The committee meets today on a very important nomination
of President George W. Bush for the deputy secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul
Wolfowitz. I have had the privilege of knowing Dr. Wolfowitz for many, many
years, worked with him in his various capacities, and I commend the president
for his nomination of this outstanding public servant.
You are a man of accomplishments in many venues. You have many years of
service in government and academia, served in the Department of Defense on two
previous occasions, as deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Regional
Programs, 1977 to 1980, and as undersecretary of Defense for Policy during the
period '89 through '93.
You were undersecretary of
Defense for Policy during the Persian Gulf War, a critical juncture in the
history of our country, and the 10th anniversary is now being observed by our
nation and the coalition partners who came together under the leadership of
President George Bush to mount that most important offensive against the
aggression of Saddam Hussein.
You've served in various
other government assignments, including chief of the State Department Policy
Planning staff and as ambassador to Indonesia under the Reagan administration.
In addition, you have had distinguished career in the academic world, having
taught at Yale, Johns Hopkins, and the National War College. And most recently
you served as dean and professor of international relations at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University -- (brief
audio break) -- your insights and expertise have assisted this committee, and
indeed the Congress as a whole, in our deliberations and responsibility, and
we're confident -- at least this senator is -- that you will continue to give
that valued counsel and advice to this committee -- (brief audio break) --
returning to the Department of Defense at a very challenging time in our
history.
In the judgment of many, and certainly this
senator, the threats growing against our interests as a nation and those of our
allies are more diverse and more complicated than any time in contemporary
history. I agree wholeheartedly with the directions with our president, George
W. Bush, and the secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld, are taking towards their
new leadership role in national security affairs and, most particularly, the
Department of Defense. It was a wise decision for the president and the
secretary of Defense to determine that they would undertake a top-to-bottom
study long term of the issues, beginning with the threat, the need to realign
the military in many ways to meet these changing threats and to take a long and
counseled course before deciding which programs should continue and those that
should be terminated.
I continue, and I am perhaps a
lone voice in some respects on this, to believe that we have short-term
interests that have to be addressed, hopefully, eventually, in a supplemental
appropriations late this summer, or perhaps even earlier, before the 4th of
July, is the target date I have, and we will work along on that issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld has asked this committee, during his
confirmation and subsequent, in consultations to move as quickly as we can on
key nominations. I think we are doing that in every respect, and I commend my
distinguished colleague, the ranking member, Mr. Levin, in working to see that
this nomination has been handled properly, and we will continue -- promptly --
and we will continue to do that.
Senator Levin?
SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Mr. Chairman, thank you. And let
me welcome our nominee. And I see Senator Sarbanes here to introduce him. We're
delighted that he is present this morning. But I am pleased to join you in
welcoming Paul Wolfowitz and his family to the Armed Services Committee for
today's hearing.
Mr. Wolfowitz is familiar with the
work of this committee and familiar with the job, surely, to which he's been
nominated, from his previous service as undersecretary of Defense for policy and
from the many times that he's testified before us and the House in his role as
the dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies.
The deputy secretary of Defense serves in a
position of awesome responsibility. He's the alter ego of the secretary. In this
capacity, the new deputy secretary will play a key role in determining how our
country will meet the national security challenges that face us today. For
example, how do we need to transform our military forces to meet a new set of
threats over the coming decades? What new weapon systems and technologies do we
need to field? And do we need to skip a generation of technology to do so? Will
the national missile defense make us more or less secure? Should we commit to
deploy such a system? And if so, what system should we deploy and under what
circumstances? To what extent should the United States remain engaged around the
world -- for example, in Kosovo, Bosnia, Colombia and even on the Korean
peninsula? What is the best approach to restrain Saddam Hussein from developing
weapons of mass destruction and from threatening his neighbors in the Persian
Gulf?
Over the years, the best approach to foreign
policy and national security policy has always been a bipartisan one. The
administration is properly conducting a strategic review to determine the
direction of our national security strategy and what direction should our
defense programs take in the years ahead.
I have
supported President Bush's and Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to conduct this
review before determining the level of resources that we should apply to our
national defense.
I look forward to working with them
on these issues over the next several years.
In
addition, the deputy secretary has traditionally served as the chief manager of
the Defense Department. A wide array of management challenges including
financial management, information security and human capital issues cut across
functional areas in the Department to such an extent that no official, other
than the secretary or the deputy secretary has the authority needed to address
them.
To take just one example, DOD's financial systems
remain in need of modernization, with hundreds of partially-linked,
error-prone computer systems spread throughout the Department. As a result, the
Department remains unable to account for billions of dollars of property,
equipment, inventory and supplies, and unable to reconcile billions of dollars
in differences between checks issued by the Department of Defense and reported
to the Treasury.
So if Mr. Wolfowitz is confirmed, and
I expect that you will be, you will have -- you will have, Mr. Wolfowitz, a very
full plate indeed. And I look forward to working with you as I know all members
of this committee do in the service ahead.
SEN. WARNER:
Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Sarbanes, we're very fortunate, and indeed the
nominee, to have you appear before this committee this morning. In my 23 years
in the Senate I have come to know you very well and respect your knowledge on
foreign affairs and national security matters. And, indeed, we've traveled
abroad together many times in this context of our security responsibilities. So,
it's a privilege for this committee to welcome you this morning and to have you
speak on behalf of this distinguished nominee.
SEN.
PAUL SARBANES (D-MD): Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Levin,
members of the Armed Services Committee, I'm pleased to have the opportunity to
recommend this morning to you -- very strongly recommend the distinguished
Maryland resident, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz for the position of deputy secretary of
Defense.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I hope you won't hold it
against him that he chose to live on the Maryland side of the Potomac and not
the Virginia side -- (scattered laughter) --
SEN.
WARNER: We observed that, but we'll let it go by.
SEN.
SARBANES: We'll let it pass, thank you very much.
SEN.
WARNER: He will be working in Virginia though.
SEN.
SARBANES: Yes, I understand that. (Laughter.)
SEN.
WARNER: If confirmed. (Laughter.)
SEN. SARBANES: Paul
Wolfowitz has had a long and impressive career in both government and academia.
Actually, his involvement in public service dates back to 1966 when he was a
management intern in the Bureau of the Budget. From '73 to '77 he held various
positions at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That posting was followed
by his service as deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Regional Programs
from 1877 to 1980, then director of the Policy Planning staff at the State
Department; '81 and '82, and assistant secretary of State for East Asia and
Pacific Affairs from 1982 to 1986.
President Reagan
then sent him, from 1986 to 1989, as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, the fourth
most populous country in the world. During his tenure there, his post was cited
as one of the four best management -- managed -- best managed embassies reviewed
by the inspectors in 1988. His last government position was undersecretary of
Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993 when Dick Cheney was the secretary of
Defense. So this is a very wide-ranging and balanced government service
involving both the State Department and the Pentagon and, I think, a very
impressive blend of responsibilities.
Shortly after
leaving government service in 1993, Paul was appointed dean of the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University here in
Washington, commonly known as SAIS. SAIS is one of the preeminent institutions
of higher learning devoted to the study of international relations. And it's no
wonder, of course, that he was appointed dean at this prestigious school,
because in addition to important government service, he has outstanding academic
qualifications -- a B.A. in mathematics and chemistry from Cornell University in
1965 followed by an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in political
science and economics. He has taught at Yale, SAIS, the National War College
where he was a George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy.
In my view in the post-Cold War environment in which we
operate, Paul's extensive background and experience should serve him well in
this very significant and important post of deputy secretary of Defense. He has
a solid grasp of complex defense and security issues, the diplomatic skills to
operate in the international arena, the intellectual strength to look ahead into
the challenges facing us in the 21st Century, and the administrative skills to
be the number two person in our largest government agency. No doubt his
mathematics degree and his experience on budget matters will also come in handy
at the Pentagon from time to time.
Mr. Chairman, I'd
like to close with a quote from a statement released by the president of the
Johns Hopkins University, William Brody, an outstanding educational leader on
the -- issued at the time of President Bush's announcement of his intention to
nominate Paul to this position. President Brody said, and I quote him:
"The bad news is that Johns Hopkins is losing a great
dean. The good news is that the country is getting a very smart, very focused,
clear-thinking leader as deputy secretary of Defense. Paul Wolfowitz will serve
the nation well."
Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, I strongly concur with this assessment. I believe you have a highly
qualified nominee before you who will serve our country well as deputy secretary
of Defense, and I strongly urge his favorable consideration by the committee.
SEN. WARNER: Senator, we thank you. And I think those of
us who have had the opportunity to know this distinguished nominee concur in
your observations and that of the distinguished president of Johns Hopkins.
Thank you, Senator.
SEN. SARBANES: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Now Dr. Wolfowitz, you have the
unlimited opportunity now to express such views as you wish. Following that,
we'll have six-minute round of questions by our members.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that unlimited
opportunities are best kept short, and I will read just a part of my statement
and submit the rest for the record.
I want to thank
Senator Sarbanes for being so gracious as to make time in a very busy schedule
to come and introduce me.
Chairman Warner, Senator
Levin, members of the Armed Services Committee, it's a great honor to appear
again before this committee, one that has done so much over the years to make
our nation strong and the world more peaceful. I am grateful to the president
and to Secretary Rumsfeld for the confidence that they have shown in me by
nominating me for a position of such great responsibility. If confirmed by the
Senate, this will be my third tour in the Pentagon. It is also the second time
that I have come before this distinguished committee to seek confirmation for a
senior position in the Department of Defense.
On the
previous occasion, in 1989, it was a very different world. The Cold War was
still a reality. Even in the heyday of Mr. Gorbachev. the principal threat to
our nation still came from a Soviet Union that was armed to the teeth with
nuclear and conventional weapons. We had well over 2 million men and women on
active duty to deter and, if necessary, to defend against this constant
threat.
Twelve years ago, many observers believed that
the United States was in a period of permanent decline, and many pointed to
other nations as models for reforming our economy. Budget deficits were taken as
a given. The personal computer was a toddler, and the Internet was a mere
infant. In the intervening years, the Cold War has become truly a part of
history, and we have fought and won a major war in the Persian Gulf. America did
not decline; it prospered. We remain a vibrant world power with a position that
is in many respects unique in the history of the world.
Under these circumstances, it was only natural that our nation desired
to reap a peace dividend. We reduced our defense budget by 40 percent. We cut
the force by nearly the same amount. Our defense budget was drawn down to the
lowest percentage of our gross domestic product since the late 1930s. But the
world remains, in Secretary Rumsfeld's phrase, a dangerous and untidy place. And
the need, indeed the demand, for U.S. leadership has increased as well.
And so, despite declining defense budgets and a shrinking
force structure, in the past decade we drastically increased the number of
military deployments for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. This added
greatly to the workload of an already busy force, one that was struggling to
maintain its combat readiness, with dedicated but tired troops manning aging
equipment. Today, as General Shelton has said, the force is frayed.
We must begin a long-overdue renovation and transformation
of the armed forces, so that we can preserve and extend the peace well into the
21st century. President Bush has set this task as one of the highest priorities
of his administration.
The president has set three
important goals for the Department of Defense. First, we must strengthen the
bond of trust with the American military. As General Creighton Abrams said when
the all- volunteer force was first created, people aren't in the Army, they are
the Army, and the same is true of all the military services. Building on the
dedicated work of the Senate and the House, we must continue to improve military
pay and quality of life.
But good pay and fair
allowances by themselves won't keep the best people in the service. Working with
the Congress and with our allies, we must also reexamine the balance among force
levels, commitments, and deployments. We will have to make sure that we are
focused on the most important defense tasks and not placing unreasonable demands
on our men and women in uniform.
We will also have to
acknowledge the relationship between morale and readiness. President Bush has
said that even the highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back
deployments, poor pay, shortage of spare parts and equipment, and declining
readiness.
Second, we must develop the capabilities to
defend against missiles, terrorists, and the complex set of threats to our
information systems and our all-important assets in space. U.S. military
strength in the field is unparalleled. Many of our enemies, therefore, have
determined that in order to move against us, they must be able to strike us at
home. Some have chosen to develop long-range missile systems. Others have chosen
to support or direct terrorist attacks with conventional devices, weapons of
mass destruction, or cyberweapons against our nation, our forces, or our
diplomats abroad. We must do everything in our power to stop them.
Third, the Department of Defense must take advantage of
the technological revolution, to help us create a military for the 21st century.
To this end, at the direction of the president, Secretary Rumsfeld has already
launched a review of our defense strategy and programs designed to provide a
sound understanding of the state of our armed forces and their readiness for the
21st century security environment. This work must be done quickly, and it must
be done before we can know what our true defense resource requirements are.
President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld believe, as the
secretary puts it, that we need to engage our brains before we open the
taxpayer's wallet. I strongly support that approach and will work hard to shape
a prompt and effective review.
In addition to that
review to support and make progress on the president's goals, the secretary has
set five key objectives for the Department of Defense. First, to fashion and
sustain a new form of deterrence appropriate to the new strategic environment, a
deterrence based less on massive levels of punishment and retaliation, and more
on the use of both defensive and offensive means to deny our adversaries the
opportunity and benefits that come from the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
Second, to assure the readiness and
sustainability of our armed forces now and into the future. This will require
not only spending to bring up current readiness levels, but also investment in
the modernization efforts that our forces need to avoid being caught in
the trap of making ever-increasing expenditures to maintain aging equipment.
Third, to modernize our command and control, and space
capabilities to support our 21st century needs. That infrastructure is the
foundation of American military strength.
Fourth, to
begin reshaping the U.S. defense establishment to meet new challenges and take
advantage of new opportunities. We must begin to move, as President Bush has
said, beyond marginal improvements to replace existing programs with new
technologies and strategies. Building on the superb human capital of the current
force, we must fashion a future force that is at once more agile, more lethal
and more rapidly deployable. It must be able to operate over increasingly longer
ranges; it must integrate the capabilities of all of the services so that field
commanders have the best possible combination of air, sea and land weapons for
each situation; and it must have the best technology that America can offer. Our
dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen deserve no
less.
And finally, we must reform Department of Defense
structures, processes and organizations. We need to seek greater efficiencies
not only to safeguard the taxpayers' money, but also because that will allow us
to create better weapon systems and invest more in the cutting edge of our
nation's defenses. There is no more solemn responsibility that the American
people entrust to the federal government than to provide for the common defense.
There is no group of Americans who deserve more respect and honor from their
fellow citizens then the men and women of our armed forces who daily put
themselves in harm's way for that constitutional purpose. It is both exciting
and humbling to be asked once again to help lead them in their work for the
common defense.
Mr. Chairman, it is more than just an
honor to be nominated by the president to be deputy secretary of Defense, it is
also a great responsibility. I appreciate the trust that President Bush and
Secretary Rumsfeld have placed in me. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
to work closely with this committee to achieve our common goals. Indeed, I
pledge to you that if confirmed, I will work with the services, the Congress and
the defense industry to help the president and the secretary prepare our armed
forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Dr. Wolfowitz.
In the
tradition of this committee of long standing, the chair now propounds to you
questions that are given to each nominee.
The first
one. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of
interest?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, I have, Senator.
SEN. WARNER: Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any
actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, I haven't, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Do you ensure that you and your staff will
comply with the deadlines established for requested communications, including
questions for the record, by this committee and other committees of the
Congress?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I consider
that a high priority. I also will work with Secretary Rumsfeld, as he indicated
in his testimony, to try and see if we can streamline some of those
requirements, because they're quite substantial, I observed already.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you.
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to
congressional requests?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I certainly
will, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Will those witnesses
be protected from any reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, they will.
SEN. WARNER:
The chair notes that you have responded to the questions propounded by this
committee and that they will be made a part of the record today.
Now we'll proceed on a round of six minutes of each member.
Dr. Wolfowitz, you were in the Department of Defense
during the Gulf War. And I copied a note from your opening statement in which
you said, "We fought and won the war in the Persian Gulf." And unquestionably,
the coalition of military forces did fight bravely and win that war.
Interesting, it was a war of about 100 hours. The decision was made not to
pursue Saddam Hussein's forces back into Iraq, and I've always defended that
decision that was made by our then-president George Bush.
But the aftermath is not necessarily one of victory. We have seen 10
consecutive years now in which, although early on there was some compliance with
the U.N. Security Council resolutions by Iraq, there's been absolute defiance of
the Security Council resolutions and the understandings that were agreed to by
Saddam Hussein.
This morning I looked at the headlines
and it said the U.S. is prepared to revise the sanctions regime. And the caption
was that we would lessen the sanctions.
My question to
you is, what do we get in return from Saddam Hussein; and what is the likelihood
that he will now comply with the clear obligations he undertook at the end of
the conflict and the clear mandates of the Security Council?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, partly in compliance with the strictures
on me as a not-yet-confirmed nominee, I haven't been intimately involved in the
policy process -- Iraq. And I saw the same article you saw in the paper this
morning. I haven't yet seen a complete transcript of what Secretary Powell said.
But I could also -- in general --
SEN. WARNER: I
recognize that you haven't been involved in that -- I understand that.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Let me offer --
SEN. WARNER: But you have devoted much of your career to these types of
issues and questions. What counsel and advice will you share with the president
and the secretary of Defense?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe
that what one has to do in approaching this issue -- and it is a very difficult
issue, and you are absolutely correct in saying that we may have won the war,
but we still have a major problem there, as long as Saddam Hussein is in power
-- one needs not just a single policy decision, for example, one concerning
sanctions; one needs an overall strategy, and that strategy has to reflect the
reality of where you are today and where you hope to be a year from now or two
years from now.
And I do believe that part of the
reality is that where we are today is that we lost a lot of ground since the end
of the Gulf War, and he's gained a lot of ground. In particular, the coalition
that, first, President Bush assembled to confront Iraq, is not anything like
what it used to be. And part of that problem is that Saddam has succeeded, to a
disturbing degree, in cultivating the notion that the sanctions aren't punishing
him, they're only punishing the Iraqi people. And I believe that part of what we
need to do is make clear that the sanctions that are in place are not intended,
and should not prevent humanitarian assistance or food or medical supplies from
getting to the Iraqi people.
But I'd also emphasize
sanctions aren't a policy; they're, at best, a part of a policy. I think the
overall policy has to focus on how one can prevent him from getting weapons of
mass destruction, or get rid of them, if he has them; how to keep him from
becoming a threat to his neighbors by conventional or unconventional means; and,
hopefully, if possible, to devise a strategy to assist the Iraqi people in
freeing themselves from this tyrant. And that's not going to be something that's
going to happen overnight.
SEN. WARNER: I've just
returned from a trip to that region -- Senator Stevens, the chairman of the
Appropriations Committee and I, and several other senators. We visited in Egypt
with President Mubarak. We visited in Israel with Prime Minister-designate
Sharon. And it seems that there's a feeling that we can reconstitute, under U.S.
leadership, in some measure the coalition of nations that fought that battle 10
years ago. And speaking for myself, I think that is probably the key to such new
policies as we have towards Iraq.
Regrettably, the
United States and Great Britain have been going it alone, certainly in the
containment of Saddam Hussein through the very courageous air operations in the
North and the South. And in the Gulf itself, we have been joined by several
other nations in the naval activities to curtail the smuggling and other
trafficking to and from Iraq in the Gulf waterways. But largely it's been the
United States and Great Britain alone.
My question to
you is, what is the likelihood that we can reconstitute in some measure that
some 20-plus nations, is my recollection, that participated in that Gulf
action?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think it's going to depend on
what we want them for, and in fact we may not need all of them, depending on
what we want to do.
But I do think the key to putting
the coalition together the first time and the key to reassembling another
coalition, if we need it, is to convince people that there's a long-term outcome
that benefits them. I think one of the problems we face today is they see many
short-term costs. Every time there's a military strike, Arab governments suffer
criticism from their own people. That's just one of many short-term costs, and
they don't see the long-term gain or benefit.
It's
crucial, I think, as the American piece of putting this coalition together, that
it convince people that there's an outcome that's worth enduring those obvious
costs.
SEN. WARNER: During the course of the early
comments by President George W. Bush, and based on his campaign commitments to
the American people, was the commitment to say that we would not engage the U.S.
forces in the many and diverse actions that were undertaken by President
Clinton. We now recognize that the Department of Defense was underfunded and the
troops overextended in that period, and corrections have to be made.
In your work with Secretary Rumsfeld and indeed with the
extraordinary, competent security team the president has put together, what is
the general framework, what are the general guidelines that should be laid down,
in your judgment, to guide future military commitments by the United States and
to guide those situations in which we'll simply say, "No, we will not
participate"?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I think, clearly,
one of the most important criteria is it has to be something that is important
to our national interests. It also has to be something where military forces can
achieve the objectives of our national interests. And I think it has to be
something where we have a strategy for success, that we have a way of achieving
our goals and completing the mission, and not end up in something that is an
unending commitment with no way out.
It is also true,
Mr. Chairman, that I believe we need to be more careful about how we engage our
forces, but one also has to be very careful about how you disengage. One can't
rewrite history, and it's very important, as we try to reduce the requirements
and burdens that we have imposed by many commitments all around the world, that
we not recreate the very situations that we went in to prevent.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you.
Senator Levin?
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, applying those criteria, where are we currently deployed
where we should not be?
(Pause.)
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It's not so much that we are deployed somewhere that we
should not be, but I think everywhere that we're deployed, we should look at the
question of whether we need as much as we have.
We
should look at the question of whether we're heading down a road where we may,
tragically, pull out precipitously. One of the, I think, very important things
we want to avoid is the precedent -- and it's been a bipartisan failure -- was
in Beirut where we lost Marines and then suddenly pulled out, in Somalia where
we lost Rangers and suddenly pulled out. It's very dangerous to have a
commitment where we're undertaking dangers that we haven't fully appreciated and
that the American people are not prepared to support.
And as a general principle, I think we need to look as much as possible
at turning responsibilities over to other people. Sometimes that means turning
responsibility over to our allies; sometimes -- and I would hope this might be
true in some places like East Timor and the Balkans -- turning more
responsibility over to the indigenous people themselves, and sometimes where
it's a matter where our highly trained combat people are performing what is
essentially a police function. I would hope we could find policemen --
hopefully, not Americans -- who can perform those functions.
So it's less a matter of there is a specific place that we should pull
out of, but rather everywhere that we have these very precious resources engaged
we should try to make sure that there aren't better alternatives.
SEN. LEVIN: Yes, I think we always should do that on an
ongoing and a continuing basis, but you're not prepared to tell us where,
applying those criteria and asking those questions, we should now plan on
withdrawing forces?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, I'm not, and I
think that's part of what this defense review that the secretary is undertaking
has to look at, although it's not entirely a Defense Department
responsibility.
SEN. LEVIN: On the Iraq questions that
the chairman asked, you have previously said that the no-fly zones don't matter.
You've been highly critical of that policy, and you've also advocated what you
have called a serious policy aimed at liberating the Iraqi people by creating a
liberated zone in southern Iraq that could be used as a base by the Iraqi
opposition, and you've stated that it will take American forces, to use your
words, to create a protected area in which the opposition forces can
organize.
Now, General Zinni, who is our most recent
CINC in that area of the world, has taken a very different approach, saying that
that approach which you have proposed is a dangerous illusion that was likely to
lead to what he called a "Bay of Goats," like a Bay of Pigs kind of an
operation. Do you still advocate the commitment of U.S. forces to support
opposition elements within Iraq in an effort to overthrow Saddam?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, it would depend on what those
opposition forces are actually capable of doing, and every statement one makes
-- thoughtful statement about Iraq policy, as I said to the chairman before --
has to look at the context.
In 1991, a month after the
end of the Gulf War, we actually did put ground forces back into northern Iraq
to create a protected zone under which Kurdish opposition forces could operate
and, to this day, although there was a significant failure in 1996, to this day
northern Iraq is a largely liberated area.
I think some
of the statements you're referring to go back to a time a few years ago when
Sandy Berger, President Clinton's national security advisor, was saying that the
problem of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction was something worth fighting
for, and my reaction was, if it's worth fighting for, then it's worth fighting
with whatever capabilities we need and not simply limiting ourselves to air
power.
The situation today --
SEN. LEVIN: Is it worth fighting for?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: It depends on what we're being asked to do. And when we were asked in
1991 to get the Kurdish refugees back into northern Iraq, it was a plausible
plan that made sense. I haven't yet seen a plausible plan today, but I would be
very interested in seeing one.
SEN. LEVIN: Is that goal
worth seeking?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think there's no
question that the whole region would be a safer place, Iraq would be a much more
successful country, and American national interests would benefit greatly if
there were a change of regime in Iraq.
SEN. LEVIN: That
being the case, why, then, do you apparently now back away from your previous
statement that if it's worth achieving, it's worth using and achieving a base
from which the Iraqi opposition can attack Saddam?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: Senator, because I believe it depends on the context, it depends on
what your real options are. If there's a real option to do that, I would
certainly think it's still worthwhile.
SEN. LEVIN: But
you're not then saying as of today there is a real option.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I haven't seen it yet.
SEN.
LEVIN: Okay.
On North Korea, do you have evidence that
North Korea has cheated on the framework agreement?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: No, I don't, Senator. But during the months I spent with
now-Secretary Rumsfeld on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission that he
chaired, we kept hearing statements that there's no evidence of this and no
evidence of that, and the commission as a whole began to come up with a saying
which I think George Tenet adopted, that "absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence." And in the case of a country like North Korea, where it is so hard to
know what's going on, it's very hard to get hard evidence. There are bits of
information that suggest it might be possible, but there's certainly no
proof.
SEN. LEVIN: Do you advocate abrogating the
framework agreement at this time?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Not if
the North Koreans comply with it, no.
SEN. LEVIN: Well,
based on what you know, do you favor abrogating it at this time?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.
My time's up. Thank you very much.
SEN. WARNER: Senator Inhofe.
SEN. JAMES INHOFE
(R-OK): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, I don't
think I've ever seen someone come in for confirmation with a more glittering
array of credentials than you have. I think we're very fortunate to be having
you at this confirmation hearing. Your credentials, as I think outlined by the
chairman and others, are both in the world of academia as well as in the
Pentagon. What do you in your mind feel particularly qualifies you for this job,
with your background?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I appreciate the
question, Senator, because you've been polite but I think one of the questions
is, you're taking on -- I'm asking to be confirmed for a job that is essentially
the chief operating officer of the Pentagon, and it's quite a management
challenge. I have had quite a bit of management experience. I'd say for the last
-- ever since I was assistant secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, so that
makes it the last 18 years, I have been managing organizations of a hundred or
multiple hundreds of people, and, I think I would say, reasonable
successfully.
And I think there are two things that I
bring to it as a manager. One is I believe in managing for results, whether the
result was a focused American policy that helped to remove Ferdinand Marcos from
the Philippines, or the result, when I was undersecretary of Defense for policy,
of implementing -- designing and implementing a strategy that helped to keep
Israel out of the Gulf War, or designing and implementing a strategy that raised
$50 billion -- more than $50 billion from our allies and friends to support the
war effort; or, on a more modest scale, but I hope I had a real impact, as dean
of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, managing an
enterprise of, if you count our students, over a thousand people, tens of
millions of dollars -- which is just a rounding error at the Pentagon, but it's
real money -- and a very successful capital campaign that raised four times our
original goal.
So I believe results is the way you
measure management, not how many jobs you've held. And I believe people are the
way you get results. That's the other thing I hope I bring to the job.
And there's something, I think, that some private-sector
managers don't quite appreciate about managing in government, even more so in
the academic world; your flexibility to reward people or to penalize people
tangibly is kind of limited. You have to motivate them in other ways. And I
think I've had the experience of motivating very good people to work ungodly
hours for the national interest, and I hope I can continue to do that.
SEN. INHOFE: I'm sure you can.
The chairman talked about it might becoming necessary to reconstitute
the 20-plus nation alliance that we once did, should it become necessary, in the
Middle East. My concern is -- while I'm concerned for that, I'm also concerned
equally about reconstituting our state of readiness. The CINCs have identified
some 87 readiness- related deficiencies, of which 31 of these are listed as
Category I, and that is our ability to fight a war.
Are
you prepared to try to address these? We brought these up before and nothing has
happened in the last few years. How do you look at these identified
deficiencies?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think that's one of the
most important issues that this defense review that Secretary Rumsfeld is
undertaking has to address. It's really central to the first of the president's
priorities because readiness is both a matter of our ability to fight wars, but
it's also a measure of our ability to keep competent, capable people in the
military services. So it's a top priority.
SEN. INHOFE:
And also, some of the readiness issues that are there today, there are some $4.5
billion of near-term readiness requirements. And some of these -- I've been out
in the field and I've seen. I've used the example of Fort Bragg during a rain
storm, it there's no, you know, roof on the barracks and their covering up their
equipment with their body. RPM accounts that are supposed to be done
immediately; they're robbing one account for the other to get ammunition.
And what is your feeling about a supplemental covering
some of these things that really have to be done?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: Well, as the secretary has said, we've really got to do this review
and do it quickly and see what our total requirements are and see if everything
we're doing we need to do. But clearly, we cannot have a force that is suffering
from the kinds of problems that you've identified, and we've got to cover those
things.
SEN. INHOFE: And they're immediate.
In your statement, I appreciate the fact that you talked
about the problems that are out there threatening us not just being missiles,
but other types -- the suitcase type. When you sit on the floor of the Senate,
those who are opposed to a national missile defense system are saying the real
threat is that in a truck or in a suitcase. Certainly, being from Oklahoma, and
the Murrah Federal Office Building, which you're very familiar with, I guess the
most significant domestic terrorist attack in the history of America, I'm very,
very sensitive to that. And yet, just one nuclear warhead has a thousand times
that explosive power. So I hope that you would look at both of these tracks at
the same time as the real threat that's out there.
You
performed very well on the Rumsfeld Commission concerning the necessity for a
national missile defense system. I applaud you for that, and I look forward to
working with you in this committee to achieve that goal.
Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much.
Senator Cleland?
SEN. MAX CLELAND (D-GA):
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz,
welcome. And we appreciate your commitment to public service.
May I just get a clear understanding here. You talked earlier in your
testimony today about the overcommitment of American men and women and the
stress on families of our commitments, the need to review those commitments,
which I certainly share.
Senator Pat Roberts and I took
the floor a number of times last year to talk about the sense in which we were
overcommitted as a nation and underfunded.
And then, in
terms of Iraq, I hear that the air campaign may not be enough; that certain
things are worth fighting for. I just want to get it straight; are you prepared
to support an American ground invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: No one has proposed that, Senator, and I
don't believe that even the statements Senator Levin referred to have to do with
how we might support efforts by the Iraqi people to overthrow their own
government.
SEN. CLELAND: I just wanted to say that
that would be a dramatic increase in American commitment abroad. American forces
are now stretched pretty thin. I just wanted to make that clear since you've
talked about overcommitment and then, in effect, indicated the air campaign may
not be enough, and that certain things were worth fighting for. I just wanted to
clarify your position on that. You do not now support an American ground
invasion with American forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I've never supported an American invasion to overthrow
Saddam.
SEN. CLELAND: Thank you very much.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: But, Senator, I think it's also fair to say
-- to point out that the long commitment to that region of our forces that
Chairman Warner referred to earlier, is in part because that war ended
inconclusively. And we can debate endlessly whether we should have fought
longer, fought differently, but the fact is, one of the things that produces
protracted commitments is inconclusive conclusions.
SEN. CLELAND: As a Vietnam veteran myself, I'm familiar with
inconclusive conclusions and situations that turn out badly if you don't pursue
them in the right way. Enough said.
May I just say that
part of my concern about the overcommitment of American forces is the inability
to get them there quickly if we are to actually make sure that we're not
overcommited, but are able to respond to hot spots in the world. That means that
we have to have global airlift strength. The Hart-Rudman Commission recently
reviewed American airlift capability and found it basically inadequate. I would
just like to call that to your attention because great aircraft like the new
C130J, the C5B and its possible modernization, are all part of a global
airlift strategy that I think fits into our strategic needs very well, and would
just call that to your attention -- the deficit in airlift capability.
There's another deficit I'd like to just bring to your
attention if I may. The key to our defense is our defenders, and I think we
would all agree with that. Almost all new servicemembers enroll and contribute
to the GI Bill -- the Montgomery GI Bill, yet only about half of these service
men and women actually use these benefits. Many who use the benefits do not use
all of their entitlement.
The great historian, Stephan
Ambrose, has said that, "the creation of the GI bill is the single-most
important law ever passed by the federal government." Yet many of these soldiers
and sailors and airmen and Marines are getting out of the service. Many would
like to stay in the service, they tell me as I get around to bases not only in
this country but around the world, but they feel they have to leave so that they
can provide, especially for the education of their spouses and children. I
believe many of these servicemembers would stay in the military if they could
transfer a part of their unused entitlement to the GI Bill to family members in
return for a service commitment. That's a win-win situation, it seems to me.
It is an idea actually supported by the Hart-Rudman
commission report. Service secretaries could use this retention tool
selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses selectively.
I would deeply appreciate it if you would give serious consideration to
how the Department of Defense can use the transfer of G.I. Bill benefits to
family members -- in other words, making the G.I. Bill more family-friendly, as
the military itself has become more a family institution -- use it as a
retention tool, and continue to give us your best thoughts on how we might
pursue this item. Is that something that might be of interest to you?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It sounds very interesting, and it
certainly addresses probably our highest priority, which is how to keep good
people -- attract good people and keep them in the service. And I know there's
nothing that a parent cares more about, I think, than the education of their
children. I know that as a father.
SEN. CLELAND: You
put your finger right on it. And the old saying is that you recruit a soldier,
but you retain a family. I was just in Osaka, Japan, and a Navy admiral
mentioned to me that the decision to stay in the Navy is made at the dinner
table.
So these retention decisions of our aviators, of
our top quality people, of our high-tech people, of our senior captains and
senior NCOs seem to be made around the dinner table, and this question of the
ability to care for the education of our spouses, education of our kids is
something that is of growing importance.
We thank you
very much for your testimony today. Mr. Chairman, no further questions. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator. I
wish to associate myself with your observations about that G.I. Bill. And as --
you know that I will work with you again to achieve those goals. Just yesterday
in Virginia I had constituents raise that very issue of transferability.
Senator Hutchinson?
SEN. LEVIN:
Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you'd yield for 10 seconds so I could join --
SEN. TIM HUTCHINSON (R-AR): Certainly.
SEN. LEVIN: -- in the chairman's support of Senator Cleland's comment
on that G.I. Bill transferability issue. This committee has been very supportive
of that effort. So after you're confirmed, maybe you can help us persuade some
of our House colleagues on --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It'll be
high on my list to look at, Senator.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank
you.
SEN. WARNER: Senator Hutchinson?
SEN. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And
Dr. Wolfowitz, I join my colleagues in welcoming you and in expressing our
belief that our nation's very fortunate to have you.
I
also want to pick up on what Senator Cleland was saying. I chair the Personnel
Subcommittee. Senator Cleland is our ranking member. And we have worked closely
on this whole issue of retaining our men and women in uniform. While at one time
most of our servicemen and -women were single, that is not the case anymore.
Most of them are families, and the issue of not just their education but the
education of dependents is foremost in their minds. I've supported and still
support very strongly Senator Cleland's efforts at portability on the Montgomery
G.I. Bill.
But I also believe that there may be other
areas, other methods by which servicemen and -women can ensure that their
children are going to receive an education. And I'd just ask for your commitment
to work with our committee in exploring ways in which we can ensure that that
opportunity is there for all of the dependents of our men and women in
uniform.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will do with enthusiasm.
SEN. HUTCHINSON: Thank you. I think, when you speak of
strengthening the bond of trust, that is a big part of the quality of life that
we're all concerned about.
Also, I want to raise an
issue concerning the acquisition policy of the Department of Defense on vaccine
production. And in the early 1990s the department made the mistake, I believe,
of abandoning its plans to construct a GOCO vaccine production facility, and the
consequences of that erroneous decision are only now being made fully evident
and fully demonstrated.
Last summer, partly as a result
of prodding from this committee and our subcommittee's hearings, the gentleman
that you will replace if confirmed, wisely, I think, decided to throw in the
towel on that existing vaccine acquisition strategy and signaled that the
department would return to the pre-1994 strategy, namely the construction of a
GOCO. Now, during this time of transition, there are rumblings that there are
those who now want to abandon that or head in another direction, which concerns
me, and I've written Secretary Rumsfeld and have asked him personally to
investigate that matter. And if you're confirmed, will you assure me that you'll
personally look into this vaccine acquisition strategy to ensure that it is an
open and fair process?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes, I will.
SEN. HUTCHINSON: And then I also want to raise something
I've been very concerned about, as well as Senator Reid and Senator Cleland, and
that is the C-130 acquisition and bed-down schedule for the
future. The Little Rock Air Force Base in my home state of Arkansas is the
schoolhouse for the training of the C-130s, and it is scheduled to receive --
that is, the Little Rock Air Force Base -- scheduled to receive the C-130J flight simulator by -- it should be up and running by '04.
But Little Rock is not scheduled to receive the first C-130J
aircraft until '06.
Now, that means there will be a
two-year gap between the availability of the simulator and the arrival of the
aircraft, and that's obviously a problem. It is a problem that Senator Reid
faces in his state as well, and that would be eased considerably if OSD and the
Air Force provided $130 million in the budget, the '02 budget, as was promised
last year, for the purchase of two C-130J aircraft. I don't
ask you to make a commitment on that, but I do ask you to make a commitment that
you will examine this budget issue and get back to me on what the possibilities
are, because obviously, if you're going to have a schoolhouse to train the
pilots and you have the simulators there, you need the aircraft there.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will look into that.
SEN. HUTCHINSON: (Chuckles.) That's a very brief answer, but we're
going to hold you to that.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I -- I will
do it.
SEN. HUTCHINSON: And we look forward to working
with you, and we're very pleased that the president has nominated you, and I
look forward to your confirmation and being able to have the next couple of
years to really see that commitment to the quality of life, to health care, to
housing, to pay being fulfilled and the whole retention issue, that has been
such a severe problem, eased.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well,
thank you. It is, I think, a unique time to both fix some old problems and move
forward on some new ones, and I really look forward to working with you and this
committee to do that.
SEN. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Dr.
Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Thank
you, Senator.
Senator Nelson.
SEN. BEN NELSON (D-NE): Thank you very much.
Dr. Wolfowitz, there is a report coming out from the Pentagon that
questions the policy of Plan Colombia as it relates to strengthening the efforts
at controlling the growth in coca and, therefore, the growth of cocaine to the
United States. It's questioning whether the policy ought to be on controlling
the area of supply or whether our efforts in Plan Colombia ought to be more in
the nature of working with sub-south countries as well as within Colombia to
build those economies and to work with those countries.
I wonder if you can give us your distinction between what you would
consider to be an appropriate role for the United States in Colombia with Plan
Colombia and what might border on nation-building. My concern is that there is a
lot of discussion and things are categorized as nation-building when we disagree
with the efforts, but also it seems to be sanitized language when we say we need
to work with these countries to help them with their infrastructure and with
their democracy.
Can you give us a distinction? I note
that in the answers to the questions about Colombia that you've reserved the
right to make statements later, given the fact that you're only being considered
for approval here at the present time. And I can appreciate that, but I wonder
if you could share with us a distinction that you would have between, let's say,
what we're doing in Colombia and what might be considered by others as
nation-building?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I have a lot to learn
about Colombia, Senator, I think including from you. I think you were just down
there, as I understand. I know the other Senator Nelson was, and I met with him
yesterday.
It does seem to me that one of the essential
things that has everyone concerned, including myself, is that we not find
ourselves in a situation as we were 35 years ago where we are fighting someone
else's civil war. I think that's the essential thing to stay out of. And that
means I would draw the line, I think, less at -- I try to understand what you
mean by the exact terms. But I think most importantly, we know when they are
doing the job, as opposed to us taking over the job. I think helping the
Colombians to help themselves is something that probably does serve American
interests. But I would be very, very leery of something that looked like we were
starting to get our troops involved in another war down there.
SEN. NELSON: Well, is it a question of an internal struggle, or is our
policy and our national interest to stem the flow of drugs north to the United
States, which may be a completely different mission than strengthening Colombia,
although it may have some connection, but it may be a different mission.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I think that is ultimately a major
part of our interest. Although I would think also it's not in our interest, from
either point of view, to see a, so-far, rather democratic government in Latin
America taken over by drug lords.
So, yes, I think
there is a difference, and I think the primary purpose of our efforts to date
has been to stem the flow of narcotics. One of the things I need to learn is
whether you can really disentangle those two as much as we say we are doing.
SEN. BEN NELSON: At some point, you might be in a position
to help us understand which is the primary and which is the secondary role?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will work very hard on that. And I look
forward to actually learning from those of you who have just been down there. I
think there's nothing like being on the spot.
SEN. BEN
NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Well
thank you. That's a very important subject for this committee, and I commend you
and our distinguished ranking member for undertaking a trip down there.
Senator Sessions?
SEN. JEFF
SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Dr.
Wolfowitz, we're delighted to have you here. You have an extraordinary
background, the kind of background I think is most valuable in public service.
You've had three tours in the Pentagon, the State Department, the SALT talks,
but have also been in the private sector and in a university where you've had
the opportunity to study maybe more objectively the events that go around in the
world, and now back in leadership. I think it's tremendous that you've agreed to
take on this challenge, which I think is very great.
When I first came here, about four years ago, George Gilder gave a
little talk and told us that the 19th century was the century of progress, the
20th century was the century of the devil, with wars and oppressions, the likes
of which -- and deaths -- we've never seen before, in a time when it really
shouldn't have happened. And that the 21st century has the potential to be the
greatest in the history of mankind.
I guess I want to
ask you, do you feel that the United States has an interest, a responsibility,
and an ability to help shape this new century in a way that promotes peace and
prosperity around the world? And if so, would you comment in general about how
that might be done?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I believe very
strongly, Senator -- and I think the reference you made to past history is
unfortunately all too true -- that the 20th century started on an extremely
optimistic note. People thought technology and economic progress was going to
bring untold benefits and even outlaw war, that people would see war wasn't
worth pursuing any longer. And then World War I came, and it was all downhill
from there. Once that terrible genie is out of the bottle, the consequences
ripple on for decades, and World War I -- the consequences of World War I were
felt well into the end of the last century.
I think one
of the greatest things to be concerned about is that we come to take for granted
the structures that have produced a relatively peaceful world today. I say
"relatively." It's peaceful for us. It's peaceful for the big countries of
Europe. Obviously, there are a lot of parts of the world that don't look
peaceful at all. But the big wars are far -- big wars don't threaten us now.
I think it is very important to have an active strategy
that is not just a military strategy -- in fact, I think diplomacy and even
economic policy may be just as important or more important -- a policy that
tries to protect those large zones of peace that we've created in the world, and
to try to extend them.
But I do believe a strong
American military is part of that. I think it's an indispensable part of that.
And I think the goal is to keep wars as small and as far away as possible, and
hopefully smaller and further away, until eventually the whole world benefits
from that.
SEN. SESSIONS: So -- well, I take it that
you're committed to creating the kind of defense force that would be relevant to
this new world we're in, for the purpose of promoting peace and prosperity.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Exactly. And I also think that's a
significant part of what Secretary Rumsfeld means when he talks about the need
for rethinking the concept of deterrence for this new world.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, that's going to take a challenge, because we have
constructed a defense establishment designed for a different kind of threat. And
as you know, institutions, I think, maybe even government institutions most of
all, are reluctant to change. Do you think and believe at this point that you
will have to confront some outmoded thinking and to recreate some strategies and
equipment, and -- that would meet these new challenges?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm sure we will, and I know there's resistance to
change. I would say that I also think there's particularly high resistance to
change when you have a situation, as I think we have today, where we are trying
to do too much with the force that we have. And when people are stretched thin,
when they're losing people because of excessive deployments, when they're afraid
that if they identify some function they don't need, that money will get taken
away and they'll suffer in their operational readiness accounts, I think all of
that puts a pressure on the force that makes it much harder to be innovative.
So I think, on the one hand, we've got to fix some of
these immediate needs, but if you want to create sort of the headroom for people
to think in an innovative fashion, I think you have to give them some confidence
that when they do try to do things differently, there will be rewards for that,
rather than people saying, "Oh, well, you've just demonstrated we can do without
that division, because you're experimenting with it, sir."
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I agree. I've been to Kosovo a couple of times,
and I do believe that our police -- I mean our men and women are basically doing
police work. In fact, the U.N. was under an obligation and agreed to produce
police forces that would allow our military to leave, and they've not done so.
So I think generating a system that actually produces police force in those kind
of circumstances, so that our military don't -- do not have to be deployed, is
the correct policy.
Let me mention one other thing. I'm
on the Seapower Committee, and I chair it now -- Subcommittee, and we have
learned that we had -- perhaps when you were last in the Department in the early
'90s we had over 500 ships; we are now at 315. We've seen, as you note in your
opening remarks, a 40 percent reduction in funding and personnel, pretty much
across-the-board. I believe that there will be no way to transform this
military; to maintain it at the right level without some increasing expenditures
to accomplish those goals.
I hope and believe you will
find every possible deficiency. I hope and believe you will find programs that
you do not have to continue to fund that could free up money for things that we
do have to fund. But how are you feeling about this review that's going to take
place? And how are you feeling about how much additional funding the Defense
Department is going to need?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I wouldn't,
even in the security of a closed hearing, feel comfortable taking a guess at a
number like that. I do share Secretary Rumsfeld's general feeling that we
probably need more. But if we're going to ask for more we'd better be very sure
that everything we're asking for is something we need. And I suspect there are
things we're doing now that we could either stop doing or do much more
efficiently.
So I think with -- President Bush during
the campaign said "We need to spend more but we need to spend smarter." And part
of this review is going to be focused very much on spending smarter so that if
we come and ask you for more you can be convinced that it's needed.
SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I support your idea that you need to
conduct a review before we just continue to -- continue programs, but I do
believe that you will need some additional support. We'll need to increase this
budget, not beyond reason. A solid increase for a number of years to compensate
for a long period now of neglect is going to be necessary if we're going to
maintain our ability to defend our just national interests around the world. And
I look forward to working with you. I am absolutely convinced that you and
Secretary Rumsfeld are about to lead a tremendous revitalization of our Defense
Department, and we thank you for it.
SEN. WARNER: We
thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka.
SEN. DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to add my welcome to Dr. Wolfowitz this morning. I'm familiar with you, as
do others that have been in the Congress for a while. And I'm familiar with your
experience, accomplishments and, of course as has been said already, familiar
with your impressive record here of service to our country.
I'm also familiar with your prior service as undersecretary of Defense
for Policy in 1989 to 1993, and particularly pleased to know that you've given
service as assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, as
policies in the Pacific have the most direct impact on my home state. And I
should tell you, in case you were not aware, that my friend, because he works
out at East-West Center, Mike Oxenberg (sp) just recently passed on, and as I
know you've known him and have worked with him on China.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: It's a great loss to our country, sir.
REP. AKAKA: Yes.
News reports indicate that
China has been helping develop a fiber optics communication system for Iraq's
military. This is the same system the British and American forces just attacked,
I understand. How important do you think it is that we should prevent the system
from becoming operational? And how persistent should we be in attacking it?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I haven't had the benefit yet of
classified briefings on the details of that. It does seem to me the principle is
very clear; if they're building something that threatens the safety of our air
crews, we should do what we have to to eliminate it or otherwise assure their
safety.
We should also, I think, make it very clear to
the Chinese that this is behavior that has a real cost in our relations.
REP. AKAKA: And I know, as I said, you've been in policy.
Do you support a policy which would permit the Chinese to resume the launching
of commercial satellites which the U.S. licenses?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: I think it depends crucially on whether we can have the kind of
adequate safeguards that make sure that our missile guidance technology doesn't
end up in the hands of the Chinese. As a commercial matter, it's probably good
all around, but I think there's evidence that suggests the practices in the past
were not sufficiently rigorous.
REP. AKAKA: As I've
indicated, I regard you as a person who has had such a broad view of our country
and our security, so let me ask you this one. There have been discrepancies in
the readiness reports of our operational forces. It is my understanding that
some of the discrepancies have been attributed to a reporting system which is
designed to provide a view of the current state of readiness rather than a
projection of the future. If confirmed, how will you address the issues
surrounding the accuracy of determining the readiness of operational forces?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: The first thing I would do, if it hasn't
been done already, is to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to make sure that we have
a really first-class person in that undersecretary job for manpower and
readiness, because this is a huge task. And I would work with that individual to
try to consider carefully whether the kinds of measures we're using for
readiness are, number one, measuring what we want them to measure, and number
two, to make sure they're not -- every time you set up a way of measurement,
whether it's military readiness or academic excellence, people start to game the
system and they start to design to the measurement instead of to something
else.
So you have to be very careful. I suppose this is
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. When you start to measure and you put out
a certain measurement, you change how people behave. You want to make sure that
you're changing it the way you want to change it and not in an unintended way.
But it's a very big issue that you raise, and a very legitimate one.
SEN. AKAKA: I'm also aware of your work out there on the
Pacific Rim and in the Philippines and what you've done there.
And again, I want to say that I'm glad to see you here and seeking -- I
think, seeking the position here with this administration. And we all know that
the future of our country and the security of our country sort of leans in the
Pacific and that area, so it's important to have a person like you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I --
SEN. WARNER:
Thank you, Senator.
SEN. AKAKA: Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN.
WARNER: Senator Bunning.
SEN. JIM BUNNING (R-KY): Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I want to explore just three -- First of all, welcome to the
committee.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN. BUNNING: I want to explore just three different areas with you,
Doctor. Base realignment and closures; and I noticed in your answers that you
shared -- or Senator Warner has shared with all the members that you kind of
took a -- what we call a powder. You didn't answer the question. (Chuckles.) You
said, "As Secretary Rumsfeld noted in his response to advance policy questions
from this committee, we withhold an assessment of this issue until after the
completion of the defense review." At least that's what's written down here.
Do you have any idea what the president's feelings are on
realignment and closure? -- because I am deeply concerned. Until I have seen the
savings that occurred from the first and the second round of base closures and
can have them proven to me, not just put down on numbers and "here's where we
saved, and here's where --" but a much thorougher examination of that; that if
we proceed in another round, you're going to have a terrible time up here on the
Hill trying to convince anyone that that's in the best interests of this
country. So do you have anything to add to your statement here?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I think I would say what I believe Secretary
Rumsfeld said when he was up here, that he believes, and I agree with him, that
the base structure should correspond to the force structure, and we are only now
looking at what the force structure ought to be as a product of this review.
There is a general feeling that we have more base structure than our present
force structure requires, but until the review is done, it's a little early to
state that as a firm conclusion.
You bring up another
issue which I discussed with you in your office yesterday, and I concur very
strongly that we need to make sure that the savings that are attributed to past
BRACs have actually been realized, and if we end up in another process of that
kind that we get real savings out of it. And that is certainly something I will
look into very hard, if I'm confirmed.
SEN. BUNNING:
Second, there is a statement that you just made this morning, and I wonder how
that fits into this statement. "Finally" -- and I'll read from the statement --
"Finally, we must reform the Department of Defense structures, processes and
organizations.
We need to seek greater efficiencies not
only to safeguard the taxpayers' money, but also because that will allow us to
create better weapon systems and invest more in the cutting edge of our national
defense."
I want to make sure that if we're going to do
something out here in closing down a base and/or removing structures, that it
isn't just to save money; that it is -- that we can't do more with less. If I've
heard that once in the last 14 years, I've heard it an awful lot of times, that
the Defense Department can do more with less. It can like heck. And it's been
proven that it can't do more with less and ask for more deployments. So does
that fit into that statement that you made?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: I certainly agree with you, we've been trying to do more with less
and the consequences are that frayed force that General Shelton referred to. I
do believe -- I mean, when I wrote those words in that statement, I'm thinking
much more of the kinds of efficiencies people say we could achieve in things
like the way we do our pay and account system, the way we purchase electricity
for our bases. There seem to be a lot of places where we're much less efficient
than the private sector, and there's no obvious reason why we ought to be. But I
certainly agree with you, the purpose is not simply to save money -- we need
that money; there are a lot of needs, both immediate needs and long-term needs
it has to be applied to.
SEN. BUNNING: Last, but not
least, Foreign Secretary -- Foreign Minister Robin Cook recently was before this
committee -- Britain's foreign minister. He told us about the effort of the
European allies to form a 60,000-member force, which would act in humanitarian
ways and perform military police-type duties, such as overtaking security
checkpoint duties in the Kosovo region, and those things. Are you familiar with
this effort of our European allies?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I am
in general terms, and in some detail.
SEN. BUNNING:
Well, let me give you an experience that I had that shows that maybe we should
encourage our European allies. I just spent a day or two at Fort Campbell in
Kentucky. And 3,000 of our finest young men and women are about -- on June 1st
-- to go off and replace 3,000 people that are in Kosovo. And I went out to the
training site, onsite, and those men and women were being trained to be MPs. And
I asked the general, how is that in the best and natural interests of our
country, national security, to be MPs in Kosovo? And he disagreed -- that it was
not in the best interests, but they were being trained to secure their own
safety when they were there.
Would you like to expand
on that a little bit?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'd repeat, I
think, what I said earlier, which is I believe it's in our interest, where
possible, to get our allies to take over jobs that they can do and we don't need
to do.
It's in our interest to get local forces to take
over tasks that they can do, that we don't need to do.
And where we're talking police work, we really ought to be looking for
policemen or their equivalent to do it, and not sending highly trained combat
troops -- in fact, as you correctly point out, untraining them, retraining them
for a whole new task, and then having to retrain them for their combat missions
when they come home. There's a lot in that that doesn't make sense, and we ought
to be looking for alternatives.
SEN. BUNNING: I wish
good luck. Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Carnahan?
SEN. JEAN CARNAHAN (D-MO):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(The following section is off
mike.) I want to welcome you to the committee today, Dr. Wolfowitz, and
congratulate you on your nomination and for your years of national service.
SEN. LEVIN: Senator Carnahan, could you put that mike so
we could all hear you? Thanks.
SEN. CARNAHAN: Thank
you.
(On mike.) Although we live in a time of peace and
prosperity, these are certainly challenging times for the Department of Defense.
Once the threat to our national security was formidable and apparent. Now the
overall threat has been reduced, but we don't always know where the enemy is or
where he's located, or who he is, or what weapons are at his disposal.
We live in a time of unprecedented budget surpluses, but
the pressure on the defense budget remains quite heavy. If we are to continue to
have the best and most highly trained and most effective military in the world,
we have to invest in our military personnel, and that means higher salaries and
better health care and improved quality of life for those who wear the
uniform.
I think we also owe it to our troops that when
they are placed in harm's way, that they are properly equipped and that they are
trained to perform the tasks for which they've been sent.
The military services continues to demand newer and sophisticated
weapons systems, but these demands must be evaluated against the type of threats
we expect to face and balanced against competing defense and domestic spending
priorities.
There are discussions of transforming our
entire armed forces structure, but as you know, we face a bureaucracy that is
set in its ways and very resistant to change. So I expect that you will have a
difficult time, but hopefully a very rewarding job, and I look forward to
working with you in those efforts.
I have a few
questions I would like to ask you today, though. Senator Bond and Congressman
Gephardt have been very involved in urging the South Korean government to
purchase F-15s. I'm very supportive of those efforts as well. The new purchase
of F-15s is necessary to keep the F-15 production line running.
Given the uncertainty of whether we will be relying on the Super Hornet
or the F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter, do you agree that it in our national
interest to continue the production of the F-15?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I certainly think it's -- it is very much in our national
interest to maintain a strong industrial base, and I -- clearly, aircraft
production is a big part of that.
You asked me, when I
met with you yesterday, about this forthcoming Korean decision, and it seems to
me that there are two strong principles here which we should emphasize to our
Korean allies in their consideration of what kind of aircraft to buy. One is
that it will be far more effective if we're both flying the same kind of
aircraft. It's not just the matter of interoperability, but the ability to
repair one another's systems.
And secondly, given that
their budgets are tight, as well as ours, I hope they'll buy the best value for
the dollar or for the won. And I suspect very much that's going to be the
American plane.
SEN. CARNAHAN: I also mentioned to
Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was here, a concern that had been expressed to me a
number of times, and that has to do with the readiness of our TRADOC posts,
especially the one at Fort Leonard Wood.
I would like
for you to, if you would, check on that for me and get back to me with more
information about that. But the question I'll ask today is one that's a little
bit more general.
I understand the department is doing
a comprehensive review, but I would like to hear what your views are on what
measures the department should take to address the short-term readiness of our
troops.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Clearly, one of the most serious
readiness deficiencies that I've been briefed on is shortages in training
facilities and lack of training time and lack of resources to do training
properly. I mean, there's no, I think, more important contributor to the
readiness of forces than the fact that they're well trained. I remember going
right after the Gulf War with Secretary Cheney to visit the Second Armored
Division inside Iraq. And Cheney talked to a tough-looking senior master
sergeant who I think had spent 26 years in the Army, and asked him, was it
tough? He said it wasn't anywhere near as tough as the National Training Center.
That's the kind of training you want to have. It's an essential part of
readiness, and it's certainly something we will be looking hard at in this
review.
SEN. CARNAHAN: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN.
WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator
Collins.
SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, I first want to echo the
comments of my colleagues in thanking you for accepting this considerable
challenge and for bringing your considerable expertise and talents to bear in
this exciting new position.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you,
Senator.
SEN. COLLINS: As a new member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, I have had a parade of service chiefs and senior
officers come to my office to brief me, and those meetings have been very
helpful. I have, however, been concerned by what I have heard. Over and over
again, senior officers have told me that there has been a pattern in the last
administration of robbing our modernization accounts to pay for pressing
readiness problems. And indeed, one senior officer told me that he was actually
instructed to prepare a budget in the last administration that he knew wouldn't
possibly meet the readiness needs of his service. In fact, there was a reliance
on supplementals in the last administration that caused there to be lots of
concerns about the training monies available for our troops and other readiness
issues.
It seems to me we need a new approach and
that's a lousy way to go about budgeting. Are you going to commit today to a
truth in budgeting process so that we really know what the numbers are and can
make sure that we're not essentially gaming the system?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I think it's essential not only for the Congress to know
but for the president and the secretary of Defense to know. And I certainly
agree with you it's a misuse of the budgeting process to have expenditures that
you fully know you're going to need submitted as an emergency supplement to your
budget. But we have to figure out how we work our way out of that process that
you correctly identify we've gotten into.
SEN. COLLINS:
On a related issue, I've also heard from these senior officers about
inefficiencies within the Defense Department acquisition and procurement
process. For example, one senior officer told me that the Defense Logistics
Agency adds a markup of 22 percent to each uniform that it buys. And he was
saying that if he could eliminate the middle man within DOD, that he could save
a great deal of money. Are you taking -- are you planing to take a thorough look
at the internal acquisition and procurement systems of DOD to see whether there
are ways to improve efficiencies and perhaps save substantial sums of money?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Absolutely. One of the things that has
struck me a lot in briefings I've had over the last six weeks or so is there's
just a shelf-full of studies going back at least to David Packard's commission
in the early 1980's, that identify all kinds of reforms. And I keep asking the
question, we don't need more studies, we need to implement these things. Why
isn't it happening? And it's not that people haven't tried, and it's not as
though it's going to be simple to do so. But I certainly think, with this
unusual man we have as secretary of Defense, we have a real opportunity now to
get some things done that everyone agrees are long-overdue.
SEN. COLLINS: I agree. I think everyone knows what the problems are but
there either has been too much internal resistance to solving them that has
prevented needed reforms from being implemented. So I appreciate that
commitment.
Finally, I want to echo Senator Sessions'
concerns about our current shipbuilding rates. The current rates of shipbuilding
do not support the goal of a 300-ship naval fleet, as identified by the last
QDR. The Clinton administration's defense budgets have been gradually taking the
Navy, not toward a 300-ship Navy, but rather toward a considerably smaller
fleet. Adding to the challenges are the facts that many defense experts believe
that even a 300-ship Navy is inadequate for our current operational and
deployment requirements.
I hope, as part of the
top-to-bottom review that you and the secretary are conducting, that you will
take a very hard look at what we can do to make sure that our shipbuilding
budgets are adequate to make up for the deficiencies of the past eight years.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: That will be a very important part of what
we look at, yes.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN.
WARNER: Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator
Nelson.
SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FL): Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. And I just want to say to the immediate past chairman, thank you again
for that trip to Colombia over the last few days. It was extraordinary, it was
informative, it was personally enjoyable to be with you and the other members,
and I thank you very much.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, thank you.
Your contribution to that very quick trip was really crucial. And our learning,
I think, was at a high level mutually. You, and Senator Ben Nelson, Senator Jack
Reed and I went. And, again, thank you for participating.
SEN. BILL NELSON: And Dr. Wolfowitz, it was a pleasure to visit with
you yesterday. I want to encourage you on the seeming new policy of the
administration to break the mold, to think outside the lines. It's, I think,
refreshing that you approach it this way. And with the changing nature of the
threat to the United States, I think it's essential. And I thank you about
that.
Now, what I'd like to get from you is some of
your ideas about what are going to be the appropriations needs over the course
of the next decade. Chairman Warner and a group of other senators from this
committee had recently written a letter, asking for necessary appropriations
having to do with a supplemental for this year. And, Senator Warner, if I
recall, it totalled some, perhaps, $7 billion additional monies in this
particular year. This is for the '01 budget, not even before we get to the '02
budget.
If I recall, also, that had to do with pay and
benefits, health benefits, it had to do with spare parts, it had to do with the
cost of fuel and a number of things like that. And that's $7 billion before we
even get to the decade that we're talking about.
Can
you give me some clue as to what you think are going to be the needs of
increased defense spending over the course of the next decade?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I suppose the real answer is, without the review, I
can't say very much. But I guess if you want a clue, it seems to me there's a
general feeling, unless we're going to radically change what we try to do in the
world -- and I say "radically" because I think we probably do have to change
what we try to do in the world, and we may want to do more, but unless we're
going to do radically less, we probably need more resources. But we've also got
to find savings within what we do because we can't just simply add to the
defense budget. And that's why even the short-term question of what do we need
to make it through '01 is something that requires a fair look at what we're
already spending our money on.
SEN. BILL NELSON: Well,
I know that that's the answer that you have to give at this point, and I respect
that. So let me suggest what I think the truth is on the answer.
The fact is, as we change the nature of our defense posture, we can
save money, but at the same time, since the reason for a federal government, in
large part, is to provide for the national defense, we cannot be penny-wise and
pound-foolish, particularly with research and development, and particularly with
regard to the provision of our forces in the field with supplies and material,
and the quality of the troops by virtue of what it's going to cost in
competition with the private sector in order to be able to retain them.
I think the bottom line is that there is going to be a
considerable demand for increased spending over the course of the next decade.
And I think we are fooling ourselves if we don't plan for that. We have some
choices to make very shortly in formulating a budget and how much are we going
to allocate for defense, and how much for education and for a prescription drug
benefit, and balance all that against the need to protect Social Security and
the surplus in the Medicare trust fund, and then balance all of that on the
question on how large is going to be the tax cut.
And
so I think there are, as we approach the subject matter of this committee,
people that are fooling themselves if they think that we're not going to need
substantial defense increases over the next 10 years, and do so at the peril of
providing for the common defense, if you use it up in other areas so that we
don't have it, or so that the only choice that is left to us is the choice of
going back into deficit financing, which was one of the reasons of a poorly
performing economy in the decade of the '80s.
So you
see where I'm coming from, Dr. Wolfowitz.
And I
congratulate you on your nomination, I congratulate you ahead of time, and I'm
going to be visiting with you about these budgetary matters in the future.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I look forward to it, Senator. Thank
you.
SEN. BILL NELSON: Thank you.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Thank you very much, Senator.
We will now have a second round of questions, and I'll initiate those
questions and my distinguished colleague, Mr. Levin, will follow up.
I was quite interested in your selection of a quote in
your opening statement. "As General Creighton Abrams said when the all-
volunteer force was first created, 'People aren't in the Army. People ARE the
Army.'" I was privileged to serve in the Pentagon at that time when he was chief
of staff, and I have the greatest respect for that military leader, and he was
exactly right. And as you said, you'll become the chief operating officer and
people will be at the very top of your agenda.
This
committee -- indeed, the Congress as a whole -- are very concerned about the
inability of the Department of Defense -- all services, some with varying
degrees, but all services -- are having difficulty retaining particularly that
group of younger officers -- captains, so to speak; lieutenants, in the Navy --
who are making that pivotal decision as to whether to go on and perhaps commit
for a career of at least 20 years. Similarly, the enlisted ranks, the middle
grade and senior petty officers, sergeants and the like, are likewise not
staying in the numbers that we need.
Now, there's been
some modest improvement here recently, possibly as a consequence of the
initiatives taken by the past administration and the Congress. This committee
took the initiatives to increase the pay raises, took the initiative to increase
the quality of health care. What are your initiatives that you're going to
assert, if confirmed and you take on this responsibility, to stem the flow of
these young people out of the military and somewhat induced by very lucrative
opportunities for their trained skills in the private sector?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Clearly, pay and allowances are one of the first things
one looks at, and you're absolutely correct; this committee has taken some very
important initiatives, including just at the end of the last year, that I think
should help us. Some of the -- I suppose the kinds of tangible benefits that
Senator Cleland referred to earlier that can help service people think that by
staying in they're ensuring their children's future, that's very important.
I think, as I said earlier, I think it's equally important
to make sure that people feel that they're getting the right kind of training
and equipment to perform their missions, because at the end of the day, I think
what keeps people in the service will never be the pay and allowances. Pay and
allowances have got to be adequate, but they can almost always earn more money
with less time away from home and less risk of life doing something else. It's
the sense of mission. It's very hard to convince people of a sense of mission if
they aren't being given the equipment for that mission or if the training for
the mission is inadequate.
And I also believe that --
and I think, hopefully, this will be part of this review -- we need, as a
country, and certainly this committee makes a big contribution in that respect,
to convince the country that the mission these men and women are doing is
important, because that, I think, is one of the greatest psychic rewards and,
therefore, one of the greatest rewards that they get for service.
So you have to look at it, I think, as a whole. It starts
with pay and allowances, but it goes right up to what the president and the
Congress and the country believe is the importance of what they're doing.
SEN. WARNER: It's also family separation, Dr. Wolfowitz,
and that's brought about by overdeployments in terms of the number of times that
these young men and women are sent abroad. They'll accept not only a reasonable
level, but a high level, because that's what they joined to do. But I think we
have in the past few years seen where we have crossed that invisible line of
where they're now confronted with serious family situations because of their
departure from family for long periods, and all too often coming at a critical
time when they're trying to raise some young children. And how well all of us
who have had that great privilege and challenge in life know the essential need
for the two parents to be together as much as possible with those children in
their formative years. Bear that in mind.
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: You're absolutely right, Senator.
SEN.
WARNER: Also, but for a spare part no bigger than the tip of that pencil,
airplanes can't fly. And the mechanics are instructed to go over and take it out
of another airplane, which is operational, and cannibalize it; put that airplane
parked for awhile. That's why I'm urging consideration of this supplemental.
We've got to get into the spare parts replenishment and the distribution of
those spare parts right away because these young people are working, whether
it's on ships or on the airline -- not the airline, but the line of airplanes on
the tarmac, working on them, they need to feel that we're supplying those parts
such that they can keep those pieces of equipment up and ready.
In our most recent -- or my most recent visit to Kosovo here a week or
so ago, we visited a young captain who had several tanks and other motorized
vehicles high on a hill in that sector that is becoming more and more
destabilized, Presevo Valley. And he said some of those units that he had up
there were in a precarious situation because of spare parts. There's a trooper
right out on the front line taking risks.
So again, I
know this question of the supplemental is not a cheerful one, but I take the
brunt of criticism directed. I just think it has to be studied and studied very
carefully. I'm confident that Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, and others who are
entrusted with the appropriations, therein is the primary responsibility, can
manage that in a way that we can achieve it, hopefully, for the military. And
maybe restrict it, and let the president indicate that he'll veto if this thing
becomes a giant snowball rolling down the hillside with everybody's need
attached to it. So I'll continue to work on that.
The
industrial base. We can really be no stronger as a nation in the military if we
do not have those companies who are willing to get out there and put at risk
their capital and to have the ability to attract the talent that's necessary to
do the research and development, and the tests and evaluation on these systems
that are coming along .
What are your views about
assisting the industrial base, and particularly the question of across-the-ocean
mergers? They're primarily in Atlantic, transatlantic, but they could well
become also in the Pacific region a factor that concerns the industrial base
here at home.
That will be your responsibility. What
are your views on that subject?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well,
first, Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about the health of our industrial
base. It is crucial to our ability to support forces in the future. It's crucial
to our ability to innovate. And I think it's hurting badly. I think when one
looks at this issue of transatlantic or even possibly transpacific mergers, I
think the crucial question is, do these mergers contribute to our ability to
innovate, contribute to the long-term health of our industrial base, or
conversely, are they a kind of fire sale, where we're transferring absolutely
essential American capabilities abroad in a way that will hurt our long-term
competitiveness?
I think some degree of distributing
production across the defense establishments of our allies as well as ourselves
may be a way to make the overall industrial base more efficient, but certainly
one of the things we better look at is to make sure that if some of that is
going eastward across the Atlantic, that there is enough gain coming back the
other direction that we're all better off in the long run.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you.
Senator Levin.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to Colombia first. As Senator Bill Nelson indicated
and the chairman indicated, four of us went down to Colombia last weekend. And
let me just give you a quick impression and then ask you for a response.
First, our focus clearly has got to be on the demand side
of this equation; that we are creating the demand which is creating the supply
that Colombia currently is supplying in the area of cocaine. But stemming the
flow of cocaine and the supply of it is an important goal as well. That's number
one.
Two, we shouldn't send our forces there to try to
go after the narcoterrorists and the narcosuppliers, but we ought to, as you put
it, assist them to assist themselves to go after those folks that are creating
this problem.
Now, strengthening the army -- this is
third -- which is supporting a democratic government, and traditionally has in
Colombia -- unlike many other countries in Latin America, the army in Colombia
has been supportive of the democratic government in Colombia traditionally, and
is now. And strengthening that army is essential to the survival of that
democracy against the onslaught of the narcotraffickers. Number one.
Those narcotraffickers are now funding the threats to that
democracy, both from the guerrillas and from the paramilitaries. So when we
strengthen the professionalism and the training and the protection of human
rights by that army, we are in the process accomplishing two things, or trying
to accomplish two things. First is we are stemming the flow of narcotics to this
country, attempting to reduce that coca crop. Secondly, we are, in the process,
strengthening Colombian democracy. Both things are going on. And they're
inseparable.
And so when you talk about disentangling
two goals, the goal of supporting Colombian democracy or nation building and the
goal of stemming the flow of cocaine, both of those goals are dependent upon
strengthening the professionalism, training of the army and making sure that
they protect human rights in order to reduce the power of the
narcotraffickers.
So the goals, it seems to me, are
inseparable, and talking about disentangling them may miss the point. Now, I
just want to give you that thought and give you a chance to respond, if you
want, or just to think about it, either way.
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: Well, I will respond. I mean, you're taking me in the direction I was
heading already. I can see a clear difference between their doing the job and
our doing the job, and that's a line I'd like to keep clear and bright. I know
people make a distinction between fighting narcoterrorists and fighting the
civil war. I don't -- I guess I haven't -- you're saying it yourself; it's hard
to disentangle, because the instrument for doing both, especially if they're
going to do it themselves, is their own military.
When
I was ambassador in Jakarta, the Colombian ambassador -- and it may have the
first they ever sent to Indonesia -- was not a foreign service officer; he was a
judge who had sent some narco-terrorists to jail. And he was in Indonesia,
essentially, to protect his life. And he told me with great bitterness that all
that money from the United States that's sucking cocaine up from Latin America
is destroying his country and destroying democracy in his country. And it was
very poignant and very moving, and people like that judge-become-ambassador are
very courageous people.
And it seems to me, if they
want our financial support, our material support, our training support, within
limits, we ought to provide it. If they want our -- the lives of our service
people, then we'll say, "It's your country. It's -- your lives should be on the"
--
SEN. LEVIN: They haven't asked for that.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I know they haven't.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Just so everybody's clear. And I don't think there's
any support for that, that I know of, in this country. And -- but there is,
however, support for -- and Plan Colombia is what I just described and, I think,
what you just described. And I gather you in general are supportive of that
goal. Is that fair to --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Yes.
SEN. LEVIN: Okay.
Back to the --
Iraq for a moment, and what many thought, including myself, was an unclear
signal to Saddam prior to his invasion of Kuwait. Would you comment on that? I
think you've spoken on that issue before -- the importance of clarity of our
signals and the lack of clarity in terms of that signal to him, as to what the
impact would be, should he move on Iraq -- on Kuwait.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I believed at the time and I believe now that we
sent ambiguous signals, argued strongly at the time that we should send a
clearer signal. In fairness to that administration, it also has to be said that
one of the greatest ambiguities came in congressional testimony, where an
assistant secretary of State was pushed, in my view, a little bit too hard to
say exactly what our commitments were. I liked Secretary Cheney's formulation at
the time, which is, we've stood by our friends in the past, and we'll stand by
them in the future, and no further questions. And I think if the administration
had stuck to that line, it would have been a better signal.
But having said that, two things:
Number one,
given how Saddam behaved when he was faced with the threat of Desert Storm and
his unwillingness to yield at that point, I think there's every reason to be
skeptical that even a very clear signal would have deterred him. He was
convinced that we were weak, that we'd lost in Vietnam, we'd lose again
there.
And secondly, there is no question that once he
invaded, it was a great help in dealing with our Arab friends in the region that
no one could accuse us of having provoked the attack. And that's -- there's
always a little bit of a trade-off between sending clear signals, on the one
hand, and being seen as being belligerent, on the other.
At the end of the day, I think history probably would have taken a
similar course.
SEN. LEVIN: Just two last questions,
and I thank our chairman for yielding to me. My time is up, but there being no
others here, and since I need to get to another hearing, the chairman, as
always, graciously allowed me to extend this period.
When you were undersecretary for Policy in President George Bush's
administration, there was an employee in the Office of Nonproliferation Policy
who became convinced that the administration was about to present false
information to Congress in a classified briefing about Pakistan's nuclear
capabilities.
The individual complained to his
supervisor and the supervisor then became concerned that the employee might take
it upon himself to correct the inaccurate information presented to Congress.
And I'm not getting into the merits at all of that case as
to who was right, who was wrong, but there was a response by the supervisor
there ordering him not to supply that information, and terminated the
employment, and apparently acted to ensure that security clearances be removed
from that employee. I don't want to get involved in the specifics of that,
either. That's the background, however, and there's apparently litigation going
on, so I don't want to -- I'm not asking you to comment in any way which affect
that litigation.
The reason I'm asking you this is
because of the questions asked of you at this hearing about providing
information to this committee and to our designated staff who are cleared to
receive classified information. And it is important, I believe, to us, that
people who wish to come to give us classified information in no way be deterred
from doing so or be threatened or be in any way deterred from providing that to,
again, designated staff who are cleared to receive classified information.
The Whistleblower Protection Act does not apply to this
type of case, because information is classified. But do you believe, putting
that aside, that it is appropriate in any way to retaliate against an employee
who threatens to take accurate information to properly cleared congressional
staffers, as a matter of policy?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: My
answer is, absolutely not. I don't believe that kind of retaliation is
appropriate at all. I'd go a bit further, too. I think it's terribly important,
and on that specific issue of what Pakistan was doing in nuclear weapons, there
was a legal obligation to keep the Congress appropriately informed.
Senator, I wasn't even aware of that employee or the
entire case until about 18 months ago when I was asked to give a deposition in a
civil suit. Most of the events he alleged took place before I was confirmed as
undersecretary.
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah, and I didn't want to
get into your --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, okay, but you
brought it up. So I believe --
SEN. LEVIN: I assumed
you were aware of it one way or another.
MR. WOLFOWITZ:
Only within the last --
SEN. LEVIN: The issue. I don't
mean back then. I mean, you are --
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I'm
aware of the issue. In fact, there have been times on that issue when I
specifically sensed that people thought we could somehow construct a policy on a
house of cards that the Congress wouldn't know what the Pakistanis were doing.
I've always thought policies based on withholding information from Congress are
going to fail in the long run, and in that case, there was a clear legal
obligation to keep the Congress informed.
SEN. LEVIN: I
appreciate that.
My final question. Is the question of
whether and how to deploy a national missile defense part of the strategic
review, or is it left out of the strategic review, as far as you know?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: My understanding is it's a piece of the
strategic review. There are many pieces; there's not a single -- and, as
Secretary Rumsfeld said when he was up here, surely one of the things that's
going to come out of this strategic review is we can make some decisions now;
we're going to have to review some more. I don't think this is a process that's
going to end.
But, clearly, you can't make decisions
about long-term resource requirements without factoring in what missile defense
requirements are going to be.
SEN. LEVIN: Mr. Chairman,
let me just again thank you. And I want to congratulate Dr. Wolfowitz -- wish
him the best of luck. And I know there will be a lot of important efforts here
to keep this committee on the bipartisan tack that it's always tried to follow,
and that we can look to you to assist us in that process.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well thank you. I think I've had courtesy calls with, I
think, 18 members of this committee, and every one of them has been a strong
bipartisan supporter of a strong national defense. So I'm sure the other six are
as well, and I really look forward to working with this committee if I am
confirmed.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.
SEN. WARNER: I have several more questions I wish to ask.
Speaking for myself, and I think others, we were shocked
about this recent series of allegations regarding a long and trusted member of
the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the allegations of his sharing
classified material with another nation. Also, regrettably, a person who
preceded you in the office to which you aspire to serve this nation was a
subject of a pardon recently by the president with regard to allegations about
his handling of classified material.
As the chief
operating officer, it seems to me, in consultation with the secretary of Defense
and other persons in the administration, you should undertake a review of the
Department of Defense with regard to the handling of classified material and the
means by which to detect any violation of the regulations of the use of that
material by employees at all levels of the Department.
Therefore, my question to you is how do you view the importance of
classification, the responsibility that those entrusted with documents that are
classified and how they should deal, not only in the safeguarding of that, but
the sharing of that information? How do you intend to deal with that issue and
what are your views with regard to classified material? I feel very strongly
that the most rigid of rules should apply, and that when an individual is found
to have violated and, subject to the appropriate legal actions that have to be
reviewed to verify that violation -- whether it's a court case or whatever --
accountability of the strongest measures should be dealt. What are you views?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, I agree very strongly with you about
that, Senator. And it's kind of shocking, the extent to which classified
information frequently and with great speed, finds its way into public in one
form or another. I do think we need to do everything we can to hold people
accountable; to make it clear that we take this seriously. I know -- you know,
any one of us has come across a classified document that we may have thought was
overclassified, but that doesn't give you an individual right to take it on
yourself -- (laughs) -- to declassify it or downgrade it. There are procedures
for doing that and they should be stuck with.
You're
talking about two very different things, and the second one is a -- the first
one is a matter of treason.
And we clearly have got to
look at what that whole Hanssen case tells us about our counterintelligence
capabilities, which -- clearly we've missed two big ones in recent times, and
think about how to protect ourselves from that kind of traitor.
On the more almost mundane matter of the day-to-day handling of
classified materials, I think we lead by example. We've got be careful
ourselves. We've got to take infractions seriously. And if we think that things
are overclassified, then we need in an orderly way to take care of that problem,
but not let individuals take it on themselves.
SEN.
WARNER: Well, are you prepared to commit to this committee that if confirmed,
that you will undertake, as one of your top priorities, a review of that subject
within your department?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: I will do so,
Mr. Chairman.
SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator.
The president, I think quite wisely, and the secretary of
Defense, in the course of his hearing before this committee, put increased
emphasis on the subject of homeland defense. This committee has taken a number
of initiatives to strengthen the ability of our communities to deal with a
terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction -- biological, chemical.
We've really been out on the cutting edge. We have a subcommittee, Emerging
Threats, and it's been one of the most active subcommittees. And I commend the
chairman and ranking member for the past work and indeed what they've proposed
to do in the coming year.
But this is a subject of
great concern to this senator and, I think, many others. It's astonishing. You
know, I don't want to harp too much on my recollections, but I remember when we
had blackouts in Washington, D.C., in the early stages of World War II. I was a
youngster then. I remember it well. I mean, people would sit here and listen to
me make that statement in astonishment.
But that was
the last time, really, that this nation felt imperiled at the hands of an
adversary. At that time, it was the -- primarily the Nazi submarine fleet, which
was actively sinking shipping off the shores. And I won't go into further
details, but it was the silhouetting of the shipping as a consequence of the
lighting emanating from the shores, and a drastic number of ships were lost
right off the Atlantic Coast of the United States. And there have been other
incidences.
But now we've come to the point where we're
threatened by intercontinental ballistic missiles. We're defenseless. I commend
the president for his strong initiatives to address the question of missile
defense. We've covered it here today.
But the terrorism
that could strike here at home is a major concern, and we've taken initiatives
in the last bill, authorization bill, of this committee to try and urge the
reorganization of the lines of responsibility in our federal government. I don't
have it with me, but I'll see to it you get it -- a chart showing the voluminous
number of crossed lines and crossed authority that exist today. I don't say that
as a criticism of the past administration; it's just a statement of fact.
So I would hope that you'd put this high on your list of
priorities to address, because we've got to have, I think, greater involvement
by all departments and agencies of the federal government in this question of
homeland defense.
And I just wondered what you thought
about the missions for the department for which you will, hopefully, be
responsible as deputy secretary of Defense.
Right now,
the Department of Justice has primary authority, and we come up against the
time-honored law of posse comitatus, which limits the involvement of the U.S.
military as it relates to the daily lives of our people in this country, and I
think that doctrine is well-founded in history and should be protected. But
again, the assets and the knowledge of the Department of Defense need to be
shared at every level of government and with the communities as to how best to
protect themselves and, if an incident were to happen, how we can best assist
those in the community that will come to the rescue of their fellow citizens.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: Actually, I know John Hamre, when he was
deputy secretary, took a very strong interest in this issue, as will I, if
confirmed.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And I commend him. He did,
indeed. We talked many, many times on this subject.
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: And actually, during the -- I guess it was the transition, it was
actually the period of the recount of the Florida votes, he convened a very
interesting three-hour session over at CSIS of officials from the Clinton
administration with a number of people, respectively, on both the Gore and Bush
group, to talk about this issue. And what that discussion and many others
reveals is there is a fundamental problem, that you identify, of how the U.S.
government organizes itself to deal with this problem, which has both a domestic
and a foreign aspect, both a law enforcement and a security aspect. And we need
to do everything we can to prevent that kind of attack; everything we can, where
possible, to defend against it; but also this question of how you respond is
crucial.
I was in Israel during the Gulf War with
Deputy Secretary Larry Eagleburger, whom President Bush sent over to persuade
the Israelis not to get in the war. So I've been in a country under missile
attack. It -- I mean, we knew the odds, and the odds individually weren't that
dangerous. But the whole country is immobilized by it, and the Israelis had a
very substantial civil defense effort and they were quite clear that without
that civil defense effort, without the little bit of warning that our satellites
were able to provide so that people could go into shelters, they would have had
a mass panic.
So the ability to deal with an event if
it happens, I think, is very important for the stability of society as a whole,
and it's got to get a high priority.
MR. WOLFOWITZ:
Well, that's an interesting historical footnote that you mentioned about your
visit with my old friend, Dr. Eagleburger, former secretary of State. I, too,
was in Israel on February the 18th, 1991, with Senator Nunn, then chairman of
this committee, Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye. And we were in the
headquarters of the Defense Ministry when the last scud fell on Tel Aviv. We had
to stop our meetings and put on our gas masks. And the strike landed a mile or
two away; I never felt, you know -- well, you were in the hands of the gods when
that thing came in, because he didn't have any particular target except to hit
the population. It was used as a terrorist weapon, not as a military.
And the people of Israel and the government of Israel
showed enormous courage at that time to withhold their ability, and they had it,
to retaliate, because they knew of how it could fracture and impede the progress
of the coalition at that time engaged in repressing Saddam Hussein.
So I share that. But I hope you put this high on your
agenda; the subject of homeland defense.
MR. WOLFOWITZ:
I will, Mr. Chairman. I hope our whole government does.
SEN. WARNER: The NMD system -- as I said, the president is taking a
strong leadership role, together with other members of his Cabinet. Secretary of
State Powell in, I think, a very forceful and successful way, based on the
reports thus reviewed, asserted the rights of the United States to defend itself
in the face of this threat. We stand, as I think we have to repeatedly say,
defenseless against an incoming strategic intercontinental ballistic missile,
and indeed other missiles for that matter. And we must marshal the resources of
this country to determine whether or not we can devise a limited ability to
interdict the accidentally-fired or terrorist missile, or whatever the case may
be, up to a dozen or more of these missiles. And, as the president and Secretary
Powell and others have pointed out, it is not a system that, in any way, should
lessen the deterrence that Russia looks to its system to provide, or indeed
other nations. It's simply an essential protection for our cities and
communities here at home.
Now, have you -- you've spent
time on this. Have you ever sorted out the sea-based system and how that could
be brought in a timely way to augment the current architecture that was employed
by the last administration?
MR. WOLFOWITZ: If I may
make one general point quickly and then get to your question, I think it is --
you said something which I think is missed too often, and that is we're not
talking about missile defense as it emerged during the Cold War, we're not
talking about SDI, we're not talking about how to compete with the Soviet Union.
We're talking about a limited missile defense of the kind that, frankly, I would
think the Russians themselves would want to have.
On
the specific question of sea-based options, or I would say other options more
generally, I think one of the things that we need to do, and hopefully the
Russians will concur in this and we can do it cooperatively, is to relax a
number of the restrictions in the ABM Treaty that I believe prevented us from
looking adequately at those kinds of options. And I'm just starting to get read
into this on a classified basis, but it's quite clear to me from what I've seen
already that our development would have looked very different over the last 10
years if the ABM Treaty hadn't been there of if it had been modified.
And what we want to do is find the most effective, least
expensive and least provocative way of proceeding in this direction. And I think
that is something that hopefully we can persuade the Russians and our allies and
many other people it's in their interest as well.
SEN.
WARNER: And I thank you for that observation and I share that. Actually, I was
in the Department at the time the ABM Treaty was negotiated and happened to have
been part of the delegation that attended the signing of that ceremony -- I was
there for other purposes. But it was in Moscow --
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: It was a different era, wasn't it, Mr. Chairman?
SEN. WARNER: I beg your pardon?
MR. WOLFOWITZ:
It was a different era.
SEN. WARNER: It was a different
era; it was May of 1972. And at that time I was secretary of the Navy and had
finished a negotiation an Incident at Sea agreement which was signed the day
before ABM and SALT I.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: START I.
SEN. WARNER: START I. The point being that yes, we do need
to address modifications -- amendment to the ABM Treaty, because the treaty does
serve, I think, an important role in the architecture -- overall architecture of
arms control agreements.
But I think progress is being
made with the Russians to come to the realization that this country has a right
to defend itself and employ that technology which can be most efficiently and
cost effectively used to achieve that system.
And
again, I commend the president for his very clear forceful message to the entire
world, that he's going to protect the rights of this country to defend itself.
And he will pursue, I think, in a diligent way in consultation with our allies
amendments to the ABM Treaty.
MR. WOLFOWITZ: And I
think we're getting more of a bipartisan consensus in this country --
SEN. WARNER: I think you're correct. But I do believe that
we've got to begin to put more focus on the sea-based option as a follow-on, or
an adjunct, whatever phraseology you wish, because that gives us, in my
judgment, a greater protection of the instruments themselves on the high seas
from interdiction of the defense system as a part of any attack, a limited
attack.
Now, moving on to Secretary Rumsfeld's very
important point when he was before this committee, he said that this nation
needs, and I quote him, "a reasonable exit strategy," end quote, as a
precondition for the decision to make a military intervention. What definition
would you apply to "a reasonable exit strategy"?
MR.
WOLFOWITZ: That we can define what our goals are, successfully achieve those
goals, and then take our forces out. I suppose one might -- I mean, at least
that would be the -- what I would generally strive to achieve. I suppose there
might be a situation like the one we used to have in Europe or the one we still
have in Korea where "exit" isn't the right word; it's a long-term commitment but
a stable one where you have a deterrent force in place. But certainly from most
of the things we're talking about, I would hope it's the kind of thing where you
can finish the job and be done.
SEN. WARNER: Well, Dr.
Wolfowitz, that concludes the questions from the committee. I think that your
responses have been very clear. I thank you for your what I perceive as total
cooperation today. And this committee will very shortly gather to determine the
balance of the confirmation process. But at the moment I'm optimistic we can
conclude it in an expeditious manner. And I thank you very much.
Document 111 of 112. 