Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
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Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
October 30, 2001, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 4603 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: TERRORISM RISK
TESTIMONY-BY: DAVID L. KEATING, SENIOR COUNSELOR
AFFILIATION: NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION
BODY: Statement of
David L. Keating Senior
Counselor National Taxpayers Union
on Proposals for Terror Reinsurance
before the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation U.S. Senate
October 30, 2001
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to present our views on proposals for terror
reinsurance. The 335,000-member National Taxpayers Union strongly opposes the
proposals offered by the insurance industry and the Administration, both of
which would violate key principles of sound insurance policymaking. These flaws
would put lives and property in danger and expose taxpayers to unnecessary
losses.
Congress should move cautiously as precedents may be created for
Congressional responses to other large losses and major insurance industry
difficulties.
Unless insurance companies have to pay--and pay a lot--for
Federal reinsurance, they will compete by giving the coverage away to clients.
This creates moral and security hazards. Second- -and this is very
important--they will have no incentive to underwrite individual risks with any
caution, to avoid concentration risks or to help their clients reduce their
risks. They will assume more risk for the government than they ever would have
if their own money were at risk. It is essential to limit the government's total
liabilities, set firm limits per policy, clearly define terrorism and limit the
government's exposure to certain types of loss (e.g., business interruption).
Otherwise, we could be paying companies not to be going back to work for years.
Of course, the insurers should have to pay enough of the claims, a minimum of 20
percent in the first year, to carefully monitor claims administration.
Too often legislation is passed as a quick response to a problem without
addressing fundamental flaws in public policy. During our work over the last six
years studying proposed legislation and public policy regarding natural
disasters, we have found that a number of Federal and state laws and regulations
greatly hamper the ability of the private sector to provide insurance for
catastrophes.
Perhaps the most important impediment to affordable
insurance against manmade or natural catastrophes is the Federal tax law, which
contains a huge implicit tax penalty on businesses and homeowners who attempt to
purchase such insurance. These same laws prevent insurance companies from
deducting an amount equal to the risk of catastrophic natural disasters or
terror attacks; amounts that we consider legitimate business expenses. We hope
this problem will be corrected and urge the Committee to use the Policyholder
Disaster Protection Act (HR 785), by Representatives Foley and Matsui, as a
starting point.
It is not clear to us whether a Federal terror
reinsurance program is needed at this time. Certainly it is completely
unacceptable to enact a program that would increase risks to lives, property and
federal finances.
Insurers are not claiming they are in trouble, only
that the market may fail to respond to higher pricing with more capacity. That's
dubious at best and there's a good case to be made that we ought to wait and see
what happens in the market. Even if terrorism is excluded from some policies,
life and business will certainly go on.
Since the Sept. 11 attacks,
property and casualty insurers' stocks have significantly outperformed the
S&P 500, and the stocks are up, not down. Insurance stocks' performance
shows a great deal about market experts' view of the industry's future
claims-paying ability, future risk, and the opportunities associated with
expected higher pricing. It also shows--along with the new company
announcements--that the capital markets have in no way restricted the industry's
ability to raise capital and take on additional risk.
If Congress enacts
such a reinsurance program, we strongly urge you to be guided by the following
principles.
1. Any Federal capacity should offer the maximum amount of
economic benefit to the nation as well as injured parties at the lowest possible
cost to the taxpayer.
2.Legislation must not erode strong incentives for
wise underwriting and insurance company management of risks (e.g., proper
security and escape contingency plans). If no reinsurance is available, then the
insurance industry will continue to cover claims until their current policies
expire or a time the current policy allows for modification of the coverage.
Until then, the insurance companies have an extremely high incentive to help
their clients take sensible steps to reduce their risk of terrorism loss.
Likewise, if a business finds it cannot insure for terror risks when its policy
expires, it too will take much more vigilant steps to secure its property,
customers and employees. A blank federal reinsurance check would eliminate a
very important incentive to increase security.
3. If Federal reinsurance
capacity is offered then there should be payment for the use of that capital and
assumption of risk. Any plan that fails to collect premiums is a giveaway that
will increase losses from any future attacks since it would undermine insurer
incentives to boost security and create effective disaster control and reaction
plans. It would be irresponsible to discourage effective safeguards that can
reduce the number of lives and amount of property that could be lost from a
terror attack. While no one knows how to price this risk since the market is not
offering it now, the government should attempt to price it at a level that would
likely be charged by the private sector after it emerges from this market
disruption. The Treasury should use very conservative assumptions in pricing for
that risk so that the private sector can retake this market as soon as possible.
4.Federal coverage should certainly not insure against all industry
terror losses. Coverage of the first dollar of losses is both unnecessary and
unwise because this too will erode incentives to increase security. Lower levels
of financial risk should remain in the private sector, which will attempt to
price the insurance for the limited risk. Those price signals will provide
important pricing information to the government for the use of its capacity. If
the government provides coverage, we strongly recommend restricting coverage to
property loss and workers' compensation only. If insureds also want business
interruption coverage, they can go to the private sector for supplemental
coverage.
5. Federal reinsurance capacity should be temporary, maximize
the use of market mechanisms and encourage the reentry of private reinsurance at
higher levels at the earliest possible date. We must rigorously avoid any
establishment of a permanent entity. Insurance is available for many other large
and highly uncertain risks and terror insurance will be more efficiently
administered and priced by the private sector in the long run. It is too easy to
make a mistake in haste, which could prove impossible politically to fix later.
6.Legislation must contain strong incentives to pay only valid claims.
The Federal government's co-payment of claims should never exceed 80 percent,
and 70 percent or less would be preferable. It is easy for insurance companies
to keep customers happy if they have little or no financial incentive to monitor
claims for fraud and overpayments.
7. The federal government's exposure
must be capped to preserve America's national security options. The Federal
government must not insure against unlimited terror or war risks. In the event
of a war or a terror attack with weapons of mass destruction, the losses would
be far more serious than those experienced in the September 11'h attacks. The
government needs to limit its liability so that it can preserve the fiscal
flexibility needed to fight a war.
8.Incentives should be created to get
the federal government out of this business and reduce its role to covering a
higher layer of loss as early as possible.
9.A mediation panel is needed
to quickly pay and settle claims for terror losses in a fair and inexpensive
way. However undesirable it may be to spend taxpayer monies on terrorism losses
of property, it will be completely unacceptable to pay large amounts to the
trial bar in the aftermath of an event, and further slow the process of getting
funds into the hands of rightful recipients. Any non-productive activity such as
litigation, which slows the process of pricing the event, will lead to more
uncertainty in repricing insurance for future events and will add to the
ultimate cost of such events. Such a variation was included in the airline
industry bailout. If people do not wish to waive their rights to sue, then they
should purchase their own terrorism coverage, unsubsidized by the government.
10. Legislation should contain a clear definition of what is a terror
loss, and all other losses should be excluded from coverage. The formulation of
coverage will need to be quite specific or there will be lots of opportunities
for financial mischief at taxpayers' expense. This definition would then need to
be met on any private industry claim payment, prior to allowing either the
customer or the insurance company to present the balance of the claim to the
government. If this definition is not clear or not rigorously applied, there
will be endless disputes. We strongly believe that any program should be limited
to property coverage, where losses are easier to verify.
11. Federal law
should override any state terror insurance regulations until the Federal
capacity has disappeared.
The Administration Proposal
The
proposal is a public-private sector program. In 2002, the government would
absorb 80 percent of the first $
20 billion of insured losses
resulting from terrorism, and 90 percent of insured losses above
$
20 billion.
In 2003, the private sector would handle
the first $
10 billion of loss. Losses between
$
10 billion and $
20 billion would be shared,
with the government paying 50 percent and the private sector paying 50 percent.
After losses exceed $
20 billion, the government would cover 90
percent of losses, and the private sector would cover 10 percent.
In
2004, the private sector would cover the first $
20 billion in
losses. Between $
20 billion and $
40 billion of
losses, the government and private sector would each cover 50 percent of the
losses. At above $
40 billion in losses, the government would
pay 90 percent of losses.
Overall liability would be capped at
$
100 billion.
The Administration plan has some sensible
provisions. We support the provisions that cap Federal liability, provide for
cost sharing (though the shares are too high for the government) and eliminate
the program after three years.
Still there are many serious problems
with the Administration proposal.
1.If Federal reinsurance capacity is
offered, then there should be payment for the use of that capital and assumption
of risk. Any plan that fails to collect premiums is a giveaway that will
increase losses from any future attacks since it would undermine insurer
incentives to boost security and create effective disaster control and reaction
plans.
2.Federal coverage should certainly not insure against all
industry terror losses. Coverage of the first dollar of losses is both
unnecessary and unwise because this too will erode incentives to increase
security and monitor claims for fraud and overpayments. Coverage of the first
dollar of losses for all insurance companies would also lead to an unnecessary
increase in Federal bureaucracy, costs, and insurance waste. It is hard to find
any consumer or business insurance policies that do not have some form of a
deductible, and Federal terror reinsurance shouldn't eliminate this sound
principle of insurance.
3. Legislation must contain strong incentives to
pay only valid claims. The Federal government's co-payment of claims should
never exceed 80 percent. The co-payment by the insurance companies must be
substantial in order to guard against excessive claims payments.
4. The
plan should clearly define coverage, and should not cover risks that are harder
to verify such as business interruption and liability insurance.
We
should note that the "industry" doesn't insure anything; individual companies
do, and these companies vary considerably in their capabilities and capacity. It
isn't apparent how the Administration's plan would distribute the losses around
the industry. Individual companies write individual risks that will incur
discreet losses (some of which might be covered, some not under normal policy
conditions), then claim payments are made as negotiated with each individual
client. Risks and losses are not distributed proportionately around the market,
as will be seen when the cost of September 11 is tallied.
The New York
Times reported Oct. 22 that Berkshire Hathaway chief executive Warren Buffett
said, "I think there is nothing wrong with having the industry lose a lot of
money if something like [a terror attack] happens. We just have to keep it
within the ability of the industry to pay. The industry can pay for a
$
10 billion loss. It can't price for a $
500
billion loss."
Lower levels of exposure should remain in the private
sector, which will price the insurance for the limited exposures. Those price
signals will provide important pricing information to the government for its
reinsurance capacity.
Improving the Administration Proposal
The
Administration proposal can be greatly improved with some key modifications.
Clearly, the Federal government must charge for its reinsurance capacity and the
coverage should kick in at higher levels.
In addition to the provisions
contained in the Administration plan, these key provisions are needed:
1. Each individual company should have a retention amount (or
deductible) for terror claims.
2. We recommend making the payment for
the Federal reinsurance equal to one percent of each company's insured volume
less the retention amount.
3. The reinsurance would pay 80 percent of
all claims over the retention amount in the first year, and diminishing amounts
in the second and third years.
4.To help build capacity in the private
sector, the tax penalty against reserving for terror risks would be repealed for
all insurance companies. This provision could be drafted by using the
Policyholder Disaster Protection Act (HR 785), by Representatives Foley and
Matsui, as a starting point. The phase-in provisions in this bill should be
deleted.
5. The coverage should be clearly defined to cover only actual
commercial property losses and workers' compensation.
6.A mediation
panel is needed to quickly pay and settle claims for terror losses in a fair and
inexpensive way.
While it may seem like a good idea for the Federal
government to stay out of pricing, we must not lose sight of the fact that the
Federal government is offering $
88 billion in reserves against
terror losses. It should certainly charge some reasonable amount for that risk.
If the insurance companies are covering only 12 percent of losses, then
they should be receiving, on average, 12 percent of the associated premium.
Since there is no traditional way to estimate or annualize losses, there
probably should be a nominal "load" established to be added to every dollar of
non-terrorism premium.
We strongly recommend that the first year of the
program also require that the private sector cover at least the first
$
10 billion of losses. After that amount the government should
cover no more than 80 percent of additional losses.
In 2003, the private
sector should cover the first $
15 billion of losses. Between
$
15 billion and $
25 billion, the private
sector should cover 50 percent of losses, and between $
25
billion and $
100 billion, the government would cover 70 percent
of additional losses.
In 2004, the private sector should cover the first
$
25 billion of losses. Between $
25 billion and
$
100 billion, the private sector should cover 50 percent of
losses.
A Plan for a Public and Private Terrorism Facflity. with
Increasing Share Being Owned by The Private Sector at Higher Levels of Capacity
All of the proposed Federal
terrorism reinsurance plans
offered to date violate key principles of sound
insurance
policymaking. These flaws would put lives and property in danger and expose
taxpayers to unnecessary losses.
If Congress concludes it must do
something to provide capacity and maintain
insurance for terror
risks, there is a better way to set up a
terrorism facility.
Our suggestion is an approach that would involve the industry financially and
operationally while creating incentives to properly price and manage risks. The
strength of this proposal is that it creates extremely powerful incentives for
the facility to operate efficiently, minimize risks to lives and property and
carefully pay claims.
Equally important, the industry and government
have immensely powerful financial incentives to disband the facility after three
years. A wonderful bonus of the dissolution would be a huge improvement in the
capacity of the industry to pay for manmade or natural mega-catastrophes.
This facility allows the Federal backstop to constantly move up, farther
from the risk as time goes on, with the Federal backstop eventually being
eliminated entirely as a result of accumulating funds in the facility.
This facility was designed to last for three years, but could easily
work for just one year or two years.
We welcome comments and suggested
improvements to this proposal.
1. Each company would invest capital to
prime the facility, with an initial investment of 2 percent of the previous
year's annualized premium charges. This would give the facility about
$
6 billion of capital at its launch, and would serve to start
the operation with no outlay of Federal funds.
2.The total capacity and
liability of the facility would equal $
100 billion, with the
Federal Government providing the difference between the facility's capital and
total liability. For example, after one year (if no losses occurred and ignoring
investment income) the facility would have $
36 billion, with
Federal backstop loan availability of $
64 billion.
3.
If a Federal backstop loan is triggered, the Government would be repaid over a
20-year period at the then-prevailing interest rate for 20-year borrowings by an
S&P rated AA financial institution.
4. The facility would be
permitted to build reserves for terror risks on a tax-deferred basis.
5.
The facility would cover only real and personal property loss and workers'
compensation arising from a formally declared event and only for those losses
defined in the facility's charter.
6. Each company would have a
retention equal to 20 percent of its written premium as a self-insured loss, to
be funded by it from its general revenue and investments. Individual companies
would be free to reinsure this amount commercially if possible.
7. After
the individual company retention, the facility would pay 80 percent of remaining
losses, which would be pro-rated if total losses exceed $
100
billion per year.
8. Terror losses eligible to be paid by the facility
and the Federal government would be specifically declared and certified by the
Secretary of the Treasury, and claims would be paid to/through individual
companies after they had presented evidence of payment of their 20 percent share
of any declared loss.
9. Quarterly, each company would collect from its
customers and remit an amount equal to 10 percent of their gross written premium
collections to the facility. These additional premiums would carry no agent or
broker commissions and the insurers would make no administrative charge for
collecting and remitting these funds. The premiums so collected would be
specifically designated as funding the national terrorism facility, and insurers
would be expressly and legally prohibited from charging customers any other
premiums related to the coverage provided by the national facility. Absent any
major loss after one year, this facility would have accumulated about
$
30 billion in added capital plus investment earnings of
approximately $
750 million. Investments could be limited to US
government obligations. If no losses occurred, the facility would have private
funding of $
100 billion in less than 3.3 years.
10. To
allow for coordination between companies to participate in the facility and to
coordinate with each other to manage the terror risk, participating companies
and the facility itself would receive an exemption from anti-trust laws as
applicable to these specific activities.
11. State regulations regarding
rates and coverages for terror risk would be preempted until the Federal
backstop capacity is no longer in place.
12. Senior management's
compensation would include a substantial bonus if Federal risk is reduced and
other management goals are met. The management goals would include (other
suggestions welcomed):
-Minimizing Federal exposure through securitizing
risk through issuing catastrophe bonds or buying reinsurance.
-Efficient
operations.
-Timely payment of claims.
-Accurate and fair claims
administration.
13. To avoid any potential conflicts of interest, a
Supervisory Board would be composed of the Treasury and industry officials with
consumer and taxpayer representatives. The chairman and majority control of the
Board would remain with Treasury officials until the industry has contributed
$
75 billion in capital and the facility had accumulated that
much capital. At that time, the chairmanship and control of the board would
switch to industry representatives.
14. The facility must at all times
maintain an independent risk management function for controlling risk
assessment, risk management, pricing, money management and claims assessments.
It would report to management and the Board.
15. A mediation panel would
quickly resolve any disputed claims for terror losses in a fair and inexpensive
way. This would ensure that victims would receive quick payment of disputed
claims and minimize non-productive litigation. Quick and fair resolution will
lead to more certainty in pricing insurance for future events and will therefore
both reduce the ultimate cost of such events and allow the private sector to
more quickly reenter the market.
16. If losses were minor, the facility
would disband after three years. If the facility disbands, then its capital
(including accumulated investment income), after payment of Federal income taxes
at the then-prevailing corporate tax rate, would be distributed to each company
according to the amount invested. Using this formula, if the facility had
$
100 billion in capital for distribution, the Government would
receive approximately $
35 billion prior to the return of the
funds to the contributing insurers. The after-tax capital would then be
distributed to the insurance companies with a requirement that it be placed in a
special tax-deferred reserve fund at each company. These reserves could only be
used to pay for manmade or natural mega-catastrophe losses in a manner similar
to the provisions of the Policyholder Disaster Protection Act (HR 785), by
Representatives Foley and Matsui.
A facility of this type would require
a small number of very capable people to operate; probably outsourcing most
labor and computer intensive functions so as to keep fixed overhead at a
minimum. All administrative and operating expenses could be paid using a very
small percentage of the accumulated funds.
At a minimum, this new
facility should be the provider of terrorism coverage for all commercial
enterprises and subject to mandatory participation by all property and casualty
companies. Carriers could provide coverage themselves for personal lines risks
or for risks outside the precise coverage definition approved by Treasury if
they want to, (perhaps even take reserves offshore,) but they would still need
to pay for this facility if they conduct any business in the United States.
The Insurance Industry Proposal
We are strongly opposed to the
industry bill as presented in its most recent draft, which is riddled with both
short and long-term flaws. It is completely contrary to at least principles 1-10
listed above on pages 2-4.
The proposal appears to create an unlimited
liability for the Federal government for terror risks. The legislation also
covers an unclear amount of war risks. As noted previously, the Federal
government must have complete flexibility during war because the most important
function of our government is to defend the country. We cannot and must not
create an entitlement program to insure against all terror or war risks, which
may cripple the financial capacity of the government to win the war.
This proposal initially offers no payment to the Federal government for
its reinsurance capacity, and it is quite possible that no payment would ever be
forthcoming. We are strongly opposed to any such giveaway. Just because it is
difficult to properly charge for the risk doesn't mean that nothing should be
charged.
The pool concept is fundamentally flawed, and there are better
alternatives. It allows companies to be looser in their underwriting and
increases moral hazard problems compared to alternatives. Companies could shift
risk in an undetectable manner to the pool.
Another key concern is that
the proposal would set up a permanent bureaucracy that would greatly expand its
mission over time, concentrating risk and displacing a healthy reinsurance
market.
This facility would have enormous advantages that no other firm
could match, including tax-free reserving, explicit access to Federal credit and
a location in one of the least-regulated states in the country. At the end of
its "life" there is to be a report on the state of capacity in the industry, not
just for terror, but for other large risks currently handled by the private
sector such as natural disasters.
We understand that the proposal has a
sunset clause, but are not reassured. Once federal programs start, they rarely
disappear, and this entity will have powerful allies who will likely seek to
dump their other least attractive risks on the taxpayer. Important sectors of
the industry have been trying for years to push legislation through the Congress
to set up a natural disaster insurance corporation, and this entity could well
take on that role as it is about to supposedly expire.
The inherent
advantages of the proposed "Homeland" insurance entity would make it almost
impossible for the private sector to move back into the business of insuring
against terror risks as it could not compete against Homeland's awesome
advantages in amassing tax-free reserves and accessing Federal credit.
Conclusion
Proposals for Federal insurance for terror and war
risks are both politically and economically risky and should be subjected to
extensive examination and comment before being enacted into law. We strongly
urge the Committee to remember that even the best- intentioned programs can have
budget-busting consequences. In this case, a poorly designed program would also
place more lives at risk and conceivably harm the financial ability of the
government to defend the country. Congress must move carefully in this highly
complex area to ensure that it does not create a fiscal disaster, unwisely
interfere with private markets or violate sound insurance principles.
LOAD-DATE: October 31, 2001