Copyright 2001 eMediaMillWorks, Inc.
(f/k/a Federal
Document Clearing House, Inc.)
Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony
October 30, 2001, Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 3061 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
HEADLINE: TERRORISM RISK
TESTIMONY-BY: DAVID A. MOSS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
AFFILIATION: HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
BODY: Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
David A. Moss Associate Professor
Harvard Business School
October 30, 2001
Thank you Senator
Hollings and Senator McCain for the opportunity to address the committee today.
1. The Government's Role as a Risk Manager
In his letter of
invitation, Senator Hollings asked me to consider "the role the Federal
government should play, if any, in indemnifying terrorism related risks.
Since I have just finished writing a book that traces the history of
government efforts to manage risk, let me start by saying just a little bit
about what the historical record suggests.'
Contrary to popular wisdom,
government involvement with private- sector risks is nothing new. American
lawmakers have been managing all sorts of risks since the earliest days of the
Republic. Many of these government policies are so firmly entrenched that we
take them for granted. Limited liability, for example, was first enacted at the
state level beginning in the early nineteenth century and has since emerged as
one of the hallmarks of modern corporation law. Yet limited liability is really
nothing more than a simple risk management device, shifting part of the risk of
corporate default from shareholders to creditors. Federal deposit insurance is
another major risk management policy. Inaugurated during the Great Depression,
this federal program safeguards individual depositors by spreading the risk of
bank failure across all depositors and potentially across all taxpayers as well.
Other notable risk-management policies include federal bankruptcy law, workers'
compensation, unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, product liability law,
state insurance guaranty funds, federal foreign-investment insurance, and
federal disaster relief. Still other examples involve federal caps on liability,
such as the cap on nuclear power liability enacted in 1957 (Price- Anderson) and
the cap on credit card liability established in 1970. One thing that these
diverse policies have in common is that they all reallocate private-sector
risks.
In a great many cases, such risk-management policies were
introduced because lawmakers concluded that private markets for risk weren't
functioning adequately on their own. As early as 1818, for example,
Representative Ezekiel Whitman of Massachusetts focused on the problem of
uninsurability as a reason for enacting a special bankruptcy law for merchants.
"Every effort of the merchant is surrounded with danger..." he noted. "Gentlemen
have said that the merchant may insure. ... He may insure against sea risks and
capture. But are these all the risks to which the merchant is liable? Indeed
they are not. The risks which overwhelm him are more frequently and almost
always, those against which he can have no [private] insurance."-" Such logic -
emphasizing the government's role as a risk manager in a world of imperfect
markets for risk - has helped to produce some of our most enduring and vital
public policies, from bankruptcy law to Social Security.
Based on this
history, I think it is fair to say that the prospect of involving the federal
government in the management of terror-related risks would in no way constitute
a radical departure from the path of American policymaking.
What the
historical record also makes clear, however, is that some risk-management
policies have worked considerably better than others. Policies like limited
liability law, federal deposit insurance, and even the cap on credit card
liability have worked remarkably well. Some others have worked less well.
Federal disaster policy, for instance, has probably proved unnecessarily costly
by encouraging construction in hazard-prone areas.
There are many
factors that serve to distinguish relatively successful risk-management policies
from less successful ones. But perhaps the most important factor is the degree
to which risk taking can be effectively monitored within the confines of the
policy. Whenever risk is shifted from one party to another - whether through an
insurance contract, some other financial transaction, or a government program -
the party that sees its risk reduced may have an incentive to engage in
additional risk taking. Economists call this moral hazard.
Private
insurers have long recognized that controlling moral hazard requires that they
carefully monitor their clients. In writing commercial fire insurance, for
example, they may require the regular inspection of sprinklers and other safety
devices. The same basic principle applies in the case of government risk
management as well. Unless some sort of monitoring - either by public or private
actors - is built into a risk management policy, moral hazard is liable to spin
out of control.
Fortunately, this sort of monitoring is built into a
large number of our risk management policies. In some cases, incentives are
created for private actors to do the monitoring. Limited liability for corporate
shareholders works well because, in most cases, corporate risk taking is
effectively monitored by private creditors, such as bankers and bondholders. In
other cases, the government itself does the monitoring. Federal deposit
insurance provides a good example, since government regulators help to limit
potential moral hazard by actively monitoring bank risk. Significantly, one of
the most striking failures of federal banking policy came in the 1980s, when
federal oversight of the S&Ls was relaxed at the same time that federal
insurance coverage was actually increased. For the most part, however, federal
monitoring of bank risk has proved reasonably effective over the years.
Unfortunately, effective risk monitoring has never been a major part of
federal disaster policy, leaving it exceptionally vulnerable to moral hazard. To
be sure, the emergency appropriations that Congress has consistently approved in
the aftermath of major disasters have relieved - and even prevented - a great
deal of suffering and distress; and they have helped facilitate and accelerate
recovery in devastated areas. But there has been precious little success in
fashioning a disaster policy in this country that would help to control reckless
building and other risky behavior that ultimately compound disaster losses.
Indeed, the disaster relief itself has probably increased this sort of behavior.
In the wake of the great Mississippi flood of 1993, which triggered over
$
6 billion in federal relief, Representative Fred Grandy of
Iowa observed, "We're basically telling people, 'We want you to buy insurance,
but if you don't, we'll bail you out anyway."' Similarly, Representative
Patricia Schroeder of Colorado noted that as "we watch this tremendously awful
flood scene unravel in the Midwest . . . we are going to have make some very
difficult choices.One of the main choices will be: Do we help those who took
responsibility, got flood insurance, put up levees, tried to do everything they
could; or do we help those who did not do that, who risked it all and figured if
all fails, the Federal Government will bail them out."' Sadly, federal disaster
policy has never adequately addressed this challenge.
It is said that
the path into the harbor is marked by sunken ships. My hope is that Congress and
the President will successfully navigate around the defects of federal disaster
policy in crafting a program that facilitates the efficient management of
terror-related risks in the aftermath of September 11'". If the federal
government is going to assume responsibility for bearing some part of the risk
that is currently borne by private insurers, it is essential that the resulting
public policy provides for the effective monitoring of risky behavior - either
through outright regulation or, better yet, well structured incentives.
The history of risk management policy demonstrates unmistakably that
government can serve an enormously constructive role as a risk manager. But the
historical record also provides a warning about the problems that can ensue from
open-ended risk-absorption policies that impose little in the way of discipline
and ultimately look more like simple subsidies than anything else. This, it
seems to me, is the proper context in which to take up the problem at hand.
II. Insurance After September 11th: Defining the Problem
One of
the many ramifications of the horror of September 11th is that the market for
insurance against terror-related risks has been severely disrupted. Some say it
is on the verge of collapse. A report put out by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin
estimates that insured losses stemming from the September 11th attack will be
between $
30 and $
58 billion, making it "the
largest single-event loss in history."'
An event of this magnitude
affects the insurance market in two separate, though related, ways. First, our
expectations about future losses stemming from terrorist attacks obviously
increase substantially. And this implies that even if insurance and reinsurance
providers were willing to continue covering terror- related risks, with no
disruption in service, the cost of such coverage would rise sharply for many
policyholders. There can be little doubt that the cost of insuring a skyscraper
like the Sears Tower should increase substantially as a result of our new
knowledge about the risks of terrorism. In some cases, insurance could prove
prohibitively expensive, destroying the economic viability of certain business
endeavors.
A second - and even more disturbing - consequence is that
terror- related risks could be rendered uninsurable in the private marketplace.
The magnitude of the September 11th catastrophe has forced insurers and
reinsurers to think seriously about previously unimaginable events (or series of
events), some of which could conceivably swamp their reserves. Although the
combined resources of the insurance industry are obviously very large, they are
nonetheless finite.
A closely related concern is that there is now
enormous uncertainty about how to estimate the probabilities of future
terror-related losses. According to most insurance textbooks, one of the
preconditions for insurability is that expected losses can be estimated with a
fair degree of confidence. "For an exposure to loss to be insurable," reads one
prominent textbook, "the expected loss must be calculable. Ideally, this means
that there is a determinable probability distribution for losses within a
reasonable degree of accuracy. ...
When the probability distribution of
losses for the exposure to be insured against cannot be accurately calculated,
the risk is uninsurable."
In explaining their intention to withdraw from
covering terror- related risks in the absence of government backing, many
insurance and reinsurance executives have cited precisely this combination of
factors: the extraordinary magnitudes of potential losses involved and the near
impossibility of accurately estimating loss probabilities. Said the Chubb
Corporation's Chairman and CEO Dean R. O'Hare at a recent congressional hearing,
"The industry has a specific amount of capital and cannot insure risks that are
infinite and impossible to price."'
The business community thus faces
two distinct problems in obtaining coverage for terrorrelated risks in the wake
of September 11th - high cost on the one hand and uninsurability on the other.
Even under the best of circumstances, such coverage would likely become far more
expensive than it was before the tragedy, raising costs for many businesses and
potentially forcing some under water. Under the worst of circumstances, such
coverage would be unobtainable at any price, severely disrupting numerous
markets but especially real estate.
Assuming that federal lawmakers
wished to address either one of these problems, the former (high cost of terror
insurance) would require some sort of government subsidy, whereas the latter
(uninsurability) would require the government to act as a risk manager, perhaps
providing terror insurance itself or facilitating its provision in the private
sector. Although these two problems - high cost and uninsurability - are
obviously linked in the current crisis, I believe it is useful to think about
them separately when contemplating a potential policy response.
III.
Fashioning a Policy Response
Ideally, I believe we should work to
fashion a public policy that ensures a working market for terror risk with as
little subsidy as possible. That is, we should try to address the sources of
uninsurability, to the extent that they exist, while working hard to avoid any
action that would make the private costs of terror- related risks look smaller
than they really are.
To return for a moment to the example of federal
disaster policy: one of the consequences of repeatedly providing ad hoc disaster
coverage (relief) that is not tied to any sort of premium is that it ends up
encouraging construction in unsafe areas, such as flood zones. That is because
those who live in these areas often do not have to bear anything like the full
actuarial costs. Federal disaster policy, in other words, helps to manage a wide
range of risks, some of which might otherwise be uninsurable in the private
marketplace. But it also ends up subsidizing those in the highest risk areas,
since federally covered losses are funded not out of experience-rated premiums
but rather out of general government revenues. Although some degree of subsidy
is probably inevitable in any public policy designed to address disaster losses,
our own federal disaster policy seems to carry the practice to an undesirable
extreme.
In constructing a federal policy to facilitate the coverage of
terror-related risks, one way to avoid these pitfalls would be to follow a more
explicit model of insurance or reinsurance, where the government demands
risk-based premiums in return for the coverage it provides. Although private
insurers and reinsurers have expressed doubts about their ability to cover
future terror- related risks, the federal government is ideally suited to
underwrite precisely this sort of risk. Unlike private entities, the federal
government is well positioned to absorb even massive losses because it enjoys
the power to tax as well as a near- perfect credit rating. If the premiums it
had collected were not sufficient to cover a particular loss, whether because of
simple bad luck or misestimation of the risk, it could always draw the needed
funds from general revenues and then recalibrate its insurance (or reinsurance)
program after the fact. As FDR's Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, once said
of the Social Security old-age-insurance program, "we have the credit of the
Government as the real underlying reserve. That is what gives this stability."'
One of the biggest challenges in constructing a federal program for
insuring or reinsuring terror risk would be to figure out how best to set
premiums, so as to avoid excessive cross subsidization and thus the distortion
of traditional market incentives. Another challenge would be to structure the
program so that the federal role would automatically shrink if private insurers
and reinsurers ever demonstrated a willingness to reassume the burden.
One option, which I favor, would be to establish a new federal
reinsurance program for terror-related risks. Primary insurers that met
appropriate standards would be permitted to reinsure terror risk with the
federal government. Under such a program, a primary insurer might be allowed to
pass (at its discretion) between, say, 20 and 80 percent of its terrorrelated
risk - along with the same percentage of the premiums it charged - to the
federal government. Ideally, the primary insurer would also be able to purchase
some sort of federal stop-loss protection on the portion of risk it retained!
There are three main advantages of this federal reinsurance approach:
First, by allowing insurers to cede a substantial portion of terror risk
to the federal government and by setting an absolute ceiling on their
terror-related losses (through stoploss protection), a federal
reinsurance program would ensure that coverage against
terrorism would continue to be written in the aftermath of
September l It".
Second, this approach would exploit the inherent
strengths of the private market.Since primary insurers would remain responsible
for writing terrorism policies, setting premiums, and retaining at least a
portion of the risk, a federal reinsurance program would make effective use of
their unparalleled capabilities in risk assessment, risk monitoring, and policy
administration. Perhaps most important, nearly all of the covered risk - even
that portion ceded to the government reinsurer - would be appropriately priced
in the private marketplace, thus minimizing any distortion of vital market
incentives.Developers who wished to build skyscrapers or other structures that
insurers deemed unusually vulnerable to terrorist attack might be deterred from
doing so by the prospect of exceptionally high insurance premiums. As a result,
there would be little need for additional federal regulation to monitor risk
taking and control moral hazard. Risk-based premiums, combined with monitoring
by private insurers, would likely prove sufficient.'
Finally, under a
public reinsurance plan of this sort, the federal government's role would
automatically recede if private insurers and reinsurers chose to assume more of
the risk. Not only would participating insurers be free to increase their
retention levels as desired (up to 80 percent), but they would also be free to
withdraw from the program entirely or to obtain coverage from private reinsurers
if the latter ever reentered the market. Competition, in other words, would be
encouraged rather than stifled.
While no plan is perfect, I favor a
program of federal
reinsurance for
terrorism-related risks because, in my view, it would combine
the best of both public and private, drawing on the government's unique
strengths as a risk manager without short- circuiting either the essential
capabilities or the relentless discipline of the private market. It would come
as close as is possible at the present time to making a broken market whole and
restoring a precious source of security in our economic life.
LOAD-DATE: October 31, 2001