Copyright 2002 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
February 27, 2002 Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 4271 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES
HEADLINE:
NEED FOR FEDERAL
TERRORISM INSURANCE ASSISTANCE
TESTIMONY-BY: DEBORAH B. BECK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION: REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK
BODY: TESTIMONY
DEBORAH B. BECK EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK
FEBRUARY 27, 2002
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL
SERVICES UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Chairman Kelly,
Representative Gutierrez, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you on behalf of the real estate industry
to make the case for a federally sponsored
terrorism insurance
mechanism.
I am Executive Vice President of the Real Estate Board of New
York. My association represents over 5,000 of the leading owners, developers,
brokers, property managers, banks, pension funds, utilities, architects,
attorneys, and other individuals and institutions professionally involved in New
York City realty. I should add that a considerable portion of our membership
also has interests in many other regions of the United States and globally.
The lack of
terrorism insurance poses a serious risk to
our nation's economy, particularly to capital-intensive enterprises, such as
real estate and industrial production, whose strength decisively affects job
growth and consumer confidence. Lenders demand terrorism coverage as an absolute
condition for making large-scale commitments. For example, where real estate is
concerned, lenders will not give loans for new construction, purchases, or
"take-outs" on recently developed high- value buildings without such coverage.
The unavailability of
terrorism insurance prevents them from
assessing the risk and pricing the loan accordingly. As a result, investment in
real estate is faltering, which cannot help the country's efforts to emerge from
a recession.
Here are the problem's broader dimensions:
As of
January 1st, the reinsurance industry had eliminated terrorism coverage for 70%
of its customers. By July 1st, unless things change, no
insurance company in the world will have back- up reinsurance
for
terrorism coverage. Without
terrorism
reinsurance, primary
insurance companies will not take the risk
of providing
terrorism coverage for individual large properties
or those concentrated around prominent properties in urban and suburban
locations. As of now, regulators in 38 states have formally agreed to allow
their insurers to exclude terrorism coverage from commercial policies. While
some large states, such as California, have refused to allow the exclusion, the
effect of that refusal is not yet known; it may cause insurers to cut back
further on the kinds of insurance they will write in those states.
When
we look just at the value of the large office and multiple dwelling unit
buildings in major U.S. cities and consider what it would cost to rebuild them,
it becomes clear that whatever terrorism coverage is available is woefully
inadequate.
Lenders are requiring full replacement cost terrorism
coverage for these large buildings. To put the problem in perspective, according
to the national brokerage firm Cushman & Wakefield, there are 1.1 billion
square feet of central business district office space across the nation. In New
York City alone, there are 400 million square feet of office space with a
conservative replacement cost of $160 billion. If you add to this the estimated
$127 billion replacement cost of the 727,437 multiple dwelling units, you have a
total
terrorism insurance demand of close to $300 billion
dollars in New York City, without taking into account terrorism coverage for
other types of properties (e.g., universities, hospitals, places of worship,
manufacturing and warehouse properties). We are informed that the
terrorism insurance problem has already affected some major
religious institutions in New York City. We understand that the
insurance companies offering
terrorism
coverage, and there are only four of them, have an aggregate of only
approximately $10 billion available.
This clearly falls far short of
what is needed in New York City and the nation. As a consequence of this
insurance shortage, an expanding number of property owners in urban and suburban
areas, in and around airports, near railroad stations, and in major shopping and
recreational locations are unable to obtain
terrorism insurance
on high-value parcels (those worth over $50 million). This
terrorism
insurance exclusion also applies to buildings of lesser value located
near what are considered to be potential
terrorism targets.
Here are some specific examples of how various kinds of real estate
activities have been thwarted recently for want of
terrorism
insurance. While these examples underscore the problems faced today by
some larger businesses and institutions, they are also representative of the
issues faced by smaller businesses throughout the nation. To honor our pledge of
confidentiality, identifying information is omitted: Case 1. National Office
Portfolio
One of the first major real estate portfolios to go without
terrorism coverage holds in excess of 25 million square feet of office and
retail space in major cities across the country including Chicago, Minneapolis,
Denver, Boston, and New York. The coverage came up for renewal just after 9/11.
Prior to that time, the entire portfolio had blanket coverage of $1 billion. The
old carrier would not renew any policies. The new carrier excluded terrorism
coverage, and for the rest of the property coverage, charged a premium
approximately four times that for the old full coverage policy. The only bid
received for stand-alone
terrorism coverage as of the end of
January was from a small
insurance company that quoted $25
million of coverage for a fee of $1 million. When the owners offered to take
Manhattan properties out of the package to obtain terrorism coverage for the
rest, they were rebuffed. Now, the owners are technically in default on their
loan financing.
Case 2. Regional Office and Residential Property
The owners of a portfolio worth $3 billion, split between residential
rental and office property in the Mid Atlantic and New England states, reports
that they are receiving quotes for
insurance that exclude
terrorism coverage and are 5 times the amount they paid for
full coverage in 2001. This business builds for its own portfolio and borrows
against completed projects to produce capital for future buildings. The company
has 2,000 employees, many of whose jobs are at risk if the business is burdened
with excessive insurance costs and risks. Once the company's insurance expires
next month, this firm will be in technical default on its mortgage agreements
with over two dozen different lending institutions. A top-rated tenant has just
moved into their most recently completed project under a 20-year lease. Despite
the assured cash flow from this lease, as of late January, the owners could not
get a mortgage on the property because available
terrorism
insurance coverage was capped at an amount below that required by the
lender.
Case 3. Refinancing of Two New York City Office Buildings
A major investment bank agreed to refinance a $200 million mortgage on a
one million square foot, top quality high-rise office building in Lower
Manhattan that was not physically affected by the attack at the World Trade
Center. A few days prior to the loan closing, the bank abruptly withdrew, saying
its large loan committee had made a decision not to pursue such loans until
terrorism insurance becomes available at a reasonable cost. As
of late last week, lenders were expressing interest in the property but nothing
is moving forward.
A second case came to my attention, and I have tried
to understand why lenders are appearing to show interest when they will not
commit to a loan under the present circumstances. The second office building is
outside the borough of Manhattan, and is fully leased to a high credit tenant.
The contemplated refinancing is similar in size to that for the Lower Manhattan
building. While a few potential lenders are pursuing discussions, the mortgage
brokers are concerned that the deal will fail once the discussion turns to
insurance requirements. The mortgage brokers believe the lenders have deferred
insurance discussions for now because the lenders, who want to be ready to make
loans, hope that government will resolve the
terrorism
insurance issue before a firm commitment to lend must be made.
If these refinancings fail, not only will the owners suffer, but also
the brokers will go unpaid. Moreover, mortgage brokers anticipate a drop in
property values if this type of problem persists.
Case 4. Hotels
A hotel industry builder and owner firm with properties along the East
Coast and in Chicago went through the
insurance renewal process
in early January and obtained
terrorism coverage on only one
$300 million property. That coverage was for $100 million and cost $3 million,
3% of the coverage. Even with that premium, the coverage included a deductible
of $1 million and limited business interruption coverage to 30 days (after the
owners covered the first 30 days).
The added insurance costs, including
a 50% increase in workers compensation premiums, the reduction in tourism as a
result of 9/11, and the inability to finance because lenders require full
replacement "all risk" coverage, means that this builder will not do any new
construction, and more unemployment will ensue. Since the average cost of these
hotel projects is $300 million, the firm won't be able to create new jobs or add
to local and state government revenues.
Case 5. Major Midtown Manhattan
Office Sale
Inadequate terrorism coverage is holding up the sale of a
Times Square building priced at $600 million. Shareholders, rating agencies and
lenders insist on having
terrorism insurance in place before
the transaction can proceed. The prospective buyer's willingness to accept
terrorism exposure for the uninsured portion is unacceptable to
the lenders. Rates for the required
insurance for the full
purchase price are far beyond the buyer's means. Should the sale be cancelled, a
loan in excess of $300 million will not be made, costing the originating bank
fees and revenues, some of which would, inevitably, be committed to other
job-generating, tax- producing business ventures.
The details of the
coverage offered to date are telling. The buyers of the property have an
existing blanket policy for the rest of their portfolio that was renewed before
9/11. Until then, new purchases were routinely added to the blanket policy. Now,
however, this property has to be insured as a separate asset. The potential
purchasers had to put down about 5% of the purchase price as a deposit knowing
that if they could not prove due diligence in trying to obtain the "all risk"
property coverage and the deal failed, they would lose around $30 million. A
team of brokers and a consultant were put to work worldwide in an effort to
patch together the required coverage. The coverage bid so far looks like this:
The insurer holding the buyer's existing blanket policy agreed to provide a
first layer of terrorism coverage of $100 million for a fee in excess of
$500,000, equal to 1/3 the amount they are paying for their entire blanket
policy. The next insurer came in for $50 million over the first $100 million,
for a fee of $500,000. These two insurers are providing $150 million of "all
risk" coverage.
With a goal of $600 million in "all risk" coverage,
without which the deal fails, the next two insurers bid on stand-alone
terrorism insurance only. They offered to sell $150 million of
terrorism insurance in excess of the first $150 million for
$675,000.
Another insurer bid to cover the remaining $450 million of
non-
terrorism coverage for $450,000. With an
insurance bill at $2.125 million per year and rising, the buyer
still has $300 million in
terrorism insurance to go.
As
of this writing, the deal is in danger of collapsing.
Case 6. Potential
Default of a Major Mall
Just last week, a lender's representative, who
had previously notified borrowers that they must maintain
terrorism
insurance, appears to have put one of America's largest malls West of
the Mississippi in danger of default. The owners of the mall are actually
numerous institutions and smaller investors in real estate funds. The owners
have obtained a court order to restrain the lender from declaring the borrowers
in default under the mortgage. The owners are disputing the lender
representative's attempt to purchase exorbitant, but incomplete,
terrorism insurance in response to the owner being unable to
purchase its own reasonable and adequate coverage.
The lender's
representative purchased $100 million of terrorism coverage at a cost of
$750,000. This premium amount is three times greater than that for the all risk
policy excluding terrorism put in place last month. In addition to the high
cost, the owner would have a $5 million dollar deductible and would have no
coverage if the act of terrorism were due to biological, chemical or radiation
events. If the structure were to implode, as the twin towers did on 9/11, there
would also be no coverage.
This example is thought to be the first of a
series of test cases to be brought across the nation by this lender
representative. If the courts agree that the representative does not have the
right to act in this manner, it is assumed the next step will be for the
representative to put the mall owner into default. Technically, any borrower
required by the lender to carry terrorism coverage, and who cannot do so at
reasonable cost, can be declared in default. Case 7. University Research
Laboratories
A major university's insurance coverage is up for renewal.
It now appears that even if the university is able to obtain limited
terrorism insurance coverage, that coverage will not extend to
incidents involving the university's chemistry, biology, physics, and other
laboratories. As a result, teaching and research activities at the university
may have to be reconsidered, and perhaps restricted. One can only imagine the
future cost to the nation in lost scientific advances if critical research and
teaching activities do not occur.
Case 8. Construction of New
Residential Building Stopped
As of last Friday, the developer of a
proposed 30 story residential project in the Lincoln Center area of Manhattan
had been unable to finance the construction due to the absence of
terrorism insurance. This project would create 500 construction
jobs, and cost $130 million to build. Unless the
terrorism
insurance can be found, this project will not go forward.
Conclusion
I'm sure that there have been, or soon will be,
similar cases in every district represented by the members of this panel. As
these examples illustrate, there is a compelling need for some federal mechanism
to provide
terrorism insurance, at least on a temporary basis.
For all its urgency, the lack of
terrorism insurance
has remained a silent crisis. Real estate owners haven't complained publicly
because they don't want this situation to frighten the public or their tenants.
Nor do they want it to be used by investors, lenders and potential purchasers as
a justification for downgrading their asset values.
As previously noted,
the reinsurance companies that provide back- up coverage have already withdrawn
from 70 percent of the marketplace. Primary real estate insurance policies,
written to be effective for twelve-month periods, are expiring on a staggered
basis so that the full impact of the crisis is yet to be felt. Owners whose
policies will be in effect for another two or three months hope Congress will
address the problem before they must obtain terrorism coverage. Based on recent
experience, these owners should have no reason to be optimistic. The first
billion- dollar-plus realty portfolio lost its coverage in October. In the
months since October, many more owners with multi- million dollar portfolios
across the nation have told their professional associations that they have been
unable to obtain terrorism coverage. Yet the Senate has not acted.
Here
are the prospects for America's real estate industry and America's economy if
remedial steps are not taken:
1. Sales of high-value property will be
few as lenders decline to risk losing their loans and potential purchasers
refuse to insure themselves for their full equity investment.
2. Sales
prices will drop, reflecting increased risks.
3. Property assessments
will drop dramatically. In turn, localities that depend on real property tax
revenues will face harsh budgetary choices. Those governments will also sustain
losses in transfer, mortgage recording and sales tax revenues because of the
slowing realty market.
4. Owners in technical default on their existing
mortgage agreements for failing to carry terrorism coverage will have to
renegotiate these contracts, almost certainly at interest rates reflecting the
lender's higher risk. Owners will also be compelled to take larger equity
positions, limiting their capacity to do transactions.
5. As the cost of
holding property becomes greater, owners will not have funds to make needed
improvements or to invest in other properties.
6. The construction and
rehabilitation work, essential to the employment of the building trades, will
drastically diminish.
7. Lenders will provide less capital, declare
owners in default of their mortgages if they do not have
terrorism
insurance, and might begin foreclosure proceedings if owners are unable
to repay their loans. As a result, lending institutions' revenues will drop.
Only the federal government can provide a temporary back-up
terrorism insurance coverage mechanism that will answer the
economy's needs until owners and/or the
insurance marketplace
can price the risk and organize a solution. Such an initiative would not be a
bailout for the insurance industry, it would be an effective defense to protect
us, your constituents, from the economic aftershock of the September 11 th
terrorist attacks. We look to Congress to do what is necessary to protect the
nation's economic well- being.
The Lack of
Terrorism
Insurance and its impact upon Tax Revenue for New York
Prepared
by Cushman& Wakefield's Financial Services Group
February 27, 2002
Introduction
Despite the ailing economy, significant capital
remains available for the purchase of well located real estate assets in
Manhattan. This strong demand is fueled by the historically low interest rates
that are currently available for acquisition financing, and by the uncertainty
surrounding alternative investments. In fact, every major Manhattan real estate
offering since September 11 has been met with enthusiasm by the buying
community.
Unfortunately, most of these offered transactions are not
being completed due to lack of available
terrorism insurance.
Not only are investors reluctant to put their own capital at risk without this
insurance, they are unable to reap the rewards of today's low interest rates
because lending institutions are absolutely unwilling to finance an acquisition
without proper insurance in place.
Without financing, large transactions
can not be completed (except, perhaps, by pension fund buyers who may not need
financing but are bound by a fiduciary duty not to invest without proper
insurance).
The irony of the situation is that the core assets that
comprise New York's largest and most reliable real estate investments are the
assets facing the most difficulty in terms of
terrorism
insurance. Thus, the most attractive acquisitions from an investment
perspective are the most difficult to execute because of the perception that
they are more likely targets of a future attack.
The result is that the
large transactions that make up the bulk of acquisition-related tax revenues for
the City and State and the Federal Government are not being completed. In
addition, smaller transactions will be held up as well, adding to the tax
shortfall. Unless the issue of
terrorism insurance is
addressed, the negative impact on tax revenues and therefore the economy will be
severe.
Insurance Industry Reaction to September 11th
The
catastrophic events of September 11th have caused the insurance industry to
reexamine the types of coverage they provide to real estate assets.
Specifically, as of January 1st, coverage for acts of terrorism were eliminated
for 70% of policy holders. Even more shocking is that by July 1st of this year,
no
insurance company in the world will have reinsurance for
terrorism coverage.
As of the end of January,
regulators in 44 states have agreed to allow their regulated
insurance firms to exclude acts of
terrorism
from their policies. Only California refused to allow this exemption.
The lack of
insurance translates directly into the
virtual cessation of the distribution of capital for new developments or
acquisitions in major urban centers. In a time of budgetary crisis, this dearth
of activity correlates directly to a reduction in tax income for both the City
and State.
Immediate legislative activity is necessary to reverse this
fiscally devastating trend.
Historical Transaction Volume
Annual
Sales Volume:
2001 $11,561,876,295
2000 $6,695,980,671
1999 $6,155,351,939
1998 $6,011,402,000
Simple Average:
$7,606,152,726
Current Tax Rates:
NY City Transfer Tax: 2.625%
NY State Transfer Tax: 0.400%
NY City Mortgage Tax: 1.750%
NY State Mortgage Tax: 1.000%
The following chart outlines the
sales volume of major commercial office buildings in Manhattan as recorded by
Cushman & Wakefield's Financial Services Group. While C&W only tracks
transactions of $10 million or greater, these represent the assets most impacted
by the lack of
terrorism insurance. They also represent
the most significant contributors to transaction-related tax revenues for the
City and State. A simple average was calculate across four years to provide a
basis for the likely volume for 2002.
Potential City and State Revenue
Legend:
CTT: New York City Transfer Tax Revenue
STT: New
York State Transfer Tax Revenue
CMRT: New York City Mortgage Recording
Tax Revenue
SMRT: New York State Mortgage Recording Tax Revenue
CTT STT CMRT - 50% Debt* SMRT 50% Debt*
In an effort to quantify
the potential loss of tax revenue to both the City and the State, the following
chart details how much revenue was received by the City and State for each of
the prior four years from sales recorded in the C&W database. Since C&W
cannot possibly record all the taxable activity, it is safe to assume that these
figures represent the low end of the spectrum. As one can see, in a typical year
the City receives over $265 million in taxes resulting from the transfer of real
estate.
Lost Revenue on a Monthly Basis
Potential Lost Revenue
by Volume
Assuming an even dollar volume of transactions occur across 12
months, this is the potential for lost revenue after each month that a solution
to the problem is delayed:
City Running Total State Running Total FOUND
ON HARD COPY
Case Studies
The following two transactions are
examples of the plight facing the current real estate market. For each, there is
a ready and willing buyer 'at the table' but unfortunately these deals
reportedly cannot close for no other reason than the lack of available
terrorism insurance. 450 Lexington Avenue 1515 Broadway
450 Lexington Avenue is under contract for
$335,000,000 * . This
represents the following revenue should the deal close:
$8,767,500 in
City Transfer Tax
$1,336,000 in State Transfer Tax
$4,987,500 in
City Mortgage Recording Tax **
$2,850,000 in State Mortgage Recording
Tax **
1515 Broadway is under contract for
$496,000,000 * . This
represents the following revenue should the deal close:
$12,993,750 in
City Transfer Tax
$1,980,000 in State Transfer Tax
$5,642,000 in
City Mortgage Recording Tax **
$3,224,000 in State Mortgage Recording
Tax **
Conclusion
Average tax revenue received from the sales of
commercial office buildings in Manhattan:
Average Annual Total Revenue
to NY City: $266,215,345.42
Average Annual Total Revenue to NY State:
$68,455,374.54
Average Monthy NY City Revenue: $22,184,612.12
Average Monthly NY State Revenue: $5,704,614.54
While some may
argue that the notable lack of transactions for 2002 is a result of the economy,
it is our opinion that this is simply not the case. There is no shortage of
equity capital available, and financing rates are more favorable now than in the
past. As the preceding case studies demonstrated, there are buyers waiting with
capital in hand, they simply cannot execute the transaction for no other reason
than the lack of
terrorism insurance. The table below
represents the cumulative tax revenue that is at risk of being lost in New York
City in 2002 alone should this urgent issue not be addressed in a timely manner.
Disclaimer
The report and the statements contained herein are
solely the opinions of the individual authors and are not intended to be relied
on as fact and Cushman & Wakefield, Inc and the authors make no
representations or warranties, express or implied concerning the accuracy,
veracity or completeness of the statements or opinions contained herein. Cushman
& Wakefield, Inc and the authors shall not be liable in any way to the
recipient for the receipt or use of the statements or opinions contain herein.
LOAD-DATE: March 1, 2002