their time
to come and participate whether they are participating in a real effort to shape
public policy or whether they are participating in a charade.
I
thank the gentleman for having the hearing and I yield back.
CANADY:
I'd like to now ask the members of the first panel of witnesses to come forward,
to take your seats, if you would, and I'll proceed with the introduction of
those who will be making presentations on the first panel.
On our
first panel today, we will hear from Professor Hadley Arkes, the Edward Ney
Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College.
Professor Arkes has been teaching at Amherst for 33 years and is also
(inaudible) on leave from Amherst at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the
Brookings Institution, the Woodrow Wilson Center at the Smithsonian Institution,
and Georgetown University.
Professor Arkes has written several books
and numerous articles on political philosophy, public policy and constitutional
law and I should add, has a long-standing interest in the subject of today's
hearing.
The second witness on this panel will be Allison Baker, a
registered nurse from Charlottesville, Virginia. Mrs. Baker will be testifying
regarding her experience as a nurse in the delivery ward of Christ Hospital in
Oak Lawn, Illinois.
Following Ms. Baker will be Jill L. Stanek, of
Mokena, Illinois. Ms. Stanek is a registered nurse and will also be sharing her
experiences as a nurse in the delivery ward of Christ Hospital in Oak Lawn,
Illinois.
After Ms. Stanek, we will hear from Dr. Matthew G. Hile.
Dr. Hile is a research associate professor of psychiatry at the Missouri
Institute of Mental Health at the University of Missouri-Columbia, School of
Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri. e will be sharing his family's experiences
following the birth of his daughter, Amelia, who was born with severe birth
defects.
To conclude our first panel, we will hear from Gianna
Jesson, of Franklin, Tennessee. Ms. Jesson will be sharing her experiences as a
survivor of an attempted abortion. In addition to speaking regularly all across
the country, Ms. Jesson writes music and is currently collaborating with other
musicians on a soon to be released compact disk. And I'd like to also note that
Ms. Jesson has testified previously before the Judiciary Committee.
I want to thank all of you for being with us this morning, and I
would ask that you do your best to summarize your testimony in five minutes or
less. And without objection, your written statements will be made a part of the
permanent hearing record.
Professor Arkes.
ARKES: Thank
you.
Chairman Canady, Congressman Watt, good to see you again.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is your microphone on?
ARKES: Is
this on?
We could raise the money, but it would be wrong. Can you
hear me?
I'm here to speak today in support of H.R. 4292, The Born
Alive Infants Protection Act.
Congressman Canady's bill offers the
gentlest and the most modest first step of all in engaging the question of
abortion. This measure also runs to the root and it offers the best chance of
drawing all sides into a conversation and achieving the kind of settlement that
I think can be achieved only by the political branches of this country.
We've been told quite often that the country's highly divided on
this question. Actually, there are large areas of consensus, which haven't been
able to express themselves politically because this matter has been ruled so
thoroughly, and exclusively by the courts.
But we need a
conversation before we could ever legislate again. Congressman Canady's bill
would begin a conversation at a point that would draw support even from people
who called themselves pro choice. Our friends on the other side have insisted
that abortion is not infanticide, which implies that they're willing to protect
the child at some point.
We take that quite seriously and we suggest
that we begin at this, the gentlest point of all. Could we not simply agree to
protect the child who survives the abortion. That's the earliest point at which
the interests of the mother and the child can be detached. Nothing in the move
to protect the child impairs any right to abortion or any right to end the
pregnancy because the abortion and the pregnancy have ended.
With
this simple measure that we make be simple but momentous parts. If the child has
a claim to the protection of the law that doesn't pivot on the question of
whether anyone happens to want her, the child then bears an intrinsic
significance that's not dependent on the interests or convenience of anyone
else.
Her injuries, then, count. They have standing in the eyes of
the law. In a notable case in 1977, Floyd v. Anders, a child survived for 20
days from an abortion and a surgery. The question was posed as to whether
there's an obligation to preserve the life of that child, and the answer tended
by Judge Clement Haynsworth was no. That was not a child protected by state law.
That was a fetus marked for termination. In other words, the right to an
abortion entailed the right to an effective abortion for a dead child.
Just as Powell once remarked in passing that this kind of argument
was remarkable. But to say that it's remarkable is not the same as saying that
it's wrong and still less is it to explain the grounds of the wrongness.
ARKES: This bill offers the chance for Congress to do exactly
that. And the problem is made all the more urgent for us by the decision of the
court three weeks ago in Stenberg v. Carhart. The court, with that decision,
brought us to a new threshold of crisis by bringing us to the threshold of
accepting infanticide itself. The court established, in effect, that the law
could not protect a child, even at the point of birth, if that protection might,
just might, inhibit the child -- inhibit an abortion. It couldn't protect the
child to the point of birth if might hadn't been an abortion.
In the
hands of Justice Breyer, as Congressman Canady suggested, the argument in
defense of partial-birth abortion is at one with the argument
that would justify delivering the baby whole and letting it die, if that
procedure would be arguably safer for the mother.
Our friends on the
side can't be warranted in arguing that the claim is far-fetched or
inconceivable that the right to an abortion is the right to an effective
abortion or a dead child. Regrettably, it is quite conceivable, and the courts
seem to be concerting now to make that claim more and more plausible.
The burden, I'm afraid, truly lies with our friends on the other
side. To make it clear that the right to an abortion does not entail for them
the right to infanticide.
Now, it doesn't take rare powers of
conjecture to anticipate the argument that, yes, we'd like to protect the child,
but we don't want to take the first steps in getting the federal government
involved in abortion. Now, we're lucky to hear this even from people who were
support FOCA (ph) years ago, who didn't think that the Constitution cast up
barriers to Congress legislating on the matter of abortion.
But
there's a curious screening here of the powers of Congress and the principles of
the Constitution. One would think that the federal courts are somehow not part
of the federal government. But we can ask, how is it possible that the federal
courts can address abortion in all of its dimensions, yet people could argue for
keeping the Congress and the national government away from the subject.
People seem to be forgetting here the deepest axioms of the American
government. Chief Justice Marshall once observed in Cohens v. Virginia in 1821
that the judicial power of every well-constituted government must be
co-extensive with the legislative and must be capable of reaching every question
that arises out of the Constitution and laws.
But people curiously seem
to forget the corollary that any -- that if the court can articulate new rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights, a right to abortion, the
legislative branch must be empowered, also, to vindicate those same rights and
in filling them out, marking their limits. The one thing that should not be
tenable under this Constitution is that the court can articulate new rights, and
then assign to itself a monopoly of the legislative power in shaping those
rights.
The ground on which we take this simplest of all measures
will clarify our understanding of the human person as a bearer of rights. To
rework the line of Lincoln's, we might say, that in securing this simplest of
all rights, we secured the rights of us all, born and unborn. And to take one
other line of Lincoln from another occasion, this step, this has been so long in
the taking. This is the simplest of steps, for as Lincoln once said, may the
vast future not lament our having failed to take it now.
CANADY:
Thank you, Professor.
Ms. Stanek.
STANEK: My name is
Jill Stanek, and I'm a registered nurse who has worked in the labor and delivery
department at Christ Hospital in Oak Lawn, Illinois, for the past five years.
Christ Hospital performs abortions on women in their second or even third
trimesters of pregnancy. Sometimes the babies aborted are healthy, and sometimes
they are not.
The method of abortion that Christ Hospital uses is
called "induced labor abortion," also now known as "live birth abortion." This
type of abortion can be performed different ways, but the goal always is to
cause a pregnant woman's cervix to open so that she will prematurely deliver a
baby who dies during the birth process or soon afterward.
The way
that the induced abortion is most often executed at Christ Hospital is by the
physician inserting a pill called Cytotec into the birth canal close to the
vagina. Cytotec irritates the cervix and stimulates it to open. When this
occurs, the small, pre- term baby drops out of the uterus, often alive. It is
not uncommon for a live aborted baby to linger for an hour or two or even
longer. One of these babies was known to live for almost an entire eight-hour
shift.
In the event that a baby is aborted alive, he or she receives
no medical assessments or care but is only given what the Christ Hospital calls
"comfort care." "Comfort care" is defined as keeping the baby warm in a blanket
until he or she dies, although even this so-called compassion is not always
provided. It is not required that these babies be held during their short lives.
One night, a nursing co-worker was taking an aborted Down syndrome
baby who was born alive to our soiled utility room because his parents did not
want to hold him, and she did not have time to hold him. I could not bear the
thought of this suffering child dying alone in a soiled utility room, so I
cradled and rocked him for the 45 minutes that he lived.
He was
about 22 weeks old, weighed about a half a pound, and was about 10 inches long,
about the size of my hand. He was too weak to move very much, expending any
energy that he had trying to breathe. Toward the end of his life, he was so
quiet that I couldn't tell if he was still alive unless I held him up to the
light to see if his little heart was still beating through his chest wall. After
he was pronounced dead, we folded his little arms across his chest, tied his
hands together with a string, wrapped him in a tiny shroud, and carried him to
the hospital morgue where all of our dead patients go.
STANEK:
The mark that this little person's untimely death left on my heart will never go
away. In large part, I ended up here today because of that baby.
Other co-workers have told me upsetting stories about live aborted
babies whom they have cared for. I was told about an aborted baby who was
supposed to have spina bifida but was delivered with an intact spine. Another
nurse is haunted by the memory of an aborted baby who came out weighing much
more than expected -- almost two pounds. She is haunted because she doesn't know
if she made a mistake by not getting that baby any medical help.
A
support associate told me about a live aborted baby who was left to die on the
counter in our soiled utility room wrapped in a disposable towel. This baby was
accidentally thrown in the garbage. Later, when they later were going through
the trash trying to find the baby, the baby fell out of the towel and on to the
floor.
I was recently told about a situation by a nurse who said, "I
can't stop thinking about it." She had a patient who was 23 plus weeks pregnant,
and it did not look as if her baby would to continue to be able to live inside
of her. The baby was healthy and had up to a 39 percent chance of survival,
according to our national statistics.
But the patient chose to
abort. The baby was born alive. If the mother had wanted everything done for her
baby at Christ Hospital, there would have been a neonatologist, a pediatric
resident, a neonatal nurse, and a respiratory therapist present for the
delivery, and the baby would have been taken to our neonatal intensive care unit
for specialized care. Instead, the only personnel present for this delivery were
an obstetrical resident and my co-working friend. After delivery the baby, who
showed early signs of thriving, her APGARs improved, was merely wrapped in a
blanket and kept in the labor and delivery department until she died two and a
half hours later.
To me, something is very wrong with a legal system
that requires doctors to pronounce babies dead but does not require them to
assess babies for life. I am also very uncomfortable with the fact that the very
doctors who may be miscalculating birth weights, due dates, or misdiagnosing
fetal handicaps, are the same ones deciding that these babies should not be
assessed after delivery.
Shouldn't these babies be given a simple
opportunity for a second opinion, just as you and I do? No other children in
America are medically abandoned like this.
Thank you for your time.
CANADY: Thank you, Ms. Stanek.
Ms. Baker?
BAKER: I'm also an RN. I worked at Christ Hospital for a year,
between the time of August of 1998 to August of 1999. I am now presently a
pediatric nurse in Charlottesville.
During this time, I witnessed
three cases. When I first started, I was on day shift. I walked into the soiled
utility room to throw something away, and laying on the metal part of the table
with nothing underneath, there was a fetus, a baby, moving vigorously, just
laying there.
I went out to find the nurse, who was responsible for
this baby, and she said that the mother had been a therapeutic -- what they call
a therapeutic abortion, as Jill had explained, and that she just didn't have
time to do anything with the baby at the time, and that if I could, can I wrap
the baby and put the baby in a warmer.
So, I went to the soiled
utility room, wrapped the baby and held the baby and found a warmer and placed
the baby in the warmer. And for about two and a half hours, the baby maintained
a heartbeat. The baby was alive.
And for me, that was a new
experience. I was there working in a high-risk facility. My patient was a
23-weeker ruptured who was trying to save her baby, laying in Trendelenburg
position, with her head down. So, therefore, I took care of a mom, and I took
care of an aborted baby.
The next case that I actually participated
in was, I had come on the shift and the -- there was a patient that had
delivered a baby -- a 20 week fetus who had spina bifida. The baby, once again,
was alive, and the baby had a heartbeat. It took an hour and 45 minutes for this
baby to finally expire.
Once again, my question was, what was the
right of this baby? Some of the nurses said to me, just leave the baby in the
warmer, and some of them said, comfort the baby. When I was at Christ Hospital,
there was no -- no one explained to me what we were supposed to do. And there
was -- there was -- nurses were doing all various kinds of things.
The last case that I experienced while I was there was 16 week fetus
that was aborted. And the baby was supposed to have Downs. And the baby, at 16
weeks, was born with a heartbeat. And the parents thought that the baby would
die right away because it was so early. The baby ended up living for
approximately 45 minutes. And during this time, the parents were very upset and
kept questioning me and the other nurses, how come their baby wasn't dead? When
was their baby going to die? Why was their baby alive?
For me, as a
nurse in a labor and delivery unit, this was confusing. It was confusing for all
the nurses. It was confusing for the parents. They thought they were just doing
something good, but yet they had to sit and ask questions of when their baby was
going to expire. For us as nurses, we're taking care of babies that we really
want to survive, and we're taking care of babies that are supposed to just die.
Thank you.
CANADY: Thank you, Ms. Baker.
Mr.
Hile?
HILE: Mr. Chairman, honorable representatives, staff and
visitors.
My name is Matthew Hile. I hold a Ph.D. in clinical
psychology; sit on the executive committee of the American Psychological
Association's Division on mental retardation and developmental disabilities and
on the St. Louis Children's Hospital ethics committee.
However,
today I come to offer testimony as the father of Amelia Meliss Hile.
Fourteen years ago, after an apparently normal pregnancy, we were
waiting for a much-anticipated birth of our first child and the first
grandchild. However, the result was not as we expected, and during a sweltering
June and July, I kept a very personal journal of the brief days of our
daughter's life.
The following has been excerpted from my journal.
"June 17th: We had an ultra sound, it always makes me nervous to
have all those people bustling about, first one tech, then another, then a
doctor -- two hours under the scan. We thought that there was just some
difficulty in getting the precise measurements."
"June 18th: Another
sonogram, with the head of the genetics department. He came into the room with a
tech and our pediatrician. He began talking and showing us things on the
monitor, the curved spine, the splayed hips, the twisted legs and feet, the
oddly bent hands and huge amounts of amniotic fluid. He says we are in for a lot
of difficulties and suggests that our baby may not survive. He suspects central
nervous system damage. Through our tears, we call the grandparents. Through
their tears, they try to comfort us.
"Meetings with physicians from
Children's Hospital. With the Regan administration and the Baby Doe decision on
our minds, we need to understand what that hospital can and cannot do. We need
to be clear about our desire to avoid heroic measures. We fear having our role
as parents and protectors of our child's welfare snatched from our hands."
"June 25th: My wife labors for 13 hours before a c-section. The
operating room is filled with doctors, nurses and technicians. 11:14 the baby is
born. Simon or Amelia? There is no noise, no crying. They are working on him or
her. Silence in the room. The silence is deafening. I let go of my wife's hand
to see the child's twisted little body. It's a girl. They try to start an IV,
but I cannot watch and turn back to cry with my wife. I go back and forth to
touch my daughter as my wife's incision is closed. They wheel Amelia out, taking
her to Children's Hospital.
"At three am, I take the long walk
through corridors that will soon be familiar, up to the fifth floor. I am shown
how to wash and gown and then enter the unit. The nurse introduces herself and
shows me how they have hooked up Amelia. Heart rate, respiration, a temperature
probe to turn the lights on and off and an oxygen helmet. Wires, tubes, lights
and alarms are everywhere. I touch Amelia and look, wish her good night and
gently kiss her. I feel strangely better for having wished her good night."
"June 26th: I visited Amelia for a couple times today. More
importantly, I get to hold her in my arms, this poor twisted body. I sit and
rock her and cry and cry. I am sorry for her, for us, but mostly for Amelia. As
I hold her I feel a great unexpected warmth wash over me. Until now, she was a
potential but not a person to me. Now she is still a potential, but also a
person in need of care and nurturing. Someone who needs our intelligence and
energy if she is going to survive and someone who needs those same qualities if
she is going to have but a little time in this world. She is a person now and it
is, in part, her responsibility to survive and thrive. We will do what we can,
but it is up to her."
"June 27th: Mother and daughter have the
opportunity to bond. I take pictures and cry; sad about the event I was hoping
to be celebrating.
"Testing begins. Cat scan -- abnormal right side
brain development. This rings in my head again and again, resounding in its
implications -- right side, pattern recognition. Doctor says it may be that she
could not recognize high notes or not appreciate the world around her. Not be
able to read, listen and understand, hear music or recognize her mother. More
tests.
"Amelia has periods where she stops breathing and her heart
rate drops. Her lips become blue and her skin gray. What if she dies? What if
she doesn't die? Do we have the right to subject this child to tubes, wires,
lights and tests? Tests that help diagnose but do nothing to help her. My wife
pumps breast milk that our daughter is fed with a tube. Our daughter cannot
swallow. She cannot close her eyes. Her arms and legs are put in splints that do
nothing."
"July 9th: The nurse calls cheerily, Oh she is doing very
well, we did have to bag her once and her feed tube is blocked and she had two
periods of her heart rate stopping, but she is doing great.
"More
tests -- brain stem abnormalities with higher cortical functioning areas also
having irregularities. No gag response. Nothing is getting better. The doctor
says give her more time. We trust him."
"July 14th: We held,
cuddled, dressed and photographed Amelia. She looks a little better -- better
color. The next day she has two bad heart rate drops lots of aspirations and
needs a transfusion in the night. The following day she has moved a little, but
was much slower to recover from heart rate drops. At those times, she dies and
the technology brings her back."
"July 18th: Another meeting with
the staff. One young doctor wants to put her on a ventilator. One with more
experience says he would not ventilate -- medically, he says, this would not be
in her best interest."
"July 25th: We become angry in a meeting with
the medical staff. What are you making her suffer like this? You have nothing to
do to help her, why do you make her go through this over and over again? Why
can't you let her go? If the nursing staff can't do this, we can."
"July 26th: After being taught how to gavage feed Amelia, we are
allowed to take our daughter into a room by ourselves. We suction, feed and
dress her. We have never been able to take her for a walk in the park, she has
never been in the fresh air, she has never seen a tree. We play music, read
Winnie the Pooh and hold her up to the window to see trees through her
unblinking eyes. We cry. We choose not to suction her again and let her go. My
wife holds the baby to the breast but she is unable to suckle. We continue to
feed her pumped breast milk.
"Medical staff checks on us throughout
the day. After the 10 p.m. feeding Amelia is looking blue. Amelia lay silently
in my wife's arms. After five minutes I tried but could find no heart beat.
After 10 minutes, I listened with a stethoscope and could hear nothing. We were
still, afraid to move her, but Amelia's suffering was over. Her spirit had flown
to a better place."
HILE: Today I am here to suggest that you
have the power to make the journals of others in similar positions have a very
different and more painful ending. It could read that Amelia suffered another
month, or another year, before her death. As it was, Amelia lived, in her 31
days, to the fullness of her life. I urge you to leave these agonizing decisions
to those most involved, the physicians and families who care deeply about their
children.
Thank you.
CANADY: Thank you, Mr. Hile.
Ms. Jessen?
JESSEN: I'll do my best to do this. I'm
struggling with a head cold today. But we're still here.
My name is
Gianna Jessen, and I would like to say thank you for the opportunity to speak
today.
I count it no small thing to speak the truth. I depend solely
on the grace of God to do this. In fact, I invite God here today. I am 23 years
old. I was aborted and I did not die. My biological mother was seven and a half
months pregnant when she went to Planned Parenthood in southern California and
they advised her to have a late- term saline abortion.
A saline
abortion is a saline salt solution that is injected into the mother's womb. The
baby then gulps the solution, it burns the baby inside and out and then she is
to deliver a dead baby within 24 hours. Ladies and gentlemen, this happened to
me.
My medical records state, "Born during saline abortion."
I remained in the solution for approximately 18 hours and was
delivered alive on April 6, 1977 at 6:00 am in a southern California abortion
clinic. There were young women in the room that had already been given their
injections and were waiting to deliver dead babies. When they saw me, they
experienced the horror of murder. They realized what they had done.
Ladies and gentlemen, I unashamedly stand here today and say I was
saved by the sheer power of Jesus Christ and him alone. I'm a Christian and not
ashamed.
I should be blind and burned. I should be dead. And yet, I
live. And I do live. Due to a lack of oxygen supply during the abortion, I live
with cerebral palsy.
When I was diagnosed with this, all I could do
was lay there and they said that was all I would ever do. Through prayer and
hard work by my foster mother, I was walking at age of three and a half with the
help of a walker and leg braces. At that time, I was also adopted into my
wonderful family. Today I am left only with a slight limp. I no longer have need
of a walker or leg braces.
I am so thankful for my cerebral palsy.
It allows me to really to depend on Christ for everything.
When the
freedoms of one group of helpless citizens are infringed upon, such as the
unborn, the newborn, the disabled and the so- called imperfect, what we do not
realize is that our freedoms as a nation and individuals is in great peril.
I come today in favor of this bill, in favor of the protection of
life. I come to speak on behalf of the infants who have died and for those
appointed to death. Learned Hand, a well respected American jurist, who's in our
own century said, quote, "The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too
sure that it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to
understand the minds of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit
which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias; the spirit of
liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded; the spirit of
liberty is the spirit of him who, near 2000 years ago, taught mankind that
lesson it has never learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there is a
kingdom where the least shall be heard and considered side by side with the
greatest."
Where is the soul of America? Members of this committee,
where is your heart? How can you deal with the issues of this nation without
examining her soul? A murderous spirit, and I say it again, a murderous spirit
will stop at nothing until it has devoured a nation. Psalm 53:1-3 says: "The
fool says in his heart, 'there is no God'; they are corrupt, and have done
abominable iniquity; there is none who does good. God looks down from heaven
upon the children of men," he's even looking now, upon this hearing, even now,
"to see if there are any who understand and who seek God. Every one of them has
turned aside; they have together become corrupt; there is none who does good,
no, not one."
Adolph Hitler once said: "The receptive ability of the
great masses is only very limited, their understanding is small; on the other
hand their forgetfulness is great. This being so, all effective propaganda
should be limited to a very few points which in turn, should be used as slogans
until the very last man is able to imagine what is meant by such words." I say
that today's slogans are, "a woman's right to choose" and "freedom of choice,"
et cetera.
There was once a man speaking from hell, recorded in Luke
16, who said, "I am tormented in this flame." Hell is real and so is Satan, and
the same hatred that crucified Jesus Christ 2000 years ago, still resides in the
hearts of sinful people today. Why do you think this whole room trembles when I
mention Jesus Christ? It is because he is real and he is able to give grace for
repentance that we need as Americans. We are proud and boastful and we kill
without shame.
He is able to give forgiveness to us and to this
nation that was once great. And it's falling, not because, not because we don't
have the technology or the books or the knowledge that we think we're so
incredible by. It is because we know better. Good men have stood before us,
listen to me. They have stood, they have stood up for righteousness and today,
we are nothing but cowards in America.
We can't even say the truth,
because we are so afraid of what our colleagues will think at the expense of
life. I have that to say, and I will now continue on with the rest, and I'm
almost finished. But you listen!
I didn't die. Because I was
supposed to be here today to say, shame on America. And as leaders here today,
you have an opportunity. If you are standing up, you continue standing. If you
are fighting, you continue fighting for life.
I will have none of
this. I am an American and we ought to be good and noble people.
I
will end with this. We are under the judgment of God, whether or not we want to
hear it, and I will end by reading this, Romans 5:8- 10. And listen very well,
"But God demonstrates his own love towards us, in that while we were still
sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, having now been justified by his
blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For when we were enemies we
were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more having been
reconciled, we shall be saved by his life."
Death did not prevail
over me, ladies and gentlemen, and I am so thankful.
CANADY: Thank
you, Ms. Jessen.
I want to thank all the members of this panel for
your testimony. There is a vote proceeding on the House floor. The subcommittee
will have to stand in recess while the members go to the floor for the vote. We
will return for a round of questions, so I appreciate your patience and I
apologize for this interruption.
The subcommittee will stand in
recess. I encourage the members to come back immediately after the vote.
(RECESS)
CANADY: The subcommittee will be in order.
And again, I apologize for the interruption.
Mr. Watt's recognized
for five minutes.
WATT: Mr. Chairman, I just have one question to
Mr. Arkes. And I do want to express my thanks to the other witnesses for being
here. And I think the -- sitting Mr. Hile and Ms. Jessen beside each other
certainly pointed -- very difficult issues that is designed to address.
This is not a trick question, Mr. Arkes, so...
ARKES:
Oh, I never suspect a trick question, Mr. Watt.
WATT: The only
question I have is whether you have done any analysis whatsoever of what
implications, if any, this has on other areas of the law, and if you haven't,
that's fine. If you have, I'd like to know.
ARKES: I've looked at a
few of the statutes, just canvassing several of them, but it struck me, and
after your comments before, that you could offer this interesting thought
experiment. Let's say it was 1861, when Edward...
WATT: Could you
try to answer my question first?
ARKES: Yes, sir. I am answering it.
I guess I get in trouble with this committee offering that rare thing called an
analogy. But it seems to me that what your question could be posed in a similar
way by asking someone, what if the Lincoln administration and Edward Bates, in
putting forth that document about revising the Dred Scott case said; this
administration considers all free blacks born in the United States to be
citizens, and therefore persons in the law. And someone came back and said how
would that effect all the places in which persons are mentioned in the law.
If you think it's in principle...
WATT: I have -- and
maybe this is just a personal thing to me, but I get real offended when people
try to put everything that I ask into some racial context. I asked you a simple
question. If you didn't -- if you haven't analyzed the impact on other things,
that's fine. That's why I started out by trying to reassure you that this was
not a trick question. But what we're talking about today has little, in my
opinion, to do with Dred Scott, and so, I mean, just because I happen to be
black, you don't have to give me a black response today. A simple yes or no
answer to my question would sufficient.
BACHUS: Mr. Chairman. Would
the gentleman yield? Would the gentleman yield?
WATT: I'm happy to
yield to the gentleman.
BACHUS: Mr. Watt, in fairness to the
witness, I wouldn't assume that he's answering that question in that way.
WATT: Mr. Bachus, don't...
BACHUS: But I don't that, but
you don't know that. I mean, only he knows that.
WATT: And I started
my response to him by saying this is a personal response, and I'm just trying,
you know, if you have done an analysis of what this implication, this bill has
on other laws, then I would like to hear that. If you haven't, then you can just
tell me you haven't. And that was the only question I had. I was actually
planning to yield the rest of my time to the chairman, because I thought he
might make better use of it.
ARKES: May I say that I'm offended by
this attempt to keep blocking off an -- I'm trying to give you a proper answer
to the question.
WATT: The question is, have you done any
analysis...
ARKES: Yes, Mr. Watt, I have, and if you don't like the
analogy of race, I could simply the ball rolling down the inclined plane.
WATT: OK. Well, keep going then.
ARKES: If somebody
says, we have the principle by which that ball -- have you tried this with the
yellows balls, the blue ones. If you're clear on the principle, then you're
clear that that principle would not be affected, even by the numerous instances
that arise under the law.
WATT: OK. Thank you, Mr. Arkes. I
appreciate the clear and concise response to my question. And I'm happy to yield
to the chairman the balance of my time.
CANADY: And I appreciate
that -- and I appreciate that, Mr. Watt. Let me just say that it's my belief
that this bill does not change the principle that is in the law of the United
States now, that has been recognized for a long time, and is in the statutes of
a large number of states.
We basically track what the current law
is. We're doing this, however, because we believe that that principle that is
currently is the law is subject to challenge and is under threat given other
developments in the law. That's why we're here doing what we are today.
HUTCHINSON: Would the gentleman yield? Would the gentleman
yield?
CANADY: The gentleman's time has expired. Without objection,
Mr. Watt will have two additional minutes.
WATT: Mr. Chairman, I
don't seek it at this time.
CANADY: OK.
The gentleman
from Arkansas is recognized for five minutes.
HUTCHINSON: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
I just want to express my thanks to the witnesses for
their testimony today. It's certainly not something that the average citizen
sees every day. Many of you are in circumstances, work in hospitals, nurses that
are affected by this and impacted by this every day. And I don't see that in my
life, and so I'm just grateful for you sharing your testimony today.
I just had a couple of questions. Ms. Baker, you testified about
your time at Christ Hospital. And the cases that you described, the infants who
were aborted, did not suffer from fatal deformities, is that correct?
So was the induced labor abortion procedure used more often on
fatally deformed infants, non-fatally deformed infants or healthy infants.
BAKER: They were infants with -- the ones that I experienced were
infants with either Down syndrome or spinal bifida. I never -- I never saw cases
of things that the baby would not survive life with. They were, you know, Downs
or spinal bifida, were both -- of all the cases that I've seen.
HUTCHINSON: Now, was that the reason for the abortion?
BAKER: Yes. That was the reason.
HUTCHINSON: And you're
saying that they could not survive life with those deformities?
BAKER: Well, they could survive life with those deformities. They
were being induced in labor at 20, 22 weeks, so they were too small to actually
intubate, and that was -- that was the reason. However, there are infants that
are being, like Ms. Stanek said, they are being induced labor and they are
saying they are 22 weeks, but when the baby is born, it's a whole lot bigger
than a 22 week fetus. And the question is, for the nurses, is what do we do,
then? This child could be intubated.
HUTCHINSON: So, your concern is
just simply how you, as a nurse, are to -- who is there to help life and
preserve life and to provide comfort, how are you to deal, under this very
difficult circumstance?
BAKER: Right. Not so much, for me, the
question is, of these born babies, that are born alive, what is the right there
for these babies? What is going to happen -- should they be left -- it is OK to
leave them on a metal table to move and to just suffocate in the means of all
they can do. Or is there some other measure we should take, as far as comfort.
HUTCHINSON: And is there a hospital policy that gives you direction?
BAKER: At that time that I was there, I believe -- there was nothing
mentioned to me. The nurses -- I was a new grad, when I went into that hospital.
Some of the nurses said, oh, I just leave the baby in a blanket on a stretcher.
I leave the baby in the soiled utility room in a warmer. There was no -- there
was no policy.
HUTCHINSON: Is there now?
BAKER: Since I
have left, Jill has informed me there is a comfort care that they talk about.
They did not have anything like that when I was there.
HUTCHINSON:
Ms. Stanek, did you want to comment on that?
STANEK: They, under
public pressure, and the Illinois attorney general's office looked into their
practice, they instituted a policy last October, and it was supposed to take
place on January 1, but it has not been put in any of our policy and procedures
books yet, which I have also reported to the attorney general again.
HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
Finally, Ms. Jessen, I would
assume that you went back and looked at the medical records surrounding your
birth. Do you know what the reason was for the decision for the abortion?
JESSEN: Sir, I have not been told why -- her particular reasoning
for having her saline abortion.
HUTCHINSON: There's nothing in the
medical records.
JESSEN: No. I was just -- I've just been given a
copy of my medical records that just say exactly what happened to me, but no
reasoning. She was 17, but that's all I know.
HUTCHINSON: Thank you
very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
CANADY: Thank
you.
The gentleman from New York is recognized.
Mr.
Nadler?
NADLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I
confess that I'm very confused on this bill. I read all the material on it. As
far as I can tell, it changes the law in no way at all. I think it's, frankly,
it's demeaning to the Congress to pass laws that don't change -- pass bills that
don't change the law in any way. I know that the anti-choice forces have placed
great stock in this bill, I can't -- I think, mistakenly.
I know
that the pro-choice forces are very fearful of this bill. I'm not sure that
they're not mistaken. As I read the law -- one of the reasons I came to this
hearing today is that I'm going to ask some witnesses how this would change
anything.
My understanding today is that any baby that is born, and
whether it's born after nine months of pregnancy or it's premature or whatever,
if it's in good health, it lives fine. If it's in desperate shape, it's up to
the parents and the doctors to decide whether to take heroic actions, put it on
the aspirator, whatever, or not, exactly as the law is with respect to next of
kin for an old person who is coming to the end of his life.
And the
question is, do you prolong his pain and suffering by a few hours before the
inevitable, or do you just not do that. And that decision is normally left to
the doctors and the next of kin.
How -- I'll ask Mr. Arkes -- how
would this bill change that in any way?
ARKES: I think you're
partially right, Congressman. This is the gentlest of bills. Most of -- you see,
most of things, I think, say Mr. Hill (sic) were complaining about were the
current provisions of the law, that I think would interpose objections if people
withdrew medical care from newborn infants with maladies.
You're
right. Most of this is taken care of right now. But...
NADLER:
Excuse me. My question is, isn't -- maybe there are problems with the law and
maybe not. But if there are problems with the law, I don't see that this bill
changes the law in any way to solve whatever problems there may be.
ARKES: Yes. It changes it, I think, in a gentle way that
addresses...
NADLER: How so?
ARKES: ...addresses Ms.
Stanek's situation.
NADLER: How do you think it changes the law?
ARKES: Well, if you have a situation with a newborn, let's say, the
one she described, a newborn afflicted with Down syndrome or spina bifida. We
thought this was exactly the kind of case that the legislation of the early
'80s, the Baby Doe legislation was meant to address, of withdrawal of medical
care.
Now, would we assume...
NADLER: Now, wait a
minute. What did that legislation say?
ARKES: That legislation
obliges, as I recall -- prohibited the withdrawal of medical care from
newborns...
NADLER: Prohibited it?
ARKES: Yes. Yes.
NADLER: Now, given the fact that that's on the law, on the books,
how does this change that?
ARKES: It deals with the problem that was
-- the misunderstanding that was apparently affecting -- or the clear
understanding that was affected many people here, that if the child had been
marked for an abortion, that child was not covered by the laws that would
ordinarily be in place to cover newborns.
NADLER: My reading of the
law...
ARKES: Yes.
NADLER: And I'm not an expert and I
haven't done a lot of research on this. I first heard of this bill a day or two
ago, or at least, reminded myself of it, I think we heard about it last year, is
that whether a child is intended for an abortion or not, if it's born alive, if
it's delivered and it's living, you have the normal laws apply. It's a person,
the normal laws apply and the question of withdrawal of heroic measures or
whatever, is whatever the law is. That being the case, how does this law change
that?
And let me just say one other thing. If, in fact, your answer
is going to be what I think you implied a moment ago, that is simply to
eliminate confusion, you don't pass laws to eliminate confusion. I mean, that's
why we have courts, that's why we have administrative agencies.
The
law is what it is, and if the law says one thing and people are confused about
it, someone ought to unconfused them. But if -- a new law that simply reiterates
the old law, first of all, it's worthless to pass new laws that don't change the
law. Has does this change the existing law with respect to that situation?
ARKES: Well, we haven't had this morning an opinion from Mr. Ken
Thomas, in which he objects to the bill...
NADLER: Who?
ARKES: Mr. Ken Thomas, objecting to the bill on the grounds that this
could possibly implicate 14th Amendment liberty interests on the part of a
woman. That is, there are many people out there who do think that the right to
abortion, articulated in Roe v. Wade alters this situation now, so that if it
was a child marked for an abortion, the usual laws that would come into play in
regard to the treatment of newborns, are now superseded. It's worth making that
point.
NADLER: Excuse me a minute. Wait a minute.
CANADY: The gentleman's time has expired. Without objection, the
gentleman will have two additional minutes.
NADLER: People may think
whatever they like, and they're either right or wrong in what they think.
ARKES: Right.
NADLER: The question is, well, do you
think that that is the law at the moment? A child who was intended for an
abortion and is alive outside the mother that that -- what is the law, under
current law, with respect to that child or whatever you want?
ARKES:
I think that law is in a state of confusion, because the answer tended by Judge
Haynsworth in Floyd v. Anders, that that is not a child protected by the law.
That argument still remains plausible because it hasn't been explicitly refuted
or rejected. And it is open to the legislature. After all, the legislature --
after all, you know, why give this task on to many people in administrative
posts, where this is a prime moment for the authors of that legislation to make
clear their own intent, and make explicit even what we thought was lurking there
implicit all the while. It not so clear.
NADLER: I never (inaudible)
clear was explicit.
ARKES. Yes. I'm afraid it's not.
CANADY: Would the gentleman...
NADLER: Go ahead.
CANADY: Would the gentleman yield?
NADLER: Yes.
CANADY: At the federal level, this principle, which is embodied in
this bill, has not been codified. I believe, as the gentleman from New York
states, that it is currently the law. But it has been subject to some question
because of the developments we discussed.
And let me suggest,
there's nothing at all unusual about Congress codifying, in statute, a rule that
the courts have developed, to prevent erosion of that rule, or an abandonment of
that rule. That's an appropriate and...
NADLER: Let me take back my
time.
CANADY: ...and by no means unique thing for the Congress to do.
NADLER: Well, I'm still very confused about this. I'm not aware of
any erosion of that rule, and I was not aware till today that any judge had ever
questioned -- you say that Judge Haynsworth did. I don't think that's the law of
the land, whatever Judge Haynsworth said.
As I said before, I, at
this point, and I remain open-minded, at this point I don't see that the law
changes -- that this bill changes anything. I don't see that it does any harm; I
don't see that it does any good, and I'm not sure why we should be dealing with
it at all.
ARKES: Well, it would certainly address the question that
Jill Stanek confronted at Oak Lawn, and that would be -- have a powerful effect
just in addressing that kind of case.
Can I say also that I'm an old
fan of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, where he showed you we could make the
argument against desegregation simply on the basis of the old text of the
Constitution? You could argue that we really didn't need the 14th and 15th
Amendments. I think that's all implicit in the original document, but -- and the
13th Amendment. But there was something to be gained.
NADLER: The
Civil War says that that wasn't so clear.
ARKES: Yes, that's right.
There was something to be gained by making all that explicit.
NADLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CANADY: Thank you, Mr.
Nadler.
Mr. Hyde is recognized for five minutes.
HYDE:
No questions.
CANADY: Would you mind yielding your time to me?
HYDE: With pleasure.
CANADY: I appreciate that, Mr.
Hyde.
Just following up on this discussion between Mr. Nadler and
Professor Arkes, which I think is actually very helpful, I think we -- everybody
should understand that the principle that we are attempting to put in the
statutes of the United States through this bill, is a principle that is already
on -- in the statutes of many states across the country, including the State of
New York.
CANADY: Now, there was time when that statute in New
York did not exist, but the legislature decided that the legislature would
codify the common law rule, which again, this bill reflects, on this point.
And we're -- in some ways; we're simply belatedly following the lead
of the New York legislature, and the legislatures of many states across the
country, which have put this principle into the statute books.
I
think it's important, and this is a fundamental point, that it is not our intent
to change the law, which has been recognized for an extended period of time. It
is our intent to reaffirm that principle and to shore it up and to protect it
from erosion. And on the point of whether that is a necessary enterprise or not,
I'll have to humbly submit.
But I think if you look at the
statements made by Judge Haynsworth that have been referred to, and look at the
logic of other judicial decisions, including the recent case involving
partial birth abortion, which I referred to in my opening
statement, you have to conclude that there is some threat to this fundamental
principle of the law.
And so, it's a prudent and necessary step for
us to take to put in the statutes of the United States. Now, do I believe that
that will necessarily make the threat to the principle go away? No. I will not
tell you that.
NADLER: Will the gentleman yield for a second?
CANADY: I think that there's a possibility that regardless of what
we do legislatively, that principle will be -- continue to be threatened. But,
we have a legislative responsibility to take this, as Professor Arkes says,
modest step to protect that very important principle.
And I'll be
happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
NADLER: Thank you.
Let me ask you this. Assume that this bill were law. Assume that we
had passed this bill, it were law and it said what it said. Now you have the
situation that I think Ms. Stanek referred to before, a baby born that is in
terribly shape, medically, et cetera. The question arises whether or not to take
heroic measures, or what to do. And she said there was confusion.
I
think that under current law, that question, basically is up the parents and the
doctor, to decide whether they should take heroic measures or not. How would
this law change that, if at all?
CANADY: This law does not do
anything to change the standard of care that would be applicable in such
circumstances. And it is true that there are difficult cases where people in
good faith can have disagreements.
NADLER: So, we need to dispel
that confusion.
CANADY: This does not solve all the world's
problems. No one contends that it does. It is, again, as Professor Arkes has
said, a modest step, but it establishes this principle, because again, we're
finding people that seem to be attacking this principle, who seem to believe
that if, particularly in the case where the child is born alive after an
abortion has performed, there is some sort of right to have a dead baby as a
consequence of the abortion, not simply a right to terminate the pregnancy, but
a right to a dead baby.
That is an idea that is being articulated,
and I think that is a dangerous idea, and that's an idea that we have a
responsibility to respond to.
Well, I appreciate the gentleman's
question. And again, I want to thank all the members of this panel for joining
us. Your testimony has been very helpful to the subcommittee and we thank you
very much.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CANADY: We'll now move to our second panel. And I'd like to ask
Representative Jones to come forward and take her seat.
We're
pleased today to welcome, as the witness on our second panel, the Honorable
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, who represents the 11th district of Ohio.
Congressman Jones sits on two committees, banking and financial
services and small business. Before coming to Congress, Congresswoman Jones
served as a county attorney and judge.
Representative Jones, we want
to thank you for being with us here this morning. I've asked that you do your
best to summarize your testimony in five minutes or less. And without objection,
your written statement will be made a part of the permanent hearing record.
Representative Jones?
JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman Watts, Congressman Hyde, Scott (ph) Nadler. I thank you for the
opportunity to be here this morning to testify with regard to this particular
legislation.
I come here today to share my concerns about it, not
only as your colleague, but as you've already said, having served as both a
judge and a Cuyahoga County prosecutor for some 18 years in combination.
My experience required me to step down from an ivory tower as just
making law, but to actually see the impact that laws that were passed by my
state colleagues and federal colleagues could have in real life. And as a judge,
I was required often to interpret the legislation that was passed.
I
have written comments and I also made some briefer comments, but based on the
interaction that has happened here already this morning, I thought I would
address a couple of things out of order.
One of the things that this
piece of legislation attempts to do is to apply a single definition of born
alive across every federal statute in place. And I would reference the committee
to the CRS report with regard to legislation. And it says specifically that this
would -- a computer search of these terms reveals that they appeared in over
15,000 sections of the United States codes and over 57,000 sections of the Code
of Federal Regulations.
Consequently, an evaluation of the statutory
and regulatory impact of this act is beyond the recourses of our office.
So, it was made clear that based on the CRS, who does the research
for Congress, that it is ill advised for us to proceed with a piece of
legislation such as this, if we can't be advised as to how this -- the impact of
the law.
The other thing that needs to be made clear. In many
states, they have enacted legislation or definitions, but the definitions
enacted in each of the states don't apply in every instance. They have
definitions that are enacted for purpose of a criminal statute, definitions that
are enacted for purposes of estate, taxes or estates, or what am I looking for,
the word -- probate issues. And so, for us to do something, or codify a piece --
the term or definition of born alive across every federal statute without
knowing the impact it would have, in my mind, is ill advised.
Even
more, and I want to step to the political piece of this, since the witnesses
prior to me testifying were on that. I am a pro- choice member of Congress. And
really, what this does is flame the political fire of those who are either
pro-choice or anti-choice, by pushing a piece of legislation that has little
impact in terms of clearing up the air, or expanding our understanding, or
anyone's understanding of the law.
What it could, in fact, do is
cause greater confusion. And we all know, those of us that are legislators, know
that we should not enact law that are vague, that do not -- do little to assist
government in its operation.
And so I would, as I said, I skipped
over much of what I would want to say to you just in response to some of those
particular issues that had already been raised. And I would say to you that
finally, as Congress, we're talking about some concept of born alive. Why aren't
we spending the time that we have in Congress today dealing with those children
that are alive?
I mean, we're sitting here discussing a concept when we
can't seem to pass legislation that will assist in the education of children,
that would assist in providing a prescription drug benefit for senior citizens
that deal with social security, that deal with so many other issues.
And we're caught up spending time talking about born alive, which is
clear from CRS, we don't know the impact it would have.
I appreciate
the opportunity to be heard, Mr. Chairman, and thank the other members of the
committee for the chance to appear here today.
CANADY: Thank you,
Representative Jones.
And I don't -- I recognize myself for five
minutes now. I don't ordinarily ask members questions, and we hopefully won't
have too many questions for you, but I guess I'm confused by your opposition to
this.
Now, I understand the point that's made that this affects --
the law would affect the whole Federal Code. But can you come up with one
example of someplace in the Federal Code where this principle would not be
appropriate.
JONES: That was CRS's job. And CRS said that of the
70,000 places where this piece of language was used, they could not tell you the
impact that it would have.
But conceptually, we could use -- in my
other testimony I said, for example, the federal law defines murder as the
unlawful killing of human being with malice or forethought. As currently
crafted, this would broaden this provision's protection to pre-viable fetuses.
Therefore, a physician at a military hospital who performs an abortion,
necessary to...
CANADY: I think that's not correct. Now, perhaps --
is your concern that if a -- as a result of an abortion, a child is born alive,
but at a stage when the child is not viable, that this law would prohibit the
killing of that child?
JONES: Now, when you use the term born alive,
are you using the term that you define born alive?
CANADY: Sure. As
defined here. It's moving. It's moving. It's got a heart beating. There's signs
of life, as the statute...
JONES: What I'm saying to you is that
there is legislation in place across the country to protect a child that's born
alive, and we need not enact new legislation to protect a child that's born
alive.
CANADY: I understand -- I understand your point. But I don't
understand how it's responsive to my question. Can you give me one example in
the Federal Code where you believe that this principle that's embodied in the
bill, which we'd put in the Federal Code, would be an inappropriate principle.
JONES: Well, it could be an inappropriate principle, assuming the
example...
CANADY: Give me an example.
JONES: Wait,
wait, wait. Now, you're going to ask me a question. Are you going to let me
answer?
CANADY: Well, if you'll answer my question.
JONES: I am answering your question.
CANADY: An example.
JONES: But I'm not going to answer it like you'd like me to answer
it. I will have it the way I choose to answer.
CANADY: You don't
have an example. You don't have an example.
JONES: I'm going to
finish the example I attempted to give you earlier.
CANADY: OK.
Please do.
JONES: Therefore, a physician at a military hospital who
performs an abortion necessary to save a woman's life or to terminate a
pregnancy resulting from rape or incest could be prosecutor for murder under
federal criminal law if that physician does not take extraordinary or possibly
medically inappropriate measures to resuscitate the fetus, should the fetus
final heartbeat or pulse outside the woman's -- have a final heartbeat or pulse
outside the woman's body.
CANADY: That is not so. That's not what
this bill does. It says nothing about -- it does nothing to change the standard
of care that would be applicable under all these state statutes or, quite
frankly, under the principle that has been articulated by the federal courts.
JOHNSON: Now, you're saying to me that I can't have an opinion. My
opinion is that is does. Your opinion is that it does not.
CANADY: I
understand that people have different opinions. Some opinions...
JOHNSON: OK. So don't say that's not your...
CANADY:
Well. At some point, we have to make judgments about which opinions are correct
or not correct.
JONES: You're not saying yours is more correct than
mine, though?
CANADY: Yes, I am. Yes.
(LAUGHTER)
JONES: And I say mine is more correct than yours.
(APPLAUSE)
CANADY: And I think -- and I think -- and I think you're -- and
you're asserting that yours is more correct than mine.
JONES: No,
I'm not. I'm just giving my opinion. I was not trying to say to you that you
were wrong. I said -- I gave -- you asked my opinion and I gave it to you.
CANADY: Well, I would suggest to you that there may be something
called the truth.
JONES: You know what? You can't impugn my
integrity, Mr. Chairman. I served as a judge for 10 years, a prosecutor as
eight, and I'm your colleague. Don't you ever attempt to say me I'm not talking
to truth.
CANADY: Oh, Representative Jones.
JONES: Don't
you ever attempt to say again I'm not talking truth.
CANADY: Please,
please.
JONES: Now you may not agree, but I'm telling truth.
CANADY: No. That was not my suggestion.
JONES: But you
said it.
CANADY: No, I did. And I think if you will look at...
JONES: (OFF-MIKE) Do you want to read it back for me? I sound like
I'm the judge in a courtroom, don't I?
CANADY: Well, you're not here
today. That was not my suggestion...
JONES: Absolutely it was.
CANADY: ...but the point is that sometimes when there are
conflicts between opinions, people have to make a judgment about which one is
right or wrong. And I respect your right to say that my opinion is wrong.
JONES: I didn't say you were wrong.
CANADY: So, you're
agnostic on the question?
JONES: No. I did not -- I said my
interpretation -- I came here to give my testimony with regard to the law. And
you're here trying to say that I'm not telling truth or that I'm incorrect. And
I'm not.
CANADY: Well.
JONES: In my opinion.
CANADY: Well, I understand your opinion and I appreciate your
offering it and I respect your right to do that. Let me say that the principle
that we are trying to put in the law here is a principle that's already in the
law of your state, which I suspect as a state judge, you are aware, there's very
little difference, I mean, if any difference between our definition of live
birth in this bill and what the State of Ohio has said.
JONES: Let
me fall back to my earlier statement.
CANADY: I just don't
understand why this should be controversial.
JONES: The reason I
gave the earlier statement...
CANADY: Without objection, I have two
additional minutes to the gentlelady can respond.
JONES: Thank you.
Fantastic.
In Ohio, there is a definition, but it does not apply
across the board. The legislation that you offer today, you propose that it
would apply in every instance across every federal statute.
Is that
not what your legislation says?
CANADY: Let me ask you this. Do you
believe that it's appropriate for this definition to apply in the criminal law
context?
JONES: It's already in place in the criminal law context.
CANADY: So, you believe it's appropriate...
JONES: In
some instances.
CANADY: You believe it's appropriate in that
context?
JONES: No, I'm not saying that it's appropriate.
CANADY: Well, I appreciate your being here with us today, and I will
recognize any other members who wish to ask you questions.
HYDE: I
would like (inaudible).
CANADY: Mr. Hyde is recognized.
HYDE: Judge, as I look at the Constitution, the word "person" is
awfully important. No person shall be deprived of equal protection of law, nor
shall any person be deprived of due process of law. So, personhood is a pretty
important concept.
Now, I'm confused as to when a fetus become a
person, if ever, he or she does. From the moment of conception till you die in a
nursing home 96 years later, along that continuum, you as a judge, a dealer in
the law, and a prosecutor, an enforcer of the law, when does that fetus, that
fertilized egg, at what period in it's journey through life, does it become a
person?
JONES: I will refer you to the Supreme Court decision on
that. I did not...
HYDE: I want you to tell me.
JONES: I
will refer you, Mr. Hyde, to the Supreme Court decision on that. I was not
required to make a decision as a court judge...
(CROSSTALK)
JONES: No. As I said to you, Mr. Hyde, I will refer you to the
Supreme Court decision.
HYDE: I want your opinion, though. What's
your opinion?
JONES: I refer you to the Supreme Court decision.
HYDE: Well, tell me what the court decision says. There are so many
of them, I haven't committed it to memory.
JONES: Oh, and neither
have I.
HYDE: What is your opinion? What is your opinion?
JONES: And neither have I, Mr. Hyde.
CANADY: Will the
gentleman yield?
HYDE: Well, I'd love to know when personhood
attaches, because it's critical.
JONES: I refer you to the Supreme
Court decision.
CANADY: Will the gentleman yield on that point.
(CROSSTALK)
HYDE: The vagueness surprises me on such a
concept. Personhood ought to attach, at some time, our Declaration of
Independence as you have inalienable rights. Let's forget personhood. When did
those inalienable rights attach to that little fertilized egg, growing into an
old man or an old woman? At what point in that continuum does the inalienable
rights, or do they ever attach?
JONES: I refer you to Roe v. Wade,
the Supreme Court decision, Mr. Hyde.
HYDE: Didn't Casey overrule
Roe?
JONES: No, not completely. Roe v. Wade is still good law in
this country.
HYDE: Now, you said that we shouldn't pass vague laws.
Would you say the phrase undue burden is terribly specific?
JONES:
It's specific enough for people to understand what it means. And an undue in my
mind's eye is to pass a piece of legislation such as this that has application
across the board to 70,000 statutes, when CRS doesn't even know -- what impact
it would have.
HYDE: What is the protection for an unborn child, a
fetus? You mentioned there is existing federal and state already provides
adequate protection for fetuses. If you can have a born fetus and put it in the
closet and let it die, I'd like to know what is the protection?
JONES: Of the criminal code, that says that you cannot have -- take
a -- have a child that's born, a child born live, and put in a closet. You have
an obligation to do something with that child, if there is criminal intent
involved. Do you know what? See, it's very interesting that neither one of you,
Mr. Canady or Mr. Hyde, say that you generally would ask questions of your
colleagues. And you're trying to use me as a pawn to discuss to your issues that
I are think are clearly inappropriate.
HYDE: No. I'm fascinate -- I
seldom get a chance to cross exam a judge. You're a judge.
(LAUGHTER)
JONES: Oh, now you'll couch in that. I'll
take that.
CANADY: Would the gentleman yield?
HYDE:
Sure.
CANADY: I just want to follow up on the principle that was stated
about the protection of the child born after an abortion, the protections of the
law...
JONES: No, I say -- OK, go ahead.
CANADY: OK.
Well, if I understood you, you said that a child that is born alive, after an
abortion has been performed...
JONES: No. I didn't even use the word
abortion, Mr. Canady. Don't put those words in my mouth.
CANADY: OK.
I'm sorry. What did you say? Clarify it for me.
JONES: He asked me,
was there a protection for a child that was born in a closet. And I said, there
is a criminal statute that applies to the conduct of a person. If a child is
born and he is alive, and someone then causes some harm to him, him or her...
CANADY: Let me -- OK. Let me, in that circumstance that's been
described, does it make any difference whether the child is at a stage of
development that some would consider to be pre-viable. The child is living, but
the judgment is made that the child cannot survive long-term. Does that make any
different to that answer?
JONES: Let me say this to you. That is not
enough information upon which I could make a determination as to whether or not
it is prosecutable.
HYDE: Mr. Nadler. I yield to you, but I don't
have any time.
CANADY: The gentleman from New York is recognized.
NADLER: I want to make a couple of comments, thank you. I wasn't
going to ask Representative Jones any questions. I was going to make some
comments, but now the -- I'll first make comments on something -- on some of Mr.
Hyde's...
(CROSSTALK)
NADLER: On some of Mr. Hyde's
comments.
I believe the law is fairly clear at this point. The right
of personhood under the Constitution -- personhood under the Constitution
attaches when a child is born. A child has no constitutional rights before that
point.
HYDE: Ten minutes before birth, it has no constitutional
rights?
NADLER: I think as a matter of law...
(CROSSTALK)
NADLER: Let me finish, please. I think it's
a matter law that is correct. It has no constitutional rights, and that way, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the states have a right to regulate abortion,
depending on, you know, on the time scale. And the states certainly have the
right to, in the last trimester, to put limits on abortions and so forth, and
some have and so forth, but I don't think that that's a constitutional right of
the child, as the courts have defined.
I think it's a right of the
states to legislate and to recognize that the state may have interests in that
child if it's nine months pregnant, or eight months, or whatever, that it wishes
to balance against the rights of the mother. And that's the legal framework that
the Supreme Court has articulated in Roe and in Casey, although they balance
somewhat differently in those two cases.
But I think that as a
matter of law, the constitutional right of a person in the 14th Amendment and
other protections attach at birth.
Let me say a second, -- and I
think that's a correct statement of law.
Secondly, I think, and
again, I'm not clear that this bill does anything, one way or the other, but I
think that it is clear in the laws of every state in the federal union that if
an abortion were performed or a natural birth occurred at any age, at three
months, and the product of that were living outside the mother -- living outside
the mother, whether it was the result of a natural occurrence or an abortion,
but if the product of that were living outside the mother, and somebody came and
shot -- and shot it, I don't think there's any doubt that person would be
prosecuted for murder in the laws of every state of the union as presently
constituted.
So, again, I'm not sure that this bill does anything at
all. It doesn't seem to have -- the questions that are -- that exist, in so far
as any questions exist, are questions of what the obligations are for a child
born in medical extremis, whether because of being very early in the pregnancy
or for some other reason. And there may be confusion on that now, and this law
doesn't dispel that confusion.
I want to say one other thing, and
that's a political thing. I don't have any doubt, and I am as pro-choice as
anybody on this earth, as I think most of the people here know.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (inaudible) stipulate.
NADLER:
Thank you. I don't think there's much doubt, at least, there isn't in my mind,
that the intent of this bill is not to dispel some confusion. The intent of this
bill is in various ways to try undermine the constitutional protections of
abortion.
I don't think it does that. And I shouldn't say, "I don't
think so." I haven't yet seen how it does that in any way, and I'm not sure that
as a political matter, it makes much sense for the pro-choice movement to go --
to say that this undermines the rationale -- the constitutional rationale for
abortion, if in fact, it doesn't.
And so far, I don't see how it
affects that...
HYDE: Would the gentleman yield?
NADLER:
...in any way. Yes.
HYDE: Just very briefly.
I
respectfully disagree with my friend. The Roe v. Wade did not say when a person
becomes a person. As a matter of fact, the court wouldn't even say when human
life begins. They punted on that question.
NADLER: Reclaiming my
time. That may be, but the fact is, that it has always been, I think, clear,
that as a practical matter, we consider that constitutional rights begin at
birth. And I would simply point out that under the criminal laws, I think of all
the states, and maybe this has changed recently because of the abortion
controversy, I'm not sure, but the traditional law, in some states, I'm not an
expert in every state, but the traditional law has always been that if you kill
-- if you shoot a woman, and she dies, you're guilty of murder.
If
you injure a woman intentionally, and her fetus dies, you're guilty of a tort,
but you're not guilty of murder. And that says, to me, that the law does not
recognize the fetus at that point, and it doesn't seem to make any difference
whether -- at what stage of pregnancy it is, but that tells you that you've
committed a tort against the woman by killing her fetus, but you haven't
committed murder, which means that that fetus is not considered from that point
-- purpose...
HYDE: How about guardian ad litem probate? For an
unborn child?
NADLER: I'm not familiar with that area of law. I
don't know. Do we have them?
I don't think we ought to have them.
HYDE: I'll explain it to you.
NADLER: But my point is,
that shows that obviously if we consider that fetus to have the right of
personhood under the 14th Amendment, the laws would be very different. You won't
consider that a tort, you'd consider that murder.
And that has
always been the case and I understand that there are -- that you, sir, and other
anti-choice people would like to change that, but it would be a change. I would
oppose that. But it would be a change. It's not the current legal concept.
JONES: I would also, Mr. Canady, like to refer you to the...
CANADY: The gentleman's time has expired. Without...
JONES: In answer to your own question, refer to you...
CANADY: The gentleman's from New York's time -- without objection,
the gentleman will have two additional minutes.
JONES: Mr. -- all I want
to do is to refer you to your memo. I don't want to testify any further. On the
third page, top, as to what you think this legislation will do, and it will
expand, based on what you think it will do, the rights of a pre-viable fetus,
that is, far and away against what Roe v. Wade said in it's -- the Supreme Court
said in Row v. Wade.
CANADY: It's the time of the gentleman from New
York.
NADLER: I'm glad I have this (inaudible). I want to make one
further comment.
I think that there is some misinterpretation in
this room about -- what the bill does, I mean, the bill -- the bill's rights,
whatever they may be, accorded by the bill, attach once the fetus or the baby or
whatever you want to call it at that point, is outside the woman and still alive
at any stage of development, meaning at any stage of pregnancy. So, I don't
think it has any -- this bill -- I don't think has comment on viability or
stages of pregnancy or anything else, other than to say that once the baby is
born, it's a person.
NADLER: I would point out to Mr. Hyde that
with respect to the question that we were addressing a moment ago, when
personhood attaches, the clear implementation of this bill, if it has any
implication at all, is that personhood attaches once a baby is born. It says the
baby is a person, once outside the mother -- outside of the mother, which is
what we normally mean by born.
And then it says the baby is a --
that personhood attaches at that point, so one might even say that the
implication of this bill would be against any -- those people who wanted to say
that the fetus at some point is a person...
HYDE: Would the
gentleman yield?
NADLER: Let me just finish.
One might
even say that the implication of this bill is against those who would want to
say that personhood attaches at some point prior to birth. Yes, I will yield.
HYDE: Would you say that if a woman wanted an abortion and went in
to get one, and had an abortion, but it failed in the sense that the baby was
delivered alive, that that baby is now a person and entitled to be protected in
life?
NADLER: That has always been my understanding.
HYDE: Good. Thank you.
CANADY: Thank you.
The gentleman from Alabama is recognized.
BACHUS: I
would just ask my colleague -- all of us keep referring, I think, to the Supreme
Court decision. Could we agree, though, that when life begins, the Supreme Court
really doesn't determine that.
JONES: Well, the question -- what's
your question? Can we agree when life begins? Is that what you said?
BACHUS: Do you agree that the Supreme Court really doesn't determine
those things?
JONES: I will agree that the Supreme Court makes a
determination that a woman has the right to have an abortion within a certain
period of time and that is her -- it is her decision.
BACHUS: Fine.
I understand. But as when life begins, and when...
JONES: Yes.
BACHUS: ...the Supreme Court doesn't...
JONES: Yes.
BACHUS: ...doesn't make those decisions.
JONES: But what
it does is, it does -- the Supreme Court has made it clear when a person has the
right...
BACHUS: No, I understand.
JONES: When a person
is a person for purposes of exercising rights guaranteed to us by the
Constitution.
BACHUS: I understand that.
JONES: OK.
BACHUS: But I mean, I think we can admit on a more basic thing that
when life begins, when a person -- we talked about human beings, we talked about
babies as opposed to fetuses. I mean, that's something that the Supreme Court
doesn't determine.
JONES: The Supreme Court interprets the laws of
our land and the Supreme Court makes a determination as to when a person has the
right to the guarantees of the Constitution, so, in essence, the Supreme Court
could determine when life begins.
For purposes of the law, but not
for purposes of the rhetorical discussion that we may be having here, for
religious or moral.
BACHUS: I'm just saying that realistically, the
Supreme Court doesn't determine when life begins.
JONES: OK. Assume
I agree with that. What's your next question?
BACHUS: No, that's --
that was my only question.
JONES: Oh. OK.
BACHUS:
Because in this discussion, it seems like sometimes we, and I'm not saying that
you do, but we, to justify things, we actually seem to imply, somehow, that the
Supreme Court can make a decision on when life begins.
JONES: Well,
for purposes of some statutes, the Supreme Court can make that determination.
That's whole issue we're here about.
BACHUS: Well, I understand.
I would like, without objection, to ask Ms. Stanek a question.
JONES: Can I leave if -- I have a committee hearing, and if you're
done with me?
Mr. Chairman?
CANADY: Let me, before the
gentleman makes his request.
Representative Jones, we thank you for
being here.
JONES: I'm glad to be here. And it was a great,
wonderful time.
CANADY: You're...
JONES: And I'll come
back again. Count on me.
CANADY: We all -- in this subcommittee we
always have a wonderful time.
JONES: So I hear. I hear you
(inaudible) entertainment sometimes, also.
CANADY: But it is --
we're grateful for your taking the time. We appreciate your interest in this
issue. And your testimony has helped illuminate the issues involved in this
legislation.
JONES: Maybe, maybe not.
CANADY: Thank you
very much.
JONES: But thank you very much.
CANADY: Thank
you.
The gentleman from Alabama has a unanimous consent request.
BACHUS: That I be allowed to ask Ms. Stanek a question, please.
WATT: I'm reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman.
There's some timeframe that we're operating in here.
BACHUS: Yes. What happened, I was called out.
WATTS: Oh,
you want five minutes.
BACHUS: Yes.
WATTS: Oh, OK.
CANADY: Without objection, the gentleman be allowed to ask a
question.
BACHUS: Ms. Stanek, you testified about a living, aborted
baby that was left to die on the counter of a soiled utility room.
STANEK: Right.
BACHUS: And it's wrapped in a disposable
towel.
STANEK: Right.
BACHUS: And the baby was
accidentally thrown into the garbage?
STANEK: Right.
BACHUS: And was found when she fell out on the floor.
STANEK: Yes.
BACHUS: You testified about how you took a
living aborted baby from one of your fellow nurses, a baby that you said was 22
weeks and had Down syndrome and that you held him until he died?
STANEK: Yes.
BACHUS: So he would not have to die in the
soiled utility closet.
STANEK: Right.
BACHUS: Was a
birth certificate issued?
STANEK: Yes. Birth and death certificates
are issued for live, aborted babies.
BACHUS: So, a birth certificate
on both these babies was issued.
STANEK: Yes.
BACHUS:
How about a death certificate.
STANEK: Yes. It's law.
BACHUS: So a birth certificate -- this was the State of Illinois
recognized that this child was born?
STANEK: Right. And died.
BACHUS: These childs (sic) -- you've testified about some living up
to eight hours?
STANEK: Right.
BACHUS: The state
recognized their birth, recognized that they died?
STANEK Right.
BACHUS: As human beings?
STANEK: Yes.
BACHUS:
Was medical care extended to them?
STANEK: No.
BACHUS:
Was any attempt made to transfer them to a neonatal ward?
STANEK:
No. That's what's at issue here, I think. That these babies were determined
pre-birth, not to have rights to live after birth, but were not assessed after
birth.
BACHUS: I was a medic in the army. I have very limited
training, but I did visit a ward for a one-week period. And they used the term
then that the baby is thriving.
STANEK: Right. Viable, non-viable.
BACHUS: Right. I think the term means it that was, you know, it was
breathing on its own, could live on its own. Were these babies -- did any of
them show signs of thriving.
STANEK: Yes. There was -- the one that
I was talking about this spring, the 23-weeker healthy baby that the mother
decided to abort rather than deliver, that baby showed signs of thriving by
APGAR scores that improved between the one and five minute APGAR scores, they
improved. The baby began to spontaneously breathe on her own.
BACHUS: Because obviously...
STANEK: So, on the short
term, yes.
BACHUS: Was it a little boy or girl.
STANEK:
Girl. And girls have a higher incidence of thriving premature deliveries also,
so she had that going for her.
BACHUS: Was any attempt made to
assist her in her life?
STANEK: No. No. No. She was wrapped in a
blanket...
BACHUS: But a death certificate -- a birth certificate
was issued? A death certificate was issued?
STANEK: Yes. Yes. Yes.
BACHUS: But no assistance was given her in her attempt to live?
STANEK: No. If the baby had been wanted by the mother, when it was
time for delivery, the neonatologist would have been called, the pediatric
resident, a neonatal nurse and a respiratory therapist would have all been
present for the delivery to take care of that baby, and then take the baby over
to NICU.
But this baby was not wanted. It was aborted.
BACHUS: What did the death certificate read?
STANEK: I
didn't read it. I just know that it is law that they are issued birth and death
certificates.
BACHUS: I have no further questions.
STANEK: Thank you.
CANADY: Thank you, Representative
Bachus.
We'll now move to our next panel.
I'm sorry.
Were there other people who wish to ask questions?
We'll now go to
the third and final panel for today's hearing. And I'd like to ask the members
of that panel to come forward and take your seats.
And I'll proceed
with the introduction of the witnesses on this panel.
The first
witness on this panel will be Kenneth R. Thomas, legislative attorney at the
American law division at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of
Congress. Before joining the American law division, Mr. Thomas was a
professional lecturer in law at the National Law Center of Georgetown University
and also served as a trial attorney in the U.S. Department of Education's office
for civil rights.
Mr. Thomas is accompanied by Jon Shimabukuro, I'm
sorry, I mispronounced your name -- who is also a legislative attorney with the
Congressional Research Service.
The second witness on this panel
will be Professor Gerald -- I'm sorry, Gerard Bradley, a professor at Notre Dame
Law School. Professor Bradley teaches courses in legal philosophy,
constitutional theory, First Amendment trial advocacy and legal ethics. Before
joining the faculty of Notre Dame, Professor Bradley taught at the University of
Illinois College of Law and served as an assistant district attorney in the
trial division in New York County.
Professor Bradley has written
extensively on constitutional law and legal philosophy.
Next, we
will hear from Dr. F. Sessions Cole, M.D. Dr. Cole is the Park J. White
professor of pediatrics and cell biology and physiology at Washington University
School of Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Cole also serves a vice chairman
of the department of pediatrics and the director of the newborn medicine
division.
He received his BA in 1969 from Amherst and his M.D. in
1973 from Yale University School of Medicine. Dr. Cole has held a number of
academic and research positions at Washington University and Harvard Medical
School, and has published numerous articles in medical journals.
Following Dr. Cole will be Dr. Watson A. Bowes, Jr., M.D., professor
emeritus at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Medicine,
where he also serves as a full professor in the department of obstetrics and
gynecology from 1982 to 1999.
Before joining the faculty at North
Carolina, Dr. Bowes was a member of the full time faculty in the department of
obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Colorado for 14 years. Dr. Bowes'
major professional interests included high-risk obstetrics, pre-term birth and
all aspects of labor and delivery. From 1995 to 1999, he served on the committee
on ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and was
for the last two years of that time chairman of the committee.
Dr.
Bowes received his medical degree from the University of Colorado in 1955.
Our last witness on this panel and for this hearing today will be
Professor Robert P. George, McCormick professor of jurisprudence at Princeton
University. Professor George teaches and writes in the areas of philosophy of
law, civil rights and liberties, and American constitutional law and theory.
Professor George graduated from Swarthmore College and Harvard Law
School. He also holds a doctorate in legal philosophy from Oxford University.
Professor George is the author of numerous books and articles on political and
legal philosophy, including his most recent book "In Defense of Natural Law,"
published by Oxford University Press in 1999.
Professor George
recently completed a six-year term as a presidential appointee to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights. He has also been listed on the Templeton's
Foundation's honor roll of outstanding professors.
And I want to
thank all of you for being with us here this morning, my script says, but it's
actually this afternoon. And I would ask that each of you do your best to
summarize your testimony in five minutes or less, and without objection, your
written statements will be made a part of the permanent record of the hearing.
Mr. Thomas?
THOMAS: Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee.
Good morning. My name is Ken Thomas, and I am here
with Jon Shimabukuro. We are attorneys with the American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service, and we are here today to discuss the statutory
implications of H.R. 4292, the "Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2000."
As you know, the Congressional Research Service is statutorily
required to be non-partisan and objective, and CRS takes no position for or
against the passage of the bill being discussed today. I will be delivering our
statement today, but both Mr. Shimabukuro and I have worked on this issue
together and we'll both be available for questions.
H.R. 4292 would
amend all federal laws and regulations which use the term "person," "human
being," "child," or "individual." H.R. 4292 would define these terms to include
"every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage
of development" as evidenced by a "beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical
cord or definite movement of voluntary muscles."
THOMAS: This
definition would apply when there is complete expulsion or extraction of an
infant from a mother as a result of natural or induced labor, as a result of a
caesarean section or as a result of an induced labor.
Our office was
asked to provide you information on the impact that this definitional change
would have. As has been discussed, a computer search of these terms reveals that
they appear in over 15,000 sections of the United States Code and in over 57,000
sections of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Consequently, we
limited our evaluation to the areas of law we thought most likely to be
affected. In our written statement, we addressed three major areas of law --
tort law, trust and estate law and criminal law. We do not anticipate that the
act will have significant impact on federal tort law or on estate law, so for
purposes of today's testimony, we will limit our discussion to the area of
criminal law.
In criminal law, the issue of whether a person is
"born alive" most often arises in determining whether charges of homicide or
manslaughter can be brought for fetal damage inflicted in utero. If a harmed
fetus does not survive until birth, common law homicide statutes generally do
not apply. This "born alive" requirement was generally seen as a remnant of a
rule of medical jurisprudence, which is developed from the 16th through the 19th
century.
This rule was developed because of related evidentiary
difficulties in establishing how and why a fetus has died. Thus, under those
laws where "born alive" standards still applies, the precise definition of that
standard might make a difference in some small number of cases.
I'd
like to turn now, though, to specific federal statutes, which would be covered
by this.
The principal federal statute against homicide are 18
United States Code 1111 and 1112, which prohibit murder and manslaughter
respectively in the special maritime and territorial jurisdictions. The proposed
act would affect these sections, as both of these sections use one of terms of
the proposed act, "human being."
Now, the jurisdiction where these
laws, 1111 and 1112 apply, is not very large. These laws only apply in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, which
includes places of a strong federal interest, such as the high seas, the waters
of the United States, certain vessels and on certain aircraft.
Now,
one significant area found in this jurisdiction are lands where the United
States has direct legislative jurisdiction, such as Indian lands, some national
parks and some military bases. But outside of this jurisdiction, murder or
manslaughter are generally prosecuted under state law.
Now, the
question we were asked to examine is how the proposed act would affect existing
law. While the common law "born alive" rule appears to apply to federal murder
and manslaughter statutes already, the Ninth Circuit in the case of United
States v. Spencer held that the "born alive" rule applies in special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction.
So the next question to ask is whether
the proposed act would vary the common law definition of being "born alive."
Now, the answer to this question depends on how the proposed act is
interpreted. The most significant difference we would note between the common
law and the proposed act is that common law homicide did not generally apply to
abortions, but the definition of the proposed act specifically does.
So, the situation where it would appear that a difference might
occur would be when an infant is expelled or extracted during an abortion and
shows some of the vital signs indicated in the bill.
One possible
interpretation of this proposed language is that homicide statutes would only
apply to actions occurring after an abortion, such as the failure to take due
care of an infant showing vital signs as described in the act. So, the question
would arise as whether this would be a change from existing law.
We
could find no reported cases dealing with the application of the murder or
manslaughter statutes in the case of an abortion where an infant was extracted
or expelled and showed vital signs. But we would note that there are some state
laws that require due care in these circumstances. So, it is difficult to say
whether there are any instances where an existing -- where the existing federal
murder or manslaughter laws would apply.
I would note, however, that
failure to treat cases are not generally analyzed under homicide statutes, but
are treated under essentially case law regarding medical treatment. So, under
this interpretation, it's not clear if the proposed act would represent any
significant change from existing law.
There is, however, another
possible interpretation of this language. Another possible interpretation is
that the murder or manslaughter provisions would apply to abortions, which
resulted in the expulsion or extractions of an infant showing the vital signs,
described in this bill.
This interpretation would be consistent with
the common law, as it exists in non-abortion cases where damage, which is
inflicted in utero, is the basis for the murder or manslaughter charges
afterwards.
However, we feel that this interpretation would raise
constitutional issues based on a woman's liberty interests under the 14th
Amendment. Courts generally resolve statutory ambiguities to avoid
constitutional questions. That rule of constructure would make this
interpretation less likely.
Both Jon and I would be glad to answer
any questions that you have on the statutory impact of this bill.
Thank you.
CANADY: Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Bradley?
BRADLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank
the entire committee for the opportunity to place my written testimony in the
record.
I get a chance to thank you again. Thank you all again for
the opportunity to put my testimony in the record. But unless there is a
vehement objection from the committee, I'd like to skip summarizing my testimony
and just take a couple or three minutes to address two points that have been
made in opposition to the bill by other witnesses today.
The first
point, the act, it is true, ignores, it doesn't follow, it doesn't track the
distinction made in abortion jurisprudence between the viable and the pre-viable
unborn. But given what the act is trying to do, rightly so, does it ignore this
distinction.
In the first instance, most literally, viable,
pre-viable refer to stages of development of the unborn child, that's true. But
in abortion jurisprudence, viability, pre-viability are always used to refer to
stages of pregnancy, and at least before the Casey opinion, there were various
rights and opportunities attached to the various stages of pregnancy defined by
viability or not.
But this bill is not about pregnant women. It's
about protecting people born after pregnancy has been terminated. The bill is
about protecting the rights of children after termination of pregnancy by birth.
No woman's right to terminate a pregnancy is affected by this bill. I don't
think the bill, in this light, is an idle one or makes no difference. I would
say at least, as the chairman said earlier, the bill codifies or affirms what
Roe and all the cases have been saying, that abortion refers to terminating a
pregnancy and has really nothing to do with terminating children.
The second point is one that was made at least in the written
testimony of Mr. Thomas. And I think he raises, in this particular part of his
testimony, one of several good questions, but here's the good question I wish to
respond to.
Towards the end of his written remarks, he raises the
question, a question about the situation where the cause of death was inflicted
prior to the induced abortion, where the injuries were inflicted upon the unborn
prior to an abortion or during an abortion. The child is born and subsequently
dies. Could a physician or abortion provider be held liable for homicide of some
sort, for injuries inflicted in utero?
I think it's a good question.
I do think there is a clear answer in the law and here it is. I think the answer
is not. While in the real world, or I might say, the natural world, the abortion
takes us into a situation which there is great continuity of events, of
intentions and of status. In the real world, whether the unborn are persons from
the moment of conception until the end of their lives, is the question. The
intentions of people involved in abortions are, throughout that process, was to
terminate a pregnancy, and perhaps, indeed, to deliver a dead child.
But in the law -- in the law, there is an abrupt and large change in
status and in the legal situation generally, at the moment of birth. I think the
moment of birth, according to this act, establishes the personhood of the now
newly born child. There is an abrupt change, but in the law, that's the change
that's made by Roe and other cases and by this act.
What that means
in terms of applying a homicide law I think is this. The doctor-abortionist
takes the new baby as he or she finds him. With regard to the demise of a child
born after an induced abortion, he would say that doctor-abortionist takes the
victim as he or she finds it, at the moment of birth. If that child comes into
the world with injuries inflicted by the abortionist during the course of the
abortion, so be it. But effectively speaking the doctor is legally immune for
those injuries.
At the time of birth and thereafter, the doctor and
all concerned, have the normal, legal duties of care that they would have for
any other infant. You might think of it this way, and my final point is an
illustration.
You might think of this situation, the application of
homicide laws to the induced abortion survivor, who shortly thereafter, dies.
You might think of how what I mean by finding or taking the victim as one finds
him in this way. Imagine that a normal, walking around person is injured in an
auto accident or perhaps even in a shooting, finds him or herself to the door at
midnight, of his doctor, knocks on the door, steps through the portal and says
to the doctor, "Doctor, I've been injured, please help me."
That
doctor has no idea, perhaps, where those injuries came from. But once that
person accepts any kind of legal responsibility, either through choice or
through circumstances imposed upon the doctor, that doctor has to deal with
those injuries, however inflicted, and take the appropriate medical steps.
I hope that illustration helps clarify this important question.
CANADY: Thank you, Professor Bradley.
Mr. Cole? Dr.
Cole?
COLE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Honorable
Representatives, staff and spectators. My name is Francis Sessions Cole, and my
family, including our two daughters, ages 16 and 14, and my wife of 28 years,
resides in St. Louis, Missouri.
I appear before you to offer
testimony concerning Representative Canady's Born Alive Infants Protection Act
of 2000, H.R. 4292, as a physician whose specialty is care of newborn infants.
My testimony is not sponsored by any organization.
I
completed my pediatric residency training at Boston Children's Hospital and my
specialty training in caring for newborn infants in the joint program in
neonatology at Harvard Medical School. Since my board certification in
pediatrics in 1981, I have cared for more than 10,000 newborn infants directly,
and I currently have administrative responsibility for approximately one half of
all the babies born in St. Louis annually, approximately 13,000 babies.
I also have an active clinical practice that focuses on caring for
babies whose transition from womb to world is complicated by one or more
problems like pre-maturity, birth defects, infections or problems with the
afterbirth or placenta. I routinely encounter babies whose problems place them
on the edge of viability.
The language of H.R. 4292 would impose on
doctors and parents a universal definition of "life" or "alive" which is, in my
experience as a neonatologist, inconsistent with the harsh reality presented by
a number of circumstances. The fact is that the characteristics identified in
the bill -- breathing, or a beating heart, or pulsation of the umbilical cord,
or definite movement of voluntary muscles -- are not themselves necessarily
indicative of life or continued viability. Frequently, the heartbeats of infants
will be maintained by medicines, not nature; their breathing may be present but
ineffective as they die; they may move voluntary muscles during the dying
process.
As a physician who cares for ill newborn infants, I feel
that I have the greatest practice in medicine, because my practice permits me to
participate in miracles every day. Thanks to significant advances in technology
over the last 20 years, babies whose parents could have been offered no hope can
now see their babies survive and, for the most part, exceed both their parents'
and their doctors' expectations as they develop.
Unfortunately, even
today's most advanced medical science is still a long way from being able to
offer every sick infant a reasonable chance for survival. In fact, in our
neonatal intensive care unit, approximately 10 percent of the infants do not
respond to advanced technology and pass away. These deaths result from accidents
of nature that are no one's fault, and they are excruciatingly difficult for
parents, doctors and nurses.
COLE: Frequently, the emotional
pain of the decision to terminate treatment in such cases is compounded by the
fact that the technology that we provide babies requires painful, invasive
procedures. When parents and physicians together decide that life support
technology is futile for an infant and is only prolonging the pain of the dying
process, parents have a moral and legal obligation to minimize the suffering of
their baby, regardless of the pain such a turn of events brings to them in their
loss.
The language of H.R. 4292 will, in my view, significantly interfere
with the agonizing, painful and personal decisions that must be left to parents
in consultation with their physicians. Imposing the proposed definition of
"alive" or "life" for statutory purposes may cause parents to prolong the
medically inevitable dying process of their infants out of fear that terminating
that process might be deemed to be, for legal purposes, the termination of a
life, when in fact all that would be terminated would be the painful process of
death.
Prolonging treatment in such cases would be not the saving of
a life, but the prolonging of the pain and suffering of inevitable death. As a
physician whose career has been dedicated to the welfare of newborns, and
especially critically ill newborns, I urge the subcommittee not to inject an
unnecessary and unrealistic definition of life, with all its legal implications,
into the already agonizing and heart-breaking situation faced by parents of
infants in the dying process.
Thank you very much.
CANADY: Thank you, Dr. Cole.
As everyone has heard,
there is a vote proceeding on the House floor. So the subcommittee will need to
stand in recess while members go to vote. This is just one vote, so I encourage
the members to come back immediately after the vote and then we will conclude
hearing the testimony and have a round of questions.
I, again,
apologize and appreciate the -- express my gratitude for the patience of the
witnesses.
The subcommittee stands in recess.
RECESS
CANADY: The subcommittee will be in order.
I believe that
will be the last interruption in our hearing. And that's certainly my hope. And
again, I thank everyone for your patience.
And we will now turn to
Dr. Bowes.
BOWES: My name is Watson Bowes. I am a professor emeritus
of obstetrics and gynecology at the -- in the department of obstetrics and
gynecology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I'm board
certified in both obstetrics and maternal-fetal medicine. My major professional
interest was in the care of women with high-risk pregnancies, especially those
at risk of delivery of a premature infant.
From 1982 until 1999, I
was a member of the full-time faculty at the University of North Carolina. And
during that time, one of my responsibilities, from 1984 until 1998, was the
infant -- was being chairman of the Infant Care Review Committee at the
University of North Carolina Hospitals.
This interdisciplinary
committee had the responsibility of developing guidelines regarding withholding
or withdrawing medical care from seriously ill infants and reviewing any
instance in which there was concern that these guidelines were not followed.
Also, from 1994 until 1999 I served on the committee on ethics of the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and was the chairman of that
committee during the last two years of that time.
My comments and
opinions about H.R. 4292 are not made in behalf of the University of North
Carolina or any other organization.
I have read the legislation
proposed in H.R.4292 that states that the criteria that an infant is born alive
at any stage of development is that the infant "breaths or has a beating heart,
pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles."
This definition applies regardless of the duration of pregnancy at which the
infant is born or the means by which it is born. This definition of live birth
is consistent with that of the World Health Organization and it is in current
use by health department guidelines throughout most of the United States.
Furthermore, these criteria of live birth are unambiguous and easily discernible
by any birth attendant.
It is my opinion that this definition of
being born alive does not and will not have a detrimental effect on either
maternal or infant health care. I am confident of this because this is the
definition of live birth that is in effect and has been in effect in the state
of North Carolina in which I practiced for 18 years. During this time, these
criteria for defining live birth did not interfere with physicians making
clinical judgments about providing appropriate care for newborn infants nor with
parents being involved in those decisions. Importantly, this definition of live
birth does not restrict a physician's prerogative to recommend that medical care
regarded as futile be withheld or withdrawn.
Finally, in my role on
the Infant Care Review Committee at North Carolina -- University of North
Carolina Hospitals, I was never aware of the egregious use or prolongation of
futile medical interventions that could have been attributed to this definition
of life birth.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
committee.
CANADY: Thank you very much, Dr. Bowes.
Professor George?
GEORGE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Congressman Nadler.
The chairman was kind enough in his introductory
remarks to mention my six years of service on the United States Commission on
Civil Rights. And in that capacity, I previously had the honor of testifying
before this committee in its oversight role.
My basic philosophy of
civil rights is simple. It is the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence,
and I believe, the Constitution of the United States. At its core is the
self-evident principle that all human beings are created equal. Each member of
the human family, as a unique and irreplaceable child of God, is endowed with
inestimable and equal worth and dignity -- equal.
We human beings
may be unlike each other, or, if you will, unequal, in various respects--some
are endowed with greater, some with lesser, intelligence, ability, physical
strength and vigor, and so forth, but none of these factors vitiates the
fundamental sense in which we are truly created equal and entitled as a matter
of right to the equal protection of the laws.
Of course, any of us,
by the wrongful exercise of his or her freedom, may forfeit liberty and certain
other rights. But none of us exists at the pleasure of others or merely to serve
their interests or fulfill their desires. There are no natural slaves or
masters. No human being is the mere property of anyone else, or disposable at
others' whims.
Our most basic rights, including the right to life,
are inherent and in no way contingent on a grant from the state or any other
merely human authority. As an inherent right, the right to life, which, properly
specified, is a right not to be killed either as an end in itself or a means to
any other end, comes into being for us when we come into being. It is not a
privilege that we earn by achieving a certain level of consciousness or
intelligence or other ability or capacity; it's not something that comes or goes
with age, size, stage of development, or condition of disability or dependency;
and it is certainly not something that depends on whether someone else happens
to want us or would prefer, all things considered, that we not exist.
If my philosophy of civil rights were uncontroversial, there would
be no need for me and the other witnesses to be here today or for you to trouble
yourselves with this hearing. Infanticide would be unthinkable. Even those who
believe in abortion, as I do not, would draw the line at birth, if not before,
on the ground that the physical separation of mother and child eliminates any
concern that protecting the life of the child would violate the rights of the
mother. But today the philosophy of civil rights I hold is far from undisputed.
Infanticide is openly defended and even put forward as itself a right. Indeed,
in the academy the intellectual groundwork is already in place -- already in
place, to extend the right to abortion into the post- natal phase.
In an article entitled "Killing Babies Isn't Always Wrong,"
Professor Peter Singer, who has since become my colleague at Princeton where he
is DeCamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values, made
the following proposal, quote, "Perhaps, like the ancient Greeks, we should have
a ceremony a month after birth, at which the infant is admitted to the
community. Before that time, infants would not be recognized as having the same
right to life as older people."
Now, I understand that Professor
Singer has since backed away from the proposed ceremony, but he has not altered
his view that we should do away in law and ethics with the principle at the core
of traditional concepts of human rights and equality, namely, that it is always
wrong intentionally to kill innocent human beings; nor has he abandoned his
claim that newborn human beings are not "persons" with a right to life that must
be respected and protected by law. He continues to insist that human beings only
become persons, and acquire a right to life, sometime well after birth. He
denies, then, that we are created equal and affirms a concept which, frankly,
makes me shudder, that of a class of human beings, including newborn infants,
who are, in effect, human non-persons.
Well, is Professor Singer
alone or eccentric in these beliefs or in their public advocacy? Far from it. In
fact, his position isn't even new. Something very much like it was articulated
in a mainstream philosophical journal as early as 1972 by philosopher Michael
Tooley. Writing even before legal prohibitions were swept away by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Roe and Doe v. Bolton, Professor Tooley bluntly declared
that human fetuses and infants, quote, "do not have a right to life." Only
"persons" have a right to life, and fetuses and infants are not, he insisted,
persons.
GEORGE: Like Singer, Tooley expressed no doubt that
infants or, for that matter, fetuses, are human beings. He acknowledged, as does
Singer, the plain fact that from the beginning of our lives, well before birth,
we are distinct, whole, living members of the species homo sapiens. But, he
insisted, we do not become persons -- we do not acquire a right to life, until
well after we are born. According to Professor Tooley, a human being, or other
organism, quote, "possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the
concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental
states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity," unquote.
Infants do not qualify.
Here in Washington, D.C., American
University philosophy professor Jeffrey Reiman, while expressly declining to
settle the issue about the moral status of infanticide, also claims that infants
are not persons with a right to life. While he offers some reasons why people
might nevertheless think it generally wrong to kill newborn babies, he promotes
the view that infants, unlike more mature human beings, do not, quote "possess
in their own right a property that makes it wrong to kill them."
He
denies that infants are members of the community who share equal worth, dignity
and rights, and explicitly holds that, quote, "there will be permissible
exceptions to the rule against killing infants that will not apply to the rule
against killing adults and children."
Members of the committee, I
could go on with examples. For now, though, sufficed to say that people who wish
to destroy a, quote, "unwanted" child, not a child in utero, mind you, an
unwanted child, living, breathing, have today in the academy, here in the United
States, influential scholars who are willing to say that the baby they seek to
have killed is not, in fact, a person with an equal right to life. Some of these
scholars promote the idea that killing an infant at the request of its parent,
presumably a father as well as a mother in view of the fact that the physical
separation of the child from the mother seems to confer on a father an equal
right to command the death of the child non-person, is morally acceptable and
ought to be legally permitted.
The legitimization of infanticide
constitutes a grave threat to the principle of human equality at the heart of
American civil rights ideals. If weak and vulnerable members of the human
family, and infants are surely among the weakest and most vulnerable, can be
defined out of the community of, quote, "persons" whose fundamental rights must
be respected and protected by law, the constitutional principle of equal
protection becomes a sham. We must begin now putting into place bulwarks against
that threat. I therefore respectfully urge passage of H.R. 4292, the Born Alive
Infants Protection Act.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee.
CANADY: Thank you, Professor George.
I
will now recognize Mr. Watt for five minutes.
WATT: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Let me first apologize to Professor Bowes for not getting
back in time to hear his testimony. As usual, as on this panel, and on most
issues, there are explanations for things. We normally participate in a
reflections group at noon on Thursdays, some members, and so I wanted to try to
drop there and at least tell them why I was not there and I got trapped a little
longer than I expected to.
Again, seating Dr. Cole and Dr. Bowes
next to each other, almost like the last panel, or the panel before last,
illustrates the difficulty of this issue, even from a medical perspective. And
so, I appreciate all of you being here today and taking the time out of your
schedules to try to enlighten us on what attitude we should have and what steps
we should take on this bill.
Mr. Bradley, I guess the question I
have is, and I'm trying to figure out what practical impact this bill would have
on a day to day, as we move, basis. Suppose a child is born alive following an
abortion, an attempted abortion, but the child is still born alive. Would that,
in your judgment, infer for that child if this bill were passed the right to
have an independent guardian ad litem?
BRADLEY: Not necessarily.
It's a good question. I don't know the answer or don't have an answer that's
backed up by conviction about my knowledge of what's involved. But, I would say
that the infant born alive after an attempted abortion is entitled to the equal
protection of the law. That's what the bill does.
Whether a guardian
ad litem would be necessary to vindicate that right to equal protection of law,
and to equal treatment, treatment equal to other one hour, one day old infants,
I don't know. It could be the case that at times it is required.
WATT: If it -- if it appeared that the infant were terminal and that
it would take extraordinary means to keep the infant alive. Let's assume that
set of circumstances for a fact, for a moment. Would that injection of a
guardian ad litem possibility into the equation cut back or diminish the parents
right to make that decision?
BRADLEY: Well, I think it's true that
if you introduce a guardian ad litem or the possibility thereof, the question is
raised, let's say, in the delivery room, it does complicate a parent's
situation. But my real response to the question, the deeper response to the
question I'd like to make is, I don't think it complicates the situation of a
post-abortion child any more than another child, nor, if this possibility is
introduced after an induced abortion, is that post-abortion child being treated
better than or, for that matter, worse than any other child.
So,
sure...
WATTS: Well, I'm not sure about that. Doesn't existing law
give the parent the right to make that decision? I'm talking about extraordinary
care situations. It's another...
BRADLEY: I agree completely.
WATT: ... I guess the issue would be a separate set of issues if the
child were determined to be able to live without the benefit of any
extraordinary measures.
BRADLEY: I agree completely. It's up the
parents to decide about the appropriateness of extraordinary measures,
especially for a terminal infant.
CANADY: The gentleman's time has
expired. Without objection, the gentleman will have three additional minutes?
WATT: Whatever.
All right. So...
BRADLEY: I mean, if I may, Congressman...
WATT: Let's
take it one step further and move beyond the necessity of extraordinary means to
prolong the life and assume you get to a situation where the child could survive
without extraordinary means. Would this bill, in your judgment, require the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, first of all.
Would a guardian
ad litem currently be required under law, second of all. And then I'd like to
ask Mr. Thomas to respond to that same question.
BRADLEY: No, I
don't think a guardian ad litem is required under present law for newborn
infants, for instance, who don't require extraordinary care. Nor would they be
required to be appointed by this bill. I think perhaps where I agree with you
and I think where the question is originating is the simple fact, in the case
we're contemplating, of a failed abortion. You have at least a mother, perhaps
both parents present, who have tried to avoid parenthood, parental
responsibilities and rights, and after the birth, accidental, you might say,
they presumably remain about as determined to be rid of the child.
So, given that that's the situation, that fundamentally I think
you're raising, you have a mother and or a father, or mother or perhaps both
parents, who wish to be rid of the child, or like I say, the child's unwanted.
Yes, that case is different with regard to issues about protecting the child's
rights, frankly, from the parents in the case we're talking about.
So, yes, in the case of the failed induced abortion, there might be
a greater frequency with which the question of guardian ad litem comes up,
because in that case, you are talking about parents, who at least moments
earlier wished not to have this child. And that's as far as I can take it at
this point. Yes, they'll be a greater frequency or more complications.
WATT: Mr. Thomas?
THOMAS: Congressman, I'd like to
caveat my answer in a number of ways.
First, I'd like to see the statute
that's being discussed before I'd be able to answer you. Since we're speaking
about basically a very narrow definitional change, it's important, first of all,
to look at the statute to see even if the definitional change applies.
WATT: You mean the statute, the guardian ad litem statute as opposed
to this statute?
THOMAS: Correct. To extent that there's a guardian
ad litem statute. And then my second caveat would be is that some guardian ad
litem statutes may exist in court rules, which are not covered by this act. That
would be another caveat I'd have to examine before I could answer that.
Third caveat is that most of these cases are going to be in state
court, so that that decision would be made by state law and not by federal law.
We're not sure if there would be many instances where an infant would be
expelled or extracted in this situation in the federal or special maritime
territorial jurisdiction.
Having given all those caveats, I think I
would tend to agree with the answer of Mr. Bradley, which is that the guardian
ad litem statutes is the context of the failure to treat situation is probably a
pretty well established legal system and I don't believe that burying the moment
of birth -- now this is again under my first statutory interpretation. It's
leaving out the ambiguity, but under the first statutory interpretation, where
you're just talking about an infant that's been born alive and you're talking
about the treatment of an infant after that birth, then I think the guardian ad
litem statutes probably wouldn't varied, and the interests of the child would be
represented consistent with existing law on medical treatment and withdrawal of
medical treatment.
WATT: Mr. Chairman, could I just ask for one
additional minute?
CANADY: Sure. Without objection, the gentleman
will have one addition minute.
WATT: To ask either Mr. -- Dr. Coles
or Dr. Bowes whether you've been involved in situations where there have been
guardian ad litems in conflict with parents, either one of you?
BOWES: I have not.
COLE: Yes we have encountered those
situations. Again, they're very complex, because they frequently involve babies
with diagnoses that are right on the edge of viability, and the -- in general,
my experience now, with these situations is that the parent view the baby as
having suffered enough, and the guardian ad litem is an individual is not
convinced of that -- not convinced of that possibility.
And so,
there is discussion, active discussion, in that area.
WATT: And Dr.
Cole, do you view the language of this bill as adding to that complication or
neutral on that complication or -- what's your opinion on that?
COLE: My
view is that would -- that this bill would add to that complication. We have had
experience in the State of Missouri where there statutes almost verbatim similar
to these, where recently, at the University of Missouri-Columbia, there were
several publicized cases of infants being maintained for up to 30 days after
delivery and eventually expiring, but caught in this web of technology and law.
WATT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CANADY: Thank you.
The gentleman from New York is recognized.
NADLER: Thank
you, Mr. Cole -- Dr. Cole, I should say.
I'm a little confused by
how you think this bill would complicate it. By any -- I mean, frankly, when a
baby is born, it's born. It's a person at that point under the meaning of the
law. You then have these decisions that have to be made about the use of heroic
measures or not.
How would this bill add to that simply by defining
that baby as a person when it's frankly a person under the law already?
I fail to see how this bill would affect that in any way, one way or
another.
COLE: Well, I can only give you the example that occurred
within the last three months in the State of Missouri, where, without law, but
with statutes that basically define epidemiological statistical gathering of
data, an interpretation at an institution in Missouri was that babies born on
the edge of viability, but who exhibited these kinds of vital signs, could not
be, at their parents' request, withdrawn from life support.
NADLER:
Yes. But this bill doesn't say that. This bill doesn't say they can or cannot be
withdrawn from life support. This bill simply says that once a baby is born,
it's a person. And then you have the question of can they been withdrawn from
life support at the parent's request, and how does this bill impact on that
question at all?
COLE: Well, only insofar as the interpretation of
the bill by individuals who are then required by law to impose their
interpretations. I think that would be the...
NADLER: Yes, but
they're required to impose their interpretations the moment there's a live
birth, and there's a live birth, with or without this bill. And the whole point
I've been trying to figure out listening to all the witnesses on both sides of
this, and I keep coming up with a big zero, that this bill doesn't do anything
pro, con or in any way.
I don't like enacting laws that do nothing.
I think that that's wrong for Congress, but I don't see, you know, you talk in
your testimony, you say that when parents and physicians together decide that
life support technology is futile and it's prolonging the pain and dying
process, parents have a moral and legal obligation to minimize the suffering the
baby, regardless of the pain of such a turn of events. (inaudible) granted. And
this bill wouldn't change that. Or how would it?
COLE: Well, again,
I can only speak to the recent experience in the State of Missouri where,
without a bill exactly like this, but with a bill close to this, families of
babies who are required to keep their babies on life support, the University of
Missouri-Columbia, for approximately 30 extra days until the baby eventually
expired and the explanation for that, at least in the press, I was not involved
in those cases -- the explanation in the press was that there was concern on the
part of the institution and concern on the part of the individuals who were
interpreting the statutes and the laws, that once life support was...
NADLER: My point is that concern would be there, with or without the
statute, because the moment you can see that the baby is human being, which I
don't anybody would question.
Mr. Bradley, would you comment on
this, and let me ask you this. As I read your definition, as I read your
testimony, you're saying that this wouldn't implicate Roe v. Wade; this wouldn't
do all these things that the pro-choice people are worried that it would do.
What, if anything would it do? I don't see that you're saying that it would do
anything.
BRADLEY: Well, I think I say it codifies what is more or
less the practice, but only more or less the practice. I think it codifies what
the Constitution implies. But frankly, I think the answer to your question, to
be honest with you, is probably supplied by the testimony of Dr. Cole.
I can only infer from his testimony that there are at least some
cases where medical personnel, at least, have in mind a class of newborns who
are not dead, alive, but not quite persons. And I think -- and I think this
bills says, well, that's the end of that.
NADLER: Well, let me ask a
question. And I'd ask Mr. Thomas the same question after Mr. Bradley.
If a baby were born, and I don't want to prejudice the question by
using the term baby, I'm not sure what term to use in this concept, but if an
infant is born alive, either through natural process or through a botched
abortion, at two months or at three months, it's really not viable, but is
alive, outside the mother, if someone came along and shot that infant, is there
any question in your mind that that would be murder?
BRADLEY: No.
NADLER: Sir.
THOMAS: I would agree that that would be
homicide.
NADLER: OK. If that is the case, well, let me ask you a
different question. I was appalled of the testimony of one of the nurses, Ms.
Stanek, I think, about the practice at one hospital of having live infants as a
result of a certain abortion technique, who are live, of giving them no care
whatsoever.
Do you think that's legal under current law?
BRADLEY: I certainly doubt it.
NADLER: You think that
hospital is breaking the law.
BRADLEY: I think they are engaged in
negligent medical practice and probably -- possibly even criminally liable
because of neglectful homicide.
NADLER: Mr. Thomas?
THOMAS: Well, I think that the homicide statute -- homicide statutes
are not generally implicated in failure to treat cases. Whether or not what
their actions were were consistent with failure to treat would depend on the
fact...
NADLER: Failure to treat is a crime?
THOMAS:
Failure to treat ---actually, to that I'd like to defer to my colleague Jon
Shimabukuro.
JON SHIMABUKURO, LEGISLATIVE ATTORNEY, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE: If I may.
In the short time that we had to prepare
for the subcommittee hearing, we did take a look at a number of state statutes
that require a doctor to provide medical care if this situation arises. If there
is an abortion that's ineffective and what results is this expelled or extracted
infant, several states have enacted statutes that require a doctor to provide
care.
However, those statutes define prosecutorial scheme, or define
how...
NADLER: Well, wait. Excuse me a second. What I'm really
looking for it not this...
CANADY: The gentleman's additional time
has expired. Without objection, the gentleman will have three additional
minutes.
NADLER: Thank you.
I'm not looking for
discourse on existing state statutes that seek to address the same question.
What I'm saying is in the absence of specific statutes on that, it's always been
my understanding that an infant that is separated from its mother is a person,
an infant, and that there are certain legal standards that apply, it's the same
legal standards that apply to a person at the other end of life, to someone
who's close to death, and there are certain standards that apply that you don't
have to do if you think that additional medical treatment is futile and
producing simply pain. You don't have to do that, but that's simply (inaudible).
You couldn't starve somebody to death.
Is that not the case for any
newborn, regardless of its age, pre- birth, and regardless of how it came to be?
Is that not the law without this bill. And if this bill were passed, would that
change that in any way?
THOMAS: Again, failure to treat is not
generally dealt with under the criminal laws. It's generally dealt with under
civil laws.
NADLER: And let's assume this bill passes. Would that
change that?
THOMAS: That would not -- I don't believe that this
bill would have any effect on -- well, the effect that we've identified was on
homicide laws, and it certainly is not intended to change the homicide laws.
So, I think the answer is no.
NADLER: So, it would have
no effect.
Mr. Bradley?
BRADLEY: Well, I think in a vast
majority of cases, you're quite right. Common sense tells us when birth occurs,
a new person has come to be, but I think there probably are some cases where
that's eroded, that can nip into view is eroded and being replaced, on occasion,
at least with a different view.
NADLER: But that's illegal. Are you
saying that some people are mistakenly doing that, or are you saying the law has
changed?
BRADLEY: Well, frankly, I think it ought to be illegal, but
my guess is that because the law in these areas depends upon a kind of
consistent application of the word person or vigorous enforcement by various
people in the field. I can only infer that the kinds of practices that Dr. Cole
has described are done, presently speaking, more or less with impunity, and I
think those cases, those practices are problematic.
NADLER: What Dr.
Cole described was not improper care. The cases he was talking about were where
an infant -- you have to make a judgment as to whether in fact heroic medical
procedures have any chance of saving this infant's life or is simply prolonging
a painful death. You wouldn't want that to change.
BRADLEY: I agree.
That's appropriate. That's a matter for judgment of people concerned. But I
also...
NADLER: And this bill would not change that in your view.
BRADLEY: No. This bill doesn't affect that standard of care at all.
NADLER: So, what does it affect?
BRADLEY: Well, I infer
that it's going to -- I infer from what he described, the situation he described
that there is a conviction on the part of some people concerned that you're
dealing with a class of people who aren't quite persons, even though they are
now separated from the mother.
NADLER: Is that fair...
BRADLEY: And that situation would be changed by this bill.
NADLER: Is that a fair characterization of what you were saying?
COLE: Well, I have great respect for Mr. Bradley; I've never met him
before. I think I've committed my life to having babies be people as soon as
they come into my care. And I don't know of any situation where I've been called
upon to take care of a baby, no matter how small, where that baby hasn't been
given everything that I can possibly give to her or him.
NADLER: Mr.
Bowes -- Dr. Bowes, my last question.
CANADY: The gentleman will
have one additional minute.
NADLER: OK. My last question. You were
in the same field as Dr. Cole, neonatology?
BOWES: No, sir, I'm in
maternal-fetal medicine. I take care of the mother before they are born and the
fetuses before they are born.
NADLER: All right. Well, let me ask
you the question anyway. If you're not competent to answer it, or familiar with
it, say so, please.
You talked about judgments about making -- these
criteria for defining live birth did not interfere with physicians making
clinical judgments about providing appropriate care for newborn infants nor with
parents being involved in those decisions. You're talking about the same kinds
of cases Dr. Cole was talking about.
Important in this definition of
live birth does not restrict a physician's prerogative to recommend that medical
care regarding as futile be withheld or withdrawn. So, your testimony is that
this bill would have no effect on that.
BOWES: That's correct. I say
that from my experience of working in a state where this is the definition of
live birth.
NADLER: Now let me ask you this. Is there any -- does
this bill do anything at all. If it doesn't affect that, what does it affect?
BOWES: Apart from, as Chairman Canady said, codifying something
that's already in place in most states, it would not affect medical care in my
view.
NADLER: OK. So, the general consensus -- OK. Very good. Thank
you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CANADY: The
gentlelady from California is recognized for five minutes.
WATERS:
Thank you very much.
I'd like to direct my question to Dr. Cole, and
I think Dr. Bowes, is it?
BOWES: Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
WATERS: Dr. Cole, are you familiar with something known as a
hydatidiform mole?
COLE: I am familiar with it, but I would defer to
my colleagues, Dr. Bowes as the individual who probably has more experience than
I do in that area. Thank you.
WATERS: Are familiar with hydatidiform
mole?
BOWES: Yes, ma'am, I am.
WATERS: Am I correct in
understanding that hydatidiform mole is, in essence, a fetus that is engulfed in
wild growth and so it can be expelled from the womb and there can be pulsation
and some of the -- well, breathing, heartbeat, and movements, even though it is
engulfed in this wild, grape-like growth. Is that correct?
BOWES:
No, ma'am. Congresswoman, that's not correct. A hydatidiform mole occurs only
when a very small portion of the developing embryo develops. The fetus does not
develop a heartbeat, has never developed a pulsation of the heart, breathing,
none of the criteria that you see here would be present in hydatidiform mole.
WATERS: I'm sorry. You're saying that it does not get to the point
of growth where there's a heartbeat?
BOWES: That's correct. It does
not. It develops as only portions of the placenta, which have overgrown. There
is no organs, such as heart, kidney or other things you would find in a fetus or
an embryo.
WATERS: How long can this growth take place in uterus?
BOWES: Up to generally about 12 to 14 weeks. It's unusual for them
to go that long, but they can go that long, and what you simply have is this
placental tissue. But it would not fulfill the criterion that are described in
this proposed statute.
WATERS: Well, the reason that I asked this
question is because that is not my understanding. Number one, it is my
understanding that the growth can get to the point of a fetus, whatever that is,
and that there can be a heartbeat and that as a matter of fact, the growth can
take place in uterus until such time that the doctor would assist in expelling
it. And at the time of expulsion, that there can be this heartbeat that's going
on which would take it beyond 12 weeks or so. That's my understanding.
BOWES: Well, I don't want to get too much into the technical matter
of this, but a hydatidiform mole is in itself only the placental tissue. A fetus
is not there. The fetus did not develop. The embryo did not develop.
Now, there is a condition in which a fetal -- a fetus develops and
it has what's called molar degeneration of the placenta. Now, that's quite a
different thing. Those fetuses almost never survive, because they...
WATERS: Well, let's take your latter, because -- and I won't prolong the
discussion on the hydatidiform mole, but let's take your latter description,
whatever that is, and talk about what happens and what it looks like at
expulsion.
BOWES: Well, the fetus, which has molar degeneration of
the placenta, are usually chromosomally abnormal. They're almost always -- I
will have to say, always born way before fetal viability.
WATERS:
But are we looking at in this bill is does it have a heartbeat?
BOWES: Yes.
WATERS: Is it breathing?
BOWES:
It might -- that fetus might breath, yes.
WATERS: And it could have
movements of involuntary muscles, right?
BOWES: Yes.
WATERS: Now, what would you do with that upon delivery or expulsion?
BOWES: Well, if that fetus was alive at the time, it would be cared
for...
WATERS: Now, remember we're talking about it has a heartbeat.
BOWES: It has a heartbeat, yes, all right. And it would be alive at
that time.
WATERS: Yes.
BOWES: Now, fetuses at that
stage of gestation will not survive irrespective of the degree of intensive care
that you would provide.
WATERS: But that's not the question here.
The question here is did it arrive outside the uterus so-called alive or with a
heartbeat.
BOWES: Yes.
WATERS: That's the question. So
what then do you do with it?
BOWES: You provide that fetus with what
we call comfort care. You provide it with warmth and not intensive care, in the
sense of active resuscitation, because that would futile care.
WATERS: So, now you are determining whether or not this fetus, that
probably won't live, will receive a certain level of care. You're making some
decisions about whether or not to have intensive care or some level of care.
You're making some decisions about what to do, is that right?
BOWES:
Yes, I think Dr. Cole and I would agree that those decisions have to be made in
these situations.
WATERS: Well, I think that really answers my
questions. Our questions...
CANADY: The gentlelady's time has
expired, without objection; the gentlelady may have three additional minutes.
WATERS: One of the reasons I don't like to get into this kind of
discussion is because we're lay people. And we don't know all of the
circumstances of birth, and we don't know all of the possibilities of something
that is -- that is delivered or expelled, that could have the signs so-called,
of life that's described here.
And to determine that someone may be
guilty because they did not provide a certain level of care, or they didn't
provide any care, that they are guilty, somehow, of not attending to a so-called
live birth in ways that this bill would attempt to describe, bothers me.
Because we don't know. We don't know and you just qualified, you
know, that a doctor in that case would make a decision about whether or not
there is something that you describe as comfort care, with warmth, or whether or
not there should be intensive care. But the fact of the matter is, you're making
a decision based on your best medical background and knowledge and understanding
about how to practice medicine.
Is that right?
BOWES: That's correct.
WATERS: And that's what I
want doctors to do. I don't want to be on this panel telling you how to do that.
I don't want to tell any doctor how to do that. I trust that you care just as
much about those babies as Dr. Cole has described, in the way that he talked
about how proud he is to be a doctor and to deliver and how many babies he's
been involved with.
And that's why I worry. I worry so much when we
start to try and talk about something we don't know. I can talk about some of
these things that I know about. And I want to tell you that there are several
such things that I know about that fall within this category. That we cannot sit
here and tell you that if it's born with a heartbeat, that somehow it's alive
and should be cared for and, you know, an attempt to keep it alive, because I
don't think even you would with agree with that.
BOWES: With all due
respect, Congresswoman, I think those situations -- I think the definitions here
do not alter the way that care would be provided in those situations that you've
mentioned.
WATERS: I think I disagree with you.
BOWES:
Well, what I'm saying is, for 18 years I've practiced in a state where we have
exactly this definition and in our tertiary care center, where I was on the
committee that had to review all these sorts of situations, this definition did
not interfere with making those kinds -- with the physicians making -- and the
parents, together, making those kind of judgments and decisions.
WATERS: OK. And let me just say with the time that has been granted
unanimous consent if I may for one more minute.
CANADY: Without
objection, the gentlelady will have one additional minute.
WATERS:
Thank you very much.
The reason that I disagree with you is this,
Doctor. That there may be a difference of opinion among doctors about what to
do, in one of those unusual circumstances. And the one that decides to do
nothing is no -- they're not any -- they're not guilty of causing the death, of
a fetus or of being negligent in any way. It was a professional decision that
the circumstances such that probably will not survive, should not do anything,
or there may be a doctor who would say, I'm going to do something. I'm going,
based on what I know and what I understand, I'm going to provide a certain kind
of guesswork treatment that may cause this to -- so, what I'm saying is, I
disagree because one is no more guilty than the other, whatever they make,
either way, in my opinion.
BOWES: Well, let me just comment upon
that. I -- there are those difficult situations where there's differences of...
CANADY: The gentlelady's time has expired.
I will
recognize myself now and I'd like to recognize -- go to Dr. Bowes to complete
his answer and then I want to recognize Professor George who appears to be
yearning to say something.
BOWES: Thank you, Chairman Canady.
In those situations where there were -- are differences of opinion,
in our hospital, the infant care review committee was asked to review those
situations, become involved, this is a multi- disciplinary committee, with lay
people, clergy, social workers and so forth, on it, to review those situations
and help resolve those difficult problems. These are times when either the
babies are very small, right at the borderline of viability, or there are
congenital defects that may or may not be able to be treated and there are --
you've described the situation very well.
There are differences of
opinion among physicians and we -- this was our way of resolving those. But this
definition of live birth did not interfere with making those kinds of decisions
and involving the parents in them.
CANADY: Thank you, Dr. Bowes.
Professor George.
GEORGE: Thank you, Congressman Canady.
I wanted to respond to Congressman Water's question in the spirit of
something that Congressman Nadler said earlier.
In cases of severely
disabled children, or very premature children, decisions about the level of care
will have to be made and within a certain range, the law leaves those decisions
to the discretion of parents guided by physicians. However, this is entirely
independent of the question, because decisions will have to be made either way.
The question whether the being, the human being, the member of homo
sapiens being cared for is a person or not, if that being is a person, then that
person is entitled to the same level care as any other person.
The
kind of disability we're talking about here can happen as the result of injuries
even to five year old or a 13 year old, who are indisputably persons. And at
that point, decisions will have to be made.
So now, the only question
becomes, are children, once they're separated from their mothers, persons, and
therefore entitled to the protection of the law. If they are, the law has to
recognize that. It's wrong for the law to fail to recognize that.
What's that?
NADLER: The law already...
GEORGE: Well, now, Congressman Nadler, if I could respond to your
point about the law already does.
I afraid I disagree with Professor
Bradley and with Mr. Thomas on -- to some extent. I do not think that there is
uniformity of opinion even among jurists, much less professors, and the decision
by Clement Haynsworth from years ago is some evidence of this. But I could cite
you more. I've got some more of the articles right here, for example,
disagreement about whether a child, once separated, as the result of an
unsuccessful abortion, is, in fact, a person who has the equal protection -- is
entitled to the equal protections of the law.
Professor Reiman, who
I cited earlier, for example, says well, if that's the case, if you interpret a
case like Roe v. Wade that way, then it would eviscerate the right to abortion,
once it became possible technologically, to extract the child from the womb at
early points and sustain it through the rest of its -- through the rest of its
life.
So, there has always been, from the very beginning, a debate.
And Roe v. Wade is unclear about this. There has always been a debate about
whether the right to abortion is the right to be free of pregnancy or is;
rather, as many argue, the right not to be a mother, not to have a child that
one doesn't want.
In that case, the right to abortion is the right
to have the child die. The pro-choice constitutional scholar Ronald Dworkin, in
the beginning of his big book from 1993 on this subject, called "Life's
Dominion," an argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual rights, in his
very opening sentence says, "Abortion and euthanasia are choices for death, the
choice to destroy the embryo or fetus."
Now, that, I understand, is
not the view of many people, and not just pro-life people, but also pro-choice
people. Now, that's the question. Here's where I disagree with Professor Bradley
and Dr. Thomas, only on the question on whether there is a dispute here. I would
argue on their side of the issue as to what the current law is. But given what
jurists have said in written opinions, given what the law professorate and many
law professors have written in Law Review articles commenting on abortion law,
and I would be happy to provide the committee when I get back to Princeton with
copies of articles and information and citations.
It is not fair to
say that it clearly established, that there's no ambiguity that needs to be
cleared up about what the right to abortion is a right to. I hope that
Congressman Nadler is right. And I would argue that he's right, that it's merely
the right to be free of pregnancy, and not the right to have the embryo or fetus
destroyed. But there many respectable people, constitutional scholars, jurists
and others, who disagree with that, not only as a matter of ethics. I've cited
the ones who are in that category in my prepared remarks, but also as a matter
of law.
CANADY: Well, thank you, Professor George.
My
time's expired, but without objection, I will have three additional minutes and
then we will conclude the hearing.
Dr. Cole, I want to just turn
back to your testimony. Now, in your testimony, you state that the definition
contained in the bill of "born alive" is unrealistic. I think that's the
specific term you used and would, quote "significantly interfere with agonizing,
painful and personal decisions that must be left to parents in consultation with
their physicians," close quote.
Now, you've also testified that you
practice medicine in Missouri and I understand the nature of your practice from
your testimony. So, I want to quote to you from Section 193.015 subsection five
of the Annotated Missouri Statutes, which defines live birth for purposes of
Missouri law, and listen to this definition that's in the statutes of Missouri
and I believe has been there since about 1984.
Quote, "Live birth
means the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of a fetus,
irrespective of the duration of pregnancy, which after such expulsion or
extraction, breathes, or shows any other evidence of life, such as beating of
the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of the
voluntary muscles, " close quote.
Now, I will submit to you, Dr.
Cole that that definition is almost identical to the definition of born alive
found in the bill under consideration by this subcommittee today. Now, were you
aware of that definition in the law of the state where you're licenses to
practice medicine when you prepared your testimony?
COLE: Yes,
Chairman Canady, and I was, and as I indicated in my response to some of the
other questions, there has been in Missouri, not in my personal practice, but in
the practice at the University if Missouri-Columbia, situations where
interpretation of the statute to which you refer, has led to the prolongation of
life support for babies who eventually expired.
CANADY: I don't
understand how interpretation of the statute would have anything to do with
that, the determination of what the appropriate standard of medical care is.
Because that's the question in those cases, is it not?
COLE: Well, I
completely agree with you that is a standard of care issue. I think that the
issue to which you refer now is that a statute in the State of Missouri defines
how a birth certificate, or a death certificate, is filled out.
CANADY: But the only -- the purpose of this statute is to make
clear, beyond any doubt, that there is a person, when there is a live birth,
correct?
COLE: Well, again, I'm....
CANADY: That's what
the statute says.
COLE: I'm not a lawyer, so I can only tell you
that the interpretation as you've described with that statute in the State of
Missouri as I understand it, in my practice, is that that statute applies to
infants and is used for statistical purposes to gather information about live
births, neonatal deaths, et cetera.
CANADY: My time has expired. I'm
giving myself one additional minute, without objection.
This law --
the purpose of this law has nothing to do with statistical -- there's maybe some
additional statute that refers to that. So, I -- and I did not understand your
testimony to make references to law such as this existing in the State of
Missouri. But the fundamental point remains that this law simply determines that
there is a person.
The secondary question about what the appropriate
standard of care is with respect to a particular person in a particular
circumstance. And I understand that there can sometimes be difficult decisions
to make about what the appropriate care is. But that is a separate question.
And all we're attempting to establish through this law, to reaffirm,
through this law, is that when there is a live birth, there is a person,
entitled to the protections of the law. I don't understand why that should be
controversial. And I think Mr. Nadler and I may have substantial, if not entire,
common ground on this point. And I do appreciate, especially the testimony of
Professor George, who has pointed out very clearly the threat that is being
posed to this principle, which explains the reason that we are here today
concerning this legislation.
And again, I want to thank all of you
for your testimony. Each of you has made a very important contribution to our
hearing. Your testimony has been very helpful to the subcommittee. We thank you
for that.
And now the subcommittee stands adjourned.
WATERS: Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent to submit to the record my
statement.
CANADY: Without objection, and other materials of members
also, thanks.
END
NOTES:
Unknown -
Indicates speaker unknown.
Inaudible - Could not make out what was being
said.
off mike - Indicates could not make out what was being said.
PERSON: CHARLES T CANADY (94%); HENRY J
HYDE (57%); WILLIAM ASA HUTCHINSON (57%); SPENCER THOMAS
BACHUS (56%); LINDSEY GRAHAM (55%); BARNEY
FRANK (54%); JOHN CONYERS (54%); MAXINE
WATERS (54%); JERROLD L NADLER (53%); STEPHANIE TUBBS
JONES (52%);
LOAD-DATE: July 24, 2000