Copyright 2002 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
April 23, 2002 Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 4829 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS
TESTIMONY-BY: KATHLEEN D. JAEGER, R.PH., J.D, PRESIDENT
& CEO
AFFILIATION: GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL
ASSOCIATION
BODY: Kathleen D. Jaeger, R.Ph., J.D.
President & CEO Generic Pharmaceutical Association Presentation to the
U.S. Senate Commerce Committee Hearing Before the Senate Commerce
Committee
April 23, 2002
Mr. Chairman. Members of the Committee.
My name is Kathleen Jaeger, and I recently became President and CEO of the
Generic Pharmaceutical Association. I am a pharmacist; an attorney, who
specializes in FDA-regulatory law; and a long-time consumer and industry
advocate. As a pharmacist and coming from a family-owned pharmacy background, I
understand the need consumers have for choice, and the challenge of placing
affordable medicine in their hands. On behalf of GPHA and its members, I want to
thank you for convening this hearing to discuss pharmaceutical cost and consumer
access. The GPHA represents manufacturers and distributors of finished generic
pharmaceutical products, manufacturers and distributors of bulk active
pharmaceutical chemicals, and suppliers of other goods and services to the
generic pharmaceutical industry. The GPHA membership supplies more than 90% of
all generic prescriptions, representing over one billion written and filled
prescriptions in the United States. We are a significant segment of America's
pharmaceutical manufacturers. No other industry has made, nor continues to make,
a greater contribution to affordable health care than the generic pharmaceutical
industry.
The various interests represented at this hearing share a
common concern: the need to make prescription medicines affordable to all
Americans. Indeed, the lack of affordable medicines is one of the great social
issues of our time. The generic pharmaceutical industry is uniquely positioned
to address this common concern by virtue of its ability to deliver safe,
effective prescriptions to the American public. Unfortunately, the generic
industry's ability to deliver affordable medicines is being hampered by legal
loopholes in the current law. I'm speaking, of course, of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term restoration Act of 1984, also known as Hatch-Waxman.
Since its enactment in 1984, Hatch-Waxman has served as the means by
which prescription medicines are developed and delivered to the American public.
During its legislative life, it has enabled American consumers, taxpayers,
employers and insurers to save tens of billions of dollars each year. But as
often happens with legislation, the environment in which Hatch-Waxman was
crafted has significantly changed, and unintended loopholes are being
manipulated in ways never envisioned by virtually all who were involved with the
development and passage of the Act. The pharmaceutical industry that
Hatch-Waxman was designed to address is a vastly different one today than it was
in 1984. Because of this, Hatch-Waxman (one of the single most important
consumer savings choice and legislation ever passed by Congress) needs to be
modestly updated to assure the statute's stated intent of enhancing competition
and preserving true innovation is preserved and enhanced.
The Generic
Pharmaceutical Association believes that this Congress has a unique opportunity
- given the American public's call for immediate and significant action on drug
pricing -- -- to modernize and strengthen Hatch-Waxman, close loopholes that
have reduced its effectiveness, and pass legislation that will achieve
significant savings that can make medicines more affordable for all Americans
and achieve offsets to finance a meaningful
Medicare prescription
drug benefit or other Congressional priorities.
To understand
the need and value of updating Hatch-Waxman, one must take a close look at the
pharmaceutical environment that exists today. According to the latest available
data, total health care costs reached $
1.3 trillion in 2000.
This represents a per capita health care expenditure of $
4,637.
The total prescription drug expenditure in 2000 was $
121.8
billion, or approximately $
430 per person. Of that total,
approximately $
11 billion, or $
38 per person,
was spent on generic pharmaceuticals.
Last year, 45% of all
prescriptions were filled with generic drugs. So while nearly one in every two
prescriptions was filled with a generic drug, only approximately 8% of all
dollars spent on drugs were spent on generic medicines. Brand name prescription
drugs, conversely, represented 55% of all prescriptions but consumed
approximately 92% of all drug therapy dollars spent. These numbers reveal a
stark reality: brand name prescription drugs exceed the cost of generics by
almost ten fold.
Let's look at these same statistics from another
perspective; namely, that of the patient or payer. The average price of a
prescription dispensed with a generic drug in 2000 was $
19.33.
The average price of a prescription dispensed with a brand name drug in 2000 was
$
65.29. The difference was $
45.96 per
prescription, or 238%.
Expressed another way, brand name prescription
drugs represent about 22% more prescriptions than generic drugs yet consume
almost 500% more retail sales dollars. No single generic drug achieved sales
revenue of $
1.0 billion in 2000. This compares with 19
brand-name patent-protected drugs that had annual retail sales in excess of
$
1.0 billion each.
Based on these data, it is
impossible to dispute that generic pharmaceuticals provide consumers with
substantial savings. It is equally impossible to dispute that the use of generic
prescriptions, and the introduction of generic medicines will result in even
greater savings to consumers, employers, insurers and our state and federal
government.
Despite the indisputable savings to be gleaned from
generics, brand name medicines continue to control the market. As a result, the
nation's prescription drug bill continues to show double- digit annual
increases. And consumers, employers, insurers and government agencies are
feeling the effects.
Although a majority of Americans have some form of
insurance that helps defray the direct costs of prescription medicines, for an
increasing number of consumers, the burden of rising prescription costs lands
directly on their pocketbooks. The uninsured population, which currently exceeds
40 million people and could reach 30% of the labor force by 2009 (up from 23% in
1999), is hit the hardest.
It is well documented that the high cost of
prescription medicines has a direct effect on patient usage. Look at the
statistics. A recent survey of 1,010 adults by Harris Interactive revealed some
very disturbing drug trends. Of surveyed patients, 22% did not purchase at least
one prescription issued by their doctor in the previous year because of cost.
Additionally, 14% of patients reported taking a drug in smaller doses than
prescribed and 16% reported taking their prescribed medication less frequently
than prescribed to save money. Such statistics can hardly be said to be
consistent with our society's goal of adequate health care. Clearly, cost is
central to the issue of compliance.
Major employers, such as GM, are
feeling the profound effect of escalating pharmaceutical costs, and are actively
encouraging generic drug utilization. Physicians are increasingly aware of the
impact that rising drug prices are having on their patients. The AMA has a
policy statement that "supports programs whose purpose is to contain the rising
cost of prescription drugs."
The policy specifically encourages
physicians to be aware of prescription drug prices and the availability of
generic versions of brand name drugs. Health plans such as Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, CIGNA, Well Point, Aetna, and others are engaging in more and more
programs to foster generic drug utilization.
It is time for this
Congress to join these companies and organizations in the fight against
escalating prescription costs by restoring the original balance of Hatch-Waxman.
Modernization of Hatch-Waxman is not simply the desire of the GPHA. Indeed, a
coalition of leading governors, businesses, and labor leaders has asked the
Congress to revisit Hatch-Waxman. The coalition, Business for Affordable
Medicine, believes that loopholes in the current legislative scheme are
undermining the intent of the law, and are being exploited to extend patents
through convoluted legal machinations at considerable expense to employers and
consumers/taxpayers.
Modernizing Hatch-Waxman could address the central
issues of cost and patient access to prescription medicines. Modernization also
would encourage the brand industry to refocus its resources on true product
innovation, rather than devoting those resources to legal maneuverings designed
solely to extend monopoly protection on existing products.
To understand
our ideas for modernizing and strengthening Hatch- Waxman, let's look at the
issue central to the current legislative proposal, the Schumer/McCain
(Brown/Emerson) bill: the automatic thirty month stay of ANDA approvals.
Let me start by emphatically stating that the generic pharmaceutical
industry supports patent rights, intellectual property protection, and the right
of any pharmaceutical company - brand or generic -- to recoup its investment and
make a reasonable profit for its shareholders. In fact, all publicly owned
pharmaceutical companies, without exception, have responsibilities to seek to
produce a reasonable return on the shareholders' investment. However, the key
word is "reasonable." We should not be drawn into the false argument that it is
necessary for the pharmaceutical industry to consistently and significantly top
every other industry in the nation in every measure of profits, in order to be
able to afford necessary and desirable investment to discover and develop new
pharmaceuticals. To the contrary, unreasonable market exclusivity stifles
competition, thereby removing the incentive for true innovation. Extending
monopoly protection beyond its intended bounds only removes the incentive to
develop new products. We recognize the dangers of monopolies in virtually every
other area of our economy. It is time to recognize untoward effects that brand
name "life cycle management: market exclusivity" practices are having on this
nation's health care system.
When Hatch-Waxman was created, it
recognized the delicate balance between intellectual property protection and
competition; between brand and generic business interests; and between consumer
savings and return on brand investment. The intent of Hatch- Waxman was to
protect the legitimate patent interests of the brand pharmaceutical company, but
allow for generic competition within a finite period, thereby providing
consumers with cost- efficient alternatives, driving drug developers back to the
labs to create the next new wonder drug.
The drafters of Hatch-Waxman
also recognized that not all patents are created equal. Patents are sometimes
found to be invalid, or not infringed upon by competing products. For this
reason, Hatch- Waxman established a mechanism by which generic manufacturers can
challenge patents which may improperly block competition. Under the Hatch-Waxman
system, brand companies "list" the patents with FDA that claim their drug. When
a generic manufacturer files an application with FDA, it must tell the agency
whether it is challenging any of the patents listed by the brand. If so, the
brand company is given 45 days to sue the generic for patent infringement.
Once a suit is filed, FDA is barred from approving the generic drug for
30 months, or until the litigation is resolved. The merits of the patent
infringement suit have no effect upon the affect of the stay. A completely
meritless suit enjoys the same 30-month stay as a meritorious one. Most of the
abuses that I will discuss today stem directly, or indirectly, from the "30-
month stay." Over the past several years, the brand industry has discovered the
enormous financial windfall that flows from the 30- month stay. Of all the
industries in the U.S., only the brand pharmaceutical industry is given a
special, unqualified ability to fend off competition. From a brand company's
perspective, the 30-month stay, and its consequent windfall is almost too good
to be true. As noted, the merits of the patent infringement claim are totally
irrelevant - the 30 month injunction is free - all that is required is a
lawsuit. Furthermore, if a brand company strategically manages the timing of its
patent applications, it can stack multiple 30-month stays on top of each other
and keep competition out of market indefinitely, regardless of the merits of the
patent case.
The potential for a free 30-month stay, creates an
irresistible incentive for brand companies to list more and more patents with
FDA. Many times these patents do not even claim the approved drug or its uses.
The patents are listed solely for the purpose of getting a free 30-month stay
and extending the brand company's monopoly.
It is hard to imagine that
the founders and negotiators of Hatch- Waxman would have fully anticipated the
creative ways in which the patent challenge process could be manipulated to
prevent competition. Patent protection was intended to give the brand
pharmaceutical industry 20 years of exclusivity. At the end of that date-certain
period, the patent should expire and competition should be allowed to begin.
Today, there is no such thing as date certain patent expiration, and no limit to
what can be patented to prevent generic competition. Patents are stacked one
upon the other, timed purposely to create a minefield of patent uncertainty. In
fact, since the enactment of Hatch-Waxman in 1984, the average number of patents
filed per blockbuster has increased five-fold - from 2 to an astounding 10
patents per drug.
Because my time is limited, I will provide but a few
examples. The anticonvulsant drug, Neurontin, represents one good example. By
listing patents with FDA that do not claim the marketed form of the drug or an
approved medical use, the brand manufacturer of this $
1.1
billion per year drug has been able to delay generic competition for 18 months
past the expiration of the drug's basic patent. The potential lost savings to
Americans by this delay has already amounted to approximately
$
825 million. With each new day, the public loses an additional
$ 1.5 million.
Furthermore, by strategically timing the submission of an
additional patent to FDA, the brand company effectively converted the automatic
30-month stay of generic approvals into 54 months of additional market
exclusivity. Another example of similar abuse occurred with the antidepressant
drug, Wellbutrin. Affordable generic versions of the $
113
million per year drug were effectively stalled for 5 years by the brand
company's listing of 6 unapproved medical uses of Wellbutrin. As a result,
consumers lost potential savings of approximately $
275 million.
These patents, as well as the Neurontin patents mentioned above, were unrelated
to the FDA-approved form and use of the brand-name drug. Rather, they were
listed simply to preserve exclusivity, and to reap the windfall of hundreds of
millions of dollars.
These are just a two of the many examples that
demonstrate that in the brand industry's eyes, anything can, and will be,
considered suitable for patent protection and monopoly extension.
We
seek to modernize Hatch-Waxman, to restore the original balance between
protecting innovation and promoting competition, which will provide affordable
medicines to Americans. We support the decision by this committee to hear this
issue, and to explore ways to increase consumer prescription drug savings. We
support the efforts of Senators McCain and Schumer, and others, for proposing
ideas that would close the loopholes in the Hatch- Waxman Act and accelerate
generic competition, brand innovation, and consumer savings.
Repeated
abuses of the provisions of Hatch-Waxman have prevented, and will continue to
prevent or delay, drug competition, crippling private and public insurance
budgets and needlessly burdening consumers. Specific abuses and problems
include:
- Patent Orange Book Listings. For virtually every blockbuster
drug, brand name companies continuously and strategically add new "Orange Book"
patent listings. Each new patent listing triggers a new 30-month stay,
preventing generic drugs from receiving FDA approval and from going to market.
As I mentioned earlier, if the brand name chooses to file a lawsuit, a 30-month
stay is automatic, regardless of the merits of the new patent, and results in an
automatic delay in generic approvals until the stay expires or a court resolves
the dispute. By staggering their Orange Book listings, the brand name companies
indefinitely extend their market exclusivity. In the past 18 years, the average
number of patents listed for each blockbuster has increased from 2 to about 10.
The time and cost associated with challenging and litigating these patents in
order to bring affordable products to consumers is extraordinary.
-
Blockage of generic competition by inappropriate manipulation of Hatch-Waxman
exclusivity protections. Brand name manufacturers delay generic entry by
distorting the intended purpose of the Hatch-Waxman 3-year exclusivity
provision. FDA has granted exclusivity to brand manufacturers for minor product
and labeling changes that present no therapeutic benefit over the predecessor
product. These changes are hardly the type of "innovation" that Congress
intended to reward when it enacted Hatch-Waxman, and are clearly not worth the
price that the public is paying for them.
A recent example involves
labeling changes that resulted after Bristol Myers Squibb conducted pediatric
clinical trials on Buspar (for anxiety) and Glucophage (for adult onset
diabetes). Information derived from these limited studies yielded minor labeling
changes. Bristol used the outcome of minor pediatric studies to delay generic
versions of each product. Bristol argued that FDA's pediatric labeling
regulation requires the "pediatric information" to be disclosed in drug product
labeling; yet, this data is protected by three years of exclusivity which
precludes generic firms from having that information on their product label.
The modest Buspar pediatric studies determined that "safety and
effectiveness were not established in patients 6 to 17 years of age. . . at
doses recommended for use in adults." Bristol sought: (1) six months of
pediatric exclusivity for the study, and (2) three years of exclusivity for
qualifying its negative pediatric labeling statement.
The limited
Glucophage pediatric studies (72 subjects) resulted in the development of
certain pediatric information. Bristol had received six months of exclusivity
for conducting the study. Bristol also received three years of exclusivity for
changing its labeling to include this "new" pediatric information, which in turn
yielded a second six month pediatric extension for the labeling change. By
preventing generic products from coming to the market consumers were denied
significant savings offered by affordable generic products. Bristol ultimately
lost its fight, but it's tactics delayed generic competition for six months,
creating a windfall for them on a drug with annual sales in excess of
$
1 billion a year. The cost of this 7 month delay at $ 2
million dollars a day, conservatively cost the system including the consumers at
least $
420 million.
- Brand migration to extend product
life cycles. Brand companies exploit patent and exclusivity strategies to delay
competition. These tactics provide the brand companies with the time needed to
focus on marketing efforts such as converting patients to patent protected
products that often provide little or no therapeutic advantage to consumers.
- Questionable timing and use of FDA citizen petition process. A Citizen
Petition "stops the clock" on the approval of a generic product, often for a
minimum of several months. Brand Citizen Petitions are typically filed late in
the review process and frequently raise highly questionable scientific issues
and, as a consequence, these petitions can delay market entry of legitimate high
quality generic competitors.
The Generic Pharmaceutical Association
believes that modest legislative fixes could stop abuses and restore the balance
between innovation, competition and access originally sought in the
Hatch-Waxman. Enactment of legislation could help restore the type of fair
competition that the authors of Hatch-Waxman originally intended while ensuring
that the brand pharmaceutical companies have every ability to enforce and
protect their innovations prior to the launch of competing products. Legislation
could achieve this balance through elimination of the loopholes and the
clarification of current law. Specifically any legislation solution should
consider the following:
1. Eliminate the 30-month automatic stay. The
30-month automatic stay that frequently prevents generic entry must be
eliminated in order to prevent gaming of the system. If this financial windfall
to brand industry were eliminated, patent holders would still be entitled to sue
generic companies but -- like all other industries -- they would have to obtain
a preliminary injunction from the court to stay generic drug approvals. Indeed,
eliminating the 30-month stay provision would infuse legal discipline and
accountability into the system.
Many examples demonstrate the need to
eliminate the 30-month stay. For example, the application of multiple,
successive 30- month stays of generic approval during patent litigation. As
noted, this practice is costing America consumers billions of dollars. The
original 30-month stay for the blockbuster antidepressant drug Paxil, with
annual sales of $
1.9 billion, (paroxetine HCl) expired in
November of 2000. Yet, the application of multiple 30-month stays has delayed
the availability of generic Paxil availability until at least 2003. Abuses such
as these are repeated continuously and lead to tens of millions of dollars in
excessive expenditures.
2. Remove legal barriers that undermine the
value of incentives for generic patent challengers. We support efforts to
preserve and strengthen incentives for firms that undertake extremely costly
challenges to complicated patents by ensuring that the reward, 180-day
exclusivity, is just that -- a reward that could commence with a successful
non-appealable court decision.
Prevent brand firms from hiding behind
questionable patents. One way to achieve this is to allow generic firms to
challenge patents during the review process. If successful, such challenges
would expedite consumer access to affordable medicines.
Limiting 3-year
exclusivity to only meaningful product innovations that are supported by
substantial clinical studies. Minor labeling changes, rather than true
innovations, should not be allowed to block the access by consumers, employers,
insurers and taxpayers to the substantial savings offered by generic products.
The watering down of the qualifying criteria for the 3-year market
exclusivity provision is costing American consumers billions of dollars. The
painkiller Ultram (tramadol HCl) is protected by two 3-year exclusivity periods
covering minor details of the drug's dosing regimen (i.e., one exclusivity for
increasing the dose in 25mg increments, and another for increasing at 50mg
increments). Congress never intended for such minor labeling changes to block
access to generic drugs. Yet, the Ultram exclusivity periods could cost
consumers, their employers, as well as public and private insurers at least
$
727 million dollars. Abuses such as these are repeated
continuously and lead to tens of millions of dollars in excessive expenditures.
5. Create a rolling generic drug exclusivity that will increase
incentives for more timely generic entry. The 180-day exclusivity provision now
available to the first generic challenger should become available to any other
subsequent challenger if - for whatever reason - the initial challenger does not
go to market. In addition, reform should ensure the forfeiture of the
exclusivity period for a range of other actions by the first challenger that
effectively delays market access to generics.
Some opponents of
reforming Hatch-Waxman have focused on the 180- day generic exclusivity
provision related to patent challenges, arguing that this incentive is
unnecessary. We believe that there are several reasons why this incentive should
be protected, and why some in the brand industry might want this incentive to be
abolished.
There are many examples of how the 180-day exclusivity
provision has benefited consumers. Perhaps the most visible, and recent example,
involves Eli Lilly's Prozac.. In August 2001, a generic firm successfully
concluded a patent challenge as prescribed under Hatch-Waxman, and introduced a
generic version of this blockbuster drug. The company enjoyed six months of
exclusivity. On January 29, 2002, the firm's period of exclusivity ended, and
multiple generic versions of Prozac entered the marketplace. Rapidly and
predictably, the price of Prozac dropped from approximately
$
2.70 per dose for the brand to less than 10 cents per dose for
generic versions at the wholesale level.
That challenge ultimately
opened the market to generic competition 2 1/2 years early, at a savings to U.S.
consumers of over $
2.5 billion. Those cost savings from generic
Prozac competition have benefited all Americans, and reduced costs to insurers,
employers, and government health care programs. There are a number of other
examples where the 180-day generic exclusivity provision has generated
significant savings for consumers. These include:
- Generic Zantac
entered the market over 4 years early at a conservative savings to consumers of
$ 2.45 billion dollars.
- Generic Taxol entered the market over 11 years
early at a savings to consumers of $
3.5 billion dollars.
Generic Relafen entered the market 3 years early at a savings to consumers of
$
109 million dollars.
- Generic Plantinol entered the
market over 11 years early at a savings to consumers of $
1
billion dollars.
The 180-day generic exclusivity provision works for
consumers. Clearly it provides the incentive that Congress intended for the
generic company. The only party who may be deemed a non- beneficiary is the
brand company. Removing the 180-day exclusivity provision will hurt consumers by
removing the incentive for generic companies to provide the adversarial check
and balance that the U.S. Patents and Trademark Office does not provide.
GPHA believes that these reforms will help achieve the objective of
restoring the balance to Hatch-Waxman, and revitalizing it for the 21st century.
Why is reform critical now? Twenty blockbuster drugs, with sales greater
than $
500 million, are scheduled to lose patent or market
exclusivity in the next 10 years. A total of 45 of the 100 most prescribed drugs
should face first-time generic competition within the next 5 years. Financial
analysts project that brand products accounting for more than
$
40 billion in annual sales should lose patent protection and
should be available for generic competition. This should generate consumer and
system savings in excess of 30 billion dollars. Of course, the brand industry
would like to forestall this event as long as possible. Without refining the
system, there is no guarantee that the nation's health care system and consumers
can realize these benefits.
The battle over modernization of
Hatch-Waxman must be understood in the context of the enormous savings available
to the American public through generic utilization. The brand pharmaceutical
industry would have Congress believe that the system isn't broken, so it doesn't
need fixing. The brand industry would have Congress and the American public
believes that the patent challenge provisions of Hatch-Waxman, with their180-day
generic exclusivity incentive, result in increased litigation and deserve to be
discarded. The brand pharmaceutical industry would have Congress and the public
believe that generic competition is a threat to the next cure or blockbuster
treatment.
We must consider the source of these arguments. They are made
by international and domestic corporations that recognize that billions of
dollars in sales and windfall profits are at stake because generic competition
works at lowering drug costs. We would argue that competition spurs true
innovation.
GPHA encourages Congress to embrace reforms of Hatch-Waxman
that close loopholes, encourage competition, reward true product innovation, and
provide consumers with date-certain savings on their drug costs. Our industry is
prepared to work with Congress on meaningful reform that expands the savings
offered by generic medicines. Thank you. I would be happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
LOAD-DATE: April 24,
2002