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Summary of Key Differences in Fast Track Proposals

1. Labor standards:
   
   
   • In the Thomas, Dooley, Jefferson, Tanner proposal, the "Principal Negotiating Objective" requires only that a country enforce its existing law, no matter how weak it is. There is no requirement that a country's law include any of the five core standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
     
     This is not the Jordan standard. The Jordan agreement was premised on the fact that U.S. and Jordan both do maintain high labor standards. In fact, that agreement expressly provides for enforcement of each country's "labor laws" - which the agreement specifically defines as laws related to core internationally recognized labor rights. Many countries do not reflect the five core ILO standards in their laws.
     
     
   • The Thomas et al. proposal includes "Promotion of ILO core standards" only as an "Overall negotiating objective." "Overall objectives" are essentially rhetorical, since they are not subject to binding commitments or dispute settlement.
     
     The Rangel/Levin proposal provides in the Principal Negotiating Objectives for free trade agreements (FTAs) the adoption and enforcement in a country's domestic law of the five ILO core standards: rights of association and collective bargaining, and bans on discrimination, forced labor and exploitative child labor.
     
     
   • For the WTO, the Thomas et al. proposal does not call for the Administration to pursue a Working Group on Trade and Labor issues.
     
     The Rangel/Levin proposal adopts this objective, which has been in U.S. law since 1994.
     
     
2. Environmental issues:
   
   
   • The Thomas et al. proposal does not provide any provisions to ensure that trade rules do not undermine legitimate domestic environmental laws.
     
     The Rangel/Levin proposal provides a provision to clarify existing exceptions in the WTO for protection of human, animal and plant life or health, and to promote conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The proposal would also provide for a more active role for the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment, so that this Committee would provide analysis, input and advice on the environmental implications of proposed trade rules.
     
     
   • On Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), the Thomas et al. proposal's "Promotion of Certain Priorities" section requires only that Administration "promote consideration of MEAs." It is not clear what this means.
     
     The Rangel/Levin proposal provides for countries to be able to enforce MEAs without violating trade rules (so long as both countries to a dispute have accepted the obligations of the MEA).
     
     
3. On investment, the Principal Negotiating Objective in Thomas et al. proposal does not address key concerns revealed by experience with NAFTA Chapter 11. A key concern is that investment provisions give foreign investors greater rights in the U.S. than domestic investors, and threaten valid health, safety and other regulations.
   
   The Rangel/Levin proposal addresses these concerns while still preserving effective investor-state mechanism so that U.S. investors can protect their investments overseas.
   
   
4. The Thomas et al. proposal includes an objective that a country enforce its existing environmental law.
   
   The Rangel/Levin proposal includes this objective, and also provides for a rule preventing countries from gaining a competitive advantage by derogating from or waiving their environmental standards.
   
   
5. Enforcement:
   
   
   • The approach to enforcement in the Thomas et al. proposal is framed in terms of "equivalent" remedies. Equivalence does not mean availability of the same remedies, nor does it mean effective enforcement. Equivalence alone can lead to weakening FTA enforcement down to the lowest common denominator - rather than preserving the full range of remedies - as illustrated by the Bush Administration exchange of letters on the Jordan Free Trade Agreement.
     
     The Thomas et al. proposal illustrates this point. Its Principal Negotiating Objectives on enforcement calls for a penalty "appropriate to the subject matter" and uses language that would undermine the most effective enforcement mechanism available in trade agreements.
     
     Since many FTA rights can be enforced through the WTO, restricting remedies in the FTA context would relegate labor and environmental provisions (where no WTO rules exist) to second class status.
     
     The Rangel/Levin proposal provides that all trade remedies would be available to enforce labor and environmental provisions, and that remedies included in agreement would be demonstrably effective to promote compliance.
   
   
   
6. Role of Congress
   
   
   • Thomas et al. proposal would provide only enhanced consultations, without additional mechanisms to assure congressional participation. The proposal includes mechanisms from the 1988 Act, which can be invoked only with approval of Ways and Means and Finance Committees as gatekeepers.
     
     Since fast track involves a unique delegation of authority to the President, It is reasonable and responsible for Congress to be an active participant. This is especially true now, as trade has become a greater portion of the national economy, involves commerce and competition with a wider range of countries, penetrates into more and more areas of public policy, and involves negotiations over long periods of time (e.g, FTAA initiated in 1994, scheduled to conclude after 2005). The Rangel/Levin proposal provides effective mechanisms for Congressional participation beyond consultations. In particular, the proposal provides a procedure for a structured biennial review of ongoing trade negotiations subject to fast track. Under this procedure, a sizeable minority of Members could bring a resolution to the Floor of the House or Senate once each Congress, to disapprove application of fast track to one or more trade negotiations.
     
     The Rangel/Levin proposal also provides that prior to the imminent completion of the negotiations, a group of Congressional Trade Advisors would have to concur with the President's certification that the negotiating objectives have been substantially satisfied in order for the implementing legislation to be considered under fast track authority.