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Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, today, along with Senator BURNS, I am introducing the Children's Safe Sleepwear and Burn Prevention Act of 2002. This legislation is designed to prevent sleepwear-related burn injuries and reverse the 1997 decision of the Consumer
[Page: S2842] GPO's PDF
In 1996, the CPSC made two principle changes to the sleepwear safety regulations. First, the Commission determined that because children age 0-9 months were not mobile, they were not at risk from fire. Consequently, the revised regulations totally exempted sleepwear for young infants from any safety regulations. Second, the CPSC decided that so-called ``tight-fitting'' sleepwear did not have to meet any fire safety requirements on the mistaken assumption that tight-fitting garments do not burn.
As a result of the Commission's action, I heard from the Shriners Hospital in Shreveport, Louisiana. The Shirners Hospitals for children operate four burn centers in the United States and treat over 20 percent of all serious pediatric burns in the country. The Shriners Hospitals conducted a study comparing the incidence of sleepwear-related burn injuries during the period 1995-1996, before the regulations were changed, to the period 1998-1999 after the changes had been put in place.
The results of the Shriners study are sobering indeed. From 1995-1996, Shriners Hospitals treated 14 children for sleepwear-related burn injuries. For the period 1998-1999, the number of children suffering from these sleepwear-related burns increased to 36, a 157 percent increase!
The Shriners Hospitals also examined pediatric burn injuries where it was impossible to determine the exact type of clothing involved or where the children was not technically wearing sleepwear but may have been using this clothing to sleep in. Over the relevant time period, the number of children suffering clothing-related burn injuries increased from 70 to 147, a 110 percent increase! Similarly, the number of pediatric burn injuries where it was impossible to determine anything about the clothing being worn because the clothing had been totally burned away increased from 218 to 311, a 43 percent increase! All told, the number of burned children treated at Shriners Hospitals increased from 302 in 1995-1996 to 494 in 1998-1999, a 64 percent increase!
The data regarding infants age 0-9 months is also revealing. In 1995-1996 Shriners Hospitals treated just five children for sleepwear-related burn injuries under nine months of age. For 1998-1999, the total number of infants suffering such injuries
rose to nineteen, a 280 percent increase!
As a practical matter, almost all pediatric burn injuries involve ignition of the clothing and some other materials. While the safety regulations cannot save a child trapped in a raging inferno, a 1972 HEW study concluded that children in fires whose clothing ignited had a four to six-fold increase in mortality and morbidity compared to those who clothing did not ignite. Take, for example, a situation where the house is on fire and a parent picks up her infants and flees the burning house. Sparks are flying, but the infants garments do not ignite because they are flame resistent. If the sleepwear is not flame resistant, the sparks catch the clothing.
The Children's Safe Sleepwear and Burn Prevention Act directs the Commission to restore the safety protections that it removed in 1997. Henceforth, young infants will not have to face the dangers of using sleepwear that provides no protection whatsoever against fire. Tight-fitting or snug sleepwear will also have to meet these fire safety requirements. There is, however, more that must be done to ensure a fire safety environment for our children.
Another problem regarding the children's sleepwear regulations must be addressed. Under the CPSC's regulations, even the pre-1997 version, clothing that the manufacturer did not intend to be used as sleepwear were not required to meet the flammability safety requirements. Consequently, a manufacturer could simply label an item as day wear as sleepwear and completely avoid the safety requirements.
This legislation eliminates this ``labeling loophole'' by creating a functional definition of sleepwear for children up to seven years of age. If, as a practical matter, clothing is used for sleepwear, then should meet the safety requirements. The legislation provides some guidance as to what types of garments are used for sleepwear with some regularity such as togs, bunny suits and garments with cartoon characters that are particularly attractive to young children.
One might ask what alternatives are there to untreated cotton. Advances in technology now provide such alternatives. Cotton can be treated with a flame retardant that does not wash out because it is bonded to the cotton through a chemical process at the atomic level. The treatment adds little to the cost of children's sleepwear.
The defense of our innocent children from the dangers of sleepwear related burn injuries should be a priority. If you have ever seen a child severely burned by flaming sleepwear, you have some sense of the suffering and horror that these injuries entail. We can make these horrible burn injuries less frequent by enacting this important piece of legislation.
I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Children's Safe Sleepwear and Burn Prevention Act of 2002''.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO CHILDREN'S SLEEPWEAR FLAMMABILITY REGULATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.--The Consumer Product Safety Commission (in this Act referred to as the ``Commission'') shall, with respect to the Commission's flammability standards for children's sleepwear sizes 0 through 14, promulgated pursuant to the Flammable Fabrics Act (15 U.S.C. 1191 et seq.; parts 1615 and 1616 of title 16, Code of Federal Regulations)--
(1) not enforce or enact a standard with respect to children's sleepwear that--
(A) exempts--
(i) diapers and underwear (including disposable diapers and underwear);
(ii) infant garments sizes 0 through 6X, infant garments sizes 9 months or smaller, or other garments described in part 1615.1(c) of title 16, Code of Federal Regulations; or
(iii) tight-fitting garments; or
(B) includes as a part of any definition of children's sleepwear (or of any item of such sleepwear) a standard based on the intent of the manufacturer or retailer; and
(2) provide a functional definition of children's sleepwear for ages 0 through 7 years (encompassing, at a minimum, infant and children's garment sizes 2 through 6X, as such sizes are defined by the Department of Commerce Voluntary Product Standard (previously identified as Commercial Standard CS151-50 ``Body Measurements for the Sizing of Apparel for Infants, Babies, Toddlers, and Children''), including children's clothing used with some regularity as sleepwear, such as--
(A) ``togs'';
(B) ``onesies'';
(C) body suits with snaps at the bottom for easy access to a diaper;
(D) all-in-one ``bunny'' suits with enclosed feet; and
(E) any garments sized for children ages 0 through 7 years with cartoon characters or symbols that the Commission finds are particularly attractive to young children.
(b) RULEMAKING.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations with respect to the flammability of children's sleepwear consistent with the provisions of this Act.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.--Sleepwear manufactured or imported on or before the effective date of the regulations promulgated by the Commission under subsection (b) shall not be treated as being in violation of the Flammable Fabrics Act or such regulations if the sleepwear complied with the rules of the Commission in effect at the time the sleepwear was manufactured or imported.
By Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. WELLSTONE, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. DAYTON, and Mrs. CLINTON):
S. 2189. A bill to amend the Trade Act of 1974 to remedy certain effects of injurious steel imports by protecting benefits of steel industry retirees and encouraging the strengthening of the American steel industry; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, the American steel industry will not consolidate and will not survive without relief from their unique burden of substantial retiree health care costs. Failing to assist the American steel industry with its retiree health care costs puts our industry at a tremendous disadvantage as it competes in
[Page: S2843] GPO's PDF
Earlier this year, the President imposed limited and temporary steel tariffs under Section 201. Today, I introduce the Steel Industry Consolidation and Retiree Benefits Protection Act of 2002, the Steel Legacy bill. This bill provides strong incentives for consolidation in the United States steel industry by supporting companies' retiree health care costs. This bill provides desperately needed medical care to retirees whose companies have been forced out of business by imports. This bill is critical to the preservation of the American steel industry, and it is humane to those individuals who have paid a very high price for our nation's free trade policies.
The American steel industry has been facing an unprecedented crisis since 1997, when the Asian financial crisis disrupted global steel trade and diverted much of the world's excess steel capacity to the U.S. market. Thirty-three U.S. steel companies, representing over 40 percent of domestic steelmaking capacity, have gone into bankruptcy since 1999, including such venerable names as Bethlehem Steel and LTV. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel in my state is in the process of reorganizing. Many more steel companies have been forced into liquidation. Almost 50,000 steelmaking jobs have been lost in this country since the steel crisis began in 1998--losses that come on top of hundreds of thousands of steel job losses in the two preceding decades.
The cause of this crisis in the industry is not that demand for steel has suddenly collapsed or that the competitiveness of the American steel industry has suddenly collapsed, but because foreign steelmakers have enjoyed decades of government subsidies and protection . Those foreign subsidies have created massive global steel overcapacity, and that foreign protection has ensured that most of the world's overcapacity has been directed at the U.S. market, which has been the most open major market in the world.
The crisis our steel industry currently faces could well mean the end of steelmaking in the United States. This would have grave consequences for steel companies and steel workers, for the steel communities that depend on them, and for our nation's industrial base and our national defense. In recognition that this could not be allowed to happen, the President announced last month that he would impose temporary Section 201 tariff measures on some steel imports. These measures will help give the U.S. steel industry some breathing room to recover. I commend the President for recognizing the importance of maintaining a domestic steel manufacturing base and for taking these steps.
Still, I think it's essential to realize that the Section 201 measures are limited in their scope and duration: first, the tariffs range from 8 percent to 30 percent, far less than the level recommended by two of the ITC Commissioners and the level that I and many others in the steel industry had argued for. And these tariffs are lowered dramatically each year, and stop after only three years. The tariffs do not apply to all steel products. Because of this, foreign steel companies will be able to engage in circumvention measures to get around the tariffs, as they have with antidumping measures. Under the 201 relief, tariffs were imposed on some grades of steel , others were exempted altogether, numerous exemptions for specific steel products have been issued, and for the critical category of slab, a tariff rate quota has been imposed that is unlikely to have any positive effect whatsoever. The tariffs are not being applied across the board to all foreign steel producers; the relief exempts all steel from developing countries and from NAFTA members, who between them represent a significant portion, over a third, of overall U.S. steel imports.
We knew from the beginning of the 201 process that even in the best of circumstances, it was clear that Section 201 tariffs were going to provide only part of the solution to help the domestic steel industry respond to this crisis. But the Section 201 remedy imposed, with its exclusions and exemptions and declining tariffs, makes the need for additional measures even more compelling.
Section 201 will slow the tide of imports. But it will not resolve the other critical issues that will determine whether America's integrated steelmaking capacity survives. America's integrated steelmakers face massive ``legacy costs'' for retiree health and pension benefits, stemming from the dramatic reduction in the American steel industry's active workforce over the past two decades, which in turn results from successive Administrations' inability to negotiate an agreement for foreign governments to stop subsidizing their steelmakers. These legacy costs both hurt American steel's international competitiveness and serve as a liability that has prevented the consolidation of the fragmented domestic steel industry. Industry consolidation is another issue that must be addressed: with foreign steelmakers merging to create a new level of top tier steelmakers, American steelmakers risk being permanently consigned to the second rank, with sub-scale facilities and insufficient revenues to fund the necessary investment in research and technology. Finally, we must take measures to mitigate the human cost of this steel crisis, particularly the cost to retirees who worked long, hard years to earn health and pension benefits for themselves and their families, but now risk seeing all that taken away because the company that pays those benefits is threatened by unfair foreign trade practices.
The bill I am introducing today, the Steel Industry Retiree Benefits Protection Act of 2002, addresses the toughest of these problems. It guarantees the health care coverage and a very limited life insurance benefit for steel industry retirees whose employer is acquired by another steelmaker or whose employer is forced to shut down because no other steelmaker will acquire it. This will ensure that in steel communities throughout the nation, no retirees will lose their critical health benefits simply because of a crisis in the global steel industry that our government failed to avert. Equally important, this bill will address retiree legacy costs in a way that will enhance our steel industry's competitiveness, by clearing the way for the industry consolidation that is necessary and inevitable if the American steel industry is to survive.
The mechanics of the bill are fairly simple. A Federal trust fund will be established that will assume the retirees' health care and life insurance costs for steel , iron ore, and coke producers, and those who transport steel mill products for steelmaking operations, that are acquired by another company; that are in bankruptcy and attempted unsuccessfully to be acquired by another company, and thus have been closed, or are in imminent danger of closing, or have been unable to be acquired for at least two years; that are in bankruptcy and sell a significant steelmaking operation to another company; or, finally, in order to ensure that the assumption of legacy costs does not distort competition within the domestic steel industry, if a significant portion of the entire industry's legacy costs have been assumed by the Federal trust fund, all steel industry retirees and beneficiaries would be eligible to be covered by the program.
The money for the Fund to pay for these legacy costs will come from the following: steel tariff revenues; an acquired steelmaker's retiree health care trust fund assets; payments for 10 years by the qualified steel company of $5 per ton of steelmaking capacity, subject to the bill's provisions; retiree premiums; and, and appropriated funds if necessary.
In order to simplify the management of the program, retiree health benefits assumed by the Fund will be limited to Federal Blue Cross/Blue Shield health benefits, a fair and reasonable standard of health coverage. Life insurance will be limited to a one-time payment of $5,000 dollars. The program will be administered by the Secretary of Commerce and by Trustees who are designated by both management and labor.
This bill is supported by both the integrated steelmakers and by the steel unions, who understand what it will take to save the American steel industry. They know that legacy costs have been the major barrier to consolidation
[Page: S2844] GPO's PDF
But, make no mistake, this steel legacy legislation will not happen without the active involvement of the President. This bill is fair, it is pro-competition, and there is a broad consensus that legacy cost legislation like this is absolutely necessary if we are to preserve integrated steelmaking in the United States, as well as the communities and businesses that depend on those facilities. But realistically, a program like this is only going to be enacted with the strong support and active engagement of the President.
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