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Secretary Richardson, in the aftermath of what some have called the ``greatest espionage'' in our whole history, is busy and is to be admired and respected for trying to reform. But if you try to reform it, and you are the Secretary of Energy, and you are as diligent as Bill Richardson--and one who likes to run a lot of things, which

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   I don't know whether Secretary Richardson does or not. But they are not in office more than 6 months, and they run around calling these great laboratories, including those in my State, ``my laboratories.'' It is just like: Isn't this great? The Secretary of Energy has this big, $3 billion laboratory, and he calls it ``my laboratory.''

   I did not say Secretary Richardson does that. I have not heard him. But, if he did, he would be consistent with the other ones.

   We have a suggestion here that is probably going to make it a little more difficult for Secretaries of Energy to run around and call them ``my laboratories,'' because they are going to be a laboratory system run by an administrator within the Department, whether he ends up being an Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary who is going to run the whole show.

   For those who do not think there are models such as this, there are. You can take a look at DARPA. You can take a look within the Energy Department at the nuclear Navy. It is different than this, but if you want to look at a model that is within a big department where you have something structured to handle a very important role and mission, there are such models. As a matter of fact, there are experts who say this is a good model, if you want to keep it within the department.

   I want to address two other things, and I want to read some notes.

   First, if this Senator thought for 1 minute that the implementation of this approach would minimize the diversification and versatility of these three major laboratories to do outside work for the government and others, I would pull it this afternoon. I don't believe that will happen. I don't believe it is inherent in this amendment. I believe that if there is concern it can be fixed with language, because the fact that it is so poorly managed under this structure that we have is not what is contributing one way or another to its versatility. It is the efficiency and effectiveness of the scientists that are making these laboratories multiuse, multipurpose, multifaceted and that do work beyond nuclear work.

   Since my colleague asked that his first speech not be counted as two speeches, which I didn't object to, I gather that the other side doesn't intend to let us vote on this. I don't know what we should do about that. I will meet with our leadership. If it is just up to me, I will debate it as long as we can tonight, and I will go home without the bill completed and bring it up and take another week on it when we come back.

   The time is now to fix this tremendous deficiency in terms of how our nuclear weapons and everything attendant to it are managed.

   Secretary Richardson is doing a mighty job, but he will never fix it without reorganization and streamlining and chain of command that is provided in this amendment, which is not perfect and not the only one. But this is what it is intended to do.

   Let me just read a couple of things. This is Admiral Chiles' report, the so-called Chiles report of March 1, 1999:

   Establish clear lines of authority in DOE. The commission believes that the disorderly organization within DOE has a pervasive and negative impact on the working environment. Therefore, on recruitment and retention, accordingly the commission recommends that the Secretary of Energy organize defense programs----

   That is what we are talking about----

   consistent with the recommendations of the 120-day study. We recommend three structural changes.

   They recommend three, for starters.

   I use this because anybody, including my colleagues and Senator REID, who has today spoken about how well the laboratories have done, would almost have to admit that they have done well in spite of the absolute chaotic condition with reference to sustained accountability within the laboratories as a piece of DOE.

   Frankly, I have appropriated for 5 years--this is my sixth--the Committee on Energy and Water, which funds totally the laboratories, to some extent, not totally, with reference to nuclear work and to some extent on nonnuclear.

   There were Congressmen asking that we create some new regional centers for headquarters, Albuquerque, for example, or a greater region somewhere in Texas and the like. We asked, rather than do that, that the appropriations fund a 120-day study. That was done. I am sure my colleague has that. If he doesn't, his staff does.

   I am going to quote from the executive summary of this, which is dated, incidentally, February 27, 1997. Still reports are saying ``fix it, fix it.''

   At the bottom of page ES-1, ``These practices''--after describing practices within this Department of Energy as it pertains to nuclear weaponry--``are constipating the system.''

   I am quoting.

   They undermine accountability, making the entire system less safe. Further, the process prevents timely decisions and their implementation. Untold millions of dollars are wasted on idle plants and equipment awaiting approvals of various types, or on investments which age and become obsolete and expensive to maintain without ever having been used for the original productive purposes. Finally, the defense program has a job to do--maintenance of a nuclear deterrent, which is not well served by the ES&H review and approval process that drags on forever.

   That is the current system of environmental safety and health review in this Department.

   People worry about what this amendment is going to do.

   Let me tell you. This report says that we are not well served by that which exists in the Department now, and an approval process that drags on forever helps no one.

   There is much more to be read in the most current studies that kind of clamor for doing something dramatic and different.

   The largest problem [says this same 120-day study on page ES-1] uncovered is that the defense program practices for managing safety, health and environmental concerns are based on nonproductive, hybrid, or centralized and decentralized management practices that have evolved over the past decade. It goes on to say that because they have evolved doesn't mean they are effective or operative.

   I very much am pleased that Senator BINGAMAN yielded so I could have a few words. Senator, I will be back shortly, but I am called to the majority leader's office to discuss this issue. It will not take me over 15 minutes, and I will return.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

   Ms. SNOWE. I rise to speak on behalf of an amendment I sponsored that was agreed to previously as part of the managers' package.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GORTON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Kyl amendment, which brings new security accountability and intelligent administration to the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons program.

   The Cox report has shown us that we have ceded design information on all of our most sensitive nuclear warheads and the neutron bomb to China. These designs, our legacy codes, and our computer data hav e been lost because of lax security at our national labs (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, and Sandia), incompetent administrations, and possibly, obstructions of investigations.

   What have we lost because of this espionage? According to the Cox report, ``Information on seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal.'' These warheads are the W-88, W-87, W-78, W-76, W-70, W-62, and W-56. China has also obtained information on a number of associated reentry vehicles. But it does not end there. China also has classified design information for the neutron bomb, which no nation has yet deployed. Other classified information, not available to the pubic, has also been stolen.

   With this information, China has made a quantum leap in the modernization of its nuclear arsenal. China will now be able to deploy a mobile nuclear force, with its first deployment as soon as 2002.

   The cost of these nuclear thefts is the security of the U.S. and the security of our allies in the Asia-Pacific.

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   I hope that our troops in the Asia-Pacific will not have to suffer for a domestic security failure. I hope that we will not have to pay for these thefts in American lives.

   But the costs will not be limited to the Asia-Pacific region. We can bet that this information will not stay in the hands of China. China has supplied Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and Libya with sensitive military technology in the past. We have no real guarantees that China will not spread our lost secrets again.

   This fiasco of security did not happen by accident. There was a concerted effort on behalf of the Chinese government to obtain this information and a lack of effort on part of certain individuals to protect those secrets. Janet Reno must be held accountable if she denied her own FBI the authority to investigate suspected spies. Likewise, Sandy Berger must be held accountable if he delayed notification of the President of the United States or if he delayed action on these security breaches.

   Mr. President, for two decades we have left the door to our DOE facilities open to thieves. We have exposed our most sensitive details to China. It is time to secure the door of security.

   We cannot reverse what has taken place. We cannot take back the information that has been stolen. But we must prevent further theft of our secrets.

   The Kyl amendment takes necessary steps in enhancing security at our DOE facilities. It establishes increased reporting requirements to Congress and the President, as well as layers of checks and balances to knock down the stone walls of silence. This amendment also gives the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Weapons programs statutory authority to competently administer our nuclear programs and enforce regulations.

   But we must also recognize that this measure is not an iron sheath for our weapons secrets. Beyond espionage at our national labs, there have also been illegal transfers of sensitive missile design information by Loral and Hughes, two U.S. satellite manufacturers, to China. With this information, China can improve its military command and control through communications satellites.

   In its efforts to engage a ``strategic partner,'' the Clinton Administration loosened export controls , allowin g satellite and high performance computer experts. Within two years of relaxing export controls , a stead y stream of high performance computers flowed from the U.S. to China, giving China 600 supercomputers. Once again, China is using these supercomputers to advance its military capabilities. These high performance computers are useful for enhancing almost every sector of the military, including the development of nuclear weapons.

   We have not reached the bottom of this pit of security failures. The investigations will continue and Congress will hold the Administration accountable. In the meantime I urge my colleagues to support the Kyl amendment.

   AMENDMENT NO. 418

   Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, Members of the Senate, last night the Senate did pass an amendment I drafted establishing a policy that would require the President to establish a multinational embargo against adversary nations once our Armed Forces have become engaged in hostilities. I thank the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator WARNER, and Senator LEVIN, as well as minority and majority staffs of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee for working with me on this initiative.

   This amendment would impose a requirement on Presidents to seek multilateral economic embargoes, as well as foreign asset seizures, against governments with which the United States engages in armed hostilities.

   After 1 month of conflict in Kosovo, the Pentagon had announced that NATO had destroyed most of Yugoslavia's interior oil-refining capacity. At approximately the same point in time, we had the Secretary of State acknowledging that the Serbians had continued to fortify with imported oil their hidden armed forces in the province.

   Just 3 weeks ago, the allies first agreed to an American proposal, one which had been put forward by this administration, to intercept petroleum exports bound for Serbia but then declined to enforce the ban against their own ships.

   On May 1, 5 weeks after the Kosovo operation had begun, the President finally signed an Executive order imposing an American embargo against Belgrade on oil, software, and other sensitive products.

   Yet, NATO and the United States have paid a steep price for failing to impose a comprehensive economic sanction on Serbia from the beginning of the air campaign, which started in March.

   As recently as May 13, a Government source told Reuters that the Yugoslavian Army continued to smuggle significant amounts of oil over land and water.

   At the end of April, General Clark gave the alliance a plan for the interdiction of oil tankers coming into the Adriatic towards Serbian ports. To justify this proposal, he cited the fact that through approximately 11 shipments, the Yugoslavians had imported 450,000 barrels containing 19 million gallons of petroleum vital to their war effort. Let me repeat: 450,000 barrels, containing 19 million gallons of oil, that supported the war effort. Half of those 19 million gallons of oil would support them for 2 months; half of the 19 million gallons of oil supported the Serbian war effort for 2 months, yet we allowed 11 shipments to come through since the beginning of this air campaign.

   Unfortunately, it has been economic business as usual for the Serbians as our missiles try to grind their will. The President declared on March 24 the beginning of the NATO campaign and set a goal of deterring a bloody offensive against the Moslem civilians. We know what happened.

   I have a chart that illustrates a chronology of the situation when it comes to economic business as usual. We started the air campaign March 24. Then on April 13, while we were adding more aircraft to the engagement, Serbia had reached the midpoint of receiving 11 shipments of oil from abroad.

   Of course, on April 27, General Clark announced:

   We have destroyed his oil production capacity.

   NATO estimates of displaced Kosovars rise to 820,000. Serbia receives 165,000 barrels of imported fuel over a 24-hour

   period.

   While we were adding more aircraft, it now had been a month later since the campaign began, we find they are still bringing in more oil. A month after the start, they were at the midpoint of receiving 450,000 barrels of oil.

   By the close of April, General Clark confirmed the destruction of Yugoslavia's oil production capacity. On the same day, however, the Serbs took in 165,000 barrels of imported oil. As I mentioned earlier in this chronology, while we are still bringing in the aircraft, they are still bringing in the oil.

   Interestingly enough, just today, in the Financial Times of London, General Wesley Clark was understood to have expressed concern about the oil issue when he briefed NATO ambassadors yesterday on the progress of the 9-week-old air campaign. He has expressed disappoint that U.S. proposals for using force to support the embargo, at least in the Adriatic, were rejected by other allies--notably France. NATO is still working out how the details of a voluntary ``visit and search'' regime under which the alliance warships would check on ships sailing up the Adriatic Sea. Let me repeat, they are still working out the details of a voluntary visit and search regime.

   Now we are in the ninth week of the campaign, well over 400 aircraft, 23, 24 Apache helicopters, the President has called up 33,000 reservists, and they have yet to establish procedures for an oil embargo. They are still working out the details.

   The article goes on to say the North Atlantic Council agreed this week to introduce the regime but has to approve the rules of engagement.

   It is clear that the air campaign is still being operated, and, obviously, the oil embargo, according to committee.

   On May 1, when the President signed the Executive order barring oil and

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   As of 3 weeks ago, the number of displaced Kosovars had topped 1 million, and NATO acknowledges the continuation--as we have certainly learned today in the most recent news updates--of energy imports by the enemy. These imported energy reserves play a significant role in supporting Serbian ground operations.

   The U.S. Energy Information Agency estimates that Yugoslavian forces consume about 4,000 barrels of oil per day. This fact means that if Serbian armored units in Kosovo used only one half of the imported fuel just from the month of April alone, they could have operated for nearly 2 months, just half the amount they imported in April, yet as we well know, the air campaign began on March 24.

   It took nearly 1 month after the start of the NATO campaign, however, for Milosevic to uproot the vast majority of the ethnic Albanian population of the province. By the timeframe that NATO had claimed to destroy Serbia's oil refining capacity, which was mid to late April, as we have seen here when General Clark announced it on April 27, the Yugoslavians still managed to perpetrate Europe's the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. We now face the strategic and operational challenge of uprooting dispersed tank, artillery and, infantry units in Kosovo. This challenge confounds NATO because our military campaign ignored the offshore economic base sustaining the aggression that we had pledged to overcome.

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