Copyright 2002 Federal News Service, Inc.  
Federal News Service
February 27, 2002, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 13985 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST
 
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT STUMP (R-AZ)
 
LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES:
 
GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, UNITED STATES ARMY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND;
 
PETER RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
 


BODY:
REP. ROBERT STUMP (R-AZ): Please come to order.

Today the committee meets to receive testimony regarding ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and the overall posture of U.S. forces within Central Command. I am pleased to welcome General Tommy Franks, Commander In Chief of the U.S. Central Command, and Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Before we start I'd like to first recognize a special guest that we have with us today, and that's Mrs. Cathy Franks.

Mrs. Franks, if you would stand, we would like to acknowledge your presence and we welcome you and we're glad to have you with us today.

(Applause.)

General Franks, a mere 11 months ago you sat in that same chair and we had a good discussion about the threats to U.S. interests in your part of the world. I don't think anyone at that time could have predicted that we would be engaged in a full scale combat in your area of responsibility less than a year later, much less in Afghanistan. Four months into Operating Enduring Freedom, our armed forces have performed this task with distinction and honor. They have routed the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda's chairs from power in Afghanistan and are in pursuit across the globe.

However, despite a 75,000 strong coalition military force contributing to our war effort in Central Asia, the region is probably no more secure than it was a year ago. Indeed, many of the threats remain and some have grown. The threat of instability in the region has increased over the past year. Tensions between India and Pakistan have risen and their shared border is concentrated with massive military build ups on both sides. It is obvious the United Status faces difficult and pressing challenges within the Central Command area of responsibility.

We welcome the opportunity to have an update on how we're doing in meeting these challenges, including our ongoing operations in Afghanistan. General Franks, before we start let me first turn to Mr. Skelton, our ranking member, for any remarks he may wish to make.

REP. IKE SKELTON (D-MO): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and let me join you in welcoming today's witness General Tommy Franks.

A special welcome to his wife Cathy Franks. It's good for you to be with us today and we hope you enjoy the proceedings. Or course and thank you Mr. Peter Rodman, the Assistant Secretary of Defense on International Security Affairs for being with us.

Now, last week, Mr. Chairman, I had the privilege of visiting the Central Command to receive briefings from General Franks and his staff and I want to thank General Franks for the courtesy he extended me and to let you know that all of us -- all of us -- are very proud of the general and everyone in his command for the way that he has conducted Operation Enduring Freedom. One has to be impressed with the professionalism and the dedication, General, that your command has demonstrated. Make no mistake about it, our success should not obscure the fact that this has been a very difficult operation and one of the challenges it has -- is involving moving personnel and equipment long distances, establishing a coalition of very diverse nations and conducting military operations in a very dangerous and hostile environment.

I also want to thank you for your efforts in keeping Congress informed. I think you've done a first-rate job of that, about the progress that you made in the operation. We look forward to hearing your testimony and we hope you will let us know what you need from Congress to continue Operation Enduring Freedom and prepare for any future operations. In particular, I hope you would address some short issues here, the first dealing with engagement. You and your predecessors in Central Command have traveled extensively throughout the area in meeting the military and civilian leaders in the whole region.

This engagement has no doubt been critical in establishing the coalition of over 50 nations that have joined in this effort and obtaining access for coalition forces. I hope you would comment about the engagement efforts that you and your predecessors have sought.

Second, the force structure. Now, last August the secretary and chief of staff both testified that the Army was 40,000 soldiers short of the unit strength necessary to perform all its mission. And since September 11th the other Services have also indicated a need for additional personnel.

And clearly, Operation Enduring Freedom has placed great demands on American forces, especially special operations forces. Would you give us your view of the need for additional troops, both conventional and special operations?

Further, in the area of equipment, Operation Enduring Freedom has required us to move forces long distances to diverse locations in short period of time, and on top of that to sustain those forces and maintain that equipment. I would appreciate any thoughts you might have on shortages of equipment supplies, spare parts and the like, things where we can help you with.

And last is technology. As with the previous conflicts, this effort of yours has shown the value of investment in research and development, such as precision guided missiles and UAVs. Any comments you might have on that. Plus any thoughts you might have that you would care to share with us about future operations.

And I thank you so much, General, for being a truly great soldier. We appreciate you. We appreciate all those in your command. I'm convinced history will treat you well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. STUMP: Thank you, Mr. Skelton.

Thanks. The entirety of your statement will be printed in the record. But before we start, let me turn to Secretary Rodman, I think, to make a few remarks before we get started.

Mr. Secretary.

MR. PETER RODMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a privilege to appear before this committee, and I thank you for the opportunity.

I don't have a written statement. But I would like to make an opening remark or two if I may. My portfolio as Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs covers regional policies around the world, in fact, most of the world outside of Europe. So my area of responsibility includes most of General Franks' area of responsibility.

I'm happy to answer policy questions as they may come up during this discussion. But I did want to make one general point of a general nature as a kind of backdrop to the report of General Franks, which we are all looking forward to hearing.

The point I wanted to make is the point that the chairman began with, asking six months ago, or a year ago, who would have imagined that the commander-in-chief of central command would be coming here to this committee reporting on a war that the United States was waging in Afghanistan.

Secretary Rumsfeld, as you know, likes to talk about expecting the unexpected. Secretary Rumsfeld mentions that, you know, in his own confirmation hearings a little more than a year ago nobody asked about Afghanistan. And he likes to tell the story of Vice-President Cheney, when Vice-President Cheney was having his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense in 1989 no one asked about Iraq. And yet within a year and a half we were in a major war in Iraq.

This is a feature of the post cold war world that we live in. We can identify some threats today. We know where some of them are likely. The president mentioned a few of them in his State of the Union Address. But a lot of them we don't know where exactly they will come from, or the form that they will take.

During the cold war, of course, we did know where the main threat came from and we could gear our planning, most of our planning to that threat. Today it is different. And that's why the president and Secretary Rumsfeld have concluded that we need what they call a capabilities based force, not a threat based force. That's a way of saying that, again, we don't know exactly where the next threat will come from. So we need to have capabilities that are robust and versatile and agile and capable, that gives us the ability to project force quickly and decisively anywhere in the world where a threat might arise.

We have seen that kind of force, and that kind of capability demonstrated in what General Franks and his colleagues have accomplished in Afghanistan. And we will see in his report, I know some -- his accounting of some of the requirements of maintaining such a capability in his area of responsibility.

But, clearly, it's a global necessity. And this is the kind of military that the Administration, and I know the Congress and this committee, are united in wanting to maintain for the United States, not only to enable us to carry forward the global war on terrorism but to safeguard the country against threats and challenges wherever the next one may come from.

That's my opening comment. I thank you for your courtesy. I'm happy to be of any assistance I can be to the committee this afternoon.

REP. STUMP: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Let me remind the members that that additional microphone in front of you is live at all times.

General Franks, the floor is yours. You may proceed in any way you might see fit.

GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS: Chairman Stump, and Congressman Skelton and members of the committee, I'm honored to have the opportunity to appear before the committee today to talk about our region, the central region, to provide you with an update on CENCOM's role in the global war on terrorism.

And, Mr. Chairman, a special thanks to you for acknowledging the presence of my wife of now more than 33 years. I'm honored to have her with me. And I will offer her a continuing praise for the support and care that she gives our young people in uniform as they serve this nation.

Central region continues to be diverse, dynamic, volatile, dangerous. As this committee knows, 25 nations involved in this region, including Egypt and Jordan on the west, the Horn of Africa further to the south, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan and the Central Asian states, a total of about 6.5 million square miles, about a half a billion people, three major religions, 18 ethnic groups, and per capita incomes which vary from a few thousand dollars to tens of thousands -- a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of dollars per year.

This region, again, as the committee knows, has been and remains home to some of the great threats to our national security by way of terrorism. I will say that the region hosts three of the seven nations on the current State Department list of those sponsoring terrorism. We continue to have issues with the desires of hegemons (ph) in Iraq and Iran. And we continue to worry our way through the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction both within and from this area. Prior to 11th September of the past year on any given day in our region we would have 30 naval vessels, about 175 military aircraft, as I have told the committee before, and today it's interesting -- and perhaps 20,000 topside, 25,000 troops in the region. As we sit here today, we have a bit over 100 naval vessels involved over in our region, representing 10 nations, more than 600 aircraft representing five nations, and about 80,000 coalition people.

I am indeed pleased and honored to command this coalition force. I am proud of their commitment, their competence, their success, and the sacrifices they have made in support of our efforts.

If you look at history, the Secretary of Defense directed on 12th September, the day following the attacks on our country, that Central Command should work with the staff in OSD and with the Joint Staff to prepare credible military options in response to the events of 11th September.

I briefed the secretary on 20th of September, some eight days later, on the concept, the mission, and the proposed time line for the operations we see unfolding today. I briefed the president the next day on 21st, and that concept was approved. We completed our planning, and had forces mostly staged by 31st September. The plan, including final target sets, sequencing and force requirements, was approved by the president on 2nd October. He issued the order at that time to attack, beginning on 7th October. Combat operations did, in fact, begin on 7th October, 26 days after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

As I sit here, I could not be more pleased with the professionalism of the decision process that led us into this current war on terrorism. First-rate work by the principals associated in the decision process, by their staffs and by all the government agencies of the United States of America.

As I reflect on the concept that we initiated involving Afghanistan, we first worked as Congressman Skelton said, to arrange basing, staging and overflight -- I'll describe that in a more detail later. And our plan had as its concept the use of operational lines. An approach that would take into account simultaneously, not sequentially, direct attack using all means of Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces inside Afghanistan, simultaneously work to provide humanitarian assistance to some 26 million people inside Afghanistan, operational fires which we talk -- we describe as air-to-ground operations. That being the much reported work by our Air Force and our Navy and our coalition pilots as they have delivered more than 18,000 munitions into the country of Afghanistan. Reconnaissance operations and direct action operations by special operating forces with which the committee is familiar. Support to opposition groups, both lethal and non-lethal support and a variety of others which I think, sir, are adequately reflected in my written posture statement. And I'll not waste the committee's time by repeating them at this point.

The purpose of our initiation of operations was to build pressure inside Afghanistan with the objective of destroying the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban inside that country. On the 7th October when we started this operation more than 80 percent of Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the IMU, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan had free reign, in the country of Afghanistan.

On 22nd December, 76 days later, Chairman Hamid Karzai took the reins as the interim government or -- of the interim government for Afghanistan and that was established in Kabul.

Our continuing operations, because they are far from completed in Afghanistan, are designed to gain and exploit. Number one; to gain and exploit intelligence information to preempt and or disrupt planned terrorist operations.

Secondly, to positively confirm or deny as necessary and eliminate the existence of weapons of mass destruction inside Afghanistan. Conduct military operations to eliminate all remaining Al-Qaeda and Taliban pockets of resistance in Afghanistan. Will continue to support the interim government and transitional governments of Afghanistan and will continue to conduct non conventional warfare operations inside Afghanistan until we have met our objectives.

Our coalition, as we speak today, involves 68 nations, 27 of whom are represented 24 hours a day by national liaison cells down in Tampa. It is a cohesive and committed coalition and I am very proud of it. It in fact continues to grow. If we look at the force and the assets that we have employed in Afghanistan, it's interesting I think to note that they come from 267 bases, from more than 40 nations, and they overflew 46 nations in order to get to that particular part of the world. The arithmetic of that is just interesting to me because is says something about the ability of the interagency team of this country to coordinate and to cooperate with nations around the world in order to achieve the basing, staging and over-flight requirements that we needed for this operation.

The attacks of 11th September have impressed on, I think all of us, the importance of taking the fight to the enemy and maintaining the initiative. Our command remains on the offensive as we speak today as part of operation Enduring Freedom. There's much left to be done. And to quote the president, "It will truly take as long as it takes." Now at the same time these operations are ongoing inside Afghanistan, central command continued operations elsewhere in the AOR. Operation Southern Watch continued. Joint Task Force South West Asia which is a -- one of our subordinate joint task forces, continues to enforce operations -- or to enforce sanctions against Iraq to include the No Fly Zone. Over the past year there have been 16,000 sorties committed to that task by our great airmen, more than 7,000 of them in Iraq. At the same time our Naval forces have conducted maritime interdiction operations in the Northern Arabian Gulf to include coalition members and those operations once again, against Iraq in support of United Nations sanctions. They boarded 1,275 vessels in the last 12 months and they diverted for smuggling 112 of those vessels.

In Kuwait, yet another combined joint task force operates as part of our command and continues operation Desert Spring which offers the defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression and that force remains somewhere above 3,000 men and women in uniform on a daily basis.

Sir, I will conclude by only saying that the real story of this operation and of all of our operations in the central region is a story of human spirit. It is about U.S. and coalition men and women in uniform and it's about civilian patriots. They come from many nations but they're unified by their sense of duty and by their selfless service. Our pride in these people is boundless, our thanks the same. They are the reason that at the end of the day this campaign will succeed. The will and the support of the American people represented by members of the Congress and our commander-in- chief have left nothing to be desired. The men and women of central command express profound appreciation to the American people, to this body, to this committee, to the president and the secretary of defense, for continuing steadfast resolve, support and leadership.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to take your questions.

REP. STUMP: Thank you, General Franks.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, the Ranking Member, Mr. Skelton.

REP. SKELTON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I do have a few questions of the general.

Conducting operation Enduring Freedom has placed great demands on our air assets and do we currently have a shortage of any of the airlift aircraft and tankers which are necessary to move the people, equipment that you need?

GEN. FRANKS: Congressman Skelton, the answer is, I believe that I would -- I believe that I would second the work that is being done by the United States Air Force, by Air Mobility Command and Transportation Command when I say that strategic mobility and our ability to lift remains a concern. I think that this budget contains funding to raise the number of C-17s to be put in the inventory as well as providing for the updating that needs to be done with the C-5 fleet. And so, yes sir, I do perceive it to be a problem and I will welcome the addition of the C-17s to the fleet.

REP. SKELTON: Thank you. On page four of your prepared testimony there is a sentence that says, "Iran continues to view itself as the natural of the Islamic world." And in light of that statement and in light of the president's reference to that country in his State of the Union address, would you give us your thoughts on the prognosis of where we are heading in that part of your AOR?

GEN. FRANKS: Congressman, I would be pleased to. Perhaps I'll make a couple of comments and then turn to Secretary Rodman who maybe able to provide some greater insight. My view is that Iran remains a difficult issue for us to look at for a very simple reason and that simple reason is that there has been over the last several years a moderation of the behavior we see in Iran. President Khatami provides evidence in the face of a very conservative guardian counsel and republican guard force inside Iran of interest in moderating the approach that Iran takes in getting along with the world community. That's the good side.

The bad side or the more difficult side is the one wherein we see a continuing investment in weapons of mass destruction. A continuing proliferation in -- of terrorism to include the Hezbollah as one example, and so what we find is we find a mixture of possibility for the future along with recalcitrance which provides every evidence of continuing along the paths of the past.

Secretary?

MR. RODMAN: There was a brief period when it seemed that Iran and the United States were pursuing parallel courses on the Afghanistan issue in the diplomacy that was taking place at the United Nations, we could see this. Because at that stage, we were both opposed to the Taliban, so there was a parallelism of interest. I think what has happened is, that once that mission was accomplished, the relationship between Iran and the United States in Afghanistan, became very competitive once again, very quickly and General Franks himself can tell you a lot of details about how Iran is playing hardball on the ground with its clients within Afghanistan, harboring Al-Qaeda, were fleeing the country and so forth.

So, sad to say, these hopes for a possible convergence of American and Iranian policy have not really been borne out. And in addition, as the general said, we see them continuing to develop their weapons of mass destruction. We see them continuing to support terrorism in other parts of the region and at the same time again, as the general mentioned, the internal -- the hopes that some of us had for some internal reform have also not been borne out because President Khatami has been frustrated. The bottom line is the policies in Iran seem to be determined by the hard line elements. The center of gravity of Iranian politics seems to be on the hard line.

And what you see in fact, is some unrest. You see student demonstrations and riots after some soccer games in the Fall and you see anti-regime sentiment. So the struggle within Iran is not just between the reformers -- you know the clerical reformers and the clerical hard liners, but you see I think, the beginning of anti- regime sentiment, at least displaying itself. And so all of these reasons I think, lead us to again not to have great hopes, if we ever did, about an improvement of relations with this regime.

REP. SKELTON: A last question for the general which is a procurement question. Several years ago we in Congress authorized appropriated funds for a new commanding control aircraft for the central command. Is that working?

GEN. FRANKS: Congressman Skelton, I hope it's working. I know for a fact the aircraft was bought.

I know that we, in central command, have put considerable energy in assuring that the command in control, the communications architecture that needs to be in the aircraft is coming into the aircraft. It remains to be seen what the positioning of that aircraft will be. Whether it comes to us to support as a command and control platform or whether it's placed elsewhere.

REP. SKELTON: In other words, you don't have it yet?

GEN. FRANKS: Don't have it yet, no, sir.

REP. SKELTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. STUMP: The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.

REP. CURT WELDON (R-PA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary and general, thank you for being here and general, thank you for the outstanding work you're doing. We're proud of you and all of our troops and I've been trying to get over there and I'll eventually get to Afghanistan to see the good work you're doing.

GEN. FRANKS: Yes, sir.

REP. WELDON: General, I do have some very serious concerns and I have three specific questions that I'd like you to answer for me and as you probably know, I led a delegation of 11 members to meet with King Zahir Shah at his home outside of Rome in October of last year, about a month after the 9/11 attack. We met with him and then we met at the same location with the leaders of the Northern Alliance. Our purpose was to assess the capability of the King to play a role in the reunification and we heard at length about his plans for the loya jirga which, to my understanding, will take place in June.

As you know, and I don't know the exact date, but in mid March the King is supposed to return to Afghanistan. I have heard that neither he, nor the current chairman of the interim Afghan government, Mr. Karzai, have adequate security or a bodyguard detachments on a 24 hour basis.

So my first question is, what is being done to provide adequate security for these two leaders, which I think is critical? And you know, there are a number of groups who would like to take the King out for fear that that will totally upset the balance of the U.N. and our ability to provide stable security in that country.

The second concern I have is regarding the interference in Afghanistan by its neighbors, that could lead to chaos and possibly a new civil war. There have been numerous press reports that a Iran- backed militant networks, including a group called Quefa-e Mohammed (ph) are also known as -- or called the Afghan Hezbollah have moved into Afghanistan near the strategic city of Mazar-e Sharif.

It has also been reported that some of these Iranian activities might be coordinated with forces loyal to the Afghan interim defense minister, General Fahim. So two questions. What efforts are being made by SINCOM to eradicate the Iranian militant groups in the Mazar-e Sharif area?

And the second question. Have you or any of your subordinates asked General Fahim to take action to remove Quefa-e-Mohammed and other Iranian groups out of the Mazar area?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, thank you.

The last question first. We are in a dialogue with Minister of Defense, Fahim Khan daily and the most recent information that I have is that rather than permitting the groups with are Iranian backed, as you suggested, from being allowed to remain isolated as functioning entities, Fahim Khan's opinion is that they should be integrated into the force which is being built. That is my understanding right now, and that is the desire of Chairman Karzai.

As a general point, I would say on the same subject, that if Afghanistan has essentially two problems from a security perspective. One is the difficulties that they face internally, because of ethnicity and because of tribal allegiance and affiliation. I think history will reflect that the last time there was a consolidated and consistent view in Afghanistan about the present and the future, was a great many centuries ago. And so, one of the issues to be faced inside Afghanistan will be the contending that goes on between the various factions in the country.

Sir, the second is the one that you mentioned as part of your question and that is external influence. External influence, certainly the one you mentioned by Iran, there are other external influences which portend possible problems. It is possible for us to see Pakistan as an external influence on what we see inside Pakistan. It is also possible to see India. It is also possible to see Russia. And the frontline states, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and so forth.

Now that is not to say that all of the influence that we may see exerted inside Afghanistan will be negative influence. I'm not implying that at all but I am saying that the nexus between the internals of Afghanistan and the contention that I described, with influences from outside Afghanistan, provide Chairman Hamid Karzai and post loya jirga a transitional government something with which to contend.

With respect of what central command is doing about that, as I said we work with Fahim Khan and Chairman Karzai on a daily basis, to keep our eyes on what is going on, on the inside of Afghanistan, and we'll continue to do that. We also work through the State Department and a variety of other nations who have, in some cases, very good contacts with some of these outside influences and so in an inter agency way we approach countries where we perceive that these influences may be originating.

With respect to the question that you asked about the security of the King and in fact, about Hamid Karzai. We have been involved and will remain involved in the training that is done of security forces inside Afghanistan, for the purpose of providing security. I'll give you one example. Right now, the International Security Assistance force is building a force which I believe stands today at 280 men, multi ethnic, which will be -- I think we would toss around the term, the palace guard. But one of the things that needs to happen, even for the local security inside Kabul of the government complexes to include the palace, and to include the headquarters where these senior interim government officials work, there is a necessity to provide security for that, and we are also involved in providing training support and so forth to stand up this Afghan capability so that Afghanistan can begin to look after itself. And sir, that's the best I can do I think, with the questions that you asked.

REP. WELDON: Just one quick follow up. So you're saying we have no knowledge of a 24 hour a day guard service? Because my understanding is that that does not exist for Karzai right now and I am extremely concerned for both him, and when the King returns, that that could be the beginning of a powder keg for that whole region. We're not providing that service right now?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, we are not -- we the United States of America are not providing the security directly that you describe, for Karzai. On the other hand, I will say that we are intimately involved in working with the forces there to improve the security that is provided for Karzai.

REP. STUMP: Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

REP. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, we're all aware that in the past, Central Command would have been unable to accomplish its mission and meet emergent requirement without reserve component contributions. Will you explain if this situation's still valid today? Also, what actions do you anticipate by the services to maintain the contribution by these reserve forces. To Central Command weren't there initially then one year mobilization orders expire in October or November of this year?

GEN. FRANKS: Congressman Ortiz, may I ask you to say -- to ask me the first question again. I want to be sure -- I think you're asking about the way our components of Central Command are functioning in their alignment with the services, Army, Air Force, Navy, and then the second was about the reserve forces.

REP. ORTIZ: That's correct.

GEN. FRANKS: Okay.

REP. ORTIZ: I think they complement your mission of what you do. And what's going to happen after they expire?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, the reserve forces that we see deployed in Central Command, and in fact, they're not only deployed, they are being employed in the operations that we have going on in Afghanistan today. And I don't know what the number of reservists currently involved in this effort is. I don't know that it is substantial. Perhaps the region I don't know is because I can't tell the difference between a trooper that belongs to the 3rd special forces group, and one of which belongs to the 19th special forces group, which as you know, congressman, is a reserve unit.

When I visit these people, and I believe that there are members of this committee who have visited on the ground inside Afghanistan, it is amazing to me that you can't tell them apart. And so number one, sir, the contribution is tremendous. Number two, I think that we are being well served, and, sir, will continue to be served by these reserve component forces as they operate inside my theatre. And so, sir, I guess that would be a suggestion that this -- that the use of these forces should continue. And, sir, that is my -- that's my personal view.

REP. ORTIZ: Their training will be appropriate to be able to carry the mission in Afghanistan. And I'm talking about the reserves and the National Guard, whoever they might be.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, my experience were the ones that we have operating in the AOR is that they come trained and ready to do the business. You know, it's interesting that much has been made of the unconventional nature of this fight inside Afghanistan. Unconventional because we have seen so much work by special forces and by special operating forces. And when I say that I can't tell the difference between a reserve outfit coming in on the special forces side from what we have had there for a while on the active side, then I think, sir, that is very instructive to your question. They do, in fact, come trained and ready to do the work.

As you know also, Congressman Ortiz., on the operation's southern watch side we continue to fly both reservists and National Guard pilots up into Iraq in forcing the sanctions against Iraq. And, sir, that, although not noticed a lot, just continues while we're working our way through Afghanistan.

The final point that I'd make has to do with our components, because, you know, a unified command like Central Command has its own Army forces, Navy forces, Marine forces and Air Forces. And in each case, these forces are commanded by an Army three star general, Air Force three star, Navy three star. Those headquarters of ours, the ones with whom we work, are located in the region. They have been in the region in face-to-face, day-to-day contact with forces both active and reserve, and I use them as a thermometer to tell me the quality of the reserve forces that are being introduced by the Air Force, the Army and the Navy. And my sense from them is what I have given you. I think we're getting trained and ready forces.

REP. ORTIZ: Thank you, my time ran out -- run out, but I think that you will allow us to submit some questions from the record, Mr. Chairman.

REP. STUMP: Certainly. Without objection. I appreciate the fine work you all are doing.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, thank you.

REP. STUMP: The chair recognizes one more member before we break for this vote.

Mr. Saxton, New Jersey.

REP. JIM SAXTON (R-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Franks and Secretary Rodman, thank you very much for being here with us today to share your thoughts on the current, and perhaps the future situation.

I have two questions. General Franks, as much as you can, would you fill us in -- I guess I should say that as chairman of the MILCON Subcommittee I'm particularly interested in what plans we have in terms of permanent basing changes that you may be contemplating. And if you can't talk about it in this forum that's fine, we'll do it another time, but I just wanted to express my -- at least express my interest, and if there's anything you can tell us today that's fine.

The second question. In fact and in perception, we have had some real military successes obviously in Afghanistan. We've been successful in destroying infrastructure. We've been successful in capturing members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. We've been successful in dispersing others. We've been successful in putting in place the interim government and making arrangements, perhaps, hopefully for a foreign government to be put in place. Those are real successes.

The same time as I listen to and read statements by leaders in various parts of the world, including this AOR, I have to ask myself questions about how we move forward. Military option is just one option that's available to us, and I'm interested in both of your perspectives relative to other parts of the AOR in dealing with the same group of people and the same problems that we dealt with in Afghanistan. Frankly, I just returned from Russia, and the Russians are very, very concerned about future actions. And after hearing their perspective I kind of understand what some of their concerns are. So if you could just elaborate on those two issues for us.

Mr. Secretary?

MR. RODMAN: Well, the second question relates to other problems of a similar nature and --

REP. SAXTON: The second question relates to how we move forward. The president has said, and I agree, this problem's far from over. But, you know, I hope there are some options available to us other than the shadow of Afghanistan.

MR. RODMAN: It is true. And this is one of the things we owe to General Franks and his colleagues, is that American credibility has gone way up. And so when we say something our persuasiveness has gone up, and so our diplomatic options have expanded as well as our military options. I mean, I -- it's not for me to say very much about what the president may yet decide about where American military forces are engaged. But you can see in many parts of the world where we are doing different kinds of things. Not always sending American troops, but helping other countries, friendly countries, who are, themselves, more ready to take on terrorism problems in their own domain.

This is a global campaign. And as you point out, sir, there are different kinds of things we can do. It often takes the form of security assistance or counter-terrorism assistance, helping friendly countries do what they're more willing to do. There's the whole financial set of -- the financial crackdown against flows of funds to terrorists. This is an ongoing operation, and I think, you know, again, our leverage with other countries in pushing for this kind of cooperation has gone way up.

The Russia case, we certainly have a new relationship with Russia. It's changed in many ways since September 11th. And we don't endorse Russian policy in Chechnya, but obviously there is some -- one thing the Russians feel that they have in common with us, is that they too are concerned, and legitimately so, to some degree about terrorism. So as you say, there are diplomatic options that have opened up to us, and not only because of September 11th but because of the effectiveness that we have demonstrated and the leadership that we have demonstrated on the whole issue.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I'll would -- I'll talk to you for a second about the permanent basing thoughts that we have right now and what we're discussing. And I agree with exactly what Secretary Rodman said, and I will offer a couple more.

If you look at just our area in the central region then you find several states which remain of concern to us. And I think those states come us no surprise to members of this committee. We look at Sudan, we look at Somalia, we look at Yemen. We certainly look at Iran and Iraq as proliferaters of weapons of mass destruction.

And I think the approach that our government may take in any one of these countries will not be like we have seen. We will not use the Afghanistan model as sort of a, "Well, then we'll apply kinetics here next and then we'll bomb something here." I think that the coupling of diplomacy and our arm on the defense side together will be in a different mix in each one of these areas.

I thought the secretary's point about states where there is will to solve a terrorist problem, but there may not be capacity to solve a terrorist problem, perhaps we can help in a state like that with training, for example. I think it's conceivable that Yeoman, who has been -- has worked with us hand in glove since the beginning of this operation may request assistance from us in the way of training and so forth, and we may well suggest to the policy level that such training be provided.

And so, sir, I -- that is the answer of where we go next. I think that there may be a view that says we will do these -- address the problems we have sequentially rather than simultaneously, and I'm not at all sure, Congressman, that that will be our approach. I think the United States of America, with this coalition, will approach many problems simultaneously and they will be approached in different ways. And with no intention at all to be coy in response to your question, that actually is where I think where we'll be.

Now, in terms of permanency of basing and staging, if you look around -- if you -- and I think this committee if familiar with the map that I've laid out. But if you look at the places where we are receiving basing and staging permission right now, you'll find, for example, Uzbekistan, Karshi Kanabad. That is a facility that we use for combat search and rescue. It's also a place from which we stage humanitarian assistance into Afghanistan. I don't know that we'll retain in a permanent MILCON sense facilities in Karshi Kanabad, but for the foreseeable future I think we'll support our operations out of there and, Congressman, I would expect that we would be wanting to spend money there for that purpose. I think, sir, we'll see the same thing in Monassakergistan (ph) as a major northern basing and staging hub for our work.

I think if you look at Pakistan in the area around Jakulabad (ph) and perhaps others -- yes?

REP. STUMP: I hate to interrupt you, but we've got less than five minutes to make this vote. It's going to be necessary for us to recess for about 15 minutes.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I'm longwinded but I think that gets to the point. We are going to work each case individually, Congressman.

REP. STUMP: Thank you, sir. When we return we'll resume with Mr. Taylor and Mr. Thornberry.

(Vote recess.)

REP. STUMP: The committee will please come to order.

Gentlemen, I don't know how much time we're going to have. They've got some arguments going on the floor and this vote is still up. We may have a vote in five minutes or maybe 25 minutes, so I think we may as well get started.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

REP. GENE TAYLOR (D-MS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Franks and Secretary Rodman, thank you for being here. Let me first of all congratulate you on your great success and I hope you will take the remarks that follow as a challenge to follow up on that great success. I remember having read "American Caesar" the biography of General McArthur and the biography of General Eisenhower by Stephen Ambrose, of that name.

One of the things that was pointed out in both books is, firstly, military greatness followed by what I think history will show is probably equally great efforts on their parts, using the incredible influence they had as the commanders in those two theaters, to demand fundamental changes, first in Germany and then in Japan after the war.

Things like when Eisenhower called in the German reporters and said, "We're going to have a free press here," they couldn't have dreamt of that for the past 15 years. "We're going to have free labor unions." Looked the reporters in the eye and said, "If my guys are doing something wrong, I want you to write about it but be honest about it." In Japan calling the emperor in, in McArthur's case, and saying, "You're going to treat women as human beings. We're going to break the bond between the government and business. You're going to have free elections."

I say that and then I think that is the glaring omission in some of our most recent efforts that I saw with the Gulf War, but that's water under the bridge. But in the case now of Afghanistan, what fundamental changes in Afghanistan are we as a nation going to seek and hopefully demand? Are we going to see to it that there really are free elections? Are we going to see it, particularly irksome to me, that the opium and heroin traffic ceases? If we're getting ready to get involved in Colombia with the nexus being drugs, don't tell me that we're going to turn a blind eye in Afghanistan because the guys who are on our side just so happen to be in the drug business.

What are we going to do so that, you know, 30 years or now from now another history book has you right up there with General McArthur and General Eisenhower, saying that you -- one of the things that you used your incredible influence to do was to change fundamentally the way things are in Afghanistan so that we don't have to go back in 10 years?

GEN. FRANKS: Congressman, it's a good question. It's a fundamental question about a fundamental issue. If you look at Afghanistan, the -- I think history will reflect that -- at least the history which informed the campaign plan that we decided to use in this fight in Afghanistan, will reflect that there are some characteristics of periods of stability inside Afghanistan, not many, and perhaps the most effective was about 320 or so B.C. with Alexander The Great and there was fundamental change as a result of Alexander The Great's conquest in Afghanistan.

And then you come through history and you reach the Soviet experience. Nine years, 10 years, the introduction of 620,000 forces in Afghanistan seeking to make a change. The loss of 15,000 lives, the wounding of some 50,000 and the results of that I think speak for themselves. And so upon that platform we have to decide what fundamental change would we as a national priority seek to see in Afghanistan? And I think representation is one of those changes that we would seek to see.

And, sir, if I can I'll use this point to plug the work done by the State Department in setting up and arranging for the Bond Commission, which set conditions to have a government for Afghanistan. Someone asked me last week if Afghanistan is going to make it, and I said I don't know. I'm not sure whether they'll make it, but I do know they have a chance. And so I think as we look toward the future, what we want to do is we want to provide -- we, the uniformed side of this, the defense side of it -- and Secretary Rodman may want to add to this also.

What we want to do is we want to do our military work inside Afghanistan and we want to support the policy decisions that come out of the policy bodies in this government with respect to what the long- term in Afghanistan looks like. I can give you a personal view and that's what I will do. My personal view is that we should do what we can to set conditions for a more stable Afghanistan so that 26 million people have a right to expect a future that's better than the past that they've been living.

The military side of that is -- down at the operational level here's what we're doing. We know that a piece of what goes on in Afghanistan's security is gong to have to do with a national army for Afghanistan, and so we are working very hard with Chairman Cazi and with the Tajik Faheem Kahn (sp) to decide what the views are on what that national army should look like. But what we think we know is that it should be multi-tribal and it should be multi-ethnic in order to break down some of the "warlord-ism" which we have seen for so many years inside Afghanistan.

Very simplistically, it would perhaps involve the bringing for training of forces from each of the very senior opposition leaders inside Afghanistan and placing them in a mix, if you will, so that that force then can represent a national government in Afghanistan and have a chance of maintaining security in Afghanistan to provide for a future.

I think your question, sir, is at one level and I've given you an operational answer to your question. But let me ask if Secretary Rodman has thoughts about what the policy may want to be.

MR. RODMAN: The short answer is that we have a lot of influence there. Even while we don't really -- we don't want to impose. I mean, our job is to help the Afghans get it right. And General Franks was correct to point to the Bond negotiation as an extremely positive sign that the Afghans may have learned some lessons from their own history. But I'm sure -- I know we were there behind the scenes helping, assisting, brokering, helping them get right, forming a representative government as has been discussed.

The next test will be the loya jirga which will come in the spring where they will establish a transitional government for another two years. So there too, I think the trick for us is to exert some influence because we have plenty of influence, but not to impose, help them ensure a kind of proper balance among the different groups, encourage them to unify an army, to form a unified army. I think we know what the problems are, what the risks are, what their weaknesses are. But I think we do have a chance. I mean, it's certainly too early to conclude that this isn't going to work. But we don't want to impose. It's another lesson we can learn from history, which is any foreign country that tries to impose its will in some overt way isn't well received. But so far we've handled it with great delicacy and it's a tribute to General Frank's diplomatic skill in addition to his other skills that we've been able to play. He himself as well as our diplomats behind the scene to sort of steer them and help the Afghans to get it right. Right now, they need a lot of help and again, our help is something -- it's our way of influencing them and our way of pointing them in the right direction. So I'm optimistic.

I just wanted to mention as a footnote. You mentioned the drug issue and this is certainly a priority of this administration. On January 16th, the Afghan authority prohibited narcotics production and just a couple of days ago, President Bush notified Congress that he was to exercise his authority to provide counter narcotics assistance to Afghanistan. So this is obviously one of the things we want to make sure they get right.

REP. STUMP: Mrs. Davis of Virginia is recognized.

REP. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General, for being here and I just want to say that we're just so proud of you and our men and women in the military and the job that they're doing over in Afghanistan and around the world.

I am concerned -- you know, we hear a lot on TV, the media. We've heard the president mention -- we've heard Secretary Rumsfeld mention Iraq and I'm not going to go into anything on operational planning because I understand the sensitivity of it. But what I do want to ask is I'm concerned about our capabilities to muster the number of troops that we might need, the number of forces we might need if we had to go back to Iraq. And if we have to go into a forcible entry situation and we require ground forces, how would our current commitments and our current end-strength affect your options?

GEN. FRANKS: Ma'am, it's very difficult for me to answer right. My sense is that we would never, as a nation -- I do not believe that my commander-in-chief would ever embark us on a campaign where we do not have adequate capacity to do that. As you know, Central Command is not what we call a force-holding command and so, what happens is Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines and special operations provide forces to us.

My sense is that the service chiefs and the service secretaries have and will bring before this committee and counterparts in the other body the requirements and the requests that are necessary in order to meet the requirements not only for my theater, as you mentioned, but also for the other theaters. And so, not intended at all to be circuitous, but my sense is that the forces available to meet my planning contingencies -- that the forces are available to meet my planning contingencies. Secretary, would you want to add to that?

MR. RODMAN: No, I wouldn't want to add to that.

REP. DAVIS: It wasn't a trick question. Sitting here on this committee, we've heard that if we had to go back into a Gulf War situation, we just don't have what we had then. And I guess that's why I've got a concern.

MR. RODMAN: Let me -- I will add because this talks also to a question asked earlier by Congressman Skelton and one we've discussed offline. The services, I think last year, indicated a desire for increased end-strength and the number that Congressman Skelton earlier is just the number that I am familiar with. 40,000 in the Army. I think that each of the services right now will be in the middle of trying to form a view of what the end-strength requirement may be for that individual service. I think that the reason that this review will take place is because we have learnt a lot in Afghanistan. We have learnt things about force composition. We have learnt about force structure and I think that the services will rush to try to take the lessons that we've learnt to decide how should they approach the question of end-strength, active and reserve end-strength. And what I told Congressman Skelton and I'll place on the record is since I am a force receiver as a combatant commander, I will support the request and recommendations that are made by the service secretaries and the service chiefs because they have to support me and when I sense that they believe in adequate structure, then I will support them before this committee.

REP. DAVIS: Thank you, General. If we could go to this subject of Saudi Arabia, to what extent -- if we were forced to leave right now, to what extent can we replace the air base there -- and everybody knows I'm going to get to carriers eventually here -- so if you had the option in this circumstance, would you rely on aircraft carriers to expand your air presence?

GEN. FRANKS: Ma'am, as you know, we will always determine a desired approach in any of our planning and then we will determine alternate approaches. And this is not necessarily related to any specific country or any specific war plan in my region. But one of the considerations that we always have in the execution of a plan is basing and staging. I would expand on your question by saying that it will not only be for Saudi Arabia, but given our current basing and staging conditions in my region, we plan alternate basing and staging from each country within the region.

REP. DAVIS: Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. STUMP: The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Snyder.

REP. SNYDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, from being here this afternoon.

General, I want to ask you several questions about the access of the American media to your area of operations. I know there have been some stories here recently. But if I was one of your company commanders, what would my instructions be as far as an American reporter wanting to accompany American ground troops into an area of operational action or to visit sites of previous action, such as the bombing sites? What would my instructions be?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, your instructions would be, as you based on experience would know, and that is to provide access to -- if you have media with you, to provide access to the media, to talk with the media in any way you choose, talk about things that have to do with your people and your level of responsibility and avoid speculation.

REP. SNYDER: When you say "to provide access," there's been -- I read all the newspapers in the plane from back home when they build up and I've seen this in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette from January 28, front page story -- it's a reprint of a Washington Post story -- and it talks about that incident when we had firing a walled hospital compound and one line was, "Witnesses saw a U.S. soldier inside the compound with M-16 assault rifle."

But journalists were kept away from the scene by roadblocks and barbed wire and armed troops. We've had the incident with -- I think it's Doug Struck from the Washington Post. Two different versions of the story. One version is his recollection, according to the story in the Post, is he's told, "If you go further, you would be shot." The Mr. Quigley said that was not what was said. What was said was, "For your own safety, we cannot let you go forward. You could be shot in a fire fight.

"

I think both those -- I notice you've got an abundance of Vietnam campaign ribbons there -- both of those excuses would not have been tolerated during the Vietnam War. One, the threat of being shot, that was true, I know you will not tolerate it. That's a very defensive attitude towards the press. The other may be almost as bad in terms of its paternalism, that a company commander is going to tell a 30, or 40 or 50-year-old reporter what they should do for their own personal safety.

So, amplify if you would, when you say they are to provide access. Does that mean accompanying ground troops on missions that may well involve being in the firefight?

GENERAL FRANKS: Sir, you know, as well as I do, once again based on experience, that there are two kinds of media involved in any wartime situation. One is embedded media, that is, media which accompanies a force.

And the second is media which appears on the battlefield. My experience in this campaign in Afghanistan is that media that has been accompanying our people to include special forces on the ground has had access to everything. And I believe they, sir, would tell you that they have had access to everything that has been encountered by those special forces units.

The second type of --

REP. SNYDER: That's not what some of my media friends are telling me. I mean, one told me just yesterday that in covering nine wars, this is the worst accessibility this person has had. So that's not what I'm hearing from media. And I mean, I'll just relate these two stories here, barbed wire and troops kept them from going to one --

GENERAL FRANKS: Two categories of media. One is that which is embedded with our units on the ground. And the other is media which appears on the battlefield. In the case of media which appears on the battlefield, and a very confused situation, I can certainly see that a company commander, or a non-commissioned officer, would tell people in the media -- now, you and I would not at all subscribe to someone saying, "If you go forward, you know, I'm going to shoot you." Of course not.

REP. SNYDER: I understand.

GENERAL FRANKS: But I can see a possibility where if people show up in civilian clothes to include with a press badge, which some young officer or a non-commissioned officer had never met in his life, and want to move for example into the Kandahar hospital where we have had, over a prolonged period of time, a firefight involving Afghans taking out six people holding a portion of a hospital, through the course of a prolonged fight where some officer, some American says, "No, you're not going to go in beyond these barricades" and so forth.

REP. SNYDER: Excuse me, General, I appreciate your answer. My time is about up. I want to be sure that I understand what you are saying. Are you saying that your policy in instructions given to the troops, that if there are ground troops going out, that if an American reporter approaches them that has proper credentials, that they are allowed to accompany troops on any mission.

GENERAL FRANKS: No, no. Not at all. We have people from media pool who are embedded. And I'm not sure what the status is today of that. But we have very well known reporters from the media of this country who are embedded over prolonged periods of time with our forces on the ground, and to my knowledge not one of the stories to which you made reference submitted by the media who have been there on the ground with our people.

These are media representatives, and not a pejorative comment at all. I mean, they're in Afghanistan to do reporting. But they are not people known to our military people who are on the ground. And I can foresee the possibility of friction between our people on the ground and reporters who simply show up and say, "Hey, I'd like to come with you." No, sir, I do not suspect that one of our young people, one of our commanders would say, "Okay, I see your credentials, so now you may come with me."

REP. SNYDER: My time is up, General. I think that is a continuing discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. STUMP: The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

REP. JOE WILSON (R-SC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, we're just honored to have you here today. And I appreciate your service, and that of the members of your command, and your success. Also, I was very happy to see that your wife is here. I can certainly tell you from my personal experience that spouses are vital to all of our success. So thank you for being here today. I appreciate your comments about the high regard that you have for guard and reserve members, and their functioning in the theatre.

On page 5 of your statement, the sentence is: "We assess that Iraq continues to pursue biological, chemical and prohibitive ballistic missile capabilities."

Obviously, that gives me great concern. And in this assessment, and I don't know how far you can go, but I will be interested in knowing how intensive their efforts are, how sophisticated they may be, or obviously how imminent they may be in their use.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, that comment on page 5 is a reflection of our experience in dealing with the Iraqis, and the fact that over the past three years we have not had inspectors on the ground there under the U.N. mandate to verify that Hussein has not been permitted to continue what he provided up until that time three years ago was every evidence of a desire to create weapons of mass destruction.

We have, as you said, without going into too great a detail, I still want to give you an answer to your question. We have reason to believe that Saddam Hussein has pursued vigorously his weapons of mass destruction program. That is not to say that we believe that he is in possession of one weapon or another weapon. But we do believe that, you know, since he used chemicals on his own people, that he has not lost his zeal with respect to getting the WMD. We believe that since we have not had inspectors inside Iraq we can't confirm the extent, or how far he has come, towards reaching his objectives of having weaponized biological and chemical munitions. And so that simply tells us how important it is to have eyes on, in the most transparent way possible, every possible approach that Saddam Hussein could be taking to the development and fielding of weapons of mass destruction.

So if you were to ask me in this forum to hold something in my hand and show you something that will tell us exactly where he is in his approach, I can't do that, but I can tell you that every sign we see indicates that he has pursued and will continue to pursue the development of WMD.

Mr. Secretary, you may add to that, sir.

MR. RODMAN: Now, this sentence in the general's report is borne out by not only our intelligence, not only the fact that the inspectors haven't been there for three years, by the fact that the easing of sanctions and the loosening of the economic sanctions against them has given him greater access to technology from outside. And also from the fundamental fact that since the Gulf War ended, a driving force of Saddam's policy has been to continue these programs. He could probably have gotten all the sanctions lifted if he had at some point said, "I relinquish these weapons. I'm coming clean, I'm going to comply with the U.N. resolution."

But he was absolutely determined to maintain these programs at all costs. At the cost of repeated confrontations with us, at the cost of a number -- of the fight over the inspectors, but he decided in the end he was going to kick the inspectors out at whatever political risk that involved because the bottom line for him was to maintain those programs to the best of his ability.

So it is a certainty to us, even though we don't know the exact detail, there's a certainty that this is what his goal is. And I think if he were to achieve some weapon, some usable, credible capability I think it would have a shock effect in the region, I think it would be very disadvantageous to us, it would be a crisis that we might have a harder time dealing with than the Gulf War if we knew he had this capability. So that is why the president was so forward leading in the State of the Union saying, you know, for us to just wait and sit back and let this happen is not the most attractive option. And I think that is -- you were right to spot that sentence in the report because it is of great importance.

GEN. FRANKS: And I think if I could also add, sir, just a few words. It's one thing for someone like Saddam Hussein to have his armed forces equipped with weapons of mass destruction, a problem to be sure, but an equal if not greater problem is the possibility of his proliferation of such systems to terrorists. And I think that that causes our continuing concern.

REP. (?): And equally it bothers me -- cited in the sentence before that -- "unmonitored cross-border traffic" which just simply raises the specter that the availability of different weaponry expertise all over the world and that these people could congregate and be paid well to be a threat.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I agree with you.

REP. STUMP: Gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

REP. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT (R-MA): Thank you very much.

Welcome, general, and thank you very much. As you know, the off duty, off base dress code for U.S. female military personnel serving in Saudi Arabia has become an issue specifically, and at least one female Air Force officer has refused to wear the traditional garment for women in Saudi Arabia.

While I personally agree that women should not be forced to wear this type of garment, I believe that we must respect the customs and traditions of countries that agree to host U.S. military personnel. Saudi Arabia has hosted U.S. troops since the Gulf War. Now press reports strongly indicate that the Saudis want a substantial reduction, if not total withdrawal, of U.S. troops. I believe the refusal of this female officer to recognize and obey Saudi customs only serves to exacerbate this situation.

This is especially troubling to me because of military officers involved. We hold the military officer corps to the very highest standards of accountability. When one of them fails to meet this standard, military discipline could begin to break down. I understand that you recently relaxed the requirement of the wearing of this garment, strongly recommending it be worn, but not requiring it to be worn when off base in Saudi Arabia. However, it's also my understanding that your subordinate commanders have the authority to implement policies that they determine to be within these guidelines and in the best interests of our troops and missions.

This raises several questions, sir. First, is this officer going to be subject to any action under the UCMJ for refusing an order?

Second, are military personnel going to be allowed to opt out of deployments to countries whose customs they personally find offensive or uncomfortable?

And, finally, does the refusal of this female officer to obey orders create tension among our other military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia, thus harming unit cohesion?

GEN. FRANKS: Congressman, let me say that those of us with a lot of experience in dealing with American forces in a whole variety of countries contend with three points. One of the points is the law and the custom of the country where we have our people.

The second is the rights and the preferences of our individual service members.

And the third has to do with force protection concerns. It is the balance of those three I think on a given -- or in a given situation that will instruct commanders about the approach.

And in this case with Colonel McSally, let me go to your later questions first. A very, very competent airman. A very competent airman and I would propose no judicial action against Colonel McSally at all. I believe that in her view this was an issue that should be brought to my level to be discussed, to ensure that the balance that I just described between law, custom, individual preference and forced protection had been struck right. And in her professional view and in her personal view it had not.

I looked at this and I studied it over a period of almost a year, in discussion with our component commanders and in discussion with people in the region and it was I who took the decision to say we would strongly recommend for force protection reasons, but not require for individual preference and rights reasons the wearing of this particular item of clothing called the abayas. So that was the decision I made and I would at this point stand by that decision.

I do not believe that the officer in question has created some sense of disobedience within our officer corps. I believe that her contemporaries and her peers would say the same thing to you. And while an issue for great discussion to be sure, I believe that the system in this case took the time that was necessary to look at this and took a decision with which I am comfortable.

REP. BARTLETT: What has this done to our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the ability to maintain the forces there that we clearly need in this area?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I have not seen a reaction by the government of Saudi Arabia to this decision.

REP. BARTLETT: They just continue with their position that they'd like fewer of us there, maybe none of us?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I wouldn't say that. My experience in dealing with the Saudis over the last five years on a continuing basis is that they remain a very good ally to what we do. And I have read the suggestions in the press that there has been a suggestion that our footprint be rearranged and changed and that Americans move out of Saudi Arabia.

But, sir, I will tell you that based on my discussions and relationships with the Saudis, I have not been approached on this. And perhaps at the policy level Secretary Rodman has. But, sir, I have not been approached either concerning the abayas issue or where they request that American forces be removed from the kingdom.

REP. STUMP: The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre.

REP. MICHAEL MCINTYRE (D-NC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you again, General, for the excellent work that you have done. As you know, Mr. Hayes and I as well as Mr. Walter Jones who serve on this committee, have many of our families involved in districts from eastern North Carolina and the Army, Air Force and Marines, all of who have been involved with SENCOM. And I just want to ask you a few very technical questions. On page 15 of your report you say that human intelligence is essential when mission objectives include locating, identifying and capturing or killing mobile targets. This requires people on the ground.

Do you feel like that was a big topic when we first started into this war on terrorism? Do you feel like you were getting the type of support you need for human intelligence and if your needs are being met or not?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I do believe that our needs were being met within capability. I think on a given day our human intelligence capability is probably not up to what we would like to see. You know, it's been much discussed and much debated about whether we have retained a sufficient human intelligence capability as a nation over time. My personal view is that we do not have a robust enough human intelligence capability.

Now, sir, having said that I will tell you that the work that went on both before and post 9/11 to have human intelligence assets in that country was -- that work was enormous. And so within the capability of all the agencies involved to provide for that form of intelligence, I think a very good job was done.

REP. MCINTYRE: All right. You'd just like to have more resources for the future?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, I'd like to have more resources for the future.

REP. MCINTYRE: All right, and over on page 17 I know from -- I believe Seymour Johnson Air Force Base has been instrumental in providing F-15Es for fly-over in the No-Fly Zones in Iraq. You mentioned that our forces responded to provocations on 25 occasions. I know not all those make the news media and maybe that's good in some situations. But when you respond, does that mean actually firing back? Is there a standard way when you say respond? Is that technically what you usually mean, "We fired back at them," or, "We shot them down," or, "We destroyed them on the ground if they were firing anti-aircraft at us?"

Or what do you mean?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, when they -- two quick points. One is when -- is that number of missions that you mentioned, that means that we applied kinetic force against targets inside Iraq in response to what they had done in shooting us. And so what happens to us is when we engage in this patrolling activity in the No-Fly Zones, in many cases what the pilots will observe as AAA fire and so forth will be so far away that we're not able with precision to identify targets on the ground. And so that's the reason you see so many shooting incidents and very few responses. But what we do is we -- when we characterize these targets in proximity to one of these shooting incidents, then we go bomb it. And so that, sir, is the response to that one.

I might just add though -- you mentioned the Strike Eagles, the F-15s. One of the interesting things that I'd like to see a little bit more reporting on is the firsts that have occurred in Afghanistan. And one of the first was the longest fighter bomber mission flown by an F15 Strike Eagle in our nation's history. We have a great many of these things that have been done by these very brave young people and very dedicated people, and that just happens to be an example.

REP. MCINTYRE: That's great and I appreciate your sharing that. I had the opportunity to fly with some of those pilots at Seymour Johnson and it was quite an experience and it makes you appreciate what they're doing every day over there for us. One other question on -- you mentioned about wanting additional procurement on page 20 of C- 17s. C-130s I know have been a topic of debate here in Congress the last two or three years. I know we have a lot of C-130s at Pope Air Force Base near Fort Bragg.

Do you find the C-130s helpful to you only in the attack mode? I guess the AC-130s for your needs and you primarily need C-17s because of the reach needed? Is that the main reason you focus on the C-17s?

GEN. FRANKS: Well, sir, let me give you a comparison. C-17s because they're both necessary. The C-17 in this particular exercise flew 1,507 strategic sorties, and 579 intra-theater lift sorties. That's a very important number. 1,507 and 579. If you compare that number to the C-130s, the C-130s flew 3,154 intra-theatre missions. And that's C-130's from a whole bunch of different places. And so when I talk about the C-17, it is the very small number of C-17s which we have in the inventory right now. And as you know, we have a much larger number of C-130s. C-130s are equally necessary for us to do our work, sir.

REP. MCINTYRE: Thank you.

REP. STUMP: Thank you, gentlemen.

We have two members left. We have roughly 10 minutes to complete this. If anyone else comes in we will have the meeting over if we can adjust our conversation a little bit.

The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie. And then Mr. Hayes from North Carolina.

REP. NEIL ABERCROMBIE (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'll certainly try and do that within that time structure.

This is, I think, primarily a political question. Our problem today I -- you remember what Mr. Taylor said about everything from American Caesar to what General Eisenhower was doing. We like to think that we can separate military policy or military activity from political activity. It's very hard to do except when you want to make a point. And so I put that in ahead of time because I'm not just trying to make a point, but it's a genuine -- it's a political question that has military implications.

I'm concerned because, Mr. Chairman, we're going to be asked to put up $30 billion. It was one thing when it was $1 billion a month, no small change, but $1 billion a month. Now it's $30 billion, and we're getting the questions about, well, can they really have some peacekeeping force or some post war fighting force come in primarily from Britain or somebody else coming in. But then all of a sudden it's, oh no, we're going to have to have American soldiers in this doing it for a long time. And at the same time we're going to the Philippines, we're going to Colombia. Now they're talking about going to Yemen or some other place.

What I'm concerned about, and this is where the political side of it comes in, it's all well and good for General Franks to talk about personnel and capabilities and adding to end-strength and all the rest, but if we're just going to have an open-ended political policy here I think we've got real problems. Are we going to be able to retain an airbase in Saudi Arabia. If we have special forces, are they, in fact, special forces, or are we talking about bringing up more guard and reserves or adding to the Army. If we become involved in a significant peacekeeping mission, can we defend Kuwait? Can we get involved in Iraq?

It's easy for politicians to talk about what the United States is going to do or not do, Mr. Secretary, but I think we need a far more articulate -- a far more clear articulation of precisely what the administration proposes, and that the military will have to dispose.

Secretary?

MR. RODMAN: Yeah, well I -- the answer to that is the president has not made decisions yet. And when he does, he knows his obligation to explain to the American public and to the Congress and to consult with the Congress. And I think this -- you know, you should not prejudge that he will not do this. Right now these are hypothetical questions. It think if we were to move to some decision I think you'd learn more and there would be public debate --

REP. ABERCROMBIE: Very good. Mr. Secretary, I know, because of the short time.

They are hypothetical questions, and so my -- it's not an admonition so much as a plea with you. I would hope that members of the administration would be more constrained in their public discussion or their so-called off the record discussion of these hypotheticals, because they American public is being led to think that we are going to do these things. I think that this committee and other committees of jurisdiction in the Congress are the place to have some of these discussions. We -- Mr. -- the chairman is always available to have closed sessions, if necessary. We should stop this circus of speculation that's out there about what the broadest expanse of definition is going to be with regard to terrorism, and making military commitments as a result.

My plea, again, to reiterate it, is that the -- certain administration officials clam up in terms of this public speculation that is running rampant in the newspapers and elsewhere about what we're going to do and what we expect of the military until we've had a very clear and complete discussion in any appropriate form you choose with respect to what we might expect of the United States military.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. STUMP: Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes.

REP. ROBIN HAYES (R-NC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Franks, Secretary Rodman, thanks for being here. I want to add my congratulations and thanks to those who have gone before me. Some I've heard and some of which I haven't -- have not heard.

Your analogy about Alexander the Great was very interesting because having spent some time with the president this morning he was talking about the fact -- I think it's very important, we are liberators, we are not conquered. Given that context and scenario, a national army for Afghanistan, part of our nation billing effort, if that's the right term, do you see -- how do you see us building that army for them, that's one question? Second, and I'm through.

The Army has worked to be lighter, faster, more mobile. Something like the Marine Corps. Now, the Marine Corps is working to achieve some of the qualities and characteristics of special forces. How is that blending going? Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, in reverse order, I think the big words scare me, being a Texas guy, but the complementarity, the relationship between the United States Marine Corps and special operations activities I think is a very good one because I think that relationship is, in fact, not duplicative, but rather gives us the ability to be expansive. It has to do with skill sets that I believe we recognize may be required in the future. And so I -- it seems to me to be a very good thing that the Marines will begin to think about this particular work, and that they will work with United States Army forces in order to further build upon and build the robustness of this capability in case (it's called?).

And so I think that's a very -- I think it's a good thing and I don't think it's duplicative. And I'm not sure at the policy level that it's been voted one way or the other, but that's my personal view.

On the business on the Afghan national army, I categorized that as one of the most important things that we have to do in Afghanistan, because I think that will provide the security within which infrastructure, education, medicine and so forth can be rebuilt to give the people a life, which I think is what has to happen in the long term to have Afghanistan avoid returning to the swamp, if you will.

Now, I think, sir, that there are several different approaches that could be taken to building an Afghan national army. One is that we could put peacekeepers all over the country and have them do the job of an Afghan national army, to provide security. I think another way is for the international community, with our participation in that community, to provide training to these forces as they come together, and resources to these forces. I suspect if those are the bookends of this, there may be several other options in the middle.

My chief of staff, a major general Army officer by the name of Campbell, returned last night, and I haven't seen him since he got back. But he has been with Hamid Karzai and with Faheem Kahn, the minister of defense for about the last week or so. Looking at the possibilities and the resource requirements to be able to decide what options we may have to build the Afghan national army.

Now, it's interesting to me that there has been much speculation and much coverage in the media of how all of this would be done, when, in fact, the guy who has been asked by the secretary and by me to go perform the analysis didn't return until last night. And so, sir, what we'll do is I'll pay attention to what he says, and then I'll make a recommendation to the secretary probably within the next week, and the secretary will form a judgment and then go higher with it.

REP. BUNCH: Anyone else? Hope not.

(Laughter.)

Gentlemen, thank you very much. And, Mr. Secretary and General Franks, we thank you again for the great job you're doing here. And, Mr. Franks, I'm sorry I ran out of time before I got to ask those questions of him that you wanted me to.

(Laughter.)

Without objection, this hearing will stand adjourned.

GEN. FRANKS: Thank you, chairman. Members, thank you very much.

REP. BUNCH: Thank you, sir. Do you have any closing remarks, general?

GEN. FRANKS: Sir, thank you for offering.

The closing remark that I would make is one that's contained in my written statement, and it says, this sink, when it comes to recognizing the quality of work by the nation in supporting our military efforts in Afghanistan and in my theatre could ask for nothing more. I truly mean that.

My thanks to the members of this committee. My thanks to the American people for providing the support that these men and women need to do their duty for the nation. We're in your debt.

Thank you, sir.

REP. BUNCH: Thank you again, Mr. Secretary. Meeting's adjourned.

END

LOAD-DATE: March 2, 2002