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And that gets to my second chart, Mr. Speaker, which is the time line.

[Page: H3755]  GPO's PDF

   Now my colleagues on the other side are going to say, ``Well, a minute, Kurt. You picked 1993. You are being partisan because that is when Clinton took office.''

   That is not the case, Mr. Speaker. I picked 1993 because two things happened.

   Up until 1993, Mr. Speaker, under Democrats and Republican Presidents alike, there was a process in place to control technology from Nations like America to be sent abroad to what we consider to be Tier 3 nations or nations that are not allowed or were not supposed to have very capable technology that could come back to hurt us. This process was called COCON. COCON was an international organization of allied nations, the U.S. and Japan, that met on a regular basis, and they decided collectively what kind of technology would be allowed to be sold and to which countries it could be sold to.

   In 1993, without pre-approval of any of the other countries, France, Great Britain, Japan or any of the other ones, this administration ended COCON, ended it, and the doors opened up.

   Now they put into place something called the Wassanar agreement which everyone has acknowledged is a total failure, yet COCON worked. In 1993 COCON ended, and the floodgates opened.

   Something else happened in that year, Mr. Speaker. I would like to enter in the RECORD at this point in time, Mr. Speaker, a letter from the White House dated September 15, 1993, to Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer of Silicon Graphics from Bill Clinton. Mr. Speaker, every American needs to read this letter because this letter was sent by the President of the United States September 15, 1993, and who did he send it to? To one of his biggest contributors and one of those blocks of people who supported his candidacy, Edward McCracken, Chief Executive Officer, Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, California.

   THE WHITE HOUSE,

   Washington, September 15, 1993.
Hon. EDWARD MCCRACKEN,
Chief Executive Officer,
Silicon Graphics, Mountain View, CA.

   DEAR EDWARD: Thanks for taking the time to come by for lunch on Wednesday. It was good to see you--and it was a pleasure to get your insights.

   I wanted to bring you up to date on a topic we were not able to discuss at lunch; the issue of export controls . As you know, for some time the United States has imposed stringent exports controls on many of our most competitive exports. By some estimates, unnecessary export controls cost U.S. companies $9 billion a year in lost sales. One reason I ran for President was to tailor export controls to the realities of a post-Cold War world.

   Let me be clear. We will continue to need strong controls to combat the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dangerous conventional weapons, as well as to send a strong signal to countries that support international terrorism. But we also need to make long overdue reforms to ensure that we do not unfairly and unnecessarily burden our important commercial interests.

   In that regard, I wanted you to know that we hope to announce some important reforms by September 30. As you may know, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown has been leading a process within the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (IPCC) to examine how we might better promote U.S. exports. As part of that process, the National Security Council has led an effort to develop specific export control reforms. I hope to announce those when the TPCC issues its report on September 30.

   We have not yet finalized all of these reforms, because I want to be sure that they get a full interagency review. But I am optimistic that the steps we take will help liberalize controls on many of our most competitive exports, while protecting our important national security concerns. Let me give you a sense of the reform we are considering:

   Liberalize Computer and Telecommunications Controls . When this Administration began, the U.S. controlled any computer with a capacity above 12.9 MTOPs. My administration is in the process of raising that level to 67 MTOPs for most free world countries, relieving well over 13 billion of computer exports each year from the need for a license. By September 30, I hope to raise that level further--and also announce important liberalizations for telecommunications exports to most free world destinations.

   Reduce Processing Time. Delays in processing export control licenses is a burden on business--and a legitimate gripe against the Federal government. I hope to announce significant reductions in the time it takes the government to process export license applications.

   Expand Distribution Licenses. We hope to expand significantly the availability of distribution licenses for controlled computers so that exporters need not come back repeatedly to the Federal government for a license.

   Eliminate Unnecessary Unilateral Controls . Controls imposed only by the U.S. (and not by competitor countries) at times can put our exporters at an unfair disadvantage as competitor companies export like products freely. I expect to announce that, by December 31, my administration will identify and eliminate wherever possible unnecessary U.S. unilateral export control policies.

   I expect that these reforms will help liberalize controls on tens of billions of dollars worth of U.S. exports. It can help unleash our companies to compete successfully in the global market.

   These reforms fit into a broader framework. Soon we will complete our review of nonproliferation and export control policy, which will set guidelines for further steps we should take. I am also currently engaged in seeking major reforms to COCOM, which should lead to significant liberalization of controls on computers, telecommunications and machine tools, while establishing a more effective structure for addressing the changing national security threats we will face in the years ahead.

   Let me assure you that I am personally committed to developing a more intelligent export control policy, one that prevents dangerous technologies from falling into the wrong hands without unfairly burdening American commerce. It is important. It is the right thing to do. And many of these changes are long overdue. I look forward to working with you in building a new consensus around an effective exports control policy that meets these objectives.

   Sincerely,

   Bill Clinton.

   But what is the content of the letter, Mr. Speaker? The letter outlines the administration's plans to liberalize, liberalize the availability of technology to nations abroad.

   So here it is in black and white where the President is telling the CEO of Silicon Graphics this is what we are going to do for you over the next 6 years.

   Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They did it.

   What were some of the highlights? Let me read from the letter. Quote: Liberalize computer and telecommunication controls , reduce processing times, expand distribution licenses, eliminate unnecessary unilateral controls , and it goes into detail in describing.

   Now, Mr. Speaker, I am a free trader, and I believe in allowing our companies to compete. But what you had in 1993 was the wholesale opening of the flood gates. At the same time Hazel O'Leary is saying we do not have to worry about the people who work in our labs, they do not need color-coded IDs, they do not need to have FBI background checks, and when they give out classified information, we are going to ignore that and not worry about it. And, oh, by the way, US News, if you want this chart of the W-87, we will give it to you, and you can run it nationwide.

   Mr. Speaker, these stories need to be told across America.

   This time line from 1993 to 1999 shows every decision made by this administration that allowed a new technology to flow, in this case to China. It also shows activities of China in violation of arms control regimes. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I would ask at this time to insert Chronology of Chinese Weapons Related Transfers:

   Indignation Rings Shallow on Nuke Tests

   Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan should come as no surprise to the Clinton administration. Since the president took office, there have been dozens of reported transfers of sensitive military technology by Russia and China--in direct violation of numerous international arms control agreements--to a host of nations, including Pakistan and India.

   Yet the Clinton administration has repeatedly chosen to turn a blind eye to this proliferation of missile, chemical-biological and nuclear technology, consistently refusing to impose sanctions on violators. And in those handful of instances where sanctions were imposed, they usually were either quickly waived by the administration or allowed to expire. Rather than condemn India for current tensions, the blame for the political powder keg that has emerged in Asia should be laid squarely at the feet of President Clinton. It is his administration's inaction and refusal to enforce arms control agreements that have allowed the fuse to grow so short.

    In November 1992, the United States learned that China had transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The Bush administration imposed sanctions for this violation but Clinton waived them a little more than 14 months later. Clearly, the sanctions did not have the desired effect: Reports during the first half of 1995 indicated that M-11 missiles,

[Page: H3756]  GPO's PDF

   Not to be outdone by its sworn foe, India aggressively pursued similar technologies and obtained them, illicitly, from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid oxygen-hydrogen rocket engines and technology to India. While sanctions were imposed by President Bush in May 1992, the Clinton administration allowed them to expire after only two years. And in June 1993, evidence surfaced that additional Russian enterprises were involved in missile technology transfers to India. The administration imposed sanctions in June 1993, and then promptly waived them for a month, never following up on the issue.

   Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to aggressively pursue technology transfers from China. In August 1996, the capability to manufacture M-11 missile or missile components was transferred from China to Pakistan. No sanctions. In November 1996, a special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment were transferred from China to an unprotected Pakistani nuclear facility. No sanctions. Also during 1996, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report stating that China had provided a ``tremendous variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program and was the principal supplier of nuclear equipment for Pakistan's program. Again, the Clinton administration refused to impose sanctions.

   Finally, in recent months we have learned that China may have been responsible for the transfer of technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile. Flight tested on April 6, 1998, the Ghauri missile has been widely blamed as the impetus for India's decision to detonate five nuclear weapons in tests earlier this month. Again, no sanctions were imposed on China.

   Retracing the history of these instances of proliferation, it is obvious that Pakistan and India have been locked in an arms race since the beginning of the decade. And the race has been given repeated jump-starts by China and Russia, a clear violation of a number of arms control agreements. Yet rather than enforce these arms control agreements, the Clinton administration has repeatedly acquiesced, fearing that the imposition of sanctions could either strain relations with China and Russia or potentially hurt U.S. commercial interests in those countries.

   Now the Clinton administration has announced a get-tough policy, threatening to impose sanctions on India for testing its nuclear weapons. But what about Russia and China, the two nations that violated international arms agreements? Shouldn't they also be subject to U.S. sanctions for their role in this crisis? Sadly, the Clinton administration is likely to ignore the proliferators and impose sanctions solely on India. In the meantime, China and Russia will continue their proliferation of missile and nuclear technology to other nations, including rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria.

                    

Date of transfer or report	Reported transfer by China	Possible violation	Administration's response
Nov. 1992	M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan (The Administration did not officially confirm reports that M-11 missiles are in Pakistan.)	MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	sanctions imposed on Aug. 24, 1993, for transfers of M-11 related equipment (not missiles); waived on Nov. 1, 1994
Mid-1994 to mid-1995	dozens or hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools to Iran	MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
2nd quarter of 1995	parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan	MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995	5,000 ring magnets for an unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment program in Pakistan	NPT; Export -Import Bank Act; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Arms Export Control Act	considered sanctions under the Export -Import Bank Act; but announced on May 10, 1996, that no sanctions would be imposed
July 1995	more than 30 M-11 missiles stored in crates at Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan	MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Sept. 1995	calutron (electromagnetic isotope separation system) for uranium enrichment to Iran	NPT; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export -Import Bank Act; Arms Export Control Act	no sanctions
1995-1997	C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air-launched cruise missiles to Iran	Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act	no sanctions
Before Feb. 1996	dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to Iran's chemical weapon program	Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	sanctions imposed on May 21, 1997
Summer 1996	400 tons of chemicals to Iran	Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act;\1\ Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Aug. 1996	plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile components in Pakistan	MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Aug. 1996	gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for missile guidance to Iran	MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Sept. 1996	special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan	NPT; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export -Import Bank Act; Arms Export Control Act	no sanctions
July-Dec. 1996	Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) reported ``tremendous variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program	MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
July-Dec. 1996	DCI reported ``tremendous variety'' of assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program	MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
July-Dec. 1996	DCI reported principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material, and technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapon program	NPT; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export -Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act	no sanctions
July-Dec. 1996	DCI reported key supplies of technology for large nuclear projects in Iran	NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export -Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act	no sanctions
July-Dec. 1996	DCI reported ``considerable'' chemical weapon-related transfers of production equipment and technology to Iran	Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Jan. 1997	dual-use biological items to Iran	BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
1997	chemical precursors, production equipment, and production technology for Iran's chemical weapon program, including a plant for making glass-lined equipment	Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Sept. to Dec. 1997	China Great Wall Industry Corp. provided telemetry equipment used in flight-tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles	MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions
Nov. 1997/April 1998	may have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998	MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act	no sanctions THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT THIS CR ISSUE GO TO Next Hit Forward Next Document New CR Search Prev Hit Back Prev Document HomePage Hit List Best Sections Daily Digest Help Doc Contents