Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
September 26, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 7764 words
COMMITTEE:
HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES
HEADLINE:
TERRORIST IMPACT ON SECURITIES, INSURANCE INDUSTRY
TESTIMONY-BY: KATHLEEN SEBELIUS,, PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS
BODY: (CORRECTED COPY)
Testimony of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Before the Committee on Financial Services United States House of
Representatives
Regarding:
The Impact of the September 11, 2001
Terrorist Attacks on America's Insurance System
September 26, 2001
Testimony of Kathleen Sebelius, President National Association of
Insurance Commissioners
Introduction
My name is Kathleen
Sebelius. I am the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Kansas, and this
year I am serving as President of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). Speaking for myself and my fellow insurance commissioners
across America, we appreciate the opportunity to update Congress and the public
today regarding the impact upon our Nation's insurance system of the disastrous
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
The United States
Insurance System Remains Fundamentally Sound
Let me start by saying that
NAIC believes the insurance industry is well-capitalized and financially able to
withstand the pressures created by the terrorist attacks, despite monumental
losses that may exceed the $
30 billion mark. We are heartened
by the response to date of our Nation's insurers. We intend to continue working
with them closely to ensure their ongoing financial health and stability. The
United States insurance industry is a $
1 trillion business with
assets of more than $
3 trillion. Preliminary loss estimates of
$
30 billion represent just 3 percent of the premiums written in
2000. In evaluating the industry's health, we should also keep in mind that
special federal government assistance programs to help the airlines and other
businesses may substantially reduce the amount of claims owed by private
insurers. Insurance policies typically specify that direct payments from other
sources to reimburse losses will be deducted from the amounts owed by the
insurer in order to avoid dual compensation for the same loss.
America's
insurance companies have time and again shown their ability to respond to huge
disasters and successfully recover. Adjusted for inflation, Hurricane Andrew in
1992 caused $
19.7 billion in insured losses, and California's
Northridge Earthquake in 1994 cost $
16.3 billion in insured
losses. As with previous disasters, we believe insurers affected by the recent
terrorist attacks will be able to pay projected claims arising from those
events.
Insurance is the sale of a promise to pay when bad things
happen. During the past two weeks, the Nation's insurance commissioners have
been in contact with affected insurance companies to gauge their intentions
regarding payment of claims, as well as to assess their financial health.
Insurers are telling us they are committed to keeping their promises to
policyholders, and that they will pay the resulting claims as quickly as
possible.
As regulators, my colleagues and I will continue monitoring
the process to make sure that insurance promises are kept. To do our job, we are
backed by an impressive array of human and technical resources, including the
NAIC and fifty-one state insurance departments that collectively employ more
than 10,400 people and spend $
910 million annually on insurance
supervision. In addition, at this time state insurance guaranty funds have the
capacity to provide up to $
10 billion to compensate American
consumers in the event of insurer insolvencies.
Attacks Spotlight the
Special Role of Insurance as Financial Safety Net
Mr. Chairman, I want
to commend you for convening this hearing because the terrorist attacks on
September 11 th are a stark reminder that insurance is different from other
financial services products. It is involved in every aspect of our lives when we
leave home each day. Insurance products provide the necessary assurance of
financial safety that encourages Americans to accept daily risks in business,
travel, and personal activities of every sort that we have come to believe are
normal to the American way of life. Commercial insurance requirements provide
front end incentives that help businesses avoid unnecessary risks, which in turn
helps make the products and services we use everyday safer for consumers.
Because nobody knows when unexpected tragedies might rob us of life, health, or
material well-being, insurance also provides a necessary level of personal
comfort in knowing that we and our families will receive the financial backing
essential to making a recovery from tragedy.
And so, as the initial
shock of seeing the World Trade Center attacked and destroyed began to settle,
leaders in business, government, and the media immediately focused their
attention on the insurance arrangements backing the persons and commercial firms
who inhabited the area of Manhattan directly hit, as well as insurance coverage
for the airline industry and those individuals who perished in four horrifying
plane crashes. Before long, many other people across America and the world began
wondering about the impact of these immense losses upon their own lives. The
anguish of coping with what was known to be lost was soon augmented by
uncertainty and fears over what might be lost in the future.
Insurance
coverage is unique in that it is a product that most people only encounter when
they are under the stress of unhappy, often extreme circumstances. Although
insurance payments cannot fully compensate for personal and emotional losses,
they typically do offer one of the first glimmers of hope for those who face the
daunting prospects of starting life over again after disastrous losses.
State insurance regulators are keenly aware that people need assurances
they will have promised financial resources available quickly to help them began
the process of recovery. We understand the true role of insurance in America
lies as much in rebuilding faith and hope as in rebuilding or replacing offices,
homes, and property. The key to delivering on the true promise of insurance is
prompt, caring, and effective handling of policyholder claims and payments.
The first responsibility of the Nation's insurance regulators on
September 11 th and the days following was to find out what happened, determine
how it might affect American policyholders and insurers, and identify any gaps
or weaknesses in the insurance system. Our second responsibility was to take
whatever steps are necessary to assure the system is functioning smoothly and
properly, and to let government, industry, and the public know that we are there
doing our job as expected to ensure a stable, solvent insurance system. We have
met those responsibilities and done much more to respond to this emergency.
Measuring the Toll of Terrorism on America's Insurance System
The American insurance system is comprised of insurance companies that
issue policies to customers and state regulators who supervise insurer solvency
and handling of claims. Both segments of the system took a hard hit on September
11 th . I'm pleased to report that both industry and regulators seem to have
absorbed these devastating blows without harm to their basic operations.
First and foremost for regulators was the direct toll on NAIC's
Securities Valuation Office (SVO) and the New York Insurance Department offices
in New York City. SVO's offices in the 7 World Trade Center building were
totally destroyed by the fire and ensuing building collapse. Fortunately, the 44
staff members at SVO were all found to be safe, and SVO reopened for business in
temporary quarters on Monday, September 17 th . The NAIC computer systems that
support SVO operations were unaffected by destruction of the New York office. As
a result, all SVO computer records were promptly restored. Insurance companies
making paper filings with SVO are being notified to resubmit their documentation
on investment securities previously filed by not yet reviewed by SVO staff
before the office was destroyed.
Measuring the ultimate toll on the
insurance industry will take years. Insurance is a unique financial product
whose final costs depend on many variables that take time to evolve. Within days
of the disaster, various organizations tendered potential damage estimates that
ranged from $
6 billion to $
72 billion. This
vast range of possibilities shows the difficulty in estimating potential
insurance losses before businesses and individuals have an opportunity to assess
the extent of their losses. Much of lower Manhattan has remained closed to
facilitate search and rescue efforts, thus restricting the ability of insurance
claims investigators to calculate losses.
At present, the number of
people believed to be killed in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia is
approaching 7,000, with a roughly similar number of injured. As time goes on,
the number of those injured physically and mentally may rise significantly as
the full extent of the human toll becomes clearer.
The total costs to
America's insurance industry will thus be huge. Measuring those losses
accurately will be an ongoing challenge for both industry and regulators.
Measuring the Amounts of Insurance Damages
While there are still
many unknowns, there are some things that we do know about the damage that was
done to property in New York. We know the twin towers at the World Trade Center
and several other buildings are total losses. We also know there is substantial
damage to many of the buildings that surround the World Trade Center in the
financial district. We expect that some of them will be damaged so extensively
that they must be imploded. Others may be structurally sound, but will require
substantial repairs before they are habitable.
At this time, NAIC staff
calculates that the property damage losses to the World Trade Center area will
be roughly $
5.5 billion. Not all of these losses are insured.
This loss estimate does not include either contents or business interruption
losses.
Building Contents
Most of the buildings that suffered
damage in New York were designed for multiple occupancy. The wide variety of
businesses that occupied the spaces make it difficult to develop damage
estimates. However, we know most of them operated in the financial sector.
Financial sector business contents are typical of that found in other offices,
but would be expected to have extensive computer hardware and software. Our
preliminary estimate for business and personal property damaged or destroyed in
New York is between $
2 billion and $
3 billion.
Business Interruption and Extra Expense
The loss exposure for
business interruption and extra expense is generally not included in basic
property insurance policies. It is typically provided in a separate policy
contract for business owners who choose to purchase it. There are many
contractual variations that are classified as business interruption or extra
expenses coverage.
Business interruption insurance typically indemnifies
a business for loss of income during the period that is necessary to restore
property damaged by an insured peril to a condition where the business can
resume its operations. It often pays for expenses that continue and profits that
would have been earned during the period of interruption. Such policies
generally contain a provision that requires the policyholder to resume
operations as soon as possible, even on a partial basis. Some policies include
provisions for covering extra expenses that are associated with resuming
business operations sooner. To determine the amount of loss, an insurer
considers the policyholder's experience before the loss and the probable future
experience if no loss had occurred. Virtually all of these contracts have
limitations concerning the duration of coverage (12 months would be typical) and
are subject to a coinsurance provision so the policyholder shares a portion of
the loss with the insurer. This is done to minimize any incentive for the
policyholder to delay the recovery process for financial gain.
Business
interruption and extra expense exposure is unique to each business. Since there
are so many available options and no easy way to figure out what each business
has selected, this is a very difficult area for which to estimate losses
sustained in the New York disaster. There may also be some business interruption
claims in areas outside the World Trade Center and Pentagon areas. A variety of
firms have offered estimations that range from $
5 billion
(Morgan Stanley) to $
8.8 billion (Friedman, Billings, Ramsey
and Co.) We believe it is reasonable to expect that these losses will fall
somewhere within this range.
Workers' Compensation
Estimating
the possible workers' compensation losses as a result of the terrorist attacks
is one of the more straightforward exercises. Since the vast majority of
injuries and deaths are associated with the fire and collapse of the twin World
Trade Center towers and the Seven World Trade Center building, it seems safe to
assume that most of the individuals injured or killed were engaged in
work-related activities that would trigger a workers' compensation claim. It
seems further safe to assume that most of these employees are entitled to
benefits under New York law because their employer was operating in that state.
There may be some employees from other states who were visiting New York's
financial district, however for purposes of estimating overall losses, assuming
that New York benefits will be paid provides a reasonable estimate of the
overall loss exposure. Early estimates of the total workers' compensation losses
attributable to the disaster are approximately $
2.4 billion. It
should be noted that this estimate does not include any claims involving
inhalation of airborne contaminants. Those claims are impossible to estimate at
this time.
For purposes of today's report, we are assuming the
casualties and injuries suffered at the Pentagon were to federal employees who
would not be eligible for benefits under state workers' compensation laws.
Although there is a federal equivalent, those costs would be borne by United
States taxpayers rather than the insurance industry.
Life Insurance
Many Americans choose to purchase life insurance products, and employers
often provide life insurance as part of a comprehensive employee benefits
package. Using the latest figures available from New York, the Pentagon, and the
plane crash in Pennsylvania, individuals listed as either dead or missing is
approaching 7,000. It is reasonable to assume that many of them had life
insurance and are entitled to benefits under those policies. Using figures on
average wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as well as figures from the
American Council of Life Insurers on typical life insurance amounts compared to
disposable income, we estimate that life insurance claims will reach
approximately $
900 million.
To facilitate the payment
of life insurance claims when many bodies are not likely to be recovered, states
are working to implement a death certification plan similar to the one used for
victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, where a similar situation existed. In that
case, Oklahoma officials developed an Affidavit of Death that permitted a
relative of the deceased to certify the deceased person worked in the destroyed
building and would have been in contact with the relative submitting the
affidavit if the victim were alive. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have
developed such affidavits of death, and each of our states will be accepting
such proof of death to help expedite the payment of insurance benefits to the
heirs of victims.
Auto Insurance
Many cars sustained damage or
were destroyed in lower Manhattan and, possibly, near the Pentagon. Using media
reports, we estimate that 3,000 cars were damaged or destroyed. Assuming an
average value of $
30,000 in calculating our estimate, we
believe the potential cost to insurers will be around $
90
million.
General Liability
There are several types of potential
liability for negligence and other damages related to the terrorist attacks that
may be seen in the future. It is very difficult for us to estimate the types of
legal actions that will be brought or the reactions of courts and juries to the
allegations. However, we believe it is prudent to expect that such claims will
result in substantial losses for insurers. Various sources have tendered
estimates of potential liability losses, typically ranging from
$
2 billion to $
6 billion. Losses within this
range seem reasonable to anticipate. It is too early to develop reliable
predictions of the ultimate liability losses.
Aviation Insurance
The most common types of insurance for aviation risks are aircraft
liability and hull coverage. Aircraft liability coverage is very similar to auto
liability insurance, with one important difference. The bodily injury liability
is usually divided into two separate coverages: (1) bodily liability for
passengers, and (2) bodily injury liability excluding passengers. Some contracts
cover bodily injury to passengers, bodily injury excluding passengers, and
property damage liability with a single limit to cover all three exposures.
Often insurers offer what is known as "voluntary settlement coverage" in
conjunction with aircraft liability insurance. This extra coverage is written on
a per-seat basis, and provides a specified sum for loss of life or certain
debilitating injuries. The voluntary settlement coverage is offered to the heirs
of those who die in exchange for a release of liability. If the heirs refuse to
sign the liability release, the voluntary offer is withdrawn and the heirs must
bring suit against the airline to seek compensation.
We understand that
both American Airlines and United Airlines have coverage for
$
1.5 billion per event. With four aircraft events, the total
insurance coverage limits would be approximately $
6 billion.
This risk is shared by a number of large insurers. The amounts actually paid by
insurers under this coverage may be affected by provisions in the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act just passed by Congress. As
we understand it, the Act limits the liability exposure of the airlines to
claims by passengers and employees only.
The second aviation exposure is
coverage for damage or destruction of the aircraft itself. This is known as hull
coverage. Hull coverage comes in two basic forms. The broader hull insurance
provides coverage for many perils, both on the ground and in flight. The more
limited form of hull insurance covers limited in-flight damages caused by fire,
lightning and explosion, but excluding crash or collision. We believe that
American and United had the broad hull coverage. The cost to replace a Boeing
757-300 is $
89.5 million, and the cost to replace a Boeing
767-300ER is $
127.5 million. Thus, the hull insurance claims
should be settled for approximately $
434 million.
Act
of War Exclusions
Questions have been raised as to whether insurers or
reinsurers might deny coverage by asserting "act of war" exclusions that may be
included in some insurance policies. State insurance regulators are also
concerned about this issue, and will be monitoring the situation closely. Here
again, we are very pleased by the responses we have been receiving from our
domestic industry leaders who have told us companies will not invoke war
exclusions, and that they will fulfill their obligations to policyholders. So
far, we are unaware of any insurance or reinsurance company taking the position
that it will raise this exclusion as a basis to deny paying claims; however, we
will be watching non-U.S. insurers very closely on this point, particularly with
respect to the global reinsurance community.
Despite the comments made
by President Bush, who at times has referred to the September 11 th attacks as
"acts of war," courts in the United States appear to be consistent in
distinguishing between true acts of war and terrorism. The United States
generally regards terrorists as criminals, not soldiers, and therefore makes
them subject to this country's criminal laws and justice system.
State
insurance regulators will be watching closely to see if insurers try to invoke
the act of war exclusion. Most states have laws that govern the handling and
processing of claims (these are often referred to as unfair claims settlement
laws). These laws provide state regulators with authority to supervise an
insurer's claims settlement practices to assure they are fair.
Reinsurance
Like other commercial insurance, the business risks
associated with the September 11 th terrorist attacks are shared throughout the
world by way of reinsurance. In the United States, the solvency and conduct of
reinsurance companies licensed here are subject to same level of financial
regulation as the primary insurance companies that issue policies to customers.
However, regulators leave it to the managers of primary insurance companies to
arrange and maintain adequate reinsurance coverage for their companies, subject
to state supervision and solvency requirements that apply to primary insurers.
Approximately 40 percent of the reinsurance covering American insurers is placed
with reinsurers located in other countries. When supervising reinsurance
arrangements, state regulators generally strive to balance the availability of
adequate amounts of reinsurance protection for United States insurers against
the ability to recover payments from reinsurers outside the United States.
State regulators use the following approaches to supervise reinsurance
transactions:
_ Statutory accounting rules and annual statement
reporting requirements are designed to give regulators sufficient information to
maintain effective oversight and control over an insurer's reinsurance
arrangements, and
_ State Credit for Reinsurance laws and regulations
are designed to ensure that primary insurers transferring risks to other
insurers place their reinsurance protection with financially- sound reinsurers
that are under regulatory control in the United States, or, in the case of
non-U.S. reinsurers, to make sure the obligations of such reinsurers are
properly collateralized with trust accounts maintained in the United States.
In general, state regulators can supervise reinsurance by deciding
whether or not to allow a primary insurer to take credit on its financial
statements for reinsurance recoveries due from reinsurers. In order to receive
credit for these recoveries, the gross liabilities transferred to a reinsurer in
another country must be funded using United States trust funds or letters of
credit.
Additionally, an insolvency clause must be included in every
reinsurance agreement. This clause states that payments from a reinsurer must be
made in full in the event of an insolvency of the primary insurer. If an
offshore reinsurer is unable or unwilling to pay claims, the primary company has
the ability to draw down those trust funds held in the United States. In the
event of insufficient trust funds, the primary insurer could be liable for those
claims.
As a practical business matter, a reinsurer denying claims based
upon certain definitions or exclusions would be causing irreparable harm to its
reputation. Thus, a reinsurer that chooses to invoke a war or
terrorism exclusion to deny
reinsurance claims
faces the likelihood that primary insurers would bring suit or choose not to do
business with the reinsurer in the future.
State regulators receive
detailed financial statements that are put into a database and include specific
information concerning reinsurance business that has been transferred to
reinsurers. The NAIC's Reinsurance Task Force is currently analyzing the
database to:
_ Reconcile liabilities transferred to Lloyd's of London
syndicates with the syndicate's trust fund balance; and
_ Summarize the
extent of reinsurance coverage for each primary company identified as having
possible exposures to losses in the life and health lines of business in New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and in the property and casualty lines of
business in New York.
The United States Insurance Industry is
Financially Strong
The United States insurance industry is recognized by
many financial rating agencies, institutional investors and economists as one
the strongest in the global economy. The property/casualty and life/health
industries boast nearly $
3 trillion in invested assets. Much of
these investments are in marketable securities, such as government and corporate
bonds, publicly traded stocks and commercial paper, which are secure and carry a
low degree of liquidity risk. As a measure of solvency, the insurance industry
provides policyholders with a capital cushion of more than $
550
billion to absorb unexpected downturns in the financial markets and adverse loss
experience on its policies. An industry loss of $
20 to
$
30 billion represents less than 6% of this capital cushion.
In terms of premium volume, the property/casualty and life/health
industries produced over $
300 billion and $
700
billion, respectively, in the year 2000. Claims under all forms of
property/casualty policies totaled $
250 billion in 2000, while
death benefits and contractual benefits under life and health policies reached
$
540 billion. Again, an industry loss of $
20
to $
30 billion would represent only 3% of industry premiums and
less than 4% of total claims in the year 2000. By all measures of financial
strength, the insurance industry was sound prior to September 11, 2001, and will
remain so in the months and years to come.
We all recognize that the
insurance system cannot withstand multiple hits on the scale caused by this
terrible tragedy. We hope Congress will do its part to help state insurance
regulators assure that adequate financial resources will be available to back
the risks associated with terrorism in our economy as America recovers from this
crisis and looks to the future.
Monitoring and Supervising Insurer
Solvency
The state insurance regulatory system provides an extensive and
comprehensive framework for ensuring that policyholder premium dollars are
invested prudently and that insurers maintain an appropriate level of additional
capital to support those risks which are inherent in the insurance business. In
this regard, each state prescribes specific guidelines for insurers' investment
holdings and related activities. Investment requirements typically specify the
type, credit quality, and limitations of investments to ensure appropriate
diversification and preservation of principal. Additionally, the NAIC risk-based
capital formulas encourage insurers to invest in high quality issuers and in
security issues that provide for appropriate diversification and liquidity. This
is generally accomplished by requiring greater amounts of capital be held as the
default rate or liquidity risk of a security or investment increases.
As
with other financial institutions, periodic fluctuations in market interest
rates and security prices affect an insurance company's balance sheet.
Identifying and managing interest rate and investment risks, such as credit and
market risks, is a core function of any insurance company's operation. Part of
this process is keeping an eye on the equity portfolios of insurers. Insurance
companies and regulators devote considerable time and resources to manage and
regulate these risks, respectively.
Insurance company managers account
for external factors by instituting specific policies and practices to help
ensure necessary cash flows for claims payments and other benefits through
future premium in-flows, as well as interest and dividend receipts under
different economic scenarios. Larger insurance groups often employ dynamic
financial analysis and purchase derivative instruments to better manage their
investment holdings in relation to present and future liabilities. Regulators
supervise these risks through actuarial requirements, on-site examinations, and
on-going assessments of an insurer's investment policies and internal controls
as they relate to the management of asset cash in-flows relative to liability
cash out-flows. These risks are further regulated through conservative
accounting treatments and extensive disclosures. For example, insurers report
bond holdings either at amortized book value or at market value depending on the
credit rating of the issuing entity (i.e., below investment grade bonds reported
at market value).
An insurer's liabilities under policies and contracts
are also recognized on a conservative basis, by requiring that all future
liabilities be accounted for in the current period, on an undiscounted basis.
Insurers share their underwriting risk with other insurers, known as reinsurers,
to further manage the extent of severe policy losses. Under this sharing
arrangement, insurance regulators regularly scrutinize the quality of the
reinsurer involved, and often require these shared liabilities to be
collateralized through trust agreements or letters of credit issued by United
States financial institutions.
State Guaranty Funds Protect Consumers
Because the insurance industry is part of the larger United States
capital market system that encourages competition, occasional insurer failures
will occur. We must recognize the possibility that the events of September 11 th
could cause an insurer to fail. However, insurance regulators work hard to
mitigate failures by identifying insurers operating in an unsound manner as
early as possible, through on-going financial reporting, financial analysis, and
on-site financial/actuarial examinations. These procedures focus heavily on an
insurer's compliance with state investment, reinsurance, and actuarial laws and
regulations, as well as compliance with statutory accounting and reporting
requirements. In circumstances where an insurer is unable to meet its claims
obligations, the various state guaranty funds provide the necessary funds. These
funds are raised through proportional assessments against all licensed insurers
operating within a state. State guaranty funds operate on post-funded basis, as
opposed to pre-funded basis, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). When a state court declares an insurer to be insolvent, all states in
which the insurer was licensed will activate their respective guaranty funds to
make-up the capital shortfall. Based on year 2000 direct premium writings by all
insurers, and accounting for the funding requirements of existing insolvencies,
the industry presently has a guaranty fund capacity of more than
$
10 billion.
NAIC Actions in Response to the September
11 th Tragedies
Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
NAIC quickly moved to understand the magnitude of these events upon the global
insurance industry, and in particular upon those insurers that wrote a
substantial amount of business in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. On
September 13, 2001, the NAIC distributed reports to state insurance departments
detailing all insurers writing property/casualty business in the State of New
York, and life and health policies in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. In
addition to providing premium information, the NAIC reports contained
information on insurer stock holdings. The NAIC and state regulators were also
in contact with the Treasury Department, federal regulators, White House staff,
and industry leaders.
During the week of September 16, 2001, the NAIC
convened special conference calls for three of our key response groups - the
Financial Analysis Working Group, the International Insurers Department (IID)
Plan of Operation Review Group, and the Reinsurance Task Force - to begin
organizing the NAIC's efforts for monitoring the impact of the terrorist attacks
on the global insurance industry.
The Financial Analysis Working Group
monitors the financial condition of approximately 1,350 U.S. insurers and
reinsurers. The IID Plan of Operation Review Group is charged with setting
policy for qualifying non-U.S. insurers desiring to conduct business in the U.S.
surplus lines market, many of which are Lloyd's of London syndicates. The
Reinsurance Task Force is charge with monitoring all issues relating to U.S.
reinsurance transactions.
A general action plan arose from these
conference calls, which was adopted unanimously by the NAIC membership on
September 24, 2001.
The NAIC's Action Agenda
NAIC Action Plan to
Assess the Financial Impact on the U.S. Insurance and Reinsurance Industries,
International Insurers, and Reinsurers and Lloyd's of London Syndicates:
Purpose:
_ To develop a collective assessment of the financial
impact on the global insurance industry, based on first hand information from
insurers, reinsurers, and Lloyd's syndicates. The assessment will focus on the
potential impact upon the solvency of these entities.
_ To form a
consistent and comprehensive message regarding state oversight of the insurance
industry in response to the tragedy of September 11, 2001.
_ To identify
legal, financial, policyholder and claimant issues stemming from the tragedies.
_ To identify insurers that may require regulatory surveillance or
intervention.
Scope:
The scope of this project will be limited
to those insurers, reinsurers and Lloyd's syndicates with material exposure to
claims arising from the terrorist attacks. In particular, the Financial Analysis
Working Group will address roughly 50 U.S. insurance groups, comprising 275
companies, which account for a substantial part of the affected insurance
markets in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. With respect to the U.S. and
international reinsurance industries and Lloyd's syndicates, the IID Plan of
Operation (C) Review Group and the Reinsurance Task Force will jointly look at
approximately 30 global reinsurance groups, up to 35 further companies, and 90
syndicates.
Specific Activities and Current Status:
_ Identify
all insurance companies with business operations in the Wall Street
District, in particular the World Trade Center Towers and buildings 5
and 7. Assess impact on those insurers with substantial "back-office"
operations.
Status: Insurers Identified. Assessment underway.
_
Identify all life/health insurers writing business in the states of New York,
New
Jersey and Connecticut, as well as property/casualty insurers in New
York. Compute each insurer's New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut books of
business to total business. Breakdown premium writings by line of business. In
conjunction with these reports, indicate each company's exposure to further
decline in the equities market. Obtain company contact information.
Status: Completed and Distributed to All States.
_ Associate all
insurers identified with parent, affiliate and subsidiary insurers.
Status: Completed and Distributed to All States.
_ Identify
insurance groups and insurers with potentially heavy loss exposures. Status:
Based on a market share analysis, 50 insurance groups were selected. The market
shares of these groups range from 75 to 85% of total premium, depending on the
line of business involved.
_ Design a limited survey to capture
information on each insurer's net and gross estimated losses, as well as general
information on the insurer's reinsurance program, reinsurers, and anticipated
cash flow needs.
Status: Discussed on Friday, September 20, 2001,
conference call.
_ For efficiency reasons, assign each group or insurer
a "survey state" to facilitate the completion of the survey. The survey state
will be a member of the Financial Analysis Working Group, and survey results
will be shared with interested states. From the 50 groups, there are roughly 15
states with key regulatory interests. The states of Connecticut and Indiana will
be added to the Financial Analysis Working Group because of certain large
insurance groups. Collect survey responses electronically, using e-mail.
Status: Discussed on Friday, September 20, 2001, conference call.
_ IID Plan of Operation Review Group and the Reinsurance Task Force will
work jointly in assessing the impact on the global reinsurance industry,
international insurance companies, and Lloyd's syndicates.
Status: The
groups met on September 18, 2001, and discussed general reinsurance issues
stemming from the September 11 events. NAIC staff, following the plan of the
Financial Analysis Working Group, is identifying key reinsurers (companies and
syndicates) providing coverage to the top 50 groups described above. The joint
groups will also consider a survey form, including the appropriate questions and
approach for obtaining information (i.e., through foreign regulatory offices or
through direct contact with reinsurers).
_ Review the 9/30/01 SEC 10Q
filings of pre-identified publicly held groups with insurance or reinsurance
operations and report to appropriate NAIC groups. Review subsequent filings as
considered appropriate, based on the completed work of the Financial Analysis
Working Group. Monitor SEC 8K filings of such insurers, as well.
Status:
Filings due the SEC by November 15th.
Ongoing Evaluation of Insurer
Disaster Recovery Plans
State insurance regulators regularly visit
insurers to conduct financial and market conduct examinations. During these
examinations, one of the items that is reviewed is contingency planning of
insurers, including the insurer's plans to restore its operations in the event
of a disaster. In this evaluation insurance regulators typically look at a
variety of items including, but not limited to the following:
_
Evaluation of insurer data processing disaster recovery plans;
_
Assuring that the insurer keeps copies of its plan off-site;
_ Review of
the insurer's identification of mission critical data processing applications;
_ Evaluation of the insurer's off-site storage and back-up of critical
data files and applications;
_ Evaluation of telecommunications disaster
recovery plans;
_ Evaluation of whether insurer has negotiated the use
of either a hot or cold site in the event of a disaster and of contracts with
vendors that are involved in the restoration process;
_ Determination of
whether the insurer uses an uninterruptible power supply;
_
Determination of the adequacy of the insurer's periodic disaster recovery
testing;
_ Determination of whether the insurer has developed a manual
processing plan that can be used until their computer data center is restored;
and
_ Determination of whether the insurer's data center has proper fire
protection and moisture sensors.
State Insurance Department Disaster
Response Activity
State insurance departments are coordinating their
disaster response activities to handle the impact of the September 11 terrorist
attacks on America's insurance system. NAIC is assisting in this effort, which
is made easier because most state insurance laws are based upon the same NAIC
models. For example, unfair claims settlement practices laws are based on common
standards of fair and equitable treatment for insurance claimants. This approach
worked well in Florida with Hurricane Andrew. Five months after Hurricane Andrew
tore through Dade and Broward Counties, volunteers from insurance departments
throughout the country were still helping the Florida Insurance Department's
staff. Today, insurance departments in states close to New York, Virginia, and
the District of Columbia have already offered their resources and staff as
needed. The Oklahoma Insurance Department has shared relevant documents
regarding its handling of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. These documents
include issues such as limitations and exclusions in insurance policies, death
certificates, handling of claims, and the recovery service center. In addition,
personnel from other state insurance departments have volunteered to travel and
do whatever is needed to help regulators and the insurance industry get through
this crisis.
The New York Insurance Department itself has one of the
best disaster response plans, and New Yorkers are benefiting from its
implementation. The NAIC's own Emergency Response and Business Continuation
Plan, recently revamped to address Y2K concerns, has proved the value of
pre-disaster planning. The NAIC plan was put into use to coordinate the safe
evacuation, relocation, and continuation of business in its Federal &
International Relations Office in Washington and in its New York City Securities
Valuation Office (SVO), which had been located in the now- collapsed Seven World
Trade Center.
NAIC staff is working with all its members, federal
regulators, and Congress to provide information and assistance as quickly as it
becomes available. As unimaginable as these terrorists' attacks may have seemed
a few weeks ago, regulatory contingency plans and procedures were already in
place that enabled the resumption of normal operations this week.
The
NAIC's Model State Disaster Response Plan
The Disaster Response Plan
Subgroup of the Catastrophe Insurance Working Group is in the process of
updating the NAIC model State Disaster Response Plan originally developed in
1996. Its primary objectives are to improve model systems and procedures for
coordinating the immediate rescue and relocation of people and business, as well
as the assessment of catastrophic loss with insurers, state emergency management
agencies, other state agencies, FEMA, and victims' assistance organizations like
the Red Cross. The goal is to draw on the best insurance department practices in
place in states such as California, Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas where major
disasters have occurred or happen more frequently. We aim to incorporate these
concepts into an easily accessible reference guide for every state to use
whether the disaster is caused by nature or other forces.
The subgroup
and its parent Catastrophe Insurance Working Group have established working
relationships with state emergency managers, FEMA, the Institute of Business and
Home Safety, and the Western States Seismic Council, to name a few. The input of
these organizations has been most useful in revising the NAIC's plan. Their
expertise on disaster mitigation and recovery is important to insurance
regulators who, after a catastrophe, may often be the first line of
communication for policyholders having questions or problems with insurance
policies or claims. We have also met with natural hazard experts, structural
engineers, transportation managers, geographers, geologists, seismologists, and
emergency management experts.
NAIC members are looking hard at
alternative methods of funding catastrophic risk and accounting for insurer
catastrophe reserves. We are working on recommendations for a tax-deferred
catastrophe reserve plan, and studying catastrophe modeling and its impact upon
catastrophe insurance rates.
Improvements to the NAIC's model disaster
response plan include enhancing communication through technological advances in
telecommunication services. They also include streamlining the process for
emergency licensing of claims adjusters from other states, and allowing claims
adjusters to have emergency access to disaster areas to assess damage more
quickly. There are recommendations for organizing and staffing department
"command posts" and communication networks, both internally and with other state
agencies, insurers, consumers and the media. A model for establishing consumer
assistance hotlines and use of volunteer resources are also made available. A
claims mediation program modeled after the Oklahoma Insurance Department's
"Ending Arguments Gently, Legally and Effectively, (E.A.G.L.E) Program" is also
being added to the NAIC's Disaster Response Plan. The Oklahoma Department
created this program following the 1999 tornado disaster. The E.A.G.L.E. program
uses mediators trained by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to help unhappy consumers
and insurance companies work toward an agreement that puts their conflict to
rest. The goal is to get disputes resolved before they get out of control, and
before the parties have abandoned disputed issues to their respective attorneys.
It has been highly praised as an efficient mechanism for resolving claims
disputes between policyholders and companies.
The NAIC model plan, as
drafted, contains model forms and instructions for regulators to use when asking
insurers for special reports of damage estimates from catastrophes. These forms
were developed with a great deal of input from the insurance industry. This
collaborative effort has helped ensure that meaningful data will be obtained and
reported in a timely and efficient manner - without additional costs to
industry.
What Can Congress Do to Help?
There is a tendency in
the insurance industry to react to traumatic events such as the September 11 th
disasters by taking steps to limit exposure for similar events in the future.
This can occur through introducing coverage exclusions or canceling policies
most likely to cause a future loss. If that happens, it will not be good for the
American economy. We believe there are two things that Congress can do to
assist:
_ We know the insurance industry cannot withstand multiple
events of this magnitude without harm to all consumers. For this reason, we
encourage Congress to look at proposals to form a
terrorism
reinsurance pool so that risk of loss from terrorist activities can be
spread as broadly as possible.
_ Congress should maintain close
oversight of all participants - both foreign and domestic - who must work
through this tragedy together in order to make sure the chain of insurance and
reinsurance protecting American citizens does not falter or fail in meeting its
responsibilities.
Conclusion
At this time, insurance regulators
believe the insurance industry is strong, and that it stands ready to meet its
obligations to provide funds where due under the contracts it has issued. State
insurance regulators are working together to help assure that any glitches which
occur do not disrupt the process of getting people's lives back in order and
America's businesses back to work. The NAIC and its members plan to work closely
with Congress and fellow regulators, as set forth in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
so that the needs of Americans are met in a timely and compassionate way.
LOAD-DATE: September 27, 2001