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Initiative for a New Cuba

Address by Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel W. Fisk
before the National Summit on Cuba
September 17, 2002
Washington, DC

Congresswoman Emerson, thank you for your introduction. And thanks to the organizers of this National Summit on Cuba for inviting me to discuss the President's policy toward Cuba.

At the outset, I cannot resist noting how glad I am that we have the freedom to openly discuss and debate our policy differences, as distinct from, say Cuba, where the kind of dissenting voice that I represent in this forum today would either be silenced or rewarded with a jail term.

Anyone involved in the debate on Cuba has to be struck by the fact that most reasoned discussion starts with the assumption that the Castro regime is bankrupt, dictatorial, and anachronistic. There is a broad acceptance that the system of government imposed on Cuba by Mr. Castro must change, that the Cuban people must be permitted to exercise their fundamental freedoms, including the right to choose freely who will govern them and how they will be governed.

The argument, then, revolves around how best to help the Cuban people accomplish this goal.

U.S. Policy - the Initiative for a New Cuba

U.S. policy seeks to encourage a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. To this end, in May, the President announced his Initiative for a New Cuba: an effort to promote Cuba’s re-incorporation into the Western Hemisphere's community of democracies.

The Initiative challenges the Castro government to undertake political and economic reforms and conduct free and fair elections next year for the National Assembly. It also challenges the Cuban government to open its economy, allow independent trade unions, and end discriminatory practices against Cuban workers. Without reform in these areas, unrestricted trade and travel benefit the Castro regime, not the Cuban people.

The President made clear that his response to such concrete reforms will be to work with the United States Congress to ease the restrictions on trade and travel between the United States and Cuba.

Further, the President committed the United States to continue to work to mitigate the suffering of the Cuban people by:

• Facilitating meaningful humanitarian assistance by American religious and other nongovernmental groups;

• Providing direct assistance to the Cuban people through non-governmental organizations;

• Working to resume direct mail service to and from Cuba; and

• Establishing scholarships in the United States for Cuban students and professionals trying to build independent civil institutions and for family members of political prisoners.

Rather than debate tactics, however, I want to focus on the realities of Cuba today, which is at the core of why we object to the Castro regime.

Economic Reality of Castro’s Cuba

Some, including, I think, all the other speakers at this event, have argued that this policy of reaching out to the Cuban people while continuing to restrict the flow of American dollars to the Castro regime is out-of-date and should be ended.

Their critiques of the policy are generally couched in three broad arguments: the embargo policy has failed to change the regime, so let’s change the policy. Or, we trade with Communist China, so why not with Communist Cuba? Or, the "at-least-they-are-buying-our-products-so-why-not-give-them-financing" line of reasoning.

These may seem plausible at first glance, but, in fact, they oversimplify and ignore the record. Furthermore, lifting current restrictions would benefit the Castro regime at the expense of the Cuban people and long-term American interests in a free and democratic Cuba.

Many at this event have argued that America could help tear down the Castro dictatorship by permitting thousands of American tourists to fill Mr. Castro’s hotel rooms – rooms built to generate revenue for the Castro regime – and by financing the regime’s purchases of U.S. goods. In the case of tourism, most of the revenues go to the regime, including specifically the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), which oversees many joint ventures, including a large number in the tourist sector.

In the case of financing, it would relieve pressure to concede further market reforms, thus helping to prolong the regime’s command economy. And in no case would tourism or commerce change Fidel Castro’s behavior. "Constructive engagement" by others, including Canada and members of the European Union, has not changed the regime’s behavior.

The argument for treating Cuba like China is superficial. The Chinese have been following an economic reform model involving decentralization and the emergence of a vibrant entrepreneurial class. China has worked to create a legal and administrative framework conducive to foreign trade and investment, albeit a framework that the international community would like to see expanded. One result of these reforms is that independent entrepreneurs account for half of China’s non-agricultural production.

To date, Mr. Castro has rejected the Chinese economic reform model.

As for foreign trade and investment, the Castro regime has devised a framework that raises costs and obstacles to foreign businesses, reserves the benefits of such interactions to itself, and carefully controls any impact on the general Cuban population. Joint ventures are not the product of joint financing – foreign firms finance most, if not all, of the projects.

Moreover, the regime does not always pay its obligations. Mr. Castro has effectively defaulted on payments to any number of creditors, be they governments or private businessmen in Russia, France, Italy, South Africa, and Chile. The regime owes international creditors somewhere in the range of $16-20 billion, in addition to the $20-plus billion it owes Russia for Soviet-era credits and aid.

Although some are in a rush to give Mr. Castro the opportunity, he has not yet stiffed U.S. farmers, namely because he is required to pay cash or use financing from third countries.

Further, with the average monthly wage of Cubans at $20, it is difficult to imagine them buying a flood of U.S. products. Confirming this is anecdotal evidence that the $100 million in agricultural commodities purchased by the Cuban regime since the end of last year has largely ended up feeding the regime elite or going to tourist hotels or dollar stores – thus doing nothing for 2/3rds of the Cuban population.

It's not at all clear how feeding visiting foreigners and the regime's elite supports a democratic opening or the development of a market economy in Cuba.

Human Rights and Democracy

Generally those who oppose current U.S. policy preface their remarks with an obligatory "Castro is a thug, dictator, or tyrant" reference. The rest of their remarks then gloss over what this means, how such a system seeks to destroy a person’s dignity and turn people against each other.

This is a dictatorship we are discussing. The most basic freedoms are subject to limitations. The freedoms of speech, expression, and assembly are severely curtailed, as are fundamental rights of privacy. Those who attempt to exercise their fundamental rights can be subjected to harassment or detention. Even daring to express the belief that Cuba belongs to all Cubans, not just Mr. Castro, can result – has resulted – in prison terms.

Mr. Castro is a Machiavellian tyrant. He fully understands the political environment he is operating in. His dictatorship is politically agile and intelligent. And he appreciates political threats, including those emanating from human rights monitoring organizations. Accordingly, the tactics of Castro’s secret police have evolved. They have moved away from 1960s-style tactics of visible repression and routinely throwing dissidents into jail for 30 years. Such measures just attract the attention of the many international organizations committed to detecting and ending such abuses. Today, State Security picks up and intimidates regime opponents, then releases them before too much heat can be generated internationally.

Fortunately, not everyone is fooled. Amnesty International recently observed:

"Detained, threatened, evicted from their homes, or prevented from leaving the country -- dissidents in Cuba are increasingly being subjected to a range of punitive measures other than long term imprisonment. …short detentions and various forms of harassment are increasingly common. The measures applied to stifle dissent may be changing, but the fact remains that the freedom to express opinions, organize meetings, or form organizations conflicting with government policies is still seriously curtailed in Cuba.''

Cuba’s Latin American neighbors, along with others, have made note of the lack of freedom in Cuba. In April, for the first time, Latin American countries sponsored a resolution in the UN Commission on Human Rights calling upon the Castro regime to improve its respect of human rights. This effort was led by Uruguay, which itself suffered a period of military rule before emerging as a vibrant democratic society. Uruguay was joined by Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, and Guatemala, in an act of solidarity with the Cuban people that declares Cubans are no less deserving of freedom than others in this Hemisphere.

Castro and the War Against Terrorism

When confronted with the political, economic, and human reality of Castro’s Cuba, critics usually fall back on the line that, at least, the Castro regime is no longer a threat to the United States or, more recently, that Castro has shown his willingness to cooperate with us in our efforts to combat terrorism and should be rewarded.

This is a hollow argument, as is apparent by a review of recent statements and events.

  • Mr. Castro has re-affirmed his solidarity with Iraq, and continues to give Saddam Hussein political support.
  • In Iran in May 2001, Mr. Castro is reported to have expressed his interest in working with that country to bring the United States to its knees.
  • Mr. Castro compares our President to Hitler and equates our efforts against terrorism with the methods of the Nazis.
  • He continues to harbor fugitives from American justice, including murderers.
  • In the wake of September 11, at last year’s UN General Assembly session, Mr. Castro’s Foreign Minister essentially accused us of engaging in war crimes, alleging that our campaign to root out the Taliban involved a "bombing campaign against [the Afghan] people."
  • Mr. Castro’s Attorney General, in reference to the establishment of a detention facility for terrorists at Guantanamo, laughingly told the press last December, "I hope 15 or 20 [detainees] get out and kill them" – "them" being our fellow citizens serving at that U.S. base.
  • On September 21, 2001, the FBI arrested Ana Belen Montes on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States on behalf of Mr. Castro. Ms. Montes was the senior Defense Intelligence Agency analyst responsible for Cuba. She pled guilty to the conspiracy charge in March of this year.
  • Coincidentally, also in September, the Cuban agent involved in espionage against the United States and who also was found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder against American citizens – specifically for his role in the deaths of three American citizens and one legal permanent resident in the shootdown of the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft in 1996 – was to have been sentenced. He was ultimately sentenced to two life terms in December of last year.
  • Most recently, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security have stated, we believe that Cuba has "at least a limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort."

The list I just enumerated is itself sufficient to demonstrate Mr. Castro abiding hostility toward the United States. But there is more: Mr. Castro and his government are actually impeding our efforts to defeat the threat of terrorism.

In the days following September 11, the United States put out a call to countries of the world for any information they might have on al-Qaida or other groups that might represent a terrorist threat to the civilized world. The Castro regime responded with decades-old information, and it chose to be misleading even about that. The frankness and openness with which our requests were received in some unexpected quarters were completely absent when it came to Mr. Castro’s response.

In short, Mr. Castro provided the United States with nothing of any value.

If the story stopped there, I suppose that, at best, we could say that Cuba had determined NOT to cooperate in the global effort against terrorism. There is more, however.

The Castro regime has actively and intentionally worked, through human or electronic means, to distract attention and resources from our on-going counter-terrorist efforts. It has attempted to set-up our intelligence and international law enforcement agencies with at least one "walk-in" a month since September 11 purporting to offer information about pending terrorist attacks against the United States or other Western interests. Even on the very day of the bombings -- September 11, 2001 -- within hours of the attacks on New York and Washington -- Mr. Castro sent an agent to us with the first such false lead.

Even as the Cuban regime was piously noting its horror over the attacks and willingness to provide medical support to us, it was seeking to misdirect the investigation. This was only the beginning of a steady stream of what has turned out to be wild-goose chases intentionally initiated by the Castro regime.

While our agencies have detected this pattern, due diligence requires them to follow up on each and every lead or "walk-in" in order to fully determine whether there is information of value.

Some might be willing to dismiss such intrigues as essentially harmless. I would submit, however, that, in the post-September 11 world, diverting counterterrorism resources from legitimate targets to pursue false leads fabricated by Castro’s intelligence apparatus diminishes our ability to respond to real threat information.

This is not harmless game-playing. It is a dangerous and unjustifiable action that damages our ability to assess real threats. This regime behavior does not evidence a lack of cooperation; this is obstructionism – and I am concerned that it could one day cost innocent people their lives.

Despite his disinformation campaign to portray himself as cooperating in the fight against terrorism, the Castro regime’s words and deeds reflect its true motives.

He knows what side he is on, and it is not ours.

We must hold the course on U.S. opposition to the Castro regime

The Castro regime represents a dark chapter in Cuba’s history. It remains the oppressor of the Cuban people; and it maintains its hostility towards the United States. This is why we must hold the course on denying the Castro regime the wherewithal to either repress Cubans or threaten us.

And it is why we must continue to reach out to the Cuban people, to encourage and promote the creation of an independent civil society. Current policies provide for non-governmental organizations and private citizens with humanitarian, family, educational, or cultural reasons to engage with the Cuban people. Despite the critics’ mantra about a travel ban, Americans can travel to Cuba to promote our values and better the lives of the average Cuban. Private donations of foods and medicines are permitted; and the sale of agricultural commodities is allowed.

Despite the repeated harassment by and threats from the regime, courageous Cubans continue to strive to create a society based on democratic values and respect for human rights. In May, in defiance of the Castro dictatorship, a grassroots endeavor, Project Varela, garnered over 11,000 signatures on a petition requesting a referendum on political and economic rights. Its organizer, Oswaldo Paya, is a courageous and skillful individual, who has succeeded in growing this pro-democracy initiative from within the corrupt and bankrupt Communist system.

That the regime decided to permanently table this effort was predictable. That Oswaldo Paya and the growing band of pro-democracy activists will continue to have their voices heard is inevitable.

In recognition of his energy and vision for democracy, the National Democratic Institute will give Mr. Paya its "W. Averell Harriman Democracy Award" on September 30. Mr. Paya would very much like to travel to Washington to accept the award, but refuses to consider leaving Cuba unless the authorities give him an assurance that they will let him return. Unfortunately, at this point it appears that the regime will not give him that assurance. He has made clear that he will not leave to accept this recognition if he cannot return to his homeland.

The question before us, then, is not whether to lift the restrictions on trade and tourism but when and how. Does it make any sense to hand a political victory and capital windfall to a hostile dictator in his final days who is the single biggest obstacle to genuine economic and political change? Or, does it make more sense to retain the leverage that we can use with a transition government to ensure deep and broad political and economic reform?

We must continue to signal our disapproval of Mr. Castro’s rule and deny him the means of holding on to power. We also must continue to be vigilant in recognizing that, while he is an adept manipulator, Mr. Castro’s malice towards the United States has not abated. And we must continue to do all we can to assist the Cuban people in their quest for a society respectful of their fundamental rights and dignity.

This is at the core of what the United States seeks and it is at the heart of the President’s Initiative for a New Cuba.

Thank you.


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