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Congressional Testimony
October 24, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 1604 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES
HEADLINE:
INSURANCE AND TERRORISM TESTIMONY-BY:
MARJORIE S. NORDLINGER, SENIOR ATTORNEY
AFFILIATION:
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
BODY: OCTOBER 24,
2001
STATEMENT BY MARJORIE S. NORDLINGER, SENIOR ATTORNEY OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL
TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE AND
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Chairman, I am
pleased to appear before you today as a representative of the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide you information on a unique,
nontraditional system that has evolved from Congress's initial enactment in 1957
of the "Price-Anderson Act". We hope that this information will assist the
Committee in its consideration of the important insurance issues that are before
you today. This testimony relates, of course, to the application of the
Price-Anderson Act to the nuclear power reactors regulated by the NRC. The
Price- Anderson Act addressed an unusual insurance situation which needed to be
resolved for Congress to succeed in its aim to have private sector development
of peaceful uses of atomic energy. That situation can be simply described as one
where (1) it was impossible to rule out the potential for an accident, which if
it occurred could have catastrophic liability; (2) there was little or no
experience and the possible costs of damages were uncertain; and (3) thus,
neither industry nor private insurers were able substantially to absorb the
risk. Two paramount goals governed Congress's consideration of a solution to
this predicament: that the solution would ensure the availability of adequate
funds for the public to satisfy liability claims in a catastrophic nuclear
accident and further, that it would permit private sector participation in
nuclear energy by removing the threat of potentially enormous liability in the
event of such an accident. The original solution, as enacted in 1957, was
characterized by its creation of a governmental role in providing
indemnification and limiting liability and its application to all reactors as a
further condition of licensing them. The licensing process itself provided
substantial assurance that each reactor would be designed, built and operated to
satisfy the government's high safety standards.
The original
Price-Anderson Act approach included as a first layer a requirement that each
power reactor licensee had to procure available financial protection (a
requirement which as a practical matter meant the purchase of commercial
insurance, the maximum then available being $
60 million). That
layer was then followed by indemnification by the United States itself to cover
up to $
500 million in liability over the amount covered by
required commercial insurance. Aggregate liability for any single accident was
by statute limited to the sum of the commercial insurance available and the
governmental indemnity .
The aggregate liability included the liability
of anyone who was found liable for any reactor accident, with the notable
exception of an accident resulting from an act of war. This broad coverage is
known as omnibus coverage. The statute also required a licensee to waive any
immunities under state or federal law. The omnibus nature of coverage was
designed to serve many purposes: to assure the availability of funds to
compensate for personal injury or damage to property of members of the public no
matter who caused the accident; to permit suppliers and professionals to
participate in the industry without fear of liability far out of proportion to
any profit they might expect to gain; and to make possible efficiencies in the
process of presenting, settling and satisfying claims. The mechanism for
accomplishing these goals was incorporated in insurance contracts purchased by
each reactor licensee and in required agreements of indemnification between the
reactor licensee and the United States government.
While the
Price-Anderson Act provided that liability was limited, the Report at the time
of original passage noted that if actual damages were to exceed the available
funds, i.e., the sum of commercial insurance coverage and government indemnity,
"the way was left open for Federal contributions after further congressional
consideration."
While Congress has amended the Price-Anderson Act from
time to time, it has done so cautiously so as to avoid upsetting the delicate
balance of obligations between operators of nuclear facilities and the United
States government as representative of the people. Before proceeding to discuss
what are likely the most interesting and significant changes, I would note that
Congress eliminated the requirement that non-commercial small educational and
test reactors purchase insurance, but nonetheless, continued to have the United
States indemnify each for $
500 million once the small reactor
licensee had paid out $
250,000 in liability damages.
The most significant amendments to date were those that effectively
removed the United States government from its obligation to indemnify any
reactor up to a half billion dollars and, for commercial power reactors, placed
the burden on the nuclear power industry. This was accomplished without any
substantial alteration of the other elements that characterized the
Price-Anderson scheme-- most particularly omnibus coverage and liability limited
to the availability of funding-- and with increased protections for the public.
The first step in this direction occurred in the 1975 amendments, when
Congress mandated that each large reactor, essentially each reactor providing
power commercially, contribute $
5 million to a retrospective
premium pool. This retrospective "premium" was due if and only if there were to
be damages from a nuclear incident that exceeded the maximum commercial
insurance available. The limit of liability was then $
560
million. Government indemnification was phased out in 1982 when the potential
pool and available insurance reached that sum.
In 1988, Congress
increased the potential obligation of each reactor in the event of a single
accident at any reactor to $
63 million to be adjusted for
inflation. The liability insurance available to comprise the first layer is now
$
200 million. When that insurance is exhausted each U.S.
reactor licensee must pay into the pool up to $
83.9 million, as
adjusted for inflation, if needed to cover damages in excess of the sum covered
by the first layer of insurance. The $
83.9 million is payable
in annual installments not to exceed $
10 million. Today the
first layer of commercial insurance and the second layer from the reactor pool
together would make available well over $
9 billion to cover any
personal or property harm to the public caused by an accident.
Other
features of the system as it exists today are worthy of attention without
tracing their history. As I noted, from the outset the system provided that
indemnified licensees waive immunities. An early amendment expanded the waivers
so that in serious accidents, denominated "extraordinary nuclear occurrences" by
the NRC, the defendants must also waive other defenses, including any more
stringent statute of limitations for filing claims. The waivers in sum provide a
result in the nature of strict liability where the claimants need prove only
that the accident caused their injury; proof of fault is eliminated.
Under the limited experience to date, claimants have settled with
insurance companies or filed suits in state or federal court. Those sued under
the Price Anderson Act are entitled to have the lawsuit removed to the United
States District Court where the accident occurred. Punitive damages may not be
awarded to any person on behalf of whom the United States is obligated to make
payments under an agreement of indemnification that covers the accident at
issue.
Price-Anderson Act coverage pertains to what is known as "third-
party liability". It does not cover property damage at the site of the reactor
where the accident occurred. Nor does it cover those covered by workmen's
compensation. Reactor licensees obtain commercially available insurance to cover
on-site property damage.
There are also statutory provisions covering
case management, distribution of funds, allowance for legal costs and the
preparation of reports to Congress in the event there is an expectation that
liabilities will exceed the available sums. Congress expressly provided that
proposed compensation plans should provide for full and prompt compensation (a
third layer) and contain recommendations of possible sources of those funds.
The Price-Anderson system from its origins has contained specific,
separate provisions to define coverage for Department of Energy (DOE) facilities
and contractors. While the DOE coverage does not include a retrospective premium
plan, the United States currently indemnifies DOE facilities and contractors up
to the same sum available from power reactor retrospective payments and
commercial insurance-now set at $
9. 5 billion.
Several
bills to reauthorize the Price-Anderson Act are now before Congress. Without
reauthorization, new reactors licensed after August 1, 2002 would not be covered
by the Price-Anderson Act.
We hope that this brief overview of an
intricate and complicated statutory program will assist you in achieving your
purposes. Further exposition of the process and of model agreements for
insurance and indemnification are available in the NRC regulations published at
10 CFR Part 140. We stand ready to answer any questions that you might have
about the Price-Anderson Act.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I welcome your
comments and questions.
LOAD-DATE: November 7,
2001