Copyright 2001 Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service
October 24, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: PREPARED TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 1958 words
HEADLINE:
PREPARED TESTIMONY OF R. GLENN HUBBARD CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT - TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE
BODY: Mr. Chairman, Senator Gramm, and members of
the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the situation facing insurance markets in the aftermath of the current
terrorist threat. In a very real sense, the timing of these hearings is
significant; it is important that Congress act on the issue of terrorism, risk
insurance before the end of the year. The terrible tragedy associated with the
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington exacted an economic toll on the
United States as well as a human toll, and the Administration is working with
Congress to address both losses. Among the direct repercussions of these attacks
has been an increased appreciation of the need to focus public policy on
security, including efforts toward defending American economic activity against
terrorist intrusions. The need for security in economic activity - whether in
such visible forms as Federal Air Marshals or more mundane needs like additional
backup computer systems - raises the overall cost of transacting business. In
this sense, the attacks acted as a shock to the costs of supplying goods and
services in the economy. It is in our economic interest to contain these
transactions costs as much as possible. The attacks also raised the degree of
uncertainty in the economic environment - from the state of aggregate demand, to
the demand for particular goods and services (air travel, for example), to a
myriad of other areas. Commercial insurance lies at the intersection of these
two forces. Property and casualty insurance is one mechanism by which economies
respond efficiently to risks in the environment.
Risks are spread,
converting for each business a potential cost of unknowable size and timing into
a set of smaller, known premium payments. The events of September 11 induced a
dramatic
revision in perceived risks, In normal circumstances, increased
risks are translated into higher premiums. This serves the useful economic
function of pricing risk, leading the private sector toward those activities
where the risk is "worth it" -- there might be losses now and then, but on
average society will benefit - and away from foolhardy gambles. At the moment,
however, the entire nation is unsure of the genuine likelihood of additional
terrorist events. For insurance markets, unfortunately, the distinction between
risk not knowing when an event will happen, but having solid knowledge of the
odds of an occurrence - and genuine uncertainty about the frequency of an
insured event is the key to being able to price efficiently. Experience with our
new security environment will mitigate this difficulty over time. In the near
term, however, it would not be terribly surprising to experience disruption of
the property and casualty market. In the extreme, customers may not be able to ,
renew policies until the market resolves pricing difficulties. That is,
reinsurers may no longer cover acts of
terrorism in their
reinsurance contracts with primary insurers. An interruption of
coverage is a particular, and extreme, version of an increase in transactions
costs as a result of terrorist-associated risks. Still, there is the possibility
that existing lines of coverage will be renewed only with quite substantial
increases in premiums. I believe we are all now familiar with the difficulties
facing aviation; disproportionate rises in insurance coverage or, in the
extreme, withdrawal of insurance coverage, would hinder transition to a new
operating environment. This phenomenon is more widespread, however. Lenders
usually require businesses to insure any property they use to secure loans. The
terms of terrorism coverage could diminish bank lending for new construction
projects. It could as well act as a sharp impediment to transactions that permit
existing commercial properties skyscrapers, pipelines, power plants, and so
forth - to change hands. It is important to point out that this "changing hands"
is an important economic function. The relative efficiency with which our
economy reallocates capital from less productive to more productive uses sets it
apart from many other nations. In short, a well-functioning insurance.market is
part of the financial infrastructure that underpins our economy. The
Administration and Congress worked together to restore the institutional
underpinnings of the financial markets in the week after September 11. In the
same way, the Administration looks forward to working with the Congress to
bolster the capacity of private insurance markets to provide the risk-sharing
services that benefit commerce and consumers.
Principles for Government
Involvement
To this end, the Administration believes that any federal
intervention in the insurance market should adhere to four key principles:
1. Intervention should encourage, not discourage, private market
incentives to expand its capacity to absorb and diversify risk.
2.
Intervention should be temporary, permitting us to review in the future the
ability of the insurance industry to price these risks and absorb losses.
3. Private market actors should face appropriate price incentives to
encourage efforts to minimize the probability of a terrorist event and to limit
losses should such an event occur.
4. Private sector uncertainty about
liabilities that arise from litigation should be reduced.
Importantly,
these principles do not imply an objective of providing government assistance to
the property and casualty insurance industry; rather, the principles address
implementation of the objective of mitigating short-run cost increases for
insurance. The Administration's approach to Terrorism Insurance adheres to each
of these four principles. In order to see this, please allow me to first explain
the basic outlines of how this approach would work.
The Administration
Proposal
After reviewing several options and discussing terrorism risk
insurance with industry lenders, insurance regulators, and academics, the
Administration developed an approach, one with which we look forward to working
with Congress. Upon enactment of this legislation, if the United States were the
victim of a terrorist attack before the end of 2002, the federal government
would pay for 80 percent of the first $
20 billion of insured
losses, and 90 percent of insured losses in excess of this amount. The private
insurance industry would pay for the remaining insured losses.
In the
year 2003, the industry would be responsible for the first $
10
billion in insured losses, and 50 percent of insured losses between
$
10 billion and $
20 billion. Above
$
20 billion, the federal government would continue to pay 90
percent of all losses.
In the year 2004, the third and final year of
this program, the industry would be responsible for 100 percent of the first
$
20 billion in losses, and 50 percent of insured losses between
$
20 billion and $
40 billion. Above
$
40 billion, the federal government would continue to pay 90
percent of all losses.
In the event that total insured losses exceed
$
100 billion in any calendar year, Congress would determine the
procedures for and source of any such payments.
In addition to this
insurance component, the Administration approach would also consolidate all
claims arising from a terrorist incident in a single federal forum. In addition,
it would prohibit claims for punitive damages (other than those directed at the
perpetrators), and require that non-economic damages be proportional to a
defendant's responsibility (for economic losses, ordinary rules of joint and
several liability would apply).
This approach is designed to mitigate
economic consequences from sudden increases in the cost of terrorism insurance
over the next year. The imposition of a deductible (in the second year) and a
subsequent increase in the deductible (in the third year) permits the federal
government to recede gradually from the market as the insurance industry adapts
to measuring and pricing terrorism risk.
Consistency of Approach with
Principles
This proposal is consistent with the Administration
principles outlined above.
This proposal encourages private sector
capacity building in several ways. First, it is forward-looking. It respects the
insurance industry's proven ability to develop the capacity to price, market,
and service products for new types of risks. In the past, naysayers deemed
reinsurance against the risks of natural catastrophes such as hurricanes as
beyond the reach of private insurance markets. Experience has proven them wrong.
By providing a temporary bridge of three years, a steadily receding Federal
presence, and an explicit sunset, we will permit the industry to grow into this
new market.
Second, the Administration's proposal recognizes that a
limitation facing the insurance and reinsurance industry is its total capacity
to absorb risk. For this reason, we provide the economic function of limiting
its maximum exposure in order to provide a backstop against catastrophic losses,
which could generate large increases in transactions costs for businesses and,
ultimately, for consumers.
Third, because the industry shares in the
losses - up to a maximum loss - and the.share it shoulders rises over time,
there will be a profit motive for insurance companies - and actuaries and
economists - to begin now to refine pricing models. As I noted earlier, there
are economic benefits to the efficient pricing of risks. While no covered
individual company can control whether terrorists strike, efficient pricing can
lead every covered company to take actions lessen the damage that results from
terrorist incidents. After the approach sunsets, the industry will have made
progress toward efficient pricing of risks, At that time, issues of pricing and
the industry's capacity to absorb losses can be revisited.
In addition,
having the industry participate will control costs after any event. If the
government agrees to pick up 100 percent of all claims, the insurance industry
has no incentive to do careful claims adjustments.
The potential losses
facing insurers depend not only upon the security and economic environment, but
on the legal setting as well. That is why the Administration approach would also
include certain legal procedures designed to manage mass tort cases arising out
of terrorism incidents. These procedures will bring damage claims closer to
their economic foundation and reduce the uncertainty about the magnitude of
potential claims. The consolidation of claims in a single federal forum, for
example, helps to ensure that the claims will be treated in a consistent manner
and eliminates the redundancy costs of litigating similar claims in multiple
courts. In addition, consolidation tends to expedite the claims process,
reducing the uncertainty about the length of the litigation. Limitations on
punitive damages (other than those directed at perpetrators or abettors) and
proportional liability for non-economic harms (except those caused by
perpetrators or abettors) reduces the potential for open-ended claims that would
exhaust the defendants' resources in mass tort cases. Such reforms are essential
for economically enhancing the efficiency of the insurance market by increasing
the ability of the insurance industry to price and absorb the risks associated
with terrorism.
Conclusion
To conclude, the U.S. economy is very
resilient, and, through the combined efforts of the Administration and Congress
it is possible to provide transitional public policy to support the needs of
purchasers of property and casualty insurance. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman,
for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer your
questions.
END
LOAD-DATE: October 31, 2001