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Time For Consensus On
Cuba by Stephen
Johnson Backgrounder #1579
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For
the past 10 years, Congress and the White House have been at
odds over U.S. policy toward the communist government of Fidel
Castro in Cuba. During the presidency of Bill Clinton, the
Administration had hoped to pursue a more conciliatory
approach toward the regime, while Congress tightened the U.S.
trade embargo and initiated programs to increase U.S. contact
with Cuban dissidents and ordinary citizens.
Now
the roles have been reversed. A growing number of U.S.
Congressmen are eager to lift sanctions, claiming that trade
will result in substantial profits for American businesses and
citing purchases Castro has made elsewhere. Meanwhile, the
Bush Administration would like to maintain pressure to contain
a hostile foe and encourage democratic reforms.
Such
controversy serves Castro more than it does America because it
allows the 75-year-old dictator to play one branch of
government against the other to gain access to U.S. credit
when he has little cash and few lenders.
On
May 20, 2002, President George W. Bush proposed his
"Initiative for a New Cuba," promising to ease sanctions
incrementally if the regime takes concrete steps to respect
human rights, enact democratic reforms, and adopt market-based
economics. This approach--still defined only in general terms
except for a promise to ease trade and travel restrictions
when Cuba holds free and fair elections for its National
Assembly--has already been challenged by an amendment to
pending legislation that would prohibit the use of federal
funds to enforce regulations controlling business transactions
with Cuba and U.S. citizen travel to the island. This measure,
the FY 2003 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act
(H.R. 5120), was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives
on July 24, 2003.
While
a studied debate on improving U.S.-Cuba policy would be
beneficial, a tug-of-war over U.S. policy that ends with a
divided front is not. Those who insist on a tough approach
toward the dictator should realize that it took prolonged
hardship--such as the loss of Soviet subsidies and widespread
international condemnation of human rights abuses--to produce
even modest concessions to capitalism and a minor improvement
in human rights practices within Cuba.
Those
who favor trading with Castro as a way to reap profits and
effect change in Cuba should consider evidence that dealing
with him on his terms provides uncertain rewards and has never
resulted in reform. Rather than work at cross purposes, the
White House and Congress should collaborate to identify
America's interests and then fill in the details of an
improved U.S.-Cuba policy that would
- Deny support to a hostile
regime by conditioning normal relations on an end to threats
against the United States and its allies and on
democratic reforms, and by maintaining "cash and carry"
policies for sales of U.S. goods until the regime permits
independent businesses and enacts market-based reforms;
- Promote economic
opportunity for America and Cuba by easing travel
restrictions and permitting U.S.-Cuban joint ventures when
Castro's regime guarantees internationally accepted labor
rights, by establishing credits for independent Cuban
businesses, and by developing a set of principles for
incorporating Cuba into normal trade relations once it
permits a market economy; and
- Encourage Cuban democrats
by enhancing U.S. contact with ordinary Cubans, by
improving efforts to support Cuban dissidents and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and by improving U.S.
efforts to provide information on democratic governance and
entrepreneurship to citizens on the island.
Trade Won't
Change Castro's Hostility
Fidel
Castro has never been a friend of the United States, nor is he
likely to be. Although U.S. diplomats gave tacit support to
his final advances against dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1958,
Castro wrote then that a war against America would be his true
destiny. After U.S. leaders
recognized his government in January 1959, he immediately flew
to Venezuela to persuade President Romulo Betancourt to form a
pact against Washington.
In
1960, Castro strengthened ties with the Soviet Union and
expropriated American-owned refineries and other properties.
On the heels of the bungled U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion,
he invited the Soviet Union to install nuclear-tipped missiles
in Cuba and urged the Soviets to launch a preemptive strike
against the United States. Supported by the Soviet Union, he
subsequently armed and trained foreign guerrillas to promote
Marxist revolutions in Latin America and Africa.
In
1974, President Gerald Ford pursued normalization talks with
Cuban officials. The dialogue ended when Castro sent 35,000
combat troops to Angola.
In
1977, the Carter Administration negotiated the opening of
interest sections (official missions, but not embassies) in
Washington and Havana--a step toward normal ties. In return,
Castro ordered 20,000 combat troops to Ethiopia and supported
the Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front's budding
struggle in Nicaragua. In 1980, he unleashed the Mariel
Boatlift, sending 125,000 refugees--including mental patients
and criminals--to the United States, helping to defeat Jimmy
Carter's re-election bid.
President Reagan also dispatched an emissary to
"deal with Castro" but found that
restraining him was more effective. Reagan sent troops to
liberate Grenada from a Cuban-backed communist regime and
pressed El Salvador, Guatemala, and even the Marxist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua to become more democratic. These
steps helped to curb Cuban-aided insurgencies, promote
democracy, and bring peace in Central America and the
Caribbean.
Even
worse for Castro, the aggressive defense posture of the Reagan
and Bush Administrations nudged a cash-strapped Soviet Union
into collapse, causing Cuba to lose subsidies worth $5 billion
to $6 billion a year, curtail its international adventures,
and reduce the size of its once-impressive armed forces from
235,000 troops to 60,000.
Occupied with economic woes, Castro had less time
and resources to foment offshore revolution. Even in weakness,
however, he rented property to Russia for sophisticated
eavesdropping facilities aimed at the United States, protected fugitives
from U.S. justice, and harbored
terrorists from such groups as the Basque Fatherland and
Liberty (ETA) and Irish Republican Army. In 1994, he allowed
30,000 rafters to set sail for American shores, causing the
Clinton Administration to agree to immigration limits that
would dampen hopes for others wishing to escape. In February
1996, his MiG fighter planes shot down two Brothers to the
Rescue Cessnas as they attempted to drop supplies to Cuban
rafters in international waters--killing three U.S. citizens
and one legal resident.
More
recently, Castro seemed to display magnanimity when he invited
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to the island in May 2002,
allowing him to appear on state television to criticize the
regime's human rights record and mention a daring petition
drive spearheaded by Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá to seek a
referendum on the regime's single-party rule. But the audio portion
of the broadcast was partly garbled, and Carter went on to
urge the U.S. government to lift its trade embargo--a plea
that was widely reported in the American press. With that
salvo delivered, Castro contrived a hasty petition of his own
to block debate on Payá's proposal in the Assembly, thereby
enshrining totalitarian control in the Cuban
constitution.
Self-Imposed Isolation
Critics of U.S. policy toward Cuba have come to
repeat Castro's frequent claim that U.S. sanctions have hurt
relations and imposed hardship on the Cuban people. In fact,
Castro's own blockades are to blame for Cuba's isolation and
poor domestic living conditions.
Political
Quarantine Soon after coming to power in 1959,
Castro ensured his own power base by curtailing civil
liberties, jailing opponents, and organizing show trials to
eliminate potential rivals. Within a year, Cuba's free labor
unions were led by Castro loyalists, and by the end of 1960,
the regime controlled nearly every media outlet. In 1961, the
"Maximum Leader," as he liked to be called, declared himself a
Marxist-Leninist and extended his personal dominion over every
dimension of government.
Castro is First Secretary of the Communist Party of
Cuba--which the constitution places above the government and
society. The party nominates a single slate of delegates to
the 600-member National Assembly of Popular Power, a
rubber-stamp congress. Within the Assembly is the Castro-led
Council of State, which issues decrees. It also appoints the
Council of Ministers, which runs various bureaucracies. Castro
presides over this body as well and holds the additional
titles of Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces.
Fidel's appointed successor is his brother Raúl,
who also serves as Minister of Defense. In this capacity, Raúl
Castro oversees state business enterprises and foreign joint
ventures in addition to commanding the armed
forces.
The
regime permits no independent media, although a handful of
clandestine journalists are able to smuggle reports out of the
island. There are no legal trade unions beyond the
now-communist Confederation of Cuban Workers. While
independent libraries exist in Cuban homes, book collectors
are subject to frequent harassment and confiscation of
materials.
During the 1970s, as many as 40,000 political
prisoners were confined in inhumane jails, and many were
beaten and tortured with electric shock treatments and large
doses of psychotropic drugs. That number declined
in the 1980s, as Castro allowed tens of thousands to leave the
country--including approximately 20,000 during the Mariel
Boatlift. Although the number of known political prisoners
further declined from several thousand in the 1990s to several
hundred in 2001, the regime still
jails and tortures dissidents on a continuing
basis.
Some
80,000 neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution keep watch on citizens and report suspicious
political activities to police or party authorities. They help
enforce a criminal code that describes thought crimes such as
"dangerousness"--a propensity to manifest behavior "in
contradiction to socialist norms"--as felonies that may
subject citizens to arrest.
Even
schoolchildren are scrutinized for dissident tendencies. They
reportedly must carry a 17-page Interior Ministry identity
form that, in addition to documenting the carrier's name and
current and former addresses, lists assessments of political
attitudes and participation in communist youth
activities.
Economic
Withdrawal Castro closed Cuba's economy just when
social and economic indicators placed it at the top of Latin
American countries and when the republic enjoyed a strong
trade relationship with the United States. At the time, Cuba
sold two-thirds of its exports to America and U.S. visitors
were the mainstay of a vibrant tourist industry. Moreover,
Washington was a primary source of development aid. Months
after coming to power in January 1959, Castro rejected that
relationship by confiscating land and businesses--some
belonging to American citizens and firms.
In
1961, Castro declared Cuba a socialist state and made the
Soviet Union its principal trading partner. He established
central planning similar to other communist satellites and
nationalized all means of production and trade. Further
isolating Cuba's citizens, he banned foreign currency and
established Soviet-style rationing of housing, goods, and
food. With the population depending on the government for
survival and foreign travel tightly controlled, workers became
part of a captive labor pool toiling in state industries
created from expropriated businesses and farms.
Even
with Soviet trade credits, oil, and subsidies worth $5 billion
to $6 billion a year, a centrally planned economy could not
sustain the island, and in 1986, the regime suspended payments
on foreign debt. Instead of introducing markets, the state
opted to further exploit its captive workforce to obtain hard
currency. It sought foreign investors willing to become
minority partners in revitalizing Cuba's latent tourist
industry, and in 1990, the first of many new joint-venture
hotels was built. In addition to taking a large share of the
receipts from this venture, the government profits by
supplying Cuban labor, charging as much as $1,400 per month
for each worker--who, in turn, may receive about $27 a month
from the state in pesos.
Cuban
doctors who normally earn about $20 to $30 a month can be sent
on medical brigades--missions to developing countries that
sometimes reimburse the regime for many times the actual costs
of the physician's services. On the island, quality health
care that is free to Castro's nomenklatura and available to
paying tourists contrasts starkly with care provided for
ordinary citizens who must bring their own soap and sheets to
shabby clinics. Foreign medical students reportedly enjoy free
textbooks and gleaming classrooms while Cuban counterparts
study in squalid conditions with obsolete equipment and
outdated texts.
Similarly, Castro built up Cuba's sophisticated
biotechnology industry in the 1980s, educating thousands of
scientists and investing heavily in research
facilities--purportedly to manufacture pharmaceuticals for
domestic needs and for export. (See text box, "Cuban
Biotechnology--Weapons Research or Wasted Effort?") But the
potential of this research was squandered by stifling
bureaucracy and the state's arbitrary decision to use tourism
to attract foreign capital. Today, public pharmacies lack even
basic medicines. According to José de la Fuente, former
director of the Center for Genetic Engineering and
Biotechnology (CIBG) in Havana, Cuba's biotech industry lacks
"capacity, creativity, and credibility" and is "a paled and
perhaps dangerous shadow of its former self."
Sanctions and Activism vs. Normal
relations
Critics of U.S. policy say that America's trade
embargo and political hostility have failed to change Castro's
behavior and argue that warmer relations would be more likely
to encourage political and economic reforms. While it is true
that Washington's cold-shoulder strategy has produced only
modest results, the approach of pursuing normal relations with
Cuba--exercised by most of the rest of the world for the past
43 years--has merely helped preserve the status
quo.
Pressure and Small
Gains
At first, U.S. policies toward
Castro reflected the dictator's efforts to isolate himself. As
Castro expropriated American businesses and property, the
Eisenhower Administration reacted by cutting sugar imports,
then by restricting U.S.-Cuban trade (except for food and
medicine), and finally by breaking diplomatic ties. After the
Soviet Union attempted to install intermediate-range nuclear
missiles on the island, the Kennedy Administration prohibited
travel and commercial transactions. While there was hope
that such measures might encourage Castro to retreat from
hard-line Marxism, the practical purpose was to deny U.S.
support to a hostile state and contain Castro's efforts to
support socialist revolution throughout the Western
Hemisphere.
U.S.
pressure began to have a significant impact only after Soviet
economic support was terminated. Austere finances and the
decreasing availability of lenders forced Castro to adopt such
concessionary economic reforms as permitting the use of U.S.
dollars, authorizing Cuban citizens to receive remittances
from relatives in the United States, allowing farmers to sell
surpluses in open markets, and opening some 150 occupations to
self-employment, including such entrepreneurial ventures as
selling street-side snacks and repairing bicycles. The regime
even papered over some of its differences with the Catholic
Church, removing constitutional references to Cuba as an
atheist state and permitting the Catholic relief organization
Caritas to distribute food and medicine.
In
the context of that opening, the U.S. Congress approved a dual
strategy to strengthen sanctions while improving contact with
the Cuban populace. First, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
(CDA) authorized direct sales and donations of food, clothing,
and medicine to charitable entities and the restoration of
direct mail and phone service (though U.S. subsidiaries were
prohibited from doing business with the regime). As a result
of this policy, the United States licensed more than $227
million in humanitarian donations of medicine and medical
equipment to Cuba between 1992 and 1999 and has approved
more than $3 billion in both food and medicine, making the
United States Cuba's largest donor of humanitarian
assistance.
In
1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act, known as the LIBERTAD Act, which was intended
to provide humanitarian aid to families of political
prisoners, support internal human rights activists, and create
penalties for third-country investors who exploited property
in Cuba that had been confiscated from a U.S. citizen. Even
though the last provision was suspended continuously by
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and derided by
foreign allies, it had an effect. Three years after its
enactment, 19 foreign companies facing potential property
claim conflicts had curtailed business operations in Cuba to
avoid sanctions. Other provisions,
such as grants to NGOs, have helped Cuban dissidents focus
international scrutiny on the regime's human rights abuses,
have assisted independent journalists in finding outlets for
their reports, and have enabled individual book collectors to
establish independent libraries--all helping to lay the
foundation for future civil society.
Finally, America's tough stance against Castro has
encouraged some international institutions and allies to take
action. In December 1996, the European Union (EU) adopted a
"Common Position" to urge the Cuban government to respect
human rights, reform its criminal code, release political
prisoners, and comply with international human rights
practices. In July 2002, the EU excluded Cuba from a
multibillion-dollar assistance program known as the Cotonou
Agreement because of its failure to make progress on these
reforms. Cuba's Latin
American neighbors have used recent Ibero-American summits to
highlight Castro's human rights practices--including a 1999
meeting in Havana where President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico
and others condemned Cuban abuses, met with dissidents, and
called for prisoner releases. This year, Uruguay
became the first Latin American country to sponsor a United
Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution calling for
Cuban reforms.
Cordial Relations and
Leverage Except for the Organization of American
States, which imposed its own embargo from 1964 to 1975, most
countries have chosen not to join U.S. sanctions against Cuba.
However, even without U.S. participation, modest foreign
commerce has helped sustain Castro's command economy and has
done nothing to encourage respect for human rights, promote
economic reform, or give the Cuban people hope that the
dictatorship might release its grip. In hopes that an approach
it calls "constructive engagement" might influence the
regime's internal policies, Canada has invested nearly $500
million (U.S.) in Cuba since 1992, including some $35 million
in aid. Despite this
investment, however, Castro has ignored Canadian Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien's pleas to respect human rights and
release jailed dissidents.
Trade
has provided dubious rewards for other partners as well. Cuba
has defaulted on loans to Chile, Spain, France, Italy, Japan,
South Africa, and Canada. It reportedly owes $20 billion in
arrears to Russia and other former Soviet countries plus
nearly $11 billion to other countries, banks, and private
suppliers. A year ago, Dutch
authorities seized a Cuban merchant ship docked at The Hague
as a step toward settling debts owed to a number of European
creditors. Another Cuban ship
is being detained in Guinea. Despite fraternal
ties between President Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro, Venezuela
suspended petroleum shipments in April 2002 after the regime
defaulted on past due bills.
For
foreign investors, Cuba can be a risky place to do business.
Ranking near the bottom of The Heritage Foundation's 2002
Index of Economic Freedom, it lacks rule of law
to protect contracts, an independent judiciary tohear
accusations and mediate disputes, and basic property rights.
Moreover, the regime chooses its foreign partners and requires
them to acquiesce to its denial of workers' rights--which is
in violation of no fewer than five United Nations
International Labor Organization conventions.
Although some investors have managed to develop
successful ventures with the Cuban state (often because they
had capabilities no one else could duplicate), others have not
been so lucky. In 1999, when the Canada-based FirstKey Project
Technologies developed designs to renovate a Soviet-built
power plant in Cuba, it reportedly lost $9 million when the
state suddenly terminated its agreement and used the firm's
proprietary plans to shop for new partners in Europe.
Why Cuba Matters
A
more democratic and market-oriented Cuba is in America's
geopolitical, social, and economic interest. Castro continues
to support socialist revolution around the hemisphere--if not
by outright subversion, by promoting the election of leftist
populists whom he would be able to influence. His counsel
encouraged President Hugo Chávez to gradually impose
authoritarian rule in Venezuela, prompting an uprising and
near collapse of the government. Castro's aid to Colombia's
two main guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), has
prolonged a brutal 40-year civil war. Cuba's Communist Party
is a leading member of the Foro de São Paulo, a platform for
36 Latin American leftist parties and three terrorist
groups--the FARC, the ELN, and Peru's Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)--all of which are opposed to
U.S. policies favoring free trade, property rights, and the
rule of law.
With
continued economic decline, Cuba's potential for dispatching
waves of emigrants is building up once again. Adolfo Aguilar
Zinser, now Mexico's Ambassador to the United Nations, once
described the island as "a boiling cauldron that's being
contained by security forces." With or without
Castro, worsening conditions could spark riots, leading the
government to encourage a mass exodus that dwarfed the 1980
Mariel Boatlift.
Caudillo rule that gives top officials unrestrained
access to money and power sets the stage for corrupt and
criminal behavior. Without the rule of law, organized
crime--which once had a visible profile in Cuba--may
resurface, accompanied by more obvious manifestations of
international drug smuggling and terrorism. Among the populace,
the need to circumvent the government's rationing system has
promoted a theft mentality, while harsh restraints on civil
liberties have led citizens to justify lying and evading laws.
In the words of Alcibiades Hidalgo, Raul Castro's former chief
of staff and now a defector in the United States, "Everybody
learns to steal from the state."
Prospects for U.S. businesses are uncertain as long
as the regime retains its failed economic model. Although the
U.S. International Trade Commission has estimated that lifting
sanctions could result in exports to Cuba of between $650
million and $1.2 billion per year, actual results could be
significantly lower due to the regime's continuing dependence
on historically supportive creditors, perennial debt problems
that limit purchasing power, and ethical questions about
bartering with a regime that essentially exploits slave
labor. Even if projections
were realized, abolishing Cuba trade sanctions would boost
U.S. exports to Latin America by only 0.7 percent. In contrast, a
reformed, market-oriented Cuba would have far greater
potential for increased, more reliable trade.
Achieving Consensus on Cuba
During the past 43 years, various U.S. Presidents
have looked for ways to improve relations with Castro but have
concluded that it cannot be done. Congress generally concurred
with that view until the 1996 approval of the LIBERTAD Act
that tightened U.S. sanctions. Thereafter, Castro began
hosting U.S. lawmakers and commercial delegations to promote
the belief that dealing with him on his terms could be good
for American enterprise, despite the fact that he closed the
Cuban economy to trade with the United States four decades
earlier. To date, efforts to lift all sanctions have
failed.
However, a successful amendment to the FY 2003
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act by
Representative Jeff Flake (R-AZ) would end restrictions on
U.S. commercial transactions with Cuba and travel to the
island by cutting funds to the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which supervises those
restrictions. Another amendment would curb enforcement of
limits on remittances that family members in the United States
are allowed to send to their relatives in Cuba. The bill was
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 24, 2002,
and awaits resolution in conference with a similarly amended
appropriations bill pending a vote in the U.S. Senate. While
the U.S. Code would remain unchanged, these measures would
remove resources to prosecute scofflaws, resulting in less
than optimal governance. President Bush said he would veto the
bill as amended.
Conflict about sanctions and restrictions
jeopardizes the effectiveness of U.S. policy and continues the
controversy that Castro can use to manipulate U.S.
politicians, giving him power far out of proportion to his--or
Cuba's--importance. Moreover, because the two amendments were
presented after Castro quashed Oswaldo Payá's drive for free
elections by declaring single-party rule untouchable, they may
have sent an unintended signal of congressional approval of
Castro's action.
Before further modifications in U.S. policy are
attempted, the Administration and Congress should identify
common objectives that should guide dealings with Cuba and
then, in a deliberate and cooperative manner, forge strategies
to pursue these goals, including:
- Defending U.S.
geopolitical interests. The United States should
not aid antagonistic regimes. Fidel Castro remains hostile
to the United States as well as to democracies and market
economies elsewhere in the hemisphere. Instead, as
conditions permit, America should commit to helping Cuba
become a better neighbor through self-determination.
- Promoting economic
opportunity. Castro still bans most private
enterprise, exploits captive labor, and makes use of
property confiscated from U.S. citizens (now estimated to be
worth between $6 billion and $20 billion, depending on
simple or compounded interest). The United States
should reward steps that permit the development of an
authentic market economy in which Cuba's 11 million citizens
can participate and should promote the compensation of
victims of expropriations.
- Helping potential allies.
Castro will never be a friend, but the Cuban people
represent the island's future. Human rights advocates,
democrats, fledgling entrepreneurs, and even disaffected
members of the Cuban government should know they have an
ally in their efforts to build a more just, prosperous
society. U.S. policies should help Cubans end their
dependence on a corrupt and repressive state.
The President's
Initiative On May 20, 2002, the centennial of
Cuba's independence from Spain, President Bush unveiled the
outline of his "Initiative for a New Cuba." While this
initiative denies commercial benefits to a hostile government,
it offers a "step-by-step" easing of trade and travel
restrictions in response to political and economic reforms. It
also urges Castro to allow free and competitive elections for
the National Assembly, which are scheduled for next
year.
The
President's initiative further challenges the regime to
implement economic and labor reforms to allow ordinary Cubans
to work for whom they wish, organize independent unions, and
purchase goods or services now reserved for tourists and
senior Cuban officials. Finally, it seeks
increased humanitarian assistance, calls for the resumption of
direct mail service to and from the island (still unattained
since called for in the 1992 CDA), and promotes scholarships
in the United States for Cuban students and professionals as
well as for family members of political prisoners. The plan
departs from previous conditions set forth in the LIBERTAD Act
that required the end of the regime before restrictions could
ease.
While
the President's initiative lacks many details, it contains
elements that promote all of the objectives listed above. In
contrast, congressional measures focused on permitting
business with the regime and tourist travel to the island
would provide only a foot in the door for U.S. commerce, and
even that must be qualified. Sales would be limited by the
state's willingness to pay and the lack of an internal market.
Joint ventures could be complicated by the use of exploited
labor and the unenforcibility of contracts. And though renewed
tourism with the island might seem at first glance to be
lucrative for U.S. airlines, it could simply attract a portion
of U.S. passengers who would otherwise be travelling to other
Caribbean destinations.
Meanwhile, an increase in the amount of foreign
investment and the number of tourists would give the Cuban
state a boost without asking anything in return. As Alcibiades
Hidalgo, defector and former chief of staff to Raul Castro,
indicated in a recent interview--congressional attempts to end
curbs on travel to Cuba, if approved, would be an economic
windfall for Cuba and a "gift to Fidel." (See text box,
"Tourism Is Unlikely to Produce Democracy.")
While
any policy toward Cuba will probably be frustrated in the near
term by the unpredictability of Fidel Castro's behavior,
history shows that the only measure likely to change such an
adversary's behavior is sustained pressure. Rather than yield
to suggestions for unconditioned engagement policies (which
have already proved futile for other countries), the
Administration and Congress should defend U.S. interests,
promote economic opportunity, and cultivate allies by adopting
strategies that:
- Condition normal
relations on an end to threats and steps toward
self-determination. Normal diplomatic relations
should be restored only when Cuba stops supporting
international terrorists, no longer harbors fugitives from
U.S. justice, allows elections for both national and local
assemblies that have true legislative powers, releases
political prisoners, and guarantees basic civil liberties
such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and due
process of law.
- Deny credit and maintain
"cash and carry" policies for sales of U.S. goods to the
regime. Until Cuba enacts market reforms and
permits independent business beyond self-employment, any
sort of U.S. government credit or subsidy should remain out
of the regime's reach. Given Castro's questionable ability
to repay lenders, Cuban debts to U.S. citizens or entities
could fall on U.S. taxpayers for repayment. In October 2000,
lawmakers passed a measure to allow cash food sales and
streamlined medicine sales to the regime. Although the state
newspaper Granma warned that Cuba "will not purchase a
single cent of food or grain in the United States," Castro
bought $30 million worth a year later. According to Senator
Jesse Helms (R-NC), a dollar such countries "spend on
American farm products is a dollar they cannot spend on
terror and repression."
- Ease U.S. travel
restrictions and permit U.S.-Cuban joint ventures when Cuba
adopts market and labor reforms. Travel and trade
restrictions should be lifted only when the regime ends
state monopolies and allows Cuban workers to work for anyone
they please, bargain for fair market compensation, join
independent unions, freely travel abroad, and purchase goods
and services from their employers. Moreover, the United
States should call on its international allies to condition
support for investments on Cuba's observance of
International Labor Organization conventions.
- Establish U.S. and
multilateral micro-enterprise credits for independent,
self-employed Cubans and independent businesses when such
businesses are permitted by Cuban law. In a
transition environment, such credits, along with programs to
teach entrepreneurship, could accelerate the growth of a
market economy.
- Develop a set of
principles for incorporating Cuba into normal trade
relations with the United States and multilateral
institutions. With increasing attention being
focused on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), now
is an opportune time to develop principles that would allow
a market-oriented Cuba to be incorporated into the framework
of U.S. and hemispheric free trade. Failure to do so now
will allow populist leftists such as Venezuelan president
Hugo Chávez to define lenient rules and unconditioned terms
of engagement.
- Direct scholarship funds
for Cuban students, professionals, and family members of
political prisoners to cooperating universities in
democracies throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Similar programs for study in the United States
have been in place in other Latin American countries for
years. The need to learn English should not necessarily be
an obstacle to an education outside of Cuba, nor is the U.S.
democratic experience the only relevant one. Both the Cuban
Solidarity Act, co-sponsored by Senators Jesse Helms and
Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), and the Bridges to the Cuban People
Act of 2001, introduced by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT)
and Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY), proposed U.S.-funded
scholarships for Cuban students, indicating bipartisan
support for such initiatives.
- Lift restrictions on
remittances. Beyond permitting Cuban-Americans to
remit money to family members, the United States should
allow U.S. groups and persons to help support independent,
self-employed Cubans and Cuban NGOs--the people and entities
working in the trenches for a better Cuba. Such independent
donations from Americans would not carry the stigma of
dollars from the U.S. government. In addition to a similar
amendment to the FY 2003 Treasury and General Appropriations
Act, a measure proposing this was introduced last year by
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) and 96 colleagues
in the House of Representatives.
- Improve U.S. efforts to
inform Cubans. Dissidents report that TV Martí is
viewable only at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana
because of state jamming efforts. A poll of recent
emigres suggests that the less jammable Radio Martí reaches
more than half the population, although listenership is
declining. TV Martí should be
refocused on delivering programs directly to the U.S.
Interests Section and making program cassettes for
distribution on the island. The cost savings could be passed
on to Radio Martí to strengthen its signal, provide more
independent news from the island, and broadcast unbiased
coverage of U.S. and world events. Although the Martí
Web sites and many non-governmental sites disseminate
information about Cuba, Internet accounts on the island are
few and are limited mostly to e-mail. News reports and
information on democratic governance should be made
available in simple formats so they can be transmitted
through such accounts. Other programs to supply printed
materials on democratic governance, market economics, and
free enterprise should be expanded.
Conclusion
Fidel
Castro invited Pope John Paul II to Havana in 1998 and allowed
him to address the Cuban people. At that time, hopes were high
that the dictator would soften his grip. Yet, aside from some
prisoner releases, nothing has changed. Former President Jimmy
Carter visited this year with a message of reform and a plea
for the United States to lift its embargo. Castro responded by
closing a loophole in his constitution that would have allowed
modification of his system.
Clearly, the dictator has his own agenda. As Larry
Birns, director of the Council for Hemispheric Affairs once
said, "You can supply billions in foreign aid, as the Russians
once did, and still have minimal leverage."
For
now, U.S. policy should be focused on constraining Castro's
mischief, prodding further concessions to market economics,
and penetrating the regime's blockade on human rights and free
choice. In the future, it should provide transition leaders
with concrete incentives to reform Cuba's predatory, parasitic
government.
However the Administration and Congress work out
the details of U.S. policy toward Cuba, patience will be
crucial to eventual success. When Castro is gone, change may
still come in fits and starts. A recent survey among
dissidents concluded that not everyone in the Communist Party
(or even in the government) likes the regime, but fear of
repression, loss of entitlements, and a sense of futility
still keep many from challenging the current order. Some worry
that a transition may bring high unemployment, the loss of
education and health benefits, and expulsions from their
homes.
Beyond Fidel's brother Raúl, who is only four years
younger and therefore considered a transitory figure, future
leaders might attempt state reforms similar to those in
post-Mao China, which meet capitalism and democracy
halfway. (See text box, "Cuba
vs. China.") Alternatively, following the East European
experience, top officials might try to seize ownership of the
industries they currently supervise as a disorganized state
tries to redefine itself. In any case, the construction of
democracy and free markets in a country that has known only
repression and propaganda for the past 43 years will be more
difficult than it has been in other Latin American countries,
where similar reforms have been initiated but still
struggle.
While
U.S. policies cannot turn Cuba into an instant democracy, they
can at least promote its construction one brick at a time. But
to be effective, they should not be based on the anticipation
that Fidel Castro will return any favors. Rather, policy
initiatives should support U.S. interests in promoting a
stable democratic neighborhood, promote the long-term
development of market-based economic prosperity that will
benefit both Cuba and the United States, and cultivate a
lasting friendship with the Cuban people--not with the old
bully who, for the moment, holds them prisoner.
Stephen Johnson is Policy
Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.
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