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Copyright 1999 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
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March 09, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition
SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01
LENGTH: 1784 words
HEADLINE: China Exploits U.S. Computer Advances; American Export Trade Raises National
Security Concerns
BYLINE: Michael Laris, Washington Post Foreign Service
DATELINE: BEIJING
BODY:
The American-made supercomputer that crowds Liu Zhi's fourth-floor office at
the Institute of Geology here is bigger than a mid-size van and cost more than
$ 300,000. It sits under a large blue tarp, obsolete and unused.
Last year, the institute bought a new computer made by Palo Alto-based Sun
Microsystems Inc. that is 562 times faster, cost just $ 20,000 and is the size
of a desktop unit. Liu linked it to the Internet, and now scholars can perform
complex calculations that were previously unthinkable in the privacy of their
offices.
The two computers, sitting in the same room in a concrete-slab building off the
Third Ring Road, Beijing's equivalent of an outer beltway, are monuments to the
benefits that China -- and U.S. high-tech companies -- have reaped from the
brisk trade in
American know-how. The computers also underscore the complexities of a U.S.
policy that, in fits and starts, has attempted to prevent China from acquiring
advanced U.S. technology that can be used for military purposes.
Computers like the Sun machine are powerful enough to be used in designing
nuclear weapons, yet it is legal under U.S. law to sell them to China. Such a
sale would be illegal if it were for Chinese military use, but Liu, an engineer
who runs the institute's network, was once a communications officer in the
Chinese army -- an illustration of the often blurred lines between the civilian
and military here.
Moreover, while the U.S. Commerce Department in theory has the right to monitor
the use of major U.S.-built computers in China, there is only one person
assigned to the Beijing embassy to perform this enormous task. And if illegal
work is being undertaken on American computers from a remote location, there is
almost no way he can find that out.
Recent disclosures of Chinese government efforts to buy dual-use technology
from the
United States and steal U.S. weapons secrets have sparked a passionate -- and
sometimes ugly -- debate in Washington and Beijing.
On one hand, American businesses and a number of government officials worry
that such revelations could disrupt one of the most successful sectors of the
U.S. economy. On the other hand, some officials worry that sales of American
high performance computers to China and other countries could erode the ability
of the U.S. military to maintain its lead in high-tech weaponry.
"We have here the beginning of a debate we should have had a long time ago," said Bates Gill, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at
the Brookings Institution and an expert on China and weapons proliferation.
"In the post-Cold War era, in a globalized, international environment, how do we
strike the right balance between high-tech
trade and national security?"
A House committee chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) has documented
examples of illegal transfers of sophisticated American equipment to China and
of espionage by Chinese agents and has called for tighter controls on satellite
and missile technology, improved security at U.S. nuclear laboratories and
greater restrictions on sales of high-speed computers to China.
But U.S. computer firm executives say exponential increases in computer
performance have made the existing rules an unacceptable burden. They warn that
if current regulations are not loosened within the next few months, 90 percent
of their business in China, the fastest growing market for computers in the
world, would be affected adversely. More restrictions, they say, would create
commercial chaos because of the enormous bureaucracy that would be needed to
enforce new trade curbs.
U.S. law currently requires American companies to obtain permission from the
government before they can export computers that run at speeds above 2,000
MTOPS, or millions of theoretical operations per second, the industry
speedometer. The rules are intended to prevent foreign nuclear-weapons
designers from acquiring powerful computers, and the United States applies them
to 50 countries viewed as proliferation risks -- including Russia and Israel.
But the impact of the rules in China's case is magnified by the massive size of
its market and U.S. concerns about China's rise on the world stage and its
military intentions.
For sales of computers with speeds above 2,000 MTOPS, companies must provide
the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration with information on
the background of the computer's end-user and describe the intended purpose of
the computer. Government agencies, including the departments of State and
Defense, have 10
days to object to such a sale. Sales of individual computer chips faster than
1,200 MTOPS also require such permits. For computers with speeds greater than
7,000 MTOPS, exporters must apply for formal licenses, which have more
stringent reporting standards both before and after the sale.
Over the past 13 months, the U.S. government received 512 requests to export
high performance computers to China, 70 of which were denied, according to the
Commerce Department. Several of the denials were reversed on appeal. The actual
number of shipments to China was substantially lower because some deals fell
through, bringing the total number of deliveries last year to 191.
Powerful U.S. computers are used here for everything from sorting mail to
running e-mail businesses. The problem is that American computers and the tiny
microchips that drive them are getting faster every day -- and cheaper.
The U.S. government has concentrated its
efforts on controlling exports of the 500 fastest American-made computers --
supercomputers that cost tens of millions of dollars each. These are the kinds
of machines that the Department of Energy uses to manage the U.S. nuclear
arsenal and that could pose the greatest danger in foreign hands, said William
Reinsch, the undersecretary of commerce for export administration and an
outspoken advocate of increased high-technology sales abroad.
"The problem is, No. 500 keeps going up in capability," he said, adding that the calculating speed of No. 500 will nearly double this
year from 11,000 to 20,000 MTOPS.
"When the high end is going up that rapidly, you have to make adjustments to
continue your ability to do that. Otherwise, what we are doing is controlling
low-end PCs."
For example, Intel Corp. says that its Pentium III microprocessors, which will
be sold in top-of-the-line personal computers in the United
States this spring, will be so fast that export permission will be needed to
sell them to China. Indeed, by the end of the year, most PCs sold to China will
have speeds above the government threshold and will require permits, industry
estimates say.
Increasingly, personal computers are being designed so they can be upgraded
with additional high-speed chips -- a technology known as parallel processing
-- and it is becoming easier to cluster groups of computers together to work on
one task. This means that individual computers or components that fall below
export speed limits can be exported legally to China, then linked together here
into more powerful units.
U.S. computer companies do more than half their business overseas, and their
officials argue that even if U.S. trade rules were tightened, transshipments of
American products would still flow easily into China from opportunistic traders
around the
globe. In addition, they say, there is no binding international agreement to
prevent other countries from selling their own powerful computers to China if
U.S. companies are not allowed to.
A Stanford University study commissioned by the Defense and Commerce
departments in 1998 concluded that
export controls on
computers
"can remain viable for the next several years [but are] much weaker than in the
past. . . . The control regime will leak."
Another problem computer experts point out is that physicists do not need
supercomputers to make a better bomb. According to the Stanford study, most of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal was built using computers that are
"at or below the performance" of many present day computer workstations, which run in the 300-to-2,000 MTOPS
range and are widely available.
"I can't tell you there are no national security implications to exporting
high performance computers," Reinsch said.
"There are national security implications to exporting personal computers. . . .
We have to weigh costs and benefits. We also have to weigh controlability."
Reinsch's critics say his brand of pragmatism is dangerous -- that U.S.
computer companies are basically more concerned with the bottom line than
national security. Peter Leitner, an official with the Pentagon's Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, is one of those critics.
"By simply decontrolling these things in response to technological development," he said,
"there is a real cost . . . that is going to be borne by the taxpayer, going to
be borne by young people who are going to be killed unnecessarily in the future
when they come up against a weapons system that is more sophisticated than it
had to be."
Many common tools of intelligence gathering will be rendered useless if key
weapons-testing in China is done on powerful computers with sophisticated
software, rather than in
actual performance tests, Leitner said.
American firms already have sold China advanced software that, when loaded into
high-performance computers available here, can simulate the resistance a
warhead meets as it reenters the atmosphere, Leitner asserted. With that
knowledge, Chinese weapons designers can -- just as their American counterparts
did -- learn to transform primitive
"city buster" warheads into more precise
"bunker busters."
In the fourth-floor network center at the Institute of Geology here, Liu Zhi,
51, said he is baffled by fears in Washington that China and its military are a
threat to the United States. Liu said China's army is meant for defense, not
offense, and that the Chinese people have witnessed too much fighting at home
in the political campaigns of the last several decades to want war abroad.
The institute's new Sun Ultra 30 Creator
workstation, which did not require an export permit, allows scientists to map
movements of the Earth's crust and monitor earthquakes using data from a series
of ground-based sensors and a sophisticated satellite system, Liu said.
"This year, we will buy a more powerful Sun server . . . for $ 50,000," he said.
"We learn a lot from American computers." Computer engineer Liu Zhi unveils the Institute of Geology's outdated
supercomputer, which was replaced by a machine the size of a desktop unit. The
Beijing institute's new computer is 562 times faster than its old model.
GRAPHIC: PH,,MICHAEL LARIS
LOAD-DATE: March 09, 1999