Program Overview and Funding Authority | Constraints on the Program | Program Grantees
Working Toward Six Program Results | The U.S. Institutional Context | The Cuban Institutional Context

Profile of the USAID Cuba Program

Program Overview and Funding Authority

USAID expends approximately $500 million per year on 72 country and regional programs that support democracy and good governance.² Pro-democracy activities range from enhancing the capacity of state institutions to supporting grassroots civic education campaigns. With some notable exceptions, the vast majority of USAID-funded democracy and good governance programs are carried out collaboratively and with the consent of the governments in the countries where activities take place. For a variety of reasons detailed in this report, the Cuba Program is an exceptional case. USAID's Cuba Program was established under the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Section 1705g), and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (Section 109a)-widely known as the Helms-Burton Act. Arising from longstanding conflictual relations between the United States and the Government of Cuba since 1959, the Helms-Burton Act states that:

The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere...The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape Cuba to freedom…The consistent policy of the United States toward Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian regime...The Congress has historically and consistently manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.

Pursuant to these findings, the Helms-Burton Act states that the policy of the United States includes the following goals:

To encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves with a government which reflects the self-determination of the Cuban people...To recognize the potential for a difficult transition from the current regime in Cuba...[And] in solidarity with the Cuban people to provide appropriate forms of assistance...to facilitate a peaceful transition to representative democracy and a market economy in Cuba and to consolidate democracy in Cuba.

In October 1995, President Clinton announced a series of measures to encourage peaceful transition to a free and open society in Cuba. The President stated that the U.S. would promote democracy and the free flow of ideas, and would increase the ability of Americans and U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to contribute to the strengthening of Cuban civil society. From 1996 to April 2000, the USAID Cuba Program has made grant awards totaling $6,419,275 to 15 U.S. NGOs and three universities.

USAID's Cuba Program supports the U.S. foreign policy goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by encouraging the development of Cuban civil society. Its strategy is to "increase the free flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise development to, from and within Cuba." ³

The USAID grants were awarded pursuant to the authority provided in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Section 1705g), which permits the U.S. Government to provide assistance "through appropriate non-governmental organizations, for the support of individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba." The Helms-Burton Act (Section 109a) further details the types of assistance and support the President is authorized to provide for individuals and independent NGOs to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba, including:

• Published and informational matter-such as books, videos, and cassettes-on transitions to democracy, human rights and market economies, to be made available to independent democratic groups in Cuba;

• Humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression, as well as their families;

• Support for democratic and human rights groups in Cuba; and

• Support for visits and permanent deployment of independent international human rights monitors in Cuba.

Constraints on the Program

• No Diplomatic Relations. The United States does not have full diplomatic relations with Cuba and maintains an embargo on most trade between the United States and the island.

• U.S. Law. In addition, U.S. legislation, including the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Section 1705g) and Helms-Burton Act, prohibits most direct assistance to the Cuban government and its dependencies (including many government-sponsored, government-established, or Communist party-affiliated non-governmental organizations).

• Cuban Law. Finally, in 1999 the Cuban government enacted legislation making it a crime for Cuban citizens to cooperate with the activities authorized by the Helms-Burton Act. Cooperation is punishable with prison terms of eight to 20 years. This legislation and the extensive control of the Government of Cuba over organizations with which USAID regularly works to promote democracy in other countries, such as trade unions, political parties, NGOs, professional associations, and women's groups limits the activities that can be undertaken through the Cuba Program.

Several constraints complicate the USAID Cuba Program's implementation, monitoring, and evaluation:

• Overt Nature of the Program. First, during the decades of the Cold War, U.S. efforts to promote U.S. foreign policy in the closed societies of the Communist bloc were carried out in substantial part by agencies that operated covertly. In contrast, the USAID Cuba Program, parts of which appear to be modeled on the Eastern European transition experience, operates publicly and openly, subjecting it and its grantees to counter pressures, criticism, policy debates, and occasionally complicating publicity.

• Communication with Cubans. Second, communication with the Cuban people in person, by mail, and by electronic means is difficult and costly. Cooperation with and by Cubans on the island is logistically difficult and entails risk.

• Range of Cuban Partners. Finally, the Program must work with truly independent NGOs and individuals rather than directly with the Government of Cuba and its dependencies and affiliates. Since the Government of Cuba dominates so many aspects of Cuban society, robust independent partners are few. Those independent groups that do exist in Cuba face constant government harassment as they carry out their activities.

Program Grantees

The USAID Cuba Program works with three types of grantees, all of which operate on a not-for-profit basis: 1) Cuba-focused organizations, 2) NGOs with a Latin America and Caribbean or global focus, and 3) universities. Some of these organizations have had little experience implementing U.S. Government-funded international development activities, while others have worked directly with the U.S. Government for many years. All Program grantees limit themselves to peaceful means of encouraging democratic transition in Cuba. The section below lists past and present Cuba Program grantees and the primary focus of their activities.

Working toward Six Program Results

• The goal of the USAID Cuba Program is to "promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by assisting the development of Cuban civil society." The strategic objective of the Program is to develop the "free flow of accurate information on democracy, human rights, and free market economics to, from, and within Cuba."⁴ Within this objective, the Program works to achieve six intermediate results⁵ in service to the overarching goal and objective:⁶

• Building Solidarity with Cuba's Human Rights Activists. The Government of Cuba has long been criticized by the United Nations and diverse human rights monitoring organizations for violating the fundamental human rights of its citizens. The USAID Cuba Program provides moral support, information, and limited food and medical aid to Cuban political prisoners and their families, and to the island's human rights activists. Assistance includes providing pens, papers, books, typewriters, fax machines and other communications equipment. $3.65 million, or more than one half of total Cuba Program funding, has been distributed to the organizations for the purpose of building solidarity with Cuba's human rights activists. Under this intermediate result, USAID has provided the following grants:

  Grantee: The Center for a Free Cuba
  Funding: $900,000
  Activities: The Center for a Free Cuba gathers and disseminates information concerning the human rights situation in Cuba, transmits the writings of Cuban human rights activists to non-governmental organizations worldwide, sponsors travel to Cuba by representatives of democratic societies, and distributes pro-democracy literature on the island.

  Grantee: Cuban Dissidence Task Group
  Funding: $250,000
  Activities: The Cuban Dissidence Task Group published and disseminated worldwide the written analysis of Cuban democratic activists on the island. The Task Group provided humanitarian assistance (food and medicine) to political prisoners and their families, and to other victims of Cuban government oppression.

  Grantee: Freedom House
  Funding: $775,000
  Activities: Under the $500,000 Transitions Project, Freedom House provided 40,000 Spanish-language books, pamphlets and other materials to the Cuban people on issues such as human rights, transition to democracy and free market economics. Through the Cuban Democracy Project, funded at $275,000, Freedom House promotes the formation of civic and political leadership in Cuba by linking professional organizations in Cuba to one another and to those in free democracies in Europe, North America, and elsewhere.

  Grantee: The Institute for Democracy in Cuba
  Funding: $1,000,000
  Activities: The Institute assists democratic activists in Cuba, informs the Cuban people, gathers and disseminates information from inside Cuba on human rights, and provides food and medicine to political prisoners, their families, and other victims of oppression.

  Grantee: International Republican Institute
  Funding: $725,000
  Activities: The International Republican Institute helps to create and bolster international solidarity committees in Latin America and Europe in order to provide material, moral, and ideological support for democratic activists in Cuba.

• Planning for Transition. The evaluation of possible transition scenarios and attendant problems for Cuba is preparation for the future. Seeking to shape eventual changes in the government and economy of Cuba, the USAID Cuba Program has issued grants for studies and prospective analyses. The grantees that have conducted transition analysis include the International Foundation for Election Systems, Rutgers University, and the U.S.-Cuba Business Council. $802,000 has been provided for transition planning.

  Grantee: International Foundation for Election Systems
  Funding: $136,000
  Activities: The International Foundation for Election Systems analyzed assistance required to support transitional elections in Cuba. Without discussing or considering the possible timing of elections, the study established guidelines, costs, and options concerning international assistance and the requirements for local administration of comprehensive voter registration and conduct of free and fair presidential and congressional elections in Cuba. Since May 2000, USAID has disseminated the report's findings to the Cuban people and international community.

  Grantee: Rutgers University
  Funding: $99,000
  Activities: Rutgers supports planning for future assistance to a Cuban transition government and, eventually, to a democratically elected government in Cuba. The University transmits planning results to the Cuban people.

  Grantee: U.S.-Cuba Business Council
  Funding: $567,000
  Activities: The U.S.-Cuba Business Council surveys U.S. private sector resources and plans to assist the eventual reconstruction of the Cuban economy. The Council conducts a conference series on Cuba's democratic free market future.

• Giving Voice to Cuba's Independent Journalists. The Inter-American Press Association and human rights monitoring organizations criticize the Government of Cuba for restricting freedom of the press and the free flow of information. Cuba's few independent journalists, almost all political dissidents, suffer from loss of employment, legal harassment, and intimidation. Improved telephone communications and international visits permit some information to flow into and out of Cuba despite Cuban government efforts. The Program supports the publication abroad of the work of independent journalists from the island, and also works to distribute their writings within Cuba. A total of $670,000 has been provided to three grantees.

  Grantee: Cuba Free Press
  Funding: $280,000
  Activities: Cuba Free Press publishes the work of professional and independent writers and journalists inside Cuba.

  Grantee: CubaNet
  Funding: $98,000
  Activities: CubaNet is expanding its comprehensive internet on-line coverage of Cuba's independent journalists, and other national and international press reports on Cuban human rights and economic issues.

  Grantee: Florida International University-International Media Center
  Funding: $292,000
  Activities: The FIU International Media Center (IMC) trains Cuba's independent journalists to help improve their professional skills.

• Defending the Rights of Cuban Workers. The Communist party-affiliated Cuban Workers Confederation (CTC) dominates the island's organized labor and supports regime policies and practices harmful to workers' rights in direct contravention to international labor treaties. Despite the dominance of the CTC, several tiny independent labor groups have emerged. USAID Program grantees seeking to advance Cuban workers' rights, encourage independent unions, and promote international better business practices by foreign firms investing in Cuba include the American Center for International Labor Solidarity and the National Policy Association. A total of $393,575 has been provided for work in this area.

  Grantee: The American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS)
  Funding: $168,575
  Activities: ACILS works with trade union movements worldwide to persuade foreign firms to respect the rights of Cuban workers in their operations inside Cuba. ACILS works to monitor the firms' performance and to train leaders of emerging independent associations of Cuban workers.

  Grantee: The National Policy Association
  Funding: $225,000
  Activities: The National Policy Association formed an international private sector working group to encourage companies doing business in Cuba to respect the rights of Cuban workers and to promote democracy. NPA conducted a conference on labor rights in Mexico City in June 2000.

• Helping Develop Independent Cuban NGOs. The political space available for independent civil society remains severely constricted by the enormous scope of Cuba's centralized government and its repressive regime. The USAID Program seeks to promote the formation and growth of fully independent NGOs in Cuba, especially grassroots, professional, and environmental organizations. The two grantees working directly in this Program area have received $408,700.

  Grantee: Pan American Development Foundation
  Funding: $236,700
  Activities: The Pan American Development Foundation works to establish environmental linkages between Cuban NGOs and counterpart NGOs operating elsewhere in the Americas to demonstrate how NGOs function within democratic societies to help conserve, manage, and protect natural resources.

  Grantee: Partners of the Americas
  Funding: $172,000
  Activities: Partners of the Americas helped establish professional and institutional linkages between emerging Cuban community grassroots and professional organizations, cooperatives, and other counterpart organizations around the world.

• Providing Direct Outreach to the Cuban People. Cubans have highly restricted access to information, including limits on both high-technology communication and interpersonal and mass communications methods. Increasing the flow of information into Cuba faces many challenges from Cuban security's monitoring and restriction of material. Grantees who work directly to overcome these obstacles include Cuba On-Line and the Sabre Foundation. Several other grantees primarily working toward other Program results also engage in direct outreach efforts as part of their activities. A total of $385,000 has been provided for activities in the Program area.

  Grantee: Cuba On-Line
  Funding: $300,000
  Activities: Cuba On-Line transmits information on democracy, human rights and free market economics directly to the Cuban people through the international mail and by electronic means.

  Grantee: Sabre Foundation
  Funding: $85,000
  Activities: The Sabre Foundation donates new books and other informational materials to independent groups and individuals in Cuba to benefit the Cuban people. Subject matter includes market economics and business, political science, government and law, medicine, and nursing and closely allied health care sciences.

The U.S. Institutional Context

USAID's 72 regional and country-level democracy programs are funded through five sources: 1) the Development Assistance Fund, 2) Support for East European Democracy, 3) Freedom Support Act, 4) the International Disaster Account, and 5) the Economic Support Fund (ESF) that is appropriated to the Department of State. The Cuba Program is funded through Economic Support Fund, which is designed to "support the economic and political foreign policy interests of the U.S. by providing financial assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy." USAID and the State Department share responsibility for the use of ESF.

While the provision of ESF to USAID for the purpose of democracy promotion is common, the Cuba Program is sui generis within USAID. Due to its particular constraints, the Cuba Program is not included within the democracy and governance portfolio of the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau. Also, unlike many other democracy programs at USAID, it is advised by an Inter-agency Working Group (IWG) described in Section 2.5.3.

Department of State

The U.S. Department of State plays a major role in the implementation of USAID's Cuba Program through its Office of Cuban Affairs in Washington and the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

• Office of Cuban Affairs. The Office of Cuban Affairs is located within the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and serves as the USAID Cuba Program's principal liaison within the State Department. It co-chairs the Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG) on Cuba and provides policy guidance as well as Cuba-specific political and economic briefings to Program grantees as requested by USAID.

• U.S. Interests Section. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana supports USAID's Cuba Program by providing information on the situation in Cuba, assisting in the review of Program proposals, and evaluating the Program's effectiveness in Cuba.

Inter-agency Working Group

While USAID directly administers and manages the Program, decisions to make grant awards are cleared by various executive branch entities through an Inter-agency Working Group (IWG). The IWG is co-chaired by USAID's Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Cuba and the Director for the Office of Cuba Affairs at the Department of State. The IWG also includes representatives of the National Security Council, Department of Commerce (Office of Foreign Policy Control), Department of Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control), as well as representatives from various bureaus of the Department of State.

The role of the IWG is to provide initial screening and policy clearance for unsolicited grant proposals, after receipt of the views of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The IWG may also provide suggestions for improving grant proposals that it considers to have high potential.

The overall review process is as follows:

• An applicant submits a proposal which is previewed by USAID's Senior Advisor for Cuba who then decides whether or not it is suitable for further review in terms of compliance with Section 109 of the Helms-Burton Act and with overall USAID program guidelines, and in terms of substantive detail.

• If so, the proposal is distributed to the IWG and also shared with the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

• The IWG meets to review the proposal and either: 1) provides policy clearance for further USAID technical review; or, 2) requests further information and clarification; or, 3) rejects the proposal.

• If the IWG provides policy clearance, the USAID Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Cuba chairs a series of USAID internal technical reviews which include experts from USAID's Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Global Bureau, and Office of the General Counsel. The technical review committee examines issues related to the feasibility, potential impact, and cost of the proposed project. The process may involve protracted dialogue with the applicant in order to resolve the issues.

• If the USAID technical committee reaches a positive decision concerning the proposal, the USAID Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Cuba drafts an approval memorandum for signature by the USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean. The memorandum summarizes the review process, indicates how issues were resolved, and recommends approval to engage in final negotiations leading to a grant award, pending formal notification to Congress.

• The USAID Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Cuba drafts and the USAID Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs submits a formal notification to Congress, which is first cleared by the Department of State. The Chair and Ranking Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the Senate and House Appropriation Committees then have two weeks during which they may place a hold on the proposed award. If a hold is placed, USAID provides whatever information or clarification is requested in order to lift the hold.

• In the absence of a hold, or once a hold is lifted, the USAID Office of Procurement proceeds with final negotiation of the grant award. The grant is approved only when the USAID Office of Procurement signs the grant agreement. The Office of Procurement conducts an additional review and may choose to conduct a "pre-award survey" prior to actual award.⁷

• Once approved, the USAID Senior Advisor/Coordinator for Cuba monitors grant implementation, and shares progress reports and implementation problems with the USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, the State Department, Congress, and other stakeholders.

In the future, USAID plans to supplement the review of unsolicited proposals with a formal solicitation of proposals. Over the past several months, USAID has drafted and cleared through the IWG and USAID technical committee a formal Request for Application (RFA) which the USAID Office of Procurement will issue upon approval by the USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean. When issued, the RFA will give applicants 90 days to submit proposals. The USAID technical review committee will then rank the proposals according to criteria set forth in the RFA. The USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean will then decide how many of the proposals, beginning with the top-ranked, will be funded. Each award will first be notified to Congress according to the normal process, and prior State Department clearance will be required for the congressional notification. Grants made under the RFA will still be subject to Office of Procurement pre-award audits and other standard procedures. However, the RFA process is intended to substantially expedite the review and approval process for grant applicants.

The United States Congress

The USAID Cuba Program operates with a degree of Congressional involvement unusual for most USAID democracy programs. Conflicting points of view about Cuba policy and about the Program itself within Congress complicate the decision-making environment, slow decision-making, and, at times, delay implementation of Program activities.

Congress has been quite directive concerning relations with Cuba through the enactment of the enabling legislation for the Cuba Program (the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act). This legislation notwithstanding, there remains room for interpretation of the law and from this arises distinct disagreements between the Administration and Congress, and among Members of Congress, as to how to structure and implement the Cuba Program.

These arguments affect the operation of the Program by raising the number of effective stakeholders in the Program who must be taken into account-many of whom directly disagree with each other about Program details. Members of Congress, often acting through their staffs, exercise both direct and indirect influence upon the Program. For example:

• Members of Congress and staff members have advised potential grantees on the Program, have suggested that they apply for Program funds, and have written USAID in support of specific grant applications.

• Some grantees maintain active contact with Congress, and in particular with Members of Congress and their staffs supportive of the Cuba Program.

• USAID grants are subject to informational holds by Congressional Committee Chairpersons and Ranking Committee Members or their staffs acting on their behalf. Several grants have been held for periods ranging from a few weeks to almost one year.

• Finally, one grantee noted that Members of Congress have generated unwanted publicity regarding their grant that created difficulties during the implementation of activities.

Despite the strong interest of several Members of Congress and their staffs in the Program as well as that of a number of other stakeholders, the evaluation team is not aware of any instance in which USAID's grant award process has been influenced unduly.

The Cuban Institutional Context

Cuba's government prohibits the free, competitive elections that are essential to democracy. The Government of Cuba employs repression to limit civil society-including independent political parties and labor unions-restricts dissidence, and restrains the free flow of information.

The Cuban government uses various instruments of repression to maintain its current politico-economic system and to retain power. Virtually all those interviewed by the team agreed that the national security apparatus (including the Direccion General de Inteligencia-DGI, Ministry of Interior police, and customs service) is highly effective in its administration of repression within Cuba. In 1999, the Cuban Congress enacted Law Number 88 that instituted prison sentences up to 20 years for Cuban citizens convicted of cooperating with the USAID Cuba Program.⁸

The Cuban government has by most accounts substantially restricted the free flow of information within, to, and from Cuba:

• Monitoring of telephones. Government monitoring of both international and domestic communications restricts the ability of Cubans to communicate freely by telephone, facsimile machine, or modem.

• Restricted Internet Access. The Cuban government tightly controls Internet access. Since the Cuban government opened a single Internet gateway in 1997, Internet access has remained severely restricted; only 33,000 Cubans (fewer than one-third of one percent of the population) are officially permitted access.⁹

• Restricted Access and Confiscation of Communication Devices. High costs, access restrictions, and aggressive confiscation at the border and within Cuba make it difficult for Cubans outside the regime to acquire and use satellite dishes, radio antennas, fax machines, photocopiers, portable and hand-held computers, video cameras, recorders and players, printers, cellular phones, and other portable communication devices.¹⁰

• Confiscation of Informational Materials. The Cuban customs service monitors mail, freight shipments, and the baggage of international visitors for material with political content that might be considered critical of the regime or supportive of democracy.

• State-sponsored Intimidation, Harassment, and Arrest. Finally, Neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) monitor their neighbors' activities and lead efforts to intimidate those perceived to be dissidents. Cuban state security monitors, harasses, and arrests those identified as providing information counter to the interests of the Government of Cuba.

Needless to say, the operational environment in Cuba affects the implementation of the USAID Cuba Program by limiting the means by which information on democracy can be transmitted to, from, and within the island. It is these restrictions on information flows that much of the Cuba Program is meant to address.

² USAID Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Performance Plan, page 58.
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³ USAID, USAID Cuba Program Assistance Strategy, FY00-FY05. Washington, DC: USAID, September 1999; p. 4. [Return to text]

⁴ A strategic objective is "the most ambitious result (intended measurable change) in a particular program area that a USAID operational unit, along with its partners, can materially affect and for which it is willing to be held responsible." [Return to text]

⁵ USAID defines an intermediate result as "a key result which must occur in order to achieve a strategic objective. Like a strategic objective, it reflects a reason a program was undertaken. The difference between the two levels is simply that one must achieve the intermediate results before one can achieve the higher level strategic objective."
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⁶ The assignment of Cuba Program partners to intermediate program results areas for this discussion corresponds to that laid out in the USAID Cuba Program Assistance Strategy, pp. 28-35. The Program's partners often identify themselves as working in multiple Program areas.
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⁷ Pre-award surveys are defined in USAID's Automated Directives System at: http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/300/303.htm
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⁸ Republic of Cuba, Ley de Proteccion de la Independencia Nacional y la Economia de Cuba, No. 88, 1999.
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⁹ There are several ways for Cubans to access e-mail and some other limited Internet capabilities through non-official channels that are also monitored by the state security apparatus. Even foreign tourists face difficulties in accessing the Internet; only five of Cuba's hotels make Internet access available. However, it is possible to access international Internet Service Providers by dialing long-distance numbers from a tourist hotel with international direct-dial service. However, these transmissions are prohibitively expensive for most Cubans and are also probably monitored.
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¹⁰ One Program grantee reported that it is relatively easy to purchase some communication equipment (i.e. fax machines) in hard-currency stores within Cuba. Another grantee believed that it was necessary to provide documentation with regard to the use and intended location of the equipment, thereby exposing it to potential confiscation. The team was unable to determine the actual availability of communications equipment within Cuba or the current level of activity of the Government of Cuba in confiscating these items.
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