LEXIS-NEXIS® Congressional Universe-Document
LEXIS-NEXIS® Congressional
Copyright 1999
Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service
OCTOBER 28, 1999, THURSDAY
SECTION: IN THE NEWS
LENGTH: 2489 words
HEADLINE: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF
WILLIAM A. REINSCH
UNDER SECRETARY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBJECT - HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER EXPORT POLICY
BODY:
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on
export policy for high performance computers (HPCs). My testimony will describe
recent changes the Administration has made to adjust our
computer export controls to ensure effective controls while reflecting the reality of rapid
technological progress in the computing sector. These adjustments were
motivated by that progress as well as our belief that national security
benefits if U.S. manufacturers remain the world's leaders in this technology.
On July 1, President Clinton unveiled new export controls on High Performance
Computers and semiconductors to ensure that control levels accurately reflect
advances in microprocessor technology and that regulations accurately reflect
any risk posed by HPC exports. The revised controls maintain the four country
groups announced in 1995, but changes the countries and
levels as follows:
First, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were moved from Tier
Two to Tier One. This reflects both their strong nonproliferation records and
their close economic and security ties with the United States.
Second, the control level for Tier Two countries, countries that pose little or
no security or proliferation risk, was raised from 10,000 to 20,000 MTOPS.
Third, the two-level system we established in 1995 for civilian and military
end-users was maintained for Tier Three countries, with individual license
levels raised from 7,000 to 12,300 MTOPS for civilian end users and from 2,000
to 6,500 MTOPS for military end users.
Finally, prior notice of exports to Tier Three countries of systems above 2,000
MTOPS is required by law. The President's announcement would raise the
notification floor to 6,500 MTOPS. As you know, the latter change, by law,
cannot take effect until the conclusion or a six month waiting period, which
will occur on January 23rd. (The President decide to delay the implementation
of the change for military end users to coincide with the adjustment to the
level for the notifications.) At the time of his announcement, however, the
President indicated that he was prepared to implement this change immediately
and urged
Congress to reduce the six-month waiting period to thirty days. Unfortunately,
Congress has not yet acted on that request.
The President has also directed the relevant agencies to continue to review
these levels every six months to determine if further adjustments are
warranted. We believe this commitment is as important as the changes we have
made, and we intend to meet the schedule he has laid out.
The role of the Commerce Department in developing these recommendations was to
collect and analyze information on computer technology, the high performance
computer market, and the capabilities of foreign producers. Our work was done
in partnership with other agencies, particularly the Department of Defense and
the Intelligence community. In examining these issues, we built on the work
done in 1995 and in 1998. I would like to briefly describe some of what we
found.
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS.
Computers were once large, bulky items, expensive and difficult to install and
maintain. Only a few
suppliers in the U.S. and Japan existed, and many systems were custom built.
Today, the situation has changed radically. The engine of change is the
microprocessor, which provides the basis of computing power. Improvements in
microprocessor design and manufacturing mean that manufacturers now sell single
chips with speeds over 2000 MTOPS, the current threshold for notification and
post-shipment inspection under the NDAA. These microprocessors, sold in the
tens of thousands, power ordinary PCs and laptops which under current law must
be treated as high performance computers.
These chips and the related motherboards are commodity items which are shipped
to thousands of distributors around the world. The computers which use these
items include servers and workstations, which require little support to install
or operate. The affordability and widespread availability of these computer
products permit foreign end-users to modify commodity computers into high
performance systems. The result is that high performance
computers are smaller, cheaper, simpler to install and maintain and more
reliable than ever before.
Although overshadowed by advances in microprocessor capabilities, recent gains
in network technology have also had a significant effect on high performance
computing. Advances in software, interconnects and parallel processing mean
that the performance levels once associated with giant machines can now be
obtained by smaller and less expensive computers. While there is still an
advantage in using one HPC instead of a group of desktop computers, software
and connection capability is opening the way to an increase in both use and
availability of very high performance computing based on PCs. Applications for
this type of computing include financial analysis, web servers, data
warehousing and data mining and have greatly increased demand for parallel
processing systems. The affordability and
widespread availability of these computer products permit foreign end-users to
configure these mass market products into high performance computer systems.
FOREIGN CAPABILITIES
The number of firms capable of producing computers able to perform above 7000
MTOPS has greatly expanded in the last few years as global demand for computers
has increased rapidly, in part driven by the growth of the Internet.
Previously, only the U.S. and Japan had firms capable of producing HPCs for the
commercial market. Other countries, primarily in Europe, had the technological
capability to produce HPCs but could not compete effectively. This is no longer
the case. While the U.S. and Japan remain the two countries with the ability to
produce high-end HPCs (vector or massively parallel processor with speeds over
20,000 MTOPS) in commercial quantities, the technology for producing HPCS using
four or eight chips is widely diffused around the world.
We found 170 computer manufacturers located around the world who account for
three quarters of global computer production. More than 120 of these
manufacturers are outside of the United States. 28 are in countries which are
not members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which provides the basis for
multilateral controls on HPCs - computers are not controlled by the
nonproliferation regimes. The technologies and the production lines these
companies use to build PCs and servers can also be used to build computers with
speeds over 7,000 MTOPS. Many of these producers are located in countries that
do not observe U.S. or multilateral restrictions on computer exports. Beyond
that, the policies of most of our major trading partners in Europe and
elsewhere do not restrict exports of Wassenaar controlled dual-use items to
countries like China. If the U.S. requires its firms to
obtain licenses for computers which can be easily produced by non-US suppliers,
these foreign suppliers can -- and will -- fill the demand. They may not do so
now because they cannot compete with us economically, but if we remove our
companies from a market, they will step in promptly.
NATIONAL SECURITY
I will speak generally to the issue of computer exports and national security,
recognizing that the Department of Defense is the U.S. Government agency best
situated to provide the Committee with the Administration's perspective on this
issue. I urge the Committee to invite DoD to discuss this issue with them in
depth at the Committee's earliest convenience. I will note as a starting point,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre's statements at the time of the President's
announcement that DoD's national security concerns were taken very seriously
during the interagency discussions on this issue, that every one of
Defense's concerns were accommodated, and that DoD is satisfied that it can
continue to protect the U.S. with these changes.
The President announced the new control levels after a careful interagency
review, involving the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and in
consultation with the Intelligence Community. Agencies considered a range of
options and took an in-depth look at the technology available in the U.S. and
overseas. The focus or our work has been to determine what we can realistically
control. Computers and computer chips which are relatively inexpensive,
manufactured in the millions and sold through thousands of outlets around the
world are readily available to any purchaser and cannot effectively be
controlled. We think it is better for our national security to focus our energy
and resources on critical items that we can control.
What we have concluded is that computers at all levels, including PCs, have
potential military applications. Our own military production
illustrates this. The weapons found in the U.S. arsenal today were built with
computers whose performance was below 1000 MTOPS -- in many cases only 500
MTOPS. The level of computational power used to develop all the bombs in the
current U.S. nuclear arsenal, for example, is less than that found today in
many workstations. Our conclusion is that the amount of computing power needed
to design and manufacture modern weapons, once you get over a few hundred
MTOPS, is not a critical variable. Other factors -software design, access to
sophisticated manufacturing techniques, experience and test data -- are more
important.
For this reason, our 1999 review focused not only on the potential military
applications but also on the issues of controllability and technological
leadership. Our conclusion was that the national security interests of the
United States are best served by ensuring that the United
States retains its technological advantage in the design, development, and
production of microprocessors and computers. As some 50 to 60 percent of
revenues for these sectors are generated through exports, the ability to
compete internationally is an essential ingredient to the continued viability
of these industries. Today, no nation can remain at the leading edge of
technology unless it participates in the global market. The continued
generation of revenues from exports provides the needed capital for research
and development which keeps these industries at the cutting edge of technology.
This, in turn, ensures that the U.S. military and U.S. defense-related
industries will continue to have access to the computer technology they need to
maintain our military advantage.
NDAA Requirements
To date, we have received a little more than 2500 notifications under the NDAA
process. Of this amount, 205, or 8 percent were converted to licenses. Of those
205 licenses, nine, or less than
one half of one percent, have been denied. A number of other cases were
returned to exporters to allow them to assemble the documents needed for the
lengthy process of license review, and roughly one hundred and twenty
notifications are pending at this time.
To be candid, there are problems with the NDAA process. In particular, the 2000
MTOPS level for notification and verification. Rapid advances in microprocessor
and computer performance make the 2000 MTOPS unworkable, and threaten to clog
the system with thousands of notifications to which no one is going to object.
This problem will only grow as microprocessor speeds continue to increase.
The 2000 MTOPS level is forcing the Department of Commerce to use scarce
investigative resources to conduct a rapidly growing number of post-shipment
verifications in Tier Three countries which detract from more important
enforcement efforts. The fact that we are required by law to visit all such
computers, including PCs and laptops, forces us to spend time on those that
don't matter. If our investigators were permitted to exercise their discretion,
we could focus our efforts directly on any problematic locations we might
identify. Adjusting the MTOPS level upwards for these required inspections will
be helpful, but it will only be temporary as chip speed increases and commodity
level PCs and laptops grow increasingly powerful.
This matter will become much more important in upcoming weeks, as several
manufacturers place tens of thousands of chips with speeds greater than 2000
MTOPS on the market. We expect to see single chips with speeds greater than
3000 MTOPS enter mass production before the end of the year. In particular, I
would call the attention of the Committee to the decision of at least one U.S.
computer company not to market laptops and PCs with
performance above 2000 MTOPS in Tier Three at this time, because of NDAA
requirements. It is not possible for PCs and laptops sold in the thousands in
retail stores to wait ten days for interagency review. If these companies sell
these commodity computers in Tier III, the NDAA review system would be
overwhelmed. I view this as only a temporary grace period. More to the point,
we must be clear that the NDAA notification process does nothing to prevent
militaries in Tier Three countries from obtaining single chip PCs and laptops
with performance above 2000 MTOPS if they want them, since these are
inexpensive, highly portable and widely available from retail outlets around
the world.
CONCLUSION
Computer export policy has broad ramifications for the health of the entire
American economy and for U.S. national security. The U.S. is the world leader
in
information technology and in computer manufacturing, and the industry's future
depends on exports. Ill- advised export controls could put this vital sector at
risk with little benefit to national security. In the short term, U.S.
companies would lose sales opportunities to foreign firms. In the long term,
U.S. companies would suffer a significant and perhaps irreversible loss of
market share in foreign markets. The loss of export revenue would adversely
affect the ability of U.S. computer companies to fund research and development
on next generation technologies, thereby harming their ability to maintain
product lines on the cutting edge of technology, including products with
strategic military applications.
High performance computers are only one example, although a salient one, of the
eroding effect of economic globalization on export controls. Our approach to
this sector is an example of our
strategy for enhancing national security in light of the globalization and
commercialization of the industrial base which supports our military. Experts
at the Defense Department argue that the US can achieve a net security gain if
it properly exploits the globalization and commercialization trends.
Conversely, a strategy dominated by risk- avoidance, or the absence of a clear
strategy altogether, will lead to a loss of security, due to gains made by
potential adversaries as they take advantage of the global availability of
militarily-useful technology.
END
LOAD-DATE: November 2, 1999