Final Report

Cover letter to Office of Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge
Preface

"On behalf of the citizens of the Seventh District of Virginia, I would like to thank the council, Chairman Glover, Johnny Johnson and Jack Wilson for their hard work and dedication to our mission. I also would like to thank the staff of Henrico County for their contributions to the council and this report.  In particular, I would like to recognize the tireless efforts of Mrs. Veta Herbaugh and her outstanding dedication to this project."
                                                              Congressman Eric Cantor

"As Chairman of the Congressional Safety and Security Council for the 7th District of Virginia, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the council for their involvement and professionalism during this endeavor.  A significant amount of information has been included in this document as submitted by members.  Our primary goal is to greatly reduce the vulnerability of economic and physical security within the 7th District, and I believe we will make a difference. "                                                                                                            Richard W. Glover, Chairman

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The council finds that agencies, businesses, and institutions across the Seventh District of Virginia have invested significant time and resources to increase the safety and security of our community in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. 

The council’s final report recommends actions to be taken to improve communication and coordination between federal, state, and local entities in providing for homeland security and to increase and reallocate resources to provide the funding, training, and equipment necessary to deter attacks and improve response capability.

A.  Improving communication and coordination between federal, state and local entities in providing for homeland security.

Radio interoperability between localities would contribute significantly to an effective communications system, essential during a response to events such as terrorist attacks and other major disasters.

During emergencies, many jurisdictions within the 7^th District have agreements allowing for mutual assistance; however, many of these localities are unable to communicate via a single radio system to coordinate their response in the midst of an emergency. 

The federal government has a program, AGILE, whereby radios can be programmed for coordination; however, this system is very expensive and most localities lack funding to put this expensive program to use.  Federal financial assistance and government prioritization of radio interoperability would aid in this endeavor.

The need for intelligence information is critical at the local level.

Local law enforcement agencies need  “real time” intelligence information to develop proactive strategies to combat terrorist activity on the ground.

Information from local departments is disseminated to state and federal agencies; however, localities often find the availability of helpful federal intelligence information to be lacking.  In fact, local agencies often receive the best national intelligence when media outlets provide information to the general public.

While some efforts have been initiated at the federal level to streamline dissemination, vital exchanges are still not routinely occurring.  An example of this confusion exists in the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.   This plan lists four threat levels but does not provide thorough detail regarding the actions local agencies are required to take at each threat level. 

Another hurdle in the information flow to local agencies involves security clearance requirements for information release. 

Legislation that modifies existing restrictions on dissemination of information related to terrorist activity and homeland security could help to address these concerns.  Additionally, local law enforcement should establish a single point of contact to obtain intelligence information.

Access to new technology providing a daily compilation of medical reports could enable the immediate identification of symptoms that indicate the outbreak of an epidemic.

Computerization of medical reports currently occurs on a regular basis throughout Virginia.  Technology exists, however, that would enable data to be compiled on a daily basis.  Daily compilations could enable the immediate identification of symptoms, should an outbreak occur that has the potential to reach epidemic proportions.  A timely response would reduce the risk of serious health complications and ultimately of loss of life.  Funding for advanced technology and for personnel increases would be required.

Geographic Information System (GIS) capability would grant localities access to critical information regarding the location of nearby utilities, roadways and property lines.

GIS information is transferable from locality to locality should an attack occur.  This information transfer would be essential, for instance, in charting water and traffic flow to help direct emergency efforts.  

Notification should be provided to localities when hazardous chemicals are transported through their borders.

Currently, localities are only notified when nuclear products are being transported across their boundaries.  Notification is not required, however, for many non-nuclear bio-hazardous chemicals being transported via rail and motorized carrier through the 7^th District on any given day.  Dangers of hazardous chemicals and the time frame of their exposure to the first responder as well as citizens could be minimized if this information was made available to affected localities on a secure web site. 

Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are needed in order to protect private industry and government buildings.

Information concerning all government buildings except jails and public safety buildings is subject to FOIA requests.  Likewise, most public records are also available to any individual upon request.  For this reason private industry is disinclined to release information on building structure, chemicals, and materials that is essential to rescue efforts and emergency planning.

Exemption of such vital information from public release is needed to free private industry from the fear of industrial espionage.  In order for government to protect public property, public employees, citizens conducting business in public facilities, and anti-terrorism tactical plans, information directly associated with counter-terrorism efforts should be exempted from the provisions of FOIA as well.

B.  Identifying and allocating resources to provide the funding, training, and equipment necessary to guarantee our security.

Adequate funds for training, equipment and technology must be provided to first responders including firefighters, emergency teams, health care professionals and law enforcement agencies.

A large-scale attack would pose extraordinary challenges for the community’s emergency response teams.  First responders to a terrorist strike, including hazardous materials teams, require additional personnel and equipment to effectively respond to a biological, chemical or nuclear attack.  In addition, in the current heightened state of security, even false alarms cause a significant burden on existing resources. 

Last fall, one Seventh District jurisdiction received over 600 emergency calls from citizens concerned about possible contact with white powdery substances that were believed to be anthrax.  Each credible incident requires first responders to use costly protective equipment and clothing that afterwards must be destroyed. 

In addition, during the recent anthrax crisis, testing of all other substances was put on hold, including the testing of birds involved in a West Nile Virus scare.  The hundreds of calls for Seventh District service could have been quickly identified as hoaxes or false scares if there were more laboratories to test substances. 

The lack of surge volume capacity could itself present a health hazard for Virginia citizens should another large quantity of testing become necessary.

Equipment, training, and resources must be provided to health care professionals to ensure that the community’s medical needs are addressed in a crisis environment. 

The Virginia Commonwealth University Health System  (VCUHS) would be relied upon heavily as the primary hub for health care support and related logistical activity during a nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorist event. 

MCV Hospitals has been identified as a Regional Response Center and has agreements in place with area employers to respond to a biological, chemical or nuclear incident.  The system has in place a Radiation Emergency Plan, a Hazardous Materials plan and has developed an Internal Epidemiological Crisis Plan to deal with potential terrorist events.   

The present regional response program is designed to handle two to four victims on an ongoing basis.  The potential fallout from an attack caused by weapons of mass destruction involving large numbers of victims, however, could cause significant stress to the area’s response system.  In the case of a federally designated emergency, like that on September 11, the American Hospital Association recommends that inner city hospitals should be prepared to handle 1,000 patients. 

To create a centralized system that will support predicted numbers of victims from terrorism events, the VCUHS would need additional financial support. 

Additional federal, state and local resources are needed to expand capacity for responding to nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism, and identified medical/surgical and pharmaceutical supplies are required.  Additional training in tracking bio-terrorism and HazMat drills was also noted.  Mental health costs associated with wide scale events would also place added demands on the system, and additional funds for safety and security as well as facilities improvement were also identified in order for area healthcare first responders to provide care.

Events like those that occurred September 11 would also require complex coordination between regional, state and federal agencies.  The State Department of Emergency Services/Emergency Operations Center, The Virginia Department of Health Radiological Health Section, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the DOE Radiation Emergency Assistance Center, MCV Hospitals and other regional hospitals all have a role to play in formulating national and regional emergency response plans to future large scale terrorist attacks. 

Resources are required to keep Seventh District infrastructure secure and to protect important transportation hubs.

Two million dollars has already been provided to expand the Richmond International Airport’s main security checkpoint to enhance safety and decrease the waiting period to board a flight.  This funding cannot be diverted and additional, continuous federal dollars should be allocated to ensure that all existing, new, and pending security mandates are appropriately funded.  The source of such federal funding must not be AIP Airport entitlement funds.

Strict performance and accountability checks, perhaps including an Aviation Industry Task Force with representation from the nation’s airports and airlines, should also be implemented to ensure that the TSA does not evolve into a stereotypical federal government bureaucracy unable to meet its primary mission in the role of airport security.

In addition, badged airport employees, regardless of agency or employer (federal, state, local or private) should all be held to the same standard.  Any current or planned exemptions from such policies should be eliminated.

Finally, the federal government should re-evaluate implementation deadlines in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act related to CTX-type scanning equipment.  If the measures cannot be implemented efficiently and effectively by December 31, 2002, the nation’s air system could be subjected to severe disruption, further injuring an industry already reeling in the aftermath of September 11.

Terrorism risk insurance coverage must be available for local businesses and facilities. 

In the aftermath of September 11, business experience reflects some insurance companies unwilling to provide terrorism risk coverage at rates commensurate with last year’s policies.  Instances where coverage was dropped or premiums were significantly increased were reported due to the perceived increased risk for local properties and infrastructure.

Concern was raised that lenders would be unwilling to waive covenants in existing loan agreements and possibly stop lending on projects without such insurance. 

Legislation aimed at assisting in reestablishing the reinsurance market for the terrorism risk coverage was seen as a positive step to stabilizing the situation.

Funds being initiated for use in anti-terrorist activity must be effectively distributed to counties as well as to cities and towns.

Grants and other forms of funding are being made available by the federal government during this time of tragedy in the United States; however, monies are not being effectively distributed to the local level.  Furthermore, federal grants are usually not made available to counties.  The Commonwealth’s unique system of government wherein all aspects of city and county governments are separate and distinct typically results in the ineffective allocation of funds in Virginia.  Modifications to allocation formulas should be made to reflect this reality.  In addition, distribution of federal funds as needed directly to local governments and first response teams, instead of sifting all aid through state government, may be more efficient.