Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
September 5, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 6751 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE: CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND
TOURISM
HEADLINE: PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING
TESTIMONY-BY: ALAN SAGER, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF HEALTH
SERVICES
AFFILIATION: BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH
BODY: 5 September 2001
AMERICANS WOULD SAVE $
38 BILLION IN 2001 IF WE PAID
CANADIAN PRICES FOR BRAND NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
How to Win Those
Savings and Use Them to Protect All Americans against High Drug Costs without
Hurting Drug Makers or Drug Research
With State-by-state Savings
Estimates
Testimony of Alan Sager, Ph.D. Professor of Health Services,
and Co-Director, Health Reform Program Boston University School of Public Health
715 Albany Street Boston, Massachusetts 02118
5 September 2001
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee-Good morning.My name is Alan
Sager and I am a professor at the Boston University School of Public Health. I
am honored by your invitation to testify today.
l. INTRODUCTION
Together, we face two challenges:
-making all needed medications
available to all Americans at affordable prices, while
-building a
durable financial foundation under drug research and delivery in the U.S.
I am convinced we can do both of these. One reason is that we already
spend enough money to do so. But not if we continue business as usual. ll. WHAT
IS THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM?
Many Americans can't afford needed
prescription drugs because they lack insurance, suffer low incomes, and face
excessive U.S. prices.
Today, 70 million Americans of all ages have no
insurance for prescription drugs. Additional dozens of millions have skimpy
coverage.
Yet American prescription drug spending per person this year
is the world's highest. Total prescription drug spending will be about
$
165 billion this year,' or roughly 11.6 percent of overall
U.S. health spending. That is some $
575 for the average
American.
The drug cost problem will probably worsen. Drug spending in
the U.S. is doubling every five years and is rising about three times as fast as
overall health care spending. Between 1994 and 2000, estimated retail
prescription spending rose by 116.4 percent while total health spending rose by
only 34.2 percent.
If we fail to make vital drugs available to all who
need them, public fear and anger will grow. But reasonable action today will
prevent reckless over-reaction tomorrow.
Our nation must choose among:
-Suffering: Many of us could suffer and die for lack of needed
medications, but that is intolerable.
-Paying: We could spend much more
public or private money-or both- to buy needed drugs, but that is both
unaffordable and unnecessary.
Changing: We could secure more drugs from
manufacturers for the amount we already spend, plus small extra sums to cover
drug makers' actual incremental costs.
Change is the only realistic
choice.Buying drugs at lower price levels, such as those already prevailing in
Canada-as a result of government action 4 is an important first element of that
change.Today's high U.S. prices make. medications unaffordable for many
patients. They induce private efforts to cut drug use, resulting in denial of
needed drugs. And they handicap public actions to expand drug coverage for more
citizens.
Ill. U.S. PAYMENTS FOR BRAND NAME DRUGS AT CANADIAN PRICES
If Americans paid average Canadian prices for brand name drugs this
year, savings across the United States would total $
38.4
billion, I estimate.
Exhibit
Calculating U.S. Savings on Brand
Name Drugs If We Paid Canadian Prices in 2001
($ billions)
1.2001 brand name drug sales, USA, net of discounts and
rebates$
113.7
2.Assume undisclosed discounts and PhRMA
generics of 10%- $
11.4
3.Conservative estimate of
sales, USA, brand name prescription drugs= $
102.3
4.If
U.S. aid Canadian prices, which averaged 62.5 % as high in 2000-
$
63.9
5.Savings if aid Canadian prices in 2001=
$
38.4
Note: All dollars are those actually paid to
brand name prescription drug manufacturers, net of discounts and rebates.
A. How the Savings Were Calculated
1. To calculate the
$
113.7 billion starting point, we began with PhRMA's figure on
total projected 2001 U.S. sales net of discounts and rebates. We then factored
out veterinary sales in line with their actual share of PhRMA's 1999 total. The
result: $
113.7 billion.
2. We then assumed undisclosed
discounts and rebates plus generic sales by PhRMA members equal to 10 percent of
PhRMA's reported sales. (The 10 percent figure may be generous, but we wish to
be conservative in our estimate of U.S. spending and therefore in the estimate
of savings gained by paying Canadian prices.) The aim is to address PhRMA's
stated concern that some U.S. discounts and rebates are not publicly disclosed
and are therefore not considered by the Canadian Patented Medicines Price Review
Board in its international price comparisons.
3. This yields a
conservative projection of human sales of brand name prescription drugs by
manufacturers in the U.S. in 2001 of $
102.3 billion.
4.
The Canadian government's Patented Medicine Prices Review Board calculated that
Canadian brand name drugs' factory prices averaged just 62.5 percent of those in
the U.S.A. in 2000. We applied this to calculate how much would be spent in the
U.S. in 2001 if we paid Canadian prices.
5. The result: cutting U.S.
payments to manufacturers by $
38.4 billion this year.
B. State-by-state Savings
We apportioned this year's
$
38.4 billion in estimated U.S. savings from paying Canadian
prices among the states.' The results are shown in the next exhibit. Savings
ranged from $
3.2 billion this year in California to
$
56 million in Alaska.
Exhibit
State-by-State
Projected Spending on Brand Name Drugs in 2001, and Savings if the U.S. Paid
Canadian Prices
FOUND ON HARD COPY
IV. AMERICANS CAN ENJOY THE
BENEFITS OF CANADIAN PRICES
Importing drugs from Canada has the
potential to provide a measure of relief from high prices to some or even many
individuals, so it should be tried until more effective price relief can be
obtained.I expect that individual citizens will be able to continue to pursue
retail importing solutions that lower their costs, but drug makers will continue
to block effective wholesale importing solutions. If, indeed, importing drugs
probably cannot do enough to make all needed medications affordable, then more
direct techniques will be necessary to give Americans the benefits of low brand
name drug prices that Canadians now enjoy.
Americans could try to obtain
Canadian prices in three ways. First, we could travel to Canada, as growing
numbers of Americans are now doing. Several problems arise. They include
inconvenience of obtaining a valid prescription and the loss of a single, local
pharmacy and pharmacist coordinating all of the patient's medications. Worse, it
becomes necessary to transport something relatively heavy, a person, instead of
something relatively light, a pill. This defies all we know about transportation
economics Second, Americans could import drugs from Canada, either individually
or collectively.
Some pursue this approach idealistically because they
reside in border states and are frustrated by visibly lower prices nearby. They
justly bemoan the burden borne by older or chronically ill patients who are
today forced to travel across the border to buy drugs at more affordable
prices.The numbers of people who buy medications from Canada is impossible to
quantify but appears substantial. One Massachusetts senior has received over 700
inquiries in the middle few months of 2001 regarding methods of ordering
medications from Canada by fax through family physicians.
One objection
to this approach is that it creates new and duplicative channels of drug
distribution, some legal and some possibly illegal. Some have raised questions
about the safety of the imported medications themselves.
The other
objection is that, were the law changed to allow wholesale importation of
medications at foreign prices, and if the volume of imports were to swell, the
drug makers would predictably adapt, as they have adapted to other types of
reform in recent years.They probably would:
-export lower volumes of
medications from U.S. factories to other nations in the first place, thereby
drying up one source of lower- priced prescription drugs;
-hold down the
volume of drugs produced at the foreign factories subject to FDA inspection,
thereby drying up the other source of lower-priced drugs; and
-try to
threaten foreign nations with higher prices if they allow medications to be
exported to the U.S.9 or simply negotiate or set terms of their sales to other
nations that prohibit re-sale of drugs abroad.
Therefore, I do not
expect importing to do enough to make medications affordable for all Americans.
Allowing easier importation of medications is an attractive idea. But it
resembles other attractive ideas of recent years-many of them implemented
through changes in legislation or medical practice-that have failed to make
medications affordable to all Americans. These ideas include patenting of
copy-cat drugs, developing formularies, promoting generic substitution, relying
on PBMs, and relying on managed care generally. All of these have attempted
either to boost competition or to reduce spending through care management or
price negotiations by fragmented buyers.
All of these ideas for winning
lower prices indirectly seemed appealing. Noneindividually or together-has
apparently slowed the rate of increase in U.S. drug spending.Consider, for
example, that generic drugs now account for about two-fifths of all U.S.
prescriptions but less than one-tenth of drug makers' revenues- indicating that
today's soaring spending is driven by soaring payments for brand name drugs.
Third, Americans could act more directly to win Canadian prescription
drug prices by importing the general methods that Canadians employ, not the
lower-priced drugs themselves. Adopting Canadian methods in the United States
does not require moving people to pills or laundering pills through the Canadian
pricing structure. It does not hitchhike on foreign regulation. Rather, it would
mean forthrightly regulating drug prices.
Simply legislating lower
prices for brand name drugs in the U.S. could work but passing such a law is
obviously difficult politically.As you know, the law that actually passed in
October of 2000 provided for re-importing drugs, but it is unlikely that this
law would actually lower prices even if it were ever implemented, for the
reasons just mentioned. We again seem to face the dilemma of "what can work
won't pass and what can pass won't work." This is demoralizing.It breeds
cynicism. We can do better.
V. REASSURING THE DRUG MAKERS BY NEGOTIATING
A PEACE TREATY
By themselves, price cuts will hurt drug makers. On the
other hand, price cuts alone will clearly aid three groups: a) many people who
are now able to afford their medications; b) the private insurors/HMOs and
public programs that help to finance medications for most of those people; and )
some people who will be able to afford medications (or more of their
medications) after the price cuts take effect. But price cuts will not help
those Americans unable to afford even the newly reduced prices.
Happily,
price cuts can be combined with other approaches to protect both patients and
drug makers. If prices are to be lowered to Canadian levels, we should at the
same time devise methods of addressing all stakeholders' legitimate interests,
including those of drug makers. And including those of all Americans who cannot
afford prescribed medications today.
Doing this requires bringing all
stakeholders, including drug makers, to the table to conduct serious
negotiations. And that requires filtering out manufacturers' bluster about free
markets and manufacturers' threats that government interventions to lower U.S.
drug prices will destroy research.
No free market sets drug makers'
prices. Free markets require many small buyers and sellers, so every actor is a
price taker, not a price maker. Free markets require an absence of artificial
restrictions on supply, demand, and price. Free markets require easy entry. And
free markets require that all parties have good evidence about price and
quality.
In the prescription drug market, patents, mergers among drug
makers, entry barriers associated with high research and marketing costs,
allegations of anti-competitive practices, patients' (and, often, physicians')
lack of good information about price and quality, and patients' inability to act
as sovereign consumers combine to mean that nothing close to a free market acts
to set drug prices."
Nor do drug makers set prices to cover costs of
research (whatever those costs really are). Drug makers today are obligated to
their stockholders to set prices to maximize profits.
If government acts
to win lower prices, "The lights go out in the labs, and there is no R&D,"
according to Tracy Baroni, senior director of policy for PhRMA.12 This is an
example of what my colleague and I call PhRMA's fog of fear.
Reasonably
careful, well-tested, and-if possible-negotiated government intervention is much
less likely to damage research than is the drug industry's own insistence on
more money for business as usual.
The drug industry is on a collision
course with financial and political realities. The industry's insistence on high
prices is frightening and angering many Americans. A few years from now, that
anger could translate into precipitous political action to gut drug prices.And
that would gravely threaten research (and profits).Worries that this might
happen could make today's drug makers the most nervous very-well -dressed people
in America.
Fortunately, government intervention to lower prices to
Canadian levels can-in combination with other reasonable steps-be designed to
protect and promote research, and even to protect drug makers' profits.
Careful U.S. action is vital to protecting and promoting research.
Unlike other nations, and unlike some U.S. states, the United States government
cannot simply cut drug prices without regard for the cuts' effects on research.
Because we buy so great a share (and an increasing share) of the world's brand
name drugs, the world's drug makers rely on the U.S. market for a
disproportionate share of their profits and the dollars they require to finance
research.
Four Elements of a Prescription Drug Peace Treaty
The
challenge is to put together the right package of policies. Here is an
inter-locking four-part method.
First, the federal government could
enact a law to lower brand name drug prices to Canadian levels. If nothing else
changed, the price cuts would deprive drug makers of $
38.4
billion in revenues from the U.S. market, as calculated earlier.
But
second, drug makers would replace much or most of this $
38.4
billion in lost revenue through the natural rise in the volume of prescriptions
filled in the private market. Lower prices allow patients to fill more of their
prescriptions and do so more often. The relation between price and volume for
prescription drugs appears to be elastic, meaning that the volume of drugs
bought by patients in a private market grows substantially when prices are
cut.'3
Third, the federal government could guarantee drug makers that
they would recoup every penny of lost revenue that was not replaced through
higher private market volume. The best vehicle for replacing that revenue would
probably be public subsidies to assist drug purchases by patients of all ages
who are unable to afford even the newly discounted prices. The subsidies would
be set to ensure replacement of all the revenue lost by drug makers that was not
recaptured through higher private market volume. This public spending would not
result in an increase in total spending on prescription drugs. Rather, it
replaces some of the drug maker revenue lost from the price cut.
Fourth,
the public subsidies would also include dollars needed to cover the actual
incremental costs of manufacturing the higher volumes of drugs. These are
relatively low, compared with current total costs.
Public subsidies
would also cover the added cost of dispensing the additional volumes of drugs in
pharmacies and elsewhere. These two items would result in increased total
spending on prescription drugs, but these are all that would be required to
extend pharmaceutical security to all Americans.No additional costs would be
incurred to pay higher profits to drug makers, because drug makers' profits as a
percentage of equity would already be preserved and protected at the high levels
antedating the peace treaty's provisions for price cuts, higher private volume,
and higher public volume.
Such a peace treaty achieves three things:
1. All Americans-not Medicare beneficiaries alone-can now afford to
obtain the prescription drugs they require.
2.Drug makers are kept
financially whole. All lost revenue is replaced, and the added cost of producing
more pills is covered. Drug makers' profits and capacity to finance research
remain intact at today's levels. This guarantee could be maintained for perhaps
five years. (It will be useful to consider whether profits should be assured as
a percentage of equity or of revenue.)
3.The actual incremental costs of
protecting all Americans are relatively low (as estimated in section VI), making
the proposal affordable. Cutting prices to Canadian levels makes it much easier
to expand coverage. Manufacturers make up for lower prices with higher volume.
In other words, the $
38.4 billion squeezed out of the drug
makers (by cutting their prices) is returned to them (because many more
prescriptions are filled)-when they serve patients who previously could not
afford needed medications.Manufacturers do forego windfall profits that they
would have garnered from higher volume in the absence of the price cuts.
This straightforward approach works most simply for the short run. It
makes today's drugs affordable for all. The arrangement could be designed to run
for perhaps five years. The main remaining questions concern how to reward drug
makers that develop new medications and how to constrain the projected explosive
growth in the cost of pharmaceuticals. These matters are taken up in section
VII.
High drug prices constitute the main logjam blocking the flow of
government reforms to win prescription drug security for all Americans. -Once
prices are lowered, it becomes possible to buy medications for all people who
need them at a price that people and payors can afford.
Vl. ESTIMATING
SHORT-RUN COSTS
Those who have sought to design a prescription drug
benefit for Medicare have experienced great frustration during the past two
years. Estimates of the cost of federal government subsidies rose from
$
118 billion for ten years in the first Clinton plan of June
1999 to $
318 billion for ten years in the Senate Democrats'
plan of June 2001.'5
Some of this is attributable to changes in benefits
and some to rising estimates of underlying drug spending and other factors. CBO
projects that drug spending by or for Medicare beneficiaries during the decade
from 2001 to 2010 will be $
1.3 trillion under current
law-without a prescription drug benefit. These projections have themselves been
rising rapidly. 's
Sadly, even at the $
318 billion
level, only about one-quarter of beneficiaries' expected baseline drug costs of
the $
1.3 trillion (that is, costs before the Medicare coverage
is introduced-costs that would surely rise in the wake of new insurance
protection) would be covered, requiring very substantial monthly Medicare
premiums and out-of-pocket payments." A plan with low premiums and low
out-of-pocket payments could cost as much as $
1 trillion over a
decade."
Some of this is attributable to most proposed legislation's
inability to limit drug prices meaningfully, resulting in huge windfall profits
for drug makers. Under most
Medicare prescription drug plans,
drug makers would sell substantially higher volumes of medications at only
slightly lower prices. Even with 25 percent or 40 percent discounts, drug
makers' incremental revenue would far exceed their incremental cost, generating
the windfall profits.
Much of this is also attributable to drug spending
projections that take as givens continued unrestricted growth in drug marketing,
continued unrestricted introduction of expensive new drugs without careful
evaluation of their incremental benefits to patients, and other costs, year
after year.
Clearly, unrestricted increases in drug spending are
unaffordable. Drug makers would like to imagine that they can marry today's high
prices in combination with tomorrow's
Medicare prescription
drug benefit that boosts volume at those high prices. But that is a
fantasy. Even without a Medicare drug benefit, restraint is inevitable-through
either private or public action.In response to high drug prices, employers are
establishing higher co-payments to try to suppress the volume of drug use. More
can be expected in the future if high prices persist.
But that flies in
the face of economic and medical realities. Economically, the marginal costs of
making more medications are typically very low, once the research is performed
and the factories are built.Medically, high prices lead to restrictions on use
that can deny many patients the medications they need.The nation would gravitate
toward a Rolls-Royce drug economy when it needs Fords and Chevy's.
To
make all of today's medications available to the patients who need them at an
affordable cost, and to promote research to develop new medications, The nation
needs two coordinated approaches, one short-run (for perhaps the next five
years) and the other longer-run.
Short-run Cost Estimates
Cutting drug prices to Canadian levels yields markedly lower estimates
of the actual short-run incremental cost of financing full prescription drug
coverage for all Americans-not only Medicare beneficiaries.
This added
cost has two components, retail dispensing costs and actual incremental
manufacturing costs.
I estimate that as many as 977 million additional
prescriptions for brand name drugs would be filled if all Americans could afford
the medications their physicians prescribed. This is a deliberately conservative
(high-side) estimate.'9 It amounts to a one-third increase over the total number
of retail prescriptions filled in 2001.2 This estimate requires considerable
refinement, but it will serve for now to permit a rough calculation of the
short-run costs of pharmaceutical security for all.
I estimate that the
added costs of manufacturing and dispensing these 977 million prescriptions
would be in the range of $
6.4 to $
11.8 billion
annually.
The lower of the two estimates assumes
-a dispensing
fee per prescription of $
3.00 and
an average
incremental manufacturing cost of $
3.51 per prescription, or
five percent of the projected average retail price for brand name drugs in 2001.
The sum of the two costs is $
6.51 per prescription.
Multiplying that by 977 million additional brand name prescriptions yields an
added total cost of $
6.4 billion annually.
The higher
of the two estimates assumes
-a dispensing fee per prescription of
$
5.00 and
-an average incremental manufacturing cost of
$
7.03 per prescription, or ten percent of the average retail
price for brand name drugs in 2001.
The sum of these two costs is
$
12.03. Multiplying that by 977 million additional brand name
prescriptions yields an added cost of $
11.8 billion annually.
This $
6.4 - $
11.8 billion range
estimates the full, total incremental cost of filling almost one billion
additional prescriptions, enough to protect all Americans in 2001. Some seven
aspects of these estimates are worth noting:
1.These are total
incremental costs above estimated 2001 spending on brand name prescription
drugs. If they are paid publicly, no additional sums for co-payments or premiums
are needed.
2.These incremental costs are a small fraction (3.9 percent
- 7.2 percent) of the $
165 billion projected to be spent on
prescription drugs in the United States in 2001. That is less than six months'
increase in total prescription drug spending- increases that have been running
around 15 percent annually.
3.These incremental costs are a fraction of
those estimated to be required to cover Medicare beneficiaries alone. Consider
the $
318 billion Medicare-only estimate for ten years that
still leaves very substantial premium and out-of-pocket costs, or the
$
1 trillion Medicare-only estimate for ten years that
eliminates premium and out-ofpocket costs that were mentioned earlier.
4.Because these are incremental prescription drug costs, they do not
include the recycling of the $
38.4 billion squeezed out of the
drug makers by applying Canadian prices for brand name drugs to the U.S. market
in 2001. That is because all of this money is returned to the drug makers
through higher private market purchases and higher publicly subsidized purchases
of medication in response to the lower prices.
5.As the
$
38.4 billion is recycled, the private share of payments for
prescription drugs will fall somewhat and the public share will rise somewhat.
That is because individuals, employers, and insurors/HMOs will enjoy most of the
benefits of the
$
34.8 billion in price reductions, but
these private parties will probably pay a smaller share of the costs of
replacing the lost revenue. (I have not yet estimated the size of these
offsetting changes.)
6.Additional costs of higher volumes of generic
drugs are excluded from these calculations. That is because pricing methods for
generics are different from those for brand name drugs. And discounts are
substantially lower.International comparisons of prices typically employ brand
name drugs only. As noted, generics today amount to only about 8.6 percent of
total U.S. prescription drug spending, even though they are over forty percent
of prescriptions. So higher spending on generics should not be substantial under
this approach. Also, lower prices for brand name drugs would reduce the price
differentials between generics and brand name drugs, probably reducing generics'
share of total prescriptions over time.
7.The estimates do not reflect
one-time costs of building pharmacies' capacity to substantially increase the
number of prescriptions dispensed annually.
Vll. PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT
OF BREAKTHROUGH DRUGS, AND CONTAINING LONG-TERM COSTS SO THAT ALL MEDICATIONS
REMAIN AFFORDABLE FOR ALL PATIENTS
In the short run, the prescription
drug peace treaty described in Section V of this testimony would make all of
today's needed medications available to all Americans at a surprisingly low
incremental cost.
Looking forward, a number of strategic interventions
must be undertaken to keep medications affordable for all Americans and for all
payors, to promote the development of new breakthrough drugs, and to generously
reward drug makers that develop those drugs.
Clearly, today's pace of
drug spending increases cannot continue; spending that doubles every five years
is unaffordable. But even reversion to the rates of increase of earlier years
could raise grave financing problems: five percent or ten percent annual
increases in drug spending would be very costly because they build on 2001's
$
165 billion base.
A. Spurring Research to Develop
Breakthrough Drugs
Several policy and financing approaches should be
considered to encourage breakthrough research. The first is to reward
breakthrough research generously. The reward for a new drug should be keyed to
the magnitude of its clinical benefit (years of life gained, disability reduced,
and pain and suffering for patient and family relieved) for the typical patient
who uses it, the number of patients who use it, the actual risks and actual
costs of research borne by the company that develops the drug, the drug's
effects on other medical and non-medical costs (costs of physician and hospital
services, costs of long-term care, and the like), and possibly other factors.
It should be recognized that drugs cannot be cleanly divided between
breakthrough or non-breakthrough drugs. Rather, they should be arrayed on a
continuum, with profits set in proportion to the benefits and costs just listed.
This activity is essential because nothing close to a genuine free
market exists to reward research.
One clear step should be to cease to
reward copy-cat research. According to DiMasi, some 40 percent of pharmaceutical
research today is imitative. 22 PhRMA claims that its members will conduct
$
23.6 billion worth of research in 2001.23If that claim is
accurate and if 40 percent goes to copy-cat research, some $
9.4
billion is probably being spent sub-optimally from the perspective of society.
Some would claim that copy-cat research is essential to generating
creating competition, and that that is essential to holding down prices. Perhaps
that is true in today's world (conceptually though not practically, since prices
have not been held down very effectively). But holding down prices by regulation
is much simpler. And $
9.4 billion is accordingly made available
to finance breakthrough research this year alone.
Others would claim
that some copy-cat drugs could have superior efficacy or fewer sideeffects. In
these cases, their developers should profit in proportion to the additional
value provided by the copy-cat medication.
In sum, one good way to
promote breakthrough research is to pay for it generously, and to refrain from
generously rewarding copy- cat research.
Another good way to promote
breakthrough research is to subsidize it publicly through the National
Institutes of Health. Such subsidies have long been very important to new drug
development, and NIH funding has been rising rapidly in recent years. Public
dollars often finance the riskiest share of the research. Drug makers should not
profit from costs and risks borne publicly, but rather from their own efforts.
In that way, effort and results are rewarded, not ability to capitalize on the
accomplishments of publicly financed research.
B. Containing Costs in
Order to Keep Medications Affordable for All
The peace treaty described
in Section V will make today's medications affordable for all. The research
promotion just described will continue to spur the development of new
breakthrough medications. The remaining challenge is to make tomorrow's
medications affordable for all.
This is probably the knottiest job. No
one tool will suffice. Although other approaches will probably be necessary as
well, I suggest starting with these three tools:
1. Cut marketing waste
PhRMA does not, apparently, estimate or report its members' marketing
costs. Instead, the drug makers cite an estimate from IMS Health that drug
makers' marketing costs were only $
13.9 billion in 1999. (This
estimate is unnaturally low, since about one-half of it is the retail value of
samples, which grossly exceeds their cost to drug makers.)The drug makers did
report that their own research spending that year was $
20.4
billion.
A more skeptical estimate puts marketing spending at
$
24 billion and research at $
10 billion. This
rests on an analysis of the allocations of drug makers' revenue published in
manufacturers' financial reports. As shown in the following exhibit, 31 percent
of drug makers' revenue went to marketing and administration, while only 11
percent went to research and development.
Exhibit How Six Drug Makers
Spent Their Money, 1999
Marketing and administration31
Research
and development11
Production32
Taxes6
Other4
Profit16
The truth may well be somewhere between the two sets of
estimates. Clearly, more accurate information and analysis is required to
resolve conflicts and inadequacies plaguing some of the currently available
data.
But one piece of evidence is clear-the drug makers' marketing
employment soared by 57 percent between 1990 and 2000, while its research
employment rose by only 10 percent, as shown in the following exhibit.
Exhibit
PhRMA Members' Marketing and Research/Development
Employment, 1990 and 2000
FOUND ON HARD COPY
In today's world,
drug marketing aims to maximize company profits. Drug makers rely on their
current marketing techniques, despite their high cost, because these techniques
pay off in higher sales. But it is far from clear that the nation's patients are
getting their money's worth. Often, new medications are being widely marketed,
advertised, and sold even though they are much costlier than older medications
they replace-and without adequate evidence that they are markedly more
effective.
This may be good for drug makers but it is not good or
affordable for patients.At some point, it will probably be necessary for the
federal government and the drug makers to negotiate simple and enforceable
limits on marketing and advertising expenditures.
2. Carefully evaluate
the efficacy of each medication and compare efficacy with cost. and disseminate
the results to physicians and patients.
If marketing becomes much less
important, how will physicians and patients learn about which drugs might be
helpful, and whether they are worth the money?
This function should
probably be performed by a research office in the National Institutes of Health
or the Food and Drug Administration, or possibly by a separate nongovernmental
non- profit research corporation. Objective evidence on efficacy should be
compiled, along with the information needed to calculate a fair return on a drug
maker's investment in a new medication. The objective evidence should be
disseminated to all physicians, along with recommendations from expert panels of
physicians and scientists regarding which medications are effective and
efficient ip treating various ailments.
We can marshal the huge sums now
badly spent on marketing, and recycle them to finance the job of collecting and
disseminating this objective evidence.
Any public agency charged with
this work must be insulated politically. It cannot be influenced by pressure
from cost- cutters to downgrade its assessment of the value of a new drug in
order to reduce public spending.That would undermine citizens' trust. We should
not substitute information from a public agency motivated to hold down spending
for information from drug makers motivated to increase spending. This
consideration might argue for relying on an independent non-profit corporation.
3. Give more careful thought to what constitutes. fair arofits for
drug-makers
As my colleague and I have noted 25 drug makers' reported
profits have been extraordinarily high since at least the 1970s. The data in the
following exhibit indicate that the prescription drug industry's return on
equity in 1999 of 35.6 percent was 2.21 times as great as the 41-industry median
of 16.1 percent. And the prescription drug industry's return on revenue of 18.6
percent was 3.58 times as great as the 41-industry median of 5.2 percent.26
Exhibit
Prescription Drug Industry Returns on Equity and Revenue
Compared with 41-Industry Median, 1999
The profits that drug makers
actually garner by manufacturing and selling prescription drugs may be
substantially higher than those they report overall. It is important to be clear
that, in making this statement, I am not in any way suggesting that any drug
maker has done anything remotely improper. Corporations report corporation-wide
financial results.
For example, my colleague and I examined Merck's
profits as a percentage of revenue (the only measure that could be calculated)
after factoring out the relatively low returns on revenue of its Medco PBM
subsidiary.
Merck reports a consolidated 1999 income before taxes of
$
8,619.5 million on revenue of $
32,714.0
million, for a before-tax return on revenue of 26.3 percent. This includes
revenue and profit on Merck's large Merck-Medco segment. But how much did Merck
make on its prescription drug business alone? 26
The answer is that
Merck garnered a 37.4 percent before-tax return on revenue on its prescription
drug business. A brief glance through Merck's annual report did not reveal this
number, though it may be there, somewhere. The 37.4 percent return on revenue is
more than two-fifths greater (42.2 percent greater) a return on revenue than the
consolidated 26.3 percent of revenue that Merck reports overall. The
calculations are shown in the exhibit that follows.
Exhibit
Merck Pharmaceutical Segment's-Revenues and Profits, CY 1997 - 1999 ($
millions)
Source, Merck & Co., Inc. 1999 Financial Report, p. 55.29
FOUND ON HARD COPY
Drug makers say they need high profits to finance
research.But profits do not finance research. The profits that they report-and
that are so far above those of other industries-are the sums left over after
they pay for research, manufacturing, marketing, advertising, administration,
taxes, and other costs.
Finally, the drug makers are not willing to
identify a ceiling on their profits or revenuesthe level of profit or revenue
beyond which no more money is needed to finance useful research. Similarly, the
drug makers are unwilling to identify any floor on their profits or revenues-the
level below which vital research would suffer. Their position is simple: more
money (for themselves) is better. That would make sense only if the drug makers
operated in a competitive free market. They do not, as discussed earlier.
For all these reasons, it will be necessary to investigate, debate, and
negotiate the level of profit required to induce drug makers to retain their
motivation to innovate and produce breakthrough drugs.
Vlll. LEARNING
FROM THE EVOLUTION OF STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICY
Examining the
evolution of states' prescription drug policy in recent decades may enlighten
future federal action. States' first phase was paying for drugs.Their second
phase is holding down prices.
All state governments began paying for
prescription drugs on a large scale through their Medicaid programs. Many others
followed with special pharmacy programs to subsidize drug purchases for citizens
who did not qualify for Medicaid, usually for seniors.
In the past few
years, many states have realized that soaring drug costs were raising the costs
of both of these activities to troubling levels.
States therefore moved
from financing to price controls Maine legislated an innovative price control
law. Vermont sought to cover more citizens under the umbrella of its Medicaid
rebate. The drug industry has challenged these efforts in the courts. If the
drug industry prevails, states will try other techniques, such as establishing
themselves as sole buyers or wholesalers of drugs within their borders, thereby
perhaps avoiding a possible Commerce Clause pre-emption of state action.
Thus far, some states have been motivated, politically, to respond to
the crisis of high drug prices because state governments feel those prices
directly and because, it appears, ordinary citizens who suffer from high drug
prices have been able to make themselves heard by some state governments.
States can act to cut drug prices without worrying about the
consequences for research. The federal government cannot do so.
The
federal government has, in one way, already acted to protect itself against high
drug prices by legislating low prices for the Veterans Administration and the
military. Unlike other nations, however, the federal government has thus far
protected mainly itself-not all citizens-against high drug costs.
High
prescription drug prices are one of the main reasons many Americans cannot
afford needed medications. High prices have spurred a number of complicated,
sometimes well-intentioned, and usually ineffective responses, ranging from PBMs
to formularies to higher co-payments to obtaining drugs from abroad.
High prices spur efforts to reduce use. But this can harm patients who
would benefit from those drugs, and it flies in the face of the low incremental
or marginal cost of those drugs.
Instead of cutting use in response to
high prices, federal action should cut prices to Canadian levels, in order to
facilitate higher use, as medically appropriate. This is best done as part of a
comprehensive prescription drug peace treaty that protects the legitimate needs
of patients, payors, and drug makers.
LOAD-DATE: September 5, 2001