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Congressional Testimony
June 28, 2001, Thursday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 7985 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE BUDGET
HEADLINE: SIZE OF THE
BUDGET SURPLUS
TESTIMONY-BY: ROBERT L. BIXBY, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR,
AFFILIATION: THE CONCORD COALITION
BODY: June 28, 2001
HOW BIG IS THE
REMAINING SURPLUS?
Committee on the Budget United States Senate
Testimony of
Robert L. Bixby Executive Director, The Concord
Coalition Overview
Mr. Chairman, Senator Domenici, and members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss the likely size
of the federal budget surplus in light of the recently passed tax cut and other
potential commitments. I am here representing the Concord Coalition, a
bipartisan organization dedicated to strengthening the nations long-term
economic prospects through prudent fiscal policy. Concords co-chairs are former
Senators, Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Sam Nunn (D-GA).
The Concord
Coalition is greatly heartened by the dramatic improvement in the federal
governments fiscal condition over the past few years. When the 1990s began the
nation was mired in large and growing deficits. Today, the budget is in surplus
and is projected to remain there for several years. Debt held by the public has
declined for three years running, and further reductions are expected in the
years ahead. Given all the good news, some may be tempted to conclude that
fiscal discipline is no longer needed. Some may also be tempted to conclude that
debt reduction is no longer important or that it will happen without effort. And
others will assume that Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and other
age-related entitlement programs have been Asaved by the prosperity of recent
years. Unfortunately, none of these conclusions are correct.
The
challenges of an aging society include fiscal pressures that cannot be remedied
simply by assuming that projected budget surpluses will bail us out. The
inevitable growth in spending on age-related entitlement programs will put
pressure on discretionary spending, revenues, and public debt. Tough choices
will need to be made to avoid burgeoning public debt in the future.
In
the years ahead, Congress and the Bush administration face the critical
challenge of adopting a framework for using near-term budget surpluses to help
fill the huge long-term gap in federal entitlement programs, and to further the
nations continued economic well being. This is certainly a more welcome
challenge than eliminating budget deficits, but it is every bit as vital. And
fiscal discipline is every bit as important.
So far this year the budget
debate has not centered on the long- term challenge but on the extent to which
taxes should be cut. Meanwhile, it has been assumed that spending will be
reinedBin. Turning that assumption into reality could prove to be a far more
difficult task than cutting taxes - particularly in light of recent proposals to
increase spending on defense, education, agriculture, Medicare and Social
Security.
As Congress now turns its attention from tax cuts to spending
it is an appropriate time to assess the size of the remaining surplus. Aside
from the $
1.35 trillion 11-year tax cut, the FY2002 budget
resolution assumed new mandatory spending of $
460 billion over
10 years, a Acontingency fund of $
897 billion, and
$
2.4 trillion worth of debt reduction. It all adds up on paper,
but only if todays long-range economic projections are accurate and only if a
number of questionable assumptions are made that tend to understate likely
expenses and overstate likely revenues. Spending increases beyond the budget
resolution level or additional tax cuts risk dipping into the Social Security
and Medicare Part A trust fund surpluses, which lawmakers have promised to
reserve for debt reduction and/or needed structural reform of these programs.
Hovering over all of this is the near certainty that the long- range
projections on which these decisions are based will be wrong - perhaps by
several hundred billion dollars in either direction. The immediate danger is not
that the budget will quickly fall back into overall deficit, but that in such
good times too many commitments will be loaded onto the thin ice of long-term
surplus projections.
How big is the remaining surplus?
With that
as background, let me turn to the question at hand: how big is the remaining
surplus? There are really two ways of answering this question. It can be
answered in a technical sense by looking at the most recent CBO baseline and
subtracting the effect of the tax cut, which as of now represents the only
legislated claim on the surplus. Using this calculation, the remaining 10-year
surplus excluding Social Security and Medicare Part A is $
1.08
trillion.
The second way of answering the question is to look not just
at the effect of the tax cut but also at the spending assumptions contained in
the budget resolution. The result is what might be called the Aavailable surplus
because it accounts for claims on the surplus that have not yet been translated
into legislation. Subtracting the effects of budget resolution policies reduces
the available surplus to about $
500 billion. It is important to
note, however, that almost all of this supposedly available surplus comes in the
final 5 years of the 10-year projection. There is a small surplus of about
$
26 billion in FY2002, not including the defense increase
requested this week by the President. The available surplus in fiscal years 2003
through 2005 is essentially zero.
Beyond the budget resolution policies
it is also relevant to look at the likelihood that certain assumptions made in
the surplus projection will prove to be unrealistic. Prominent in this regard
are the assumptions that discretionary spending will hold at the level of
inflation for the nine years beyond 2002, and that the various sunset provisions
in the tax cut will actually go into effect. If discretionary spending grows at
4 percent a year rather than 2.6 percent as assumed in the baseline, then the
remaining $
500 billion of available surplus would be consumed.
If discretionary spending keeps pace with GDP growth by increasing at roughly 5
percent annually, then the surplus would be reduced by about $
1
trillion. Either of these spending assumptions seems more realistic than the
baseline. Discretionary budget authority has grown by an average of 6 percent
over the past three years and will grow by 7 percent this year if the Presidents
defense request is simply added to the $
661 billon budget
resolution total without offsets.
Another questionable assumption is
that several expiring tax provisions, including the recently passed tax cut,
will sunset before 2011. Adjusting the for the effects of the sunsets, including
relief from the alternative minimum tax, would require an additional
$
500 billion of the surplus.
In short, the combined
effects of the tax cut (adjusted for AMT relief and sunsets) the budget
resolution mandatory spending policies, the extension of expiring tax breaks,
and percent annual discretionary spending growth would, if enacted, eliminate
the entire Aavailable surplus and produce a deficit of approximately
$
1 trillion. This sum would be covered by the Medicare and
Social Security surpluses, so there would still be a total, or unified, surplus
under current economic projections even if all of this new spending and
additional tax cuts took place.
What would be lost, however, is the
opportunity to use the full extent of the trust fund surpluses to better prepare
for the demographically driven fiscal challenges ahead.
Remaining
surplus in the short-term - Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002
The Aoff-budget
Social Security surplus seems safe this year and next. Moreover, the projected
on-budget surplus seems sufficient to set the bar higher by also reserving the
Medicare Part A trust fund surplus. While this goal is clearly within reach, it
will require fiscal restraint and a cooperative economy.
The FY2001 tax
rebate and the shift of $
33 billion in anticipated corporate
revenues into FY2002 leaves a thin margin of about $
6 billion
above the Social Security and Medicare Part A surpluses this year. In addition
to the tax rebate, the budget resolution authorized $
5.5
billion in additional mandatory spending for agriculture this year and about
$
3 billion more in discretionary outlays. On June 1, President
Bush submitted a FY2001 supplemental spending request within the budget
resolution limit. But there is little room to add anything to the Presidents
request without offsets. Doing so would require dubious emergency designations,
or a waiver of the discretionary spending limit contained in the budget
resolution. While these options would get around the spending limit they would
not change the bottom line, and so the surplus would be diminished.
Given that three-quarters of the fiscal year has already passed, it is
unlikely that Congress will be able to spend too much more in FY2001 than
currently anticipated even if it wants to. That does not mean, however, that a
non-Social Security, non-Medicare surplus is assured. With a small margin for
error any unexpected increase in the cost of current programs or a drop in
projected revenues over the remaining months of FY2001 could cause an
unintentional dip into the Medicare Part A surplus (See Appendix A.) As a
practical matter, there is no available surplus remaining this year.
As
for FY2002, Congress must struggle to maintain the tight budget resolution
target of $
661 billion in new discretionary budget authority -
an increase of roughly 4 percent over this year, but a marked decrease from the
6 percent average annual growth of the past three years.
Complicating
the picture is the Bush Administrations recommendation for an increase of about
$
18 billion in defense spending. The budget resolution allows
for an adjustment in defense spending, provided that it does not cause a
non-Social Security, non-Medicare (HI) deficit.
While there appears to
be room for the Presidents request in 2002, the real question is the extent to
which the on-going strategic defense review causes a higher discretionary
spending assumption and lower surplus projection over the long-term. Presumably,
the FY2002 request is only a down payment on higher increases to come, and it is
not realistic to assume that higher defense spending can be entirely carved out
of the existing non- defense baseline. In other words, the defense request for
FY2002 should not be viewed in isolation. It is not intended to be a one- time
plus-up, but the beginning of a higher defense baseline. This simply underscores
the point that, absent a new surge in surplus projections, Congress will have
some tough trade-offs to make between spending, tax cuts and savings.
As
for mandatory spending, the budget resolution assumes increases for items such
as agriculture and health insurance assistance totaling about
$
19 billion in FY2002. Legislation must be enacted to actually
spend this money. If no such legislation is enacted, the surplus will be higher.
Again, this involves a trade-off. But assuming that the budget resolution
policies are enacted, the current non-Social Security, non-Medicare FY2002
surplus appears to be about $
26 billion. (See Appendix B.) The
defense increase will take a substantial portion of this, but the exact amount
will depend on the outlays generated by the Presidents request for
$
18 billion in additional budget authority. Undoubtedly,
legitimate emergency spending will also claim a portion of this small Aavailable
surplus.
The shift of $
33 billion in revenues from this
year into next is a bookkeeping gimmick apparently designed to ensure a
non-Social Security, non-Medicare surplus in FY2002. However, it undoubtedly
will result in higher spending. If the revenue were to remain in FY2001 it would
go to debt reduction because it is too late in the year to spend it. But when
shifted into FY2002, most of it becomes available to spend.
Another
complicating factor in next years outlook is uncertainty about whether continued
slow economic growth will cause a reduction in CBOs most recent revenue
projections. In January, CBO estimated that a mild recession of about the same
size as the 1990-91 recession would cause a $
65 billion drop in
the FY2002 surplus. While it does not appear that the economy has entered a
recession, the slow growth experienced so far in FY2001 raises the possibility
that FY2002 revenues will be lower than currently projected. To a certain
extent, that effect has already been seen. Between January and May, CBO lowered
its revenue projections by $
20 billion for FY2001 and by
$
10 billion for FY2002.
Remaining 10-year surplus -
FY2002-2011
The May 2001 CBO baseline update essentially confirmed the
January surplus projection of $
5.6 trillion over 10 years.
Included in the $
5.6 trillion total is the
$
2.5 trillion Social Security trust fund surplus and the
$
400 billion Medicare Part A trust fund surplus.1 The
non-Social Security, non-Medicare Part A projected surplus is
$
2.7 trillion. Under the budget resolution assumptions and
policies, the Social Security and Medicare surpluses can theoretically remain
untouched throughout the next 10 years. But there is very little room for error,
and even though the projected surplus over the next 10 years is enormous, most
of it has been spoken for or may be needed for things that were not included in
the budget resolutions long-term assumptions. It is also important to note that
the projected surplus excluding Social Security and Medicare is heavily
backloaded, with only 28 percent of it coming in the next five years.
A.
Uncertainty in surplus projections
Before reviewing in more detail the
current and potential claims on the surplus, it is important to keep in mind
that 10-year budget projections are highly uncertain. There is an unfortunate
tendency to discuss these numbers as if they were a lottery payout, or money in
the bank. They are projections, and as the CBO will be the first to say, they
are highly uncertain projections.
Prior to 1992 CBO did not make 10-year
projections. It is therefore impossible to establish a fair 10-year track
record. However, CBO has been able to evaluate its track record of five- year
projections. Its conclusions:
C Five-year projections have been off, on
average, by 3.1 percent of GDP even after adjusting for the effects of
legislation.
C Applying that average error to the current baseline means
that the projected total surplus of $
508 billion in 2006 could
be off by more than $
400 billion in either direction.
C
Ten-year projections are likely to be less accurate than five- year projections.
Given the historic error rate, Congress could well find itself with a much
smaller surplus, and a non-Social Security deficit within the next five years,
even without the tax cut, a prescription drug benefit, or any other
surplus-eroding legislation. It is true that the numbers could also be wrong on
the low side, as they have been in recent years. As a matter of prudent fiscal
planning, however, it is best to err on the side of caution, particularly in
light of the fiscal pressures that are certain to occur beyond the 10-year
budget window as the baby boomers begin to draw their Social Security benefits
and qualify for Medicare. Dealing with unexpected good news is much easier than
dealing with unexpected bad news. The options are more pleasant.
It is
also relevant to note that nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of the projected
$
5.6 trillion 10-year surplus comes in the second five years
when, if history is any guide, the projection is likely to be off by several
hundred billion dollars each year.
Discretionary spending - a key
variable
Adding to the uncertainty of long-term projections is the
assumption that must be made about the growth rate of discretionary spending.
The 10-year surplus that is now being dedicated to tax cuts, new entitlement
spending and debt reduction Alockboxes is heavily dependent on the assumption
that discretionary spending, which includes defense, will grow no faster than
the rate of inflation. This is a very fiscally responsible goal, but it is far
from certain to be achieved. The table below demonstrates how different todays
10-year surplus projection is if it is assumed that discretionary spending grows
at a higher, and probably more realistic, pace than assumed in the budget
resolution. It will take a level of fiscal restraint not seen in recent years to
simply validate the surplus that is now being divvied up.
B. Current
claims on the surplus
Assuming that the 10-year surplus projection is
accurate, it is clear that a substantial portion of it has already been claimed.
To begin with, the projected $
2.5 trillion Aoff-budget Social
Security surplus is dedicated to debt reduction or reform of the program. The
budget resolution also sets up procedural protection for the
$
400 billion Medicare Part A trust fund surplus, although it
permits use of this money for a Medicare reform plan that improves access of
beneficiaries to prescription drugs.
By far, the largest claim on the
remaining surplus is the tax bill signed into law by President Bush on June 7.
This $
1.35 trillion 11-year tax cut is heavily backloaded and
riddled with gimmicks. Because most of its provisions are phased in slowly,
nearly 60 percent of the tax cut occurs in the last five years (2007-2011), when
todays surplus projections are in their most uncertain period. Many of the
individual provisions are even more backloaded.
Fitting the tax cut into
the available surplus requires the following assumptions:
C Todays
surplus projections are accurate or too pessimistic to begin with
C
Discretionary spending will grow no faster than the rate of inflation for 10
years
C The sunset will be allowed to take effect, causing a massive tax
increase in 2011
C Congress will do nothing as the number of Americans
subjected to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) grows from 1.4 million to 35.5
million in 2010, canceling out a portion of the tax relief the bill purports to
give
C Congress will allow dozens of popular tax breaks, which have been
routinely renewed in the past, to expire
C Social Security reform will
not require resources from the non- Social Security surplus
C A
Medicare prescription drug benefit will cost no more than the
10-year $
300 billion set aside for this purpose in the budget
resolution Alone, each of these is a questionable assumption. It stretches
credibility to believe that all of them will come to pass.
A cloudy
sunset
One of the most confusing and controversial aspects of the tax
bill is that the entire thing is presumed to Asunset at the end of 2010. This
remarkable assumption made it possible to cut taxes by a greater amount in the
first 10 years of the plan than would otherwise have been possible without
technically exceeding the $
1.35 trillion 11-year limit imposed
by the budget resolution. If taken literally, the sunset provision means that as
of January 1, 2011:
C The top rate will rise from 35 percent back to
39.6 percent
C All other rates will go up by 3 percentage points
C The new 10 percent bracket will be eliminated
C The Amarriage
penalty will reappear
C The maximum annual contribution limit for IRAs
will revert to $
2,000 from $
5,000
C
The child credit will revert to $
500 after having risen to
$
1,000 just 12 months earlier
C The estate tax will
come back to life, like Dracula rising from the grave, one year after its
supposed demise in 2010 Obviously, the sunset provision should not be taken
literally. The very absurdity of the result guarantees that it will never
happen. The real significance of the provision is that it allowed lawmakers to
temporarily avoid making hard choices about which tax cuts would have to be
eliminated from the bill to fit within the carefully negotiated budget
resolution limit of $
1.35 trillion over 11 years.
Moreover, there are some mini-sunsets in the bill that also artificially
depress the cost estimate. For example, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)
provision, which costs $
14 billion from 2001-2005, terminates
at the end of 2004. A new above-the- line deduction for higher education
expenses is assumed to sunset after 2005. It is no more likely that these
mini-sunsets will take effect than it is that the overall sunset will occur in
2010. They are simply scorekeeping gimmicks.
All of the sunset
provisions, taken together, result in an artificially low cost estimate for the
total bill. According to a preliminary estimate by the Joint Committee on
Taxation, without the sunset provisions the 11-year revenue loss from the tax
cut would rise by $
138 billion to a total of
$
1.49 trillion. Adjusting the Alternative Minimum Tax to
prevent the tax cut from causing an even more dramatic rise in the number of AMT
ratepayers than under pre-tax cut law would add another $
200
billion over 10 years. Finally, the cost of permanently extending a number of
current tax breaks scheduled to expire including the research and development
tax credit, adds another $
120 billion. In other words, instead
of the assumed $
1.35 trillion revenue loss over 11 years, the
number is closer to $
2.2 trillion including higher debt service
cost. The combination of backloading and sunsets makes the ultimate fiscal
effect of the tax cut difficult to assess. Its official cost estimate assumes
that all of the phase-ins and sunsets will occur on schedule. But two
Congressional elections and a Presidential election will take place before the
final round of rate reductions is effective, and before most of the Amarriage
penalty relief even begins. There will be four Congressional elections and two
Presidential elections before the estate tax is repealed and the child credit
reaches $
1000. It is fair to question whether such delayed
provisions will remain frozen in place over such a long period before taking
effect. However, for purposes of assessing the 10- year budget outlook it must
be assumed that they will.
Unfortunately, it must also be assumed by CBO
that the sunset provisions will take effect as planned. This is a very
troublesome assumption because it will artificially inflate future surplus
projections, particularly for the years 2011 and beyond. If Congress chooses to
maintain the sunset provisions as the ultimate Atrigger to protect against
optimistic projections, it should also ensure that new policies be assessed
against a baseline that accounts for the tax cut as if the sunset provisions
didnt exist. The fiction that the sunsets will take place as planned should not
be indulged to justify larger tax cuts or higher spending.
New mandatory
spending claims
The tax cut is not the only current claim on the 10-year
surplus, but it is the only one that has been enacted into law. The budget
resolution assumes new mandatory spending of $
460 billion over
10 years.1 Most of it is contained in Areserve funds designated for specific
purposes. The fact that Congress has set aside these reserves in the budget
resolution does not mean that the money will actually be spent. Specific
legislation must be passed and signed into law by the President before the
mandatory spending reserves will have an effect on the budget. However, for
purposes of assessing the available surplus, it is appropriate to subtract the
new mandatory spending contained in the budget resolution because it represents
Congressional intent.
In the language of the budget resolution, aside
from the
Medicare prescription drug provision, legislation to
unlock each of the reserves, Amay not when taken together with all other
previously enacted legislation reduce the on-budget surplus below the level of
the of the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund surplus in any fiscal year
covered by this resolution.
C. Items not included in the budget
resolution that may decrease the surplus
In addition to existing claims
on the surplus, there are a number of other initiatives that enjoy substantial
support in Congress or the Administration. Turning these initiatives into
legislation will affect the surplus. Any such list involves subjective judgment,
and cost estimates are dependent upon how each policy is actually implemented.
But it would be surprising if the surplus were not reduced by legislative action
on at least some of the following items:
C Defense increases - The
budget resolution includes $
3.65 trillion in budget authority
for defense over the next 10 years. But Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is
conducting a broad ranging review of national security policy, and many expect
him to conclude his review by requesting substantial increases in the defense
budget. This years request for an additional $
18 billion is the
first installment, but the potential fiscal impact of the defense review will
likely not be seen until the Presidents FY2003 budget request is submitted in
February 2002. However, making room for an increase without raising the overall
level of discretionary spending or without making corresponding cuts in the
defense budget would require a virtual freeze in non-defense discretionary
spending. That is not a realistic prospect.
C Education increases - The
Senate version of the budget resolution contained nearly $
300
billion over 10 years in new mandatory spending for education, much of it
earmarked for guaranteed funding of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA). Ultimately, this provision was removed in the House- Senate
conference before final passage of the budget resolution. But shortly
thereafter, the Senate voted to increase IDEA funding by $
150
billion over 10 years in an amendment to its bill reauthorizing the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The House version of the education bill does
not include 10-year guaranteed funding for IDEA. Regardless of whether the
Senate or House position prevails on the question of guaranteeing IDEA funding,
it seems likely that more money will be spent on this and other education
programs than is contemplated in the budget resolution.
C Alternative
Minimum Tax reform - The AMT, which was designed to prevent wealthy taxpayers
from using a combination of deductions and tax breaks to pay little or no income
taxes, is not indexed for inflation. Over the years, the number of taxpayers
subject to the AMT has been slowly increasing. But without reform, the number of
taxpayers subjected to the AMT will shoot up from 1.4 million this year to 35.5
million in 2010. The recently passed tax bill is responsible for about 15
million of these prospective new AMT ratepayers. As a result, a growing number
of taxpayers will not receive the full amount of the tax cut they have been led
to believe they will get. Given that the goal of the tax cut is to give money
back to the taxpayers, it seems unlikely that Congress will take away with one
hand what it gives back with the other. Correcting this problem is estimated to
cost about $
200 billion according to the Joint Committee on
Taxation. Even with this correction, the number of taxpayers subjected to the
AMT will rise to over 20 million by 2011. Thus, it is likely that additional
modifications will have to be made to address the AMT problem that already
existed before the tax cut.
C Expiring tax provisions - Several tax
provisions (Aextenders) are scheduled to expire between 2002 and 2011. The
largest is the research and development tax credit. Although most observers
believe that these provisions will be extended most of them were left out of the
tax bill. Permanently extending the provisions scheduled to expire this year
along with the popular research and development tax credit would lower revenues
by about $
120 billion over 10 years.
C Social Security
reform - While President Bush has appointed a Commission to recommend actions to
ensure the long-term sustainability of Social Security, the budget resolution
does not reserve anything from the non-Social Security surplus for this purpose.
Strictly speaking, Social Security reform need not require a contribution from
the non-Social Security surplus. But if, as reported, the Social Security
commission recommends that personally owned accounts be created within the
system the thorniest question will be how such accounts should funded. As a
frame of reference, using 2 percent of taxable payroll to fund a personal
account reform plan would require roughly $
1 trillion over the
next ten years. One source of such funding is the Social Security surplus, which
by definition is already dedicated to the payment of future retirement benefits.
However, given the strong desire of many lawmakers to reserve the Social
Security surplus for debt reduction only, and the clear need for a source of up-
front funding to make the personal account concept work, it seems very likely
that a contribution from non-Social Security revenues will be necessary.
C Emergency spending - Supplemental emergency appropriations are
designed to allow Congress to fund natural disaster relief, military operations,
and other unforeseeable events that develop after the regular appropriations
bills have been passed. The Presidents Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
estimates that the average annual amount spent on natural disaster relief is
$
5.6 billion. According to CBO, the average annual amount of
total emergency appropriations, excluding Gulf War expenses, between 1991 and
1999 was $
8.9 billion. Nevertheless, the budget resolution
contains no earmarked funding to deal with natural disasters, or other emergency
needs. A House provision setting up a designated emergency fund of
$
5.6 billion in the FY2002 budget was deleted in conference
with the Senate. If history is any guide, however, the money will be needed
whether it is recognized in the budget resolution or not. Over 10 years, routine
emergency spending is likely to cost anywhere from $
50 to
$
90 billion.
What about the Acontingency fund?
To account for these and other uncertainties involved in any 10- year
budget, the budget resolution reserves approximately $
900
billion in what has been called a Acontingency fund. This $
900
billion simply represents the portion of the non-Social Security surplus that is
not committed to tax cuts, new spending, and interest costs.
The first
claim on the contingency fund is the Medicare Part A trust fund surplus, which
unlike Social Security is an Aon-budget item. Removing the Medicare Part A
surplus from the contingency fund lowers the total to about
$
500 billion. There is ample reason to doubt whether the likely
costs of anticipated defense and education increases, AMT reform, renewal of
expiring tax provisions, Social Security reform, emergency spending, and
interest costs, can all be covered by this $
500 billion
contingency fund.
IV. Beyond the 10-year budget window
Todays
major budgetary decisions must not be viewed through a short-term lens. Fiscal
discipline is the key to providing for the unmet needs of the future. Somehow,
sufficient resources must be set aside to meet the huge retirement and health
care costs associated with the coming Asenior boom. The time to address the
long-term challenge is now, while the demographics are favorable and the budget
is in surplus. The surpluses provide an opportunity to help meet this challenge
C but only if we are careful to preserve them.
Absent from the budget
debate so far is the one issue that will determine government's size and shape
in the new century--the long-term growth in entitlement spending. Neither side
has any plan to slow that growth. In fact, to the extent that leaders are
talking about entitlements at all, it is to advocate adding new ones.
Nevertheless, in advance of developing a plan for dealing with the future
financing requirements of Social Security and Medicare, Congress and the
President have enacted a tax cut that, if all the questionable sunsets are
ignored, totals almost $
2 trillion.
The current trend
in entitlement spending remains unsustainable.
C The three biggest
benefit programs for seniorsCSocial Security, Medicare, and MedicaidCnow consume
43 percent of the federal budget, up from 15 percent in 1965. On the current
course they will consume roughly 80 percent of budget outlays by 2040.
C
All told, OMB projects that these three programs will nearly double as a percent
of GDP by 2040, from about 7 percent to over 14 percent.
C According to
the 2001 Trustees report, Social Security outlays will exceed earmarked tax
revenues by a widening margin starting in 2016. By 2025, Social Security will
face an annual cash shortfall of over $
400 billion. By 2038,
the last year the trust funds are technically solvent, the annual shortfall will
be over $
1 trillion.
C To cover these deficits, the
trust funds will have to redeem their IOUs from the Treasury. And to come up
with the cash, Congress will have to hike taxes, cut other spending, consume
surpluses if they exist, or borrow from the publicCexactly as if the trust funds
never existed.
C This year, all Social Security benefits could be paid
for with a tax rate of 10.5 percent of payroll. By 2040, the Trustees project
that they will cost 17.7 percent of payroll. Add in Medicare Part A and the
projected burden rises to 24 percent of each workers taxable paycheck.
C
The recent prosperity has not lowered Medicares long-term cost rate. Nor has it
altered the demographic, social, and technological forces driving up the future
cost of health care. Far from it: Following the recommendation of an official
technical panel, the Trustees this year increased their projection of Medicare's
long-term cost rate by a staggering 60 percent.
This years dynamic of
cutting taxes while planning to raise spending creates the threat of renewed
non-Social Security, non- Medicare deficits and may result in failure to reduce
the public debt to the low levels now projected. Savings from deficit reduction,
and now surpluses, have helped provide the capital to increase the productivity
of American workers - a major factor in the record growth of the last 10 years.
Further gains in productivity will become especially urgent when the retirement
of the huge baby boom generation virtually halts the growth in the size of the
U.S. work force. But even improved productivity is not a complete solution.2
In the language of the budget resolution, aside from the
Medicare prescription drug provision, legislation to unlock
each of the reserves, Amay not when taken together with all other previously
enacted legislation reduce the on-budget surplus below the level of the of the
Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund surplus in any fiscal year covered by
this resolution.
C. Items not included in the budget resolution that may
decrease the surplus
In addition to existing claims on the surplus,
there are a number of other initiatives that enjoy substantial support in
Congress or the Administration. Turning these initiatives into legislation will
affect the surplus. Any such list involves subjective judgment, and cost
estimates are dependent upon how each policy is actually implemented. But it
would be surprising if the surplus were not reduced by legislative action on at
least some of the following items:
C Defense increases - The budget
resolution includes $
3.65 trillion in budget authority for
defense over the next 10 years. But Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is
conducting a broad ranging review of national security policy, and many expect
him to conclude his review by requesting substantial increases in the defense
budget. This years request for an additional $
18 billion is the
first installment, but the potential fiscal impact of the defense review will
likely not be seen until the Presidents FY2003 budget request is submitted in
February 2002. However, making room for an increase without raising the overall
level of discretionary spending or without making corresponding cuts in the
defense budget would require a virtual freeze in non-defense discretionary
spending. That is not a realistic prospect.
C Education increases - The
Senate version of the budget resolution contained nearly $
300
billion over 10 years in new mandatory spending for education, much of it
earmarked for guaranteed funding of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA). Ultimately, this provision was removed in the House- Senate
conference before final passage of the budget resolution. But shortly
thereafter, the Senate voted to increase IDEA funding by $
150
billion over 10 years in an amendment to its bill reauthorizing the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The House version of the education bill does
not include 10-year guaranteed funding for IDEA. Regardless of whether the
Senate or House position prevails on the question of guaranteeing IDEA funding,
it seems likely that more money will be spent on this and other education
programs than is contemplated in the budget resolution.
C Alternative
Minimum Tax reform - The AMT, which was designed to prevent wealthy taxpayers
from using a combination of deductions and tax breaks to pay little or no income
taxes, is not indexed for inflation. Over the years, the number of taxpayers
subject to the AMT has been slowly increasing. But without reform, the number of
taxpayers subjected to the AMT will shoot up from 1.4 million this year to 35.5
million in 2010. The recently passed tax bill is responsible for about 15
million of these prospective new AMT ratepayers. As a result, a growing number
of taxpayers will not receive the full amount of the tax cut they have been led
to believe they will get. Given that the goal of the tax cut is to give money
back to the taxpayers, it seems unlikely that Congress will take away with one
hand what it gives back with the other. Correcting this problem is estimated to
cost about $
200 billion according to the Joint Committee on
Taxation. Even with this correction, the number of taxpayers subjected to the
AMT will rise to over 20 million by 2011. Thus, it is likely that additional
modifications will have to be made to address the AMT problem that already
existed before the tax cut.
C Expiring tax provisions - Several tax
provisions (Aextenders) are scheduled to expire between 2002 and 2011. The
largest is the research and development tax credit. Although most observers
believe that these provisions will be extended most of them were left out of the
tax bill. Permanently extending the provisions scheduled to expire this year
along with the popular research and development tax credit would lower revenues
by about $
120 billion over 10 years.
C Social Security
reform - While President Bush has appointed a Commission to recommend actions to
ensure the long-term sustainability of Social Security, the budget resolution
does not reserve anything from the non-Social Security surplus for this purpose.
Strictly speaking, Social Security reform need not require a contribution from
the non-Social Security surplus. But if, as reported, the Social Security
commission recommends that personally owned accounts be created within the
system the thorniest question will be how such accounts should funded. As a
frame of reference, using 2 percent of taxable payroll to fund a personal
account reform plan would require roughly $
1 trillion over the
next ten years. One source of such funding is the Social Security surplus, which
by definition is already dedicated to the payment of future retirement benefits.
However, given the strong desire of many lawmakers to reserve the Social
Security surplus for debt reduction only, and the clear need for a source of up-
front funding to make the personal account concept work, it seems very likely
that a contribution from non-Social Security revenues will be necessary.
C Emergency spending - Supplemental emergency appropriations are
designed to allow Congress to fund natural disaster relief, military operations,
and other unforeseeable events that develop after the regular appropriations
bills have been passed. The Presidents Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
estimates that the average annual amount spent on natural disaster relief is
$
5.6 billion. According to CBO, the average annual amount of
total emergency appropriations, excluding Gulf War expenses, between 1991 and
1999 was $
8.9 billion. Nevertheless, the budget resolution
contains no earmarked funding to deal with natural disasters, or other emergency
needs. A House provision setting up a designated emergency fund of
$
5.6 billion in the FY2002 budget was deleted in conference
with the Senate. If history is any guide, however, the money will be needed
whether it is recognized in the budget resolution or not. Over 10 years, routine
emergency spending is likely to cost anywhere from $
50 to
$
90 billion.
What about the Acontingency fund?
To account for these and other uncertainties involved in any 10- year
budget, the budget resolution reserves approximately $
900
billion in what has been called a Acontingency fund. This $
900
billion simply represents the portion of the non-Social Security surplus that is
not committed to tax cuts, new spending, and interest costs.
The first
claim on the contingency fund is the Medicare Part A trust fund surplus, which
unlike Social Security is an Aon-budget item. Removing the Medicare Part A
surplus from the contingency fund lowers the total to about
$
500 billion. There is ample reason to doubt whether the likely
costs of anticipated defense and education increases, AMT reform, renewal of
expiring tax provisions, Social Security reform, emergency spending, and
interest costs, can all be covered by this $
500 billion
contingency fund.
IV. Beyond the 10-year budget window
Todays
major budgetary decisions must not be viewed through a short-term lens. Fiscal
discipline is the key to providing for the unmet needs of the future. Somehow,
sufficient resources must be set aside to meet the huge retirement and health
care costs associated with the coming Asenior boom. The time to address the
long-term challenge is now, while the demographics are favorable and the budget
is in surplus. The surpluses provide an opportunity to help meet this challenge
C but only if we are careful to preserve them.
Absent from the budget
debate so far is the one issue that will determine government's size and shape
in the new century--the long-term growth in entitlement spending. Neither side
has any plan to slow that growth. In fact, to the extent that leaders are
talking about entitlements at all, it is to advocate adding new ones.
Nevertheless, in advance of developing a plan for dealing with the future
financing requirements of Social Security and Medicare, Congress and the
President have enacted a tax cut that, if all the questionable sunsets are
ignored, totals almost $
2 trillion.
The current trend
in entitlement spending remains unsustainable.
C The three biggest
benefit programs for seniorsCSocial Security, Medicare, and MedicaidCnow consume
43 percent of the federal budget, up from 15 percent in 1965. On the current
course they will consume roughly 80 percent of budget outlays by 2040.
C
All told, OMB projects that these three programs will nearly double as a percent
of GDP by 2040, from about 7 percent to over 14 percent.
C According to
the 2001 Trustees report, Social Security outlays will exceed earmarked tax
revenues by a widening margin starting in 2016. By 2025, Social Security will
face an annual cash shortfall of over $
400 billion. By 2038,
the last year the trust funds are technically solvent, the annual shortfall will
be over $
1 trillion.
C To cover these deficits, the
trust funds will have to redeem their IOUs from the Treasury. And to come up
with the cash, Congress will have to hike taxes, cut other spending, consume
surpluses if they exist, or borrow from the publicCexactly as if the trust funds
never existed.
C This year, all Social Security benefits could be paid
for with a tax rate of 10.5 percent of payroll. By 2040, the Trustees project
that they will cost 17.7 percent of payroll. Add in Medicare Part A and the
projected burden rises to 24 percent of each workers taxable paycheck.
C
The recent prosperity has not lowered Medicares long-term cost rate. Nor has it
altered the demographic, social, and technological forces driving up the future
cost of health care. Far from it: Following the recommendation of an official
technical panel, the Trustees this year increased their projection of Medicare's
long-term cost rate by a staggering 60 percent.
This years dynamic of
cutting taxes while planning to raise spending creates the threat of renewed
non-Social Security, non- Medicare deficits and may result in failure to reduce
the public debt to the low levels now projected. Savings from deficit reduction,
and now surpluses, have helped provide the capital to increase the productivity
of American workers - a major factor in the record growth of the last 10 years.
Further gains in productivity will become especially urgent when the retirement
of the huge baby boom generation virtually halts the growth in the size of the
U.S. work force.
But even improved productivity is not a complete
solution.3 Closing the gap between what government promises and what it can
afford will require someone to give something up.
The one way to
mitigate the sacrifice is to boost national savings in advance of the age wave.
Continued debt reduction is the governments most direct contribution to
net national savings.
Increasing national and personal savings is the
single most effective policy the government can pursue to promote long-term
economic growth and retirement security. As public debt is reduced, other
policies such as retirement savings accounts also play an important role.
Household savings are nowhere near adequate to prepare for ever-lengthening
retirements.
Earlier this year, The Concord Coalitions urged Congress to
consider establishing a system of mandatory, individually owned retirement
accounts to help families build a more ample nest egg while alleviating concerns
that future budget surpluses will result in either higher spending or in a large
build up of government- owned private sector financial assets. We still believe
that this would be the best way to use our prosperity of today to prepare for
the fiscal challenges of tomorrow. But funding such a savings program will be
far more difficult, if not impossible, if the bulk of the surplus is devoted to
new spending programs or large escalating tax cuts.
Budget surpluses
must not be used as an excuse to abandon fiscal discipline. But as the recently
passed tax cut demonstrates, the temptation is great. The following Surplus
Scorecard demonstrates how easily todays surpluses could be consumed. It is not
a prediction. Congress may or may not take action on several of the items
listed. The Surplus Scorecard is intended to be a hard choices reality check.
Large as the surplus appears, policymakers must still set priorities. And they
must do so within the context of two very important caveats:
C The
surplus is only a projection, and the further out it goes the more uncertain it
becomes
C More certain, because it is driven by demographics, is the
challenge of affording the baby boomers retirement and health care costs.
Relying on todays surpluses to enact a series of large escalating new
commitments, such as the recently passed tax cut or a
Medicare
prescription drug benefit, in advance of developing a plan to fund the
unfunded entitlements we already have is to rely on the unreliable while
ignoring the inevitable.
LOAD-DATE: July 6,
2001