LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe-Document

LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic

June 5, 1999, Saturday ,City Edition

SECTION: OP-ED; Pg. A19

LENGTH: 815 words

HEADLINE: US faces limits in keeping advanced technology from China;
BRUCE STOKES;
Bruce Stokes is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a columnist for the National Journal.

BYLINE: By Bruce Stokes

BODY:

None of us will sleep very well at night if, as alleged in the recently released Cox Committee report, Chinese spies have acquired America's advanced nuclear weapons technology.

And it is certainly disconcerting that Beijing may have legally obtained US high-performance computers, machine tools, and semi-conductor manufacturing equipment that could be used to build that weaponry.

But Beijing's having this knowledge and Washington's ability to do anything about it are two different things, something the Cox Committee refused to acknowledge and something we as Americans have got to learn to accept.

Clamping down on espionage appears to be a straightforward exercise in tightening security. But the government's failure, to date, to bring any indictments for Chinese spying suggests this case is far more complex than it is portrayed in the report. Even more problematic are the Cox Committee recommendations to tighten export controls as a means of denying Beijing access to advanced American commercial technology that might be used for military purposes.

It is true that between 1996 and 1998, China obtained 450 high-performance computers from the United States, most without the need for an export license. The report alleges that Beijing has used these computers to upgrade nuclear weapons, design and build advanced military aircraft, and improve China's military communications network.

This potential is irrefutable. But after months of investigation, the committee produced no hard evidence that such diversions actually took place.

Nevertheless, to halt the "hemorrhage" of high-performance computers to China, the committee recommended making it harder for Beijing to buy such gear. But the horse has already left the barn. If Beijing does not buy these machines from the United States, it will simply buy them elsewhere. Acer Inc., a Taiwanese computer assembler, for example, offers for sale on its Web site a computer with four Intel Pentium III chips, a configuration that would require an export license if the machine were sold from the United States.

To aid its customers in mainland China, Acer's Web site even offers an icon that can be clicked to get mailing instructions in Chinese. And controlling such rapidly advancing technology will only get harder in the months ahead as millions of ever-more-powerful computer chips flood the market.

By this summer, the PowerPC chip used in Apple computers will require an export license to be sold to military end users in China. In 2000, Intel's next generation chip faces similar restraints. Then, executives taking laptop computers to China and children with Sony PlayStations heading there on vacation may need export licenses.

The committee also proposed "binding international controls" on Chinese acquisition of high technology. Easier said than done. Europe and Japan do not share America's fear of China as a security threat. In the early 1990s, when Washington blocked Beijing's efforts to divert a US machine tool from commercial to military use, China turned around and bought better equipment in Europe. With friends like these, Cox's recommendations will not get far.

There are limited things that can be done to ensure that China does not illicitly acquire militarily useful commercial technologies. It is still possible to continue to deny the Chinese high-end super computers. The Cox Committee rightly recommends higher penalties for US firms that violate export controls. The Senate Banking Committee is considering several amendments to the Export Administration Act, the legal basis for export controls, including a whistle-blower provision to encourage self-policing of exports and recorded votes when government agencies decide on license applications to insure accountability.

But in the end, Washington and all of us must accept our own limitations.

It is true that America is the world's only super power. But that power is severely constrained in matters such as these. Experience demonstrates that the United States can't compel its allies to act. And in a global market characterized by rapid technological change, Draconian efforts to curtail exports by US high-tech firms will only undermine the very high-tech American industries the Cox committee would ostensibly protect.

China represents a $1.8 billion market for high-performance computers. If US firms are kept from meeting that demand, other Asian or European firms will step in.

Despite the troubling findings of the Cox report, the United States will simply have to learn to live with the fact that China can now easily obtain most of the computing power and refined machinery it needs to be a formidable adversary.

This fact is not conducive to a peaceful night's rest. But it is one more harsh reality of a post-Cold War world that promises not to be as tranquil as we once hoped.

LOAD-DATE: June 08, 1999