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Congressional Testimony
November 28, 2001, Wednesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 4706 words
COMMITTEE:
SENATE JOINT ECONOMIC
HEADLINE:
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
TESTIMONY-BY: R. GLENN HUBBARD,
CHAIRMAN
AFFILIATION: COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
BODY: Testimony of R. Glenn Hubbard Chairman,
Council of Economic Advisers
before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S.
Congress
November 28, 2001
Chairman Saxton, Vice Chairman Reed,
and members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the economic outlook for the United States.
The Near-Term
Economic Outlook
Let me begin by briefly reviewing the present state of
the economy and its near-term prospects. In doing so, it is useful to organize
thinking around supply conditions - the capacity of the economy to produce goods
and services - and demand conditions - the ability and willingness of
households, firms, and governments to purchase these services and products.
The events of September 11 had dramatic human and economic implications.
As is now apparent, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon resulted in loss of life, physical damages, damage to the financial
sector, and interruption of commercial aviation that temporarily restricted the
economy's ability to supply goods and services in the short run. These "supply
shock" consequences of the attacks substantially reduced the growth rate of GDP
during the third quarter and will adversely affect economic growth in the
current quarter. Of course, there are potentially more durable effects as well.
The economic aftermath includes shocks to household and business confidence, and
increased uncertainty regarding the economic environment. The effects on
confidence and uncertainty give rise to a number of additional supply-side costs
of transacting business deriving from enhanced security and more costly
insurance which reduce output growth.
On the demand side, the attacks
and their potential repercussions lowered household and business confidence
about the future, and along with it household and business willingness to spend
and invest. Prior to the attacks, a focus of policy was to ensure a continued
flow of resources - incomes and cash flow - to households and businesses to
provide a base for sustained growth in aggregate demand. If confidence effects
are substantial, the attacks must necessarily shift our focus somewhat - away
from simply providing temporary funds to households, for example, and toward
buttressing the confidence of households to make purchases out of those dollars.
What is the outlook in this regard? The most recent Blue Chip consensus
estimates of GDP growth indicate a rebound in 2002, with growth at an annual
rate of 0.5 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively, in the first two quarters of
2002, and 3.9 percent in the second half of 2002. Even with this recovery, the
unemployment rate is likely to rise through 2002. Underlying this outlook is an
implicit current decline in confidence that rebounds early next year.
Much recent attention has focused on the possibility that the United
States has entered a recession, a debate that has ended with the announcement on
November 26 by the National Bureau of Economic Research that the economy reached
its cyclical peak in March of this year. To my mind, this announcement is less
important than looking forward and anticipating the path for economic policy
best able to facilitate the economy's return to potential growth.
How
would such a recovery take place? The key factors are growth of gross private
domestic investment - especially business investment in equipment and software -
and the strength of growth of personal consumption expenditures. The latter
constituted 69 percent of aggregate purchases in the third quarter, while the
former accounted for another 17 percent. In the third quarter, consumption grew
at an annual rate of 1.2 percent and contributed 0.8 percentage point to GDP
growth. In contrast, investment declined at an annual rate of 10.7 percent and
contributed a decline of 1.8 percentage points to overall GDP growth.
Simple arithmetic shows that without changing any other aspect of
economic performance - that is, holding growth in other components of aggregate
demand at their third quarter values - simply having investment decline at a
slower rate of 5 percent would yield a growth rate of GDP that was nearly a full
percentage point higher.
In addition, raising real personal consumption
growth from its recent pace of 1.2 percent to the 3.0 percent that prevailed
from the second quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 would yield
substantial additional GDP growth.
These are the mechanics of recovery.
It is not appropriate to imagine that the future path of state and local
government expenditures, federal purchases, and net exports will be the same as
in the third quarter. However, this illustrative calculation places attention on
the two key aspects of resuming rapid economic growth.
It is not
necessary to have an immediate, robust rebound to positive growth in investment
in order to have more rapid growth. Simply slowing the decline, or even stopping
it, would contribute greatly. The substantial monetary easing since January will
contribute greatly in this regard.
Recently, however, the notion that
investment will not display even this modest improvement because businesses are
burdened with significant excess capital - a "capital overhang" - has gained
popularity. This seems unduly pessimistic. While there may be narrow sectors of
the economy for which this characterization rings true - as, for example, in the
telecommunication infrastructure sector - as a general matter any capital
overhang is likely to have been eliminated by the weak investment performance in
2001.
Capital overhang represents the difference between the actual and
desired amounts of capital in the form of equipment or structures. Because
slower expected output growth lowers the amount of investment necessary to
maintain the same capital stock relative to the output it produces, a slowdown
in expected economic growth can lower the capital stock firms want to hold,
generating a potential overhang and reducing investment. For example, if a
near-term slowdown reduced the expected average long-term growth rate by
one-fourth percentage point, gross investment would fall $
25
billion in the first year in which the slowdown became apparent.
Now,
suppose that rapid economic growth in the late 1990s implied that firms had no
excess capital in 1999, but that slower economic growth caused the growth rate
of the desired capital stock to be roughly 3 percent in 2000. The capital stock
in 2000 grew at a 4.2 percent rate and therefore would have created a roughly
$
100 billion capital overhang. Given the pace of events thus
far this year, the capital stock appears to be growing more slowly than the
three percent rate. This means under-investment in the capital stock for the
year has largely eliminated any overhang that may have developed.
While
thinking about capital overhang, it is worth noting that this is different from
the conventional notion of unused capacity. During the sluggish growth in 2001,
capacity utilization rates have fallen, but this does not imply a capital
overhang. First, capacity utilization data focus
solely on
manufacturing, utilities, and mining and are not representative of the entire
economy. Moreover, business capital purchases take time to plan, order, and put
in place. For this reason, businesses look beyond current conditions - focusing
on sales, cost of capital, and cash flow in the future - to plan investments. In
a growth slowdown, the capital stock firms want to hold may continue to rise
even though current capacity is not being strained.
To summarize, the
basic path of economic recovery incorporates more rapid growth in consumption
and a slowing in the decline in investment in the next few quarters. Thereafter,
a recovery of positive investment growth would coincide with growth at or above
potential.
This baseline forecast corresponds roughly to the consensus
of private forecasters. However, it is associated with considerable uncertainty.
To see this, consider the range of estimates that underlies the most recent
available Blue Chip forecasts. The range reflects a divergence of views about
both the depth of the initial decline in confidence and the persistence of that
decline. For example, for the fourth quarter, the range between the average of
the top ten estimates and bottom ten estimates is from a low of -0.1 percent to
a high of -3.3 percent for the fourth quarter of 2001. For the first quarter of
2002, the same gap is from 2.9 percent to -1.7 percent, and 4.3 percent to 0.6
percent in the second quarter of 2002. The gap is from 2.6 percent to -0.1
percent for growth during 2002 as a whole. This range suggests the need to think
seriously about downside risks and policies that address the source of the
economy's vulnerability in the quarters ahead - vulnerability especially to
slower growth of consumption and a continued sharp decline in investment.
Public Policies to Promote Economic Security
A key impact of the
terrorist attacks has been to make us aware of new risks into the economic
environment. One of the challenges is to develop policies that address these
risks, but utilize the strengths of the private sector in doing so.
Growth Insurance
This perspective informs the Administration's
efforts regarding economic growth insurance, or "stimulus." In the current
setting, it is important to focus on the potential for downside risks, and
develop policies as insurance against a slower and/or more sluggish upturn in
economic growth than currently expected - that is to guard against a sustained
downturn in business and household confidence or another adverse event.
Insurance, of course, has to be purchased in advance to have any value.
Thus the first implication of this view is that we should move now to put into
place the correct package of measures. In response to the President's
leadership, the House of Representatives acted quickly to pass its. stimulus
legislation. It is time for the Senate to follow suit.
There has clearly
been substantial debate of what should be included in a stimulus package. The
growth insurance perspective provides considerable guidance. First, it should be
pro-growth - it should enhance long-run incentives to work, invest, take risks,
and increase our productivity.
Of course, it should also be cognizant of
short-term needs. The President recognized this early on, incorporating tax
relief for low-income families and targeted extensions of assistance for
displaced workers. This addresses their needs and provides some demand-side
insurance for businesses. As a general matter, though, throwing money at the
problem does not buy meaningful growth insurance.
Over the past year,
the household sector has sustained economic growth in the face of weak business
investment. Because personal consumption spending is over two-thirds of
aggregate purchases, negative growth in consumption is an important downside
risk - declines in consumption would be at the heart of any severe contraction.
However, in part due to the tax cut proposed by the President and passed
by Congress last spring, disposable income has held up quite well through the
third quarter. Instead, the slowdown in household spending tracks the decline in
consumer confidence. Consumer confidence is the issue.
How can public
policy address confidence? One part of this response is attention to security
and progress against terrorism. On the economic front, surveys of consumer
sentiment indicate that individuals are less optimistic in the face of job
losses and the prospect of future softening in the labor market. To address
confidence, we need to focus on job creation.
One key to this is small
businesses, traditionally a source of new jobs in the economy. The best policy
for small businesses and entrepreneurs is to reduce their marginal tax rates.
For this reason, the President wisely focused on moving forward the marginal tax
rate cuts that were passed by Congress in the spring. Lower marginal tax rates
both improve incentives and augment the cash flow of small businesses. Recent
research by Harvey Rosen of Princeton University shows that through these
channels entrepreneurs will expand their payrolls and increase their
investments.
The second key is to help businesses overcome the current
uncertainty and restart investment spending. At the aggregate level, the
resumption of rapid economic growth requires resumption in the growth of capital
expenditures. Employment losses have been concentrated in the manufacturing
sector - a sector heavily dependent on the health of business investment. For
this reason, the Administration has focused on investment incentives -
partial expensing - and corporate cash flow - eliminating the corporation
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), which raises effective tax rates on business in
downturns. These growth incentives target the source of the problem, diminished
private sector job creation that is associated with the decline in consumer
confidence.
Some critics have suggested that investment incentives will
not work because of a capital overhang. To the contrary, there is good reason
for one to expect the Administration's economic stimulus proposals to be
effective in the current setting. Investment incentives - partial expensing -
lower the expected cost of capital, raising the amount of capital that firms
want to hold. Elimination of the AMT reduces effective tax rates during
downturns, again lifting the amount of capital that firms wish to have put in
place. These incentives translate into an impetus for more investment.
Investment incentives work through expected reductions in the future cost of
capital and increases in corporate cash flow. The longer the investment
incentives are in place, the greater the stimulus to investment.
To
summarize, the Administration's approach is a growth insurance package that
contains both demand-side support for purchases and incentives to expand
investment and jobs. We expect that timely adoption would raise GDP growth by
0.5 percent in 2002 and help the private sector to create an additional 300,000
jobs.
Because the focus is on delivering incentives and support via the
tax system, it can be put into place quite quickly. Because it contains
supply-side incentives, it is not heavily dependent on precise timing and fiscal
fine-tuning. Also because it is focused on using the private sector - crowding
in private activity instead of crowding out - it will not harm the long-term
outlook.
The notion of "crowding out" has surfaced in another aspect of
the debate over the macroeconomic response to the terrorist attacks - effects of
policy responses on interest rates. The right policy at the right time will not
cause long-term interest rates to rise. Recent research by Douglas Elmendorf of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and N. Gregory Mankiw of
Harvard University indicates that reduced surpluses for the sort of modest
confidence-building package the President outlined would raise long-term
interest rates by only three to five basis points. A well constructed fiscal
stimulus will affect the out- year budget by only a fraction of this amount, and
will have trivial effects on long-term interest rates.
This is not
surprising. Bond market participants recognize that the modest tax cuts under
discussion are small in the context of the global capital market. More
importantly, the markets have absorbed more quickly than some observers the
lesson that a strong economy is the source of Federal surpluses and not the
reverse. Policies that insure against sub-par growth will also insure against
sustained reductions in Federal surpluses.
The principal threat to
long-term discipline is the other approach featured in the public debate -
additional spending. Japan is the best example of trying to spend one's way to
faster growth. It has not worked and will not work. Many such proposals are
disguised special interest subsidies and pork-barrel public works proposals.
At the center of the debate, however, have been proposals to expand the
scope of social insurance. The President recognized early on that there would be
a need to address these aspects of the repercussions of the terrorist attacks.
The Administration has proposed tax relief for lower-income families, and
extension of Unemployment Insurance (Ul) benefits in those areas experiencing a
marked increase in unemployment, and flexible National Emergency Grants to
provide funds for health insurance, reemployment services, and other needs.
These approaches are timely and flexible.
An alternative is broad-based
expansion of social insurance programs. This alternative does not, however, fit
the perspective of growth insurance. It will not stimulate demand in a the very
near-term nor provide supply side incentives. It is not timely, and does not
address the underlying problem of job creation, and in some cases would serve to
raise - not lower - unemployment.
Some proposals would impose
substantial additional costs on businesses and states for hiring new workers
-working against job creation and adding fiscal burdens for states. In the past,
UI has reflected federalism principles: States determine benefits and payroll
tax rates. The proposals endorsed by the Senate Finance Committee contain large
benefit increases and expansions of coverage requirements for all states. The
annual cost of the expansion in benefits exceeds $
8 billion per
year - equivalent to a UI payroll tax increase of around one percentage point.
Put differently, over $
8 billion annually in states' revenues
would be forced into a new Federal mandate. In addition to raising the costs of
doing business, these proposals would almost certainly increase the unemployment
rate.
The Administration's approach is more timely - the President's
proposals can be implemented quickly because they rely on existing mechanisms
and permit states to target Federal funds effectively. It is a better approach
to handling the needs of displaced workers.
The public policy response
to the terrorist attacks rightfully includes a carefully constructed set of
measures designed to address risks of prolonged and adverse shocks to business
and household confidence. Again, these risks are most effectively addressed
using the private sector; tax cuts crowd-in the private sector by supporting its
job creation, providing support to demand, enhancing supply-side incentives, and
doing these things in a timely fashion. Spending-oriented alternatives are both
less timely and fail to exploit the creativity, flexibility, and innovation of
the private sector.
Terrorism Risk Insurance
The terrorist
attacks indicated that the probability of catastrophic property and casualty
losses was higher than anticipated. In the short run, insurers face difficulties
in responding; in particular, the current difficulty of evaluating the
probability of more events or handling catastrophically large events has made
the reinsurance industry reluctant to cover terrorist events. For example, Keith
Buckley, an insurance analyst with Fitch Ratings Company, states that it is "the
universally stated plan of
reinsurance companies to add
specific
terrorism exclusions to
reinsurance
coverage." Without
reinsurance, primary insurers will be forced
to exclude
terrorism coverage, charge very high premiums, or
withdraw from the market entirely.
The loss of property and casualty
insurance against terrorist acts eliminates a mechanism by which the economy can
respond efficiently to such contingencies. In general, insurance spreads risks,
converting for each business a potential cost of unknowable size and timing into
a set of smaller, known premium payments. In normal circumstances, increased
risks are translated into higher premiums. This serves the useful economic
function of pricing risk, leading the private sector toward those activities
where the risk is "worth it" - there might be losses now and then, but on
average society will benefit - and away from foolhardy gambles.
For
insurance markets, unfortunately, the distinction between risk - not knowing
when an event will happen, but having solid knowledge of the odds of an
occurrence - and genuine uncertainty about the frequency of an insured event is
the key to being able to price efficiently.
Only experience with our new
security environment will allow businesses to appropriately price the
contingencies that businesses now face.
An interruption of coverage is
an extreme, version of an increase in transactions costs as a result of
terrorist-associated risks. If existing lines of coverage are renewed, it will
quite likely involve substantial increases in premiums.
A withdrawal of
insurance coverage would cause large costs as well. Lenders usually require
businesses to insure any property they use to secure loans. The terms of
terrorism coverage could diminish bank lending for new construction projects. It
could as well act as a sharp impediment to transactions that permit existing
commercial properties - skyscrapers, pipelines, power plants, and so forth - to
change hands. It is important to point out that this "changing hands" is an
important economic function. The relative efficiency with which our economy
reallocates capital from less productive to more productive uses sets it apart
from the economies of many other nations.
Without adequate insurance, it
will be difficult to develop, operate, acquire, refinance, or sell property.
While lenders may accept alternative terms for their financing, this
modification simply disguises the problem. Instead of risk being borne
efficiently by the insurance industry, it will be shifted to the banking sector.
In either event, the absence of insurance coverage for terrorism risks
will likely raise the difficulty of financing existing commercial structures and
deter the construction of new projects. The result could look like a "credit
crunch." A rough estimate is an overall reduction in 2002 GDP of 0.3 percentage
point if the problem is not solved, with most of the loss early in 2002. This
reduced growth rate of GDP would likely be equal to 0.8 percentage point at an
annual rate in the first quarter of 2002, 0.7 percentage point in the second
quarter of 2002, and lower thereafter. The decline is caused by a reduction in
asset values that reduces the consumption purchases of the household sector. In
addition, lower valuations reduce the incentive to invest in new structures. The
overall liquidity effects also reduce the path for investment in nonresidential
structures.
The appropriate policy response in this environment is to
encourage private market incentives to expand its capacity to absorb and
diversify risk. Thus we should seek an approach that recedes as the private
market becomes capable of insuring losses on its own, provides customers and
firms with appropriate incentives to minimize the expected costs of such an
event, and reduces uncertainty about liabilities that arise from the events.
Congress and the Administration have each developed proposals in recent
weeks which I hope will soon provide a catastrophic backstop for the private
sector that retains market incentives. One part of these efforts has not been
well understood, however. The Administration has proposed sensible litigation
procedures for mass tort terrorism cases. Specifically the proposals would: (1)
consolidate terrorism cases in single Federal court, (2) preserve the pool of
defendant resources and provide for just plaintiff recovery by eliminating
punitive damage awards, (3) prevent unfair and unnecessary bankruptcies caused
by joint and several liability for non-economic damages, and (4) maintain the
pool of defendant resources for just plaintiff recovery by preventing double
recovery by some plaintiffs.
These proposals should not be confused with
or made part of the debate over general tort reform. In fact, there should not
be - and in the past has not been - political or philosophical disagreement
about the need for alternative litigation procedures in mass tort cases. In
fact, the Administration's litigation proposals would apply only in a modest
sub-category of mass tort cases, namely, mass tort terrorism cases.
These litigation procedures will help reduce the substantial uncertainty
faced by the insurance industry in pricing terrorism risk. A significant
component of the terrorism risk to insurers is likely to be the liability
component of property and casualty insurance. The Administration's proposed
litigation procedures will help to manage that risk and crowd in the private
market. Absent these procedures, the resources of liable defendants, including
resources from their liability insurance policies, will not suffice to
compensate the class of successful plaintiff- victims in mass tort terrorism
incidents. For that reason, mass torts often are resolved through bankruptcy
(where plaintiffs rarely receive full compensation) or settlement (again, where
plaintiffs rarely receive full compensation). Put differently, the procedures
will preserve the assets in order that successful plaintiffs are compensated
fairly and equitably.
The Longer-Term Outlook
Turning toward the
longer-term outlook, a few issues arise. The first, and most important, is that
the long-term fundamentals of the U.S. economy remain sound. Even during the
recent slowdown productivity growth remains strong. Productivity grew at an
annual rate of 2.7 percent in the third quarter and averaged 2.5 percent since
1995. The growth in productivity is one of the most important factors
determining our long run prosperity, which determines our ability to meet both
public and private goals.
Second, over the longer term, one of those
objectives will be to address the generalized need for greater security and to
"harden" the U.S. economy against the threat of terrorism. In doing so, it is
important to minimize the impact on underlying productivity growth. To date, the
impact of meeting these needs appears likely to have a modest impact on
productivity growth.
Our estimate is that doubling private security
spending would lower the rate of productivity growth by no more than 0.1
percentage point over the next several years.
It may be the case that
the Nation determines that adequately addressing these needs requires devoting
more resources. One possible manifestation would be a genuine need for enhanced
outlays for security in the Federal budget. If so, it is sensible to
re-prioritize -not just augment - budget resources to address these needs. As
with other aspects of addressing terrorism risks, we should not forget the
historical lesson that private markets are resilient, efficient, and flexible in
meeting new challenges. We should seek as our objective new standards for the
security - and perhaps augment Federal resources - but should be wary of
dictating how to achieve our objectives. Instead, we need to work to identify
the range of risks and the appropriate level of security to require of the
private sector. Having done so, it is in our national interest to be both
vigilant in ensuring that these standards are met, but flexible in allowing the
private sector to do so in an efficient fashion.
Another possibility
would be an attempt to hide the costs of addressing terrorism risk by keeping
expenditures off public sector budgets, instead mandating security measures in a
heavy handed way. One of the success stories of the past thirty years has been
the productivity growth derived from deregulation. We should be wary of losing
these benefits via excessive new and burdensome regulation, even in the name of
enhanced security, as there are more efficient approaches to the same problems.
To conclude, the U.S. economy is very resilient and, with prudent
investments in enhancing the private sector's ability to address the risks of
terrorism, we have every reason to expect a timely recovery of economic growth
and a continuation of our economy's long-term progress.
Thank you again,
Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to
answer your questions.
LOAD-DATE: November 28,
2001