.gif){kind=small} |
|
The federal bill and state laws banning so-called "partial birth" abortion do far more than ban one type of late second-trimester abortion procedure. Most of the state laws make it a criminal offense for a physician to perform a so-called "partial birth" abortion at any time in pregnancy including throughout the first trimester and in the second trimester before a fetus is viable. Moreover, the laws define "partial birth" abortion so broadly and vaguely that the laws could be understood to ban every type of abortion procedure except early medical abortion and hysterotomy, which requires an incision in the woman’s abdomen*: Fifteen courts Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois (reversed), Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Virginia (stayed) have ruled that these laws would ban dilation and evacuation abortions, used in 93 percent of second-trimester abortions (Koonin et al., 1999). Seven of those courts Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois (reversed), Louisiana, and New Jersey have also ruled that the laws would ban induction procedures, used in 2 percent of second-trimester abortions (Koonin et al., 1999). Seven of the courts Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois (reversed), Iowa, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Virginia (stayed) have ruled that the laws would ban suction curettage procedures, used in over 95 percent of first-trimester abortions (Koonin et al., 1999). In several respects, these laws fundamentally undermine the critical balance between the rights of the pregnant woman and the state’s interest in the potential life of the fetus established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade (1973) and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). Because of their broad and vague language, these laws significantly reduce women’s access to the safest and most common medical procedures for terminating a pregnancy prior to fetal viability. For example, an Alaska court ruled: "The broad sweep of the language involved could allow broad enforcement against most, or all, abortion procedures depending upon the choice of the prosecuting authority." (Planned Parenthood v. Alaska, 1998). Similarly, a federal court ruled that New Jersey’s law "threatens women with irreparable injury because they may be denied access to the most conventional and safest abortion procedures." (Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, 1998). This violates the principle established in Casey, that a state may not place a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus" (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey). These laws ban safe medical procedures without allowing an exception to protect a woman’s health, thereby devaluing the life and health of a pregnant woman in favor of the potential life of a pre-embryo, embryo, or fetus. This directly contravenes one of the core principles of Roe that the life and health of the pregnant woman are paramount throughout pregnancy. These laws violate the "right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his [or her] professional judgment" (Roe, at 165), including the right to determine what medical procedure is best for his or her patient, which is at the core of the right to choose abortion that was also established in Roe. Even if the laws banned only the intact dilation and extraction (D&X) abortion procedure, such laws would be unconstitutional. One federal court ruled that D&X is the safest abortion method in the later part of the second trimester, even before the fetus is viable, and banning it would subject women "to an appreciably greater risk of injury or death than would be the case if these women could" obtain the banned procedure‡ (Carhart v. Stenberg, 1998). Similarly, another federal court ruled that the "D&X procedure appears to have the potential of being a safer procedure than all other abortion procedures" in the later part of the second trimester (Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 1998; Evans v. Kelley, 1997). In its October 26, 1999 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found Illinois and Wisconsin "partial birth" abortion laws constitutional (Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 1999a). On November 30, 1999, however, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens issued an order blocking the enforcement of these laws (Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 1999b). The issue seems headed for a final resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court (Biskupic, 1999) because the Seventh Circuit’s ruling is in conflict with the September 24, 1999 rulings of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in three related cases (Carhart v. Stenberg; Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Jegley; Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller). *Most of the state laws and the federal bill define the term "partial-birth" abortion as "an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." The laws further define the term "vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus" as meaning "deliberately and intentionally delivers into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure the physician knows will kill the fetus, and kills the fetus." ‡Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1123 (D. Neb. 1998), affirmed on other grounds, No. 98-3245NE, 1999 WL 753919 (8th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999). The court ruled that this procedure is safer than other variants of the D&E because: "(a) it reduces instrumentation in the uterus that can cause damage to the uterus and cervix; (b) it reduces uterine or cervical perforation from bony fragments; (c) it prevents disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC) and amniotic fluid embolus (among the most common causes of maternal mortality and complications) . . . ." Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. Biskupic, Joan. (1999, Dec. 1). "Justice Halts Enforcement of States’ Late-Term Abortion Bans." Washington Post, A06. Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F. 3d. 1142 (8th Cir. 1999). Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Hope Clinic v. Ryan (1999a) No. 98-1726, 1999 WL 974098 (7th Cir. Oct. 26, 1999). _____. (1999b), No. 99-3-428 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1999) (Stevens, Circuit J.). Koonin, Lisa M., et al. (1999, July 30). "Abortion Surveillance United States, 1996." MMWR, 48 (SS-4). Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Jegley, 192 F. 3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999) Planned Parenthood v. Alaska, No. 3-AN-97-06019 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct., 3rd Jud. Dist. Mar. 13, 1998). Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J. 1998). Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller, No. 99-1372SI, 1999 WL 753770 (8th Cir. Sept 24, 1999). Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1070 (S.D. Ohio 1995), aff’d, 130 F. 3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998). Media Contacts New York:212/261-4660 Washington, DC: 202/785-3351 Public Policy Contact Washington, DC: 202/785-3351 Fact Sheet Published by the Katharine Dexter McCormick Library Planned Parenthood Federation of America 810 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10019 212-261-4779 Current as of December 1999 |
|
