Before the
National
Telecommunications and Information Administration
Notice,
Request for Comments
)
Docket No.
on
Deployment of Broadband Networks )
and Advanced
Telecommunications
)
011109273-1273-01
RIN 0660-XX13
COMMENTS OF
EVEREST MIDWEST LICENSEE, LLC.
dba Everest Connections
Corporation
Rachel
Lipman Reiber
Vice
President of Regulatory and
Government Affairs
Everest
Midwest Licensee, LLC. dba
Everest Connections
4740 Grand,
Suite 200
Kansas City,
MO 64112
(816)
714–2972
Voice
(816)
714-2995
FAX
Before the
National
Telecommunications and Information Administration
Notice,
Request for Comments
on
Deployment of Broadband Networks
Docket No.
and Advanced
Telecommunications
011109273-1273-01
COMMENTS OF
EVEREST MIDWEST LICENSEE, LLC
dba Everest
Connections Corporation
Everest Midwest Licensee, LLC (“Everest”) is a
broadband service provider offering telecommunications, cable and high speed
Internet service via cable modem in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Everest is pleased to have the
opportunity respond to the questions posed by the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, since broadband is
our business.
The
majority owner of Everest is UtiliCorp United, Inc., which provides electric and
gas distribution service in seven Midwestern states and has utility operations
in Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain. Utilicorp also has an energy
merchant trading business, Aquila.
Everest
began providing its facilities-based service to customers on January 25,
2001. In the ten and a half months
since Everest began providing service, it has passed approximately 15,000 homes
and has acquired more than 5,000 customers. In addition to its Everest operations,
Utilicorp also owns a controlling interest in Unite, a broadband service
provider in Kearney, MO, where it has been successful at attracting 60% of all
residential customers and 85% of all business customers from the incumbent local
exchange carrier. Everest also is
an investor in Prarie iNet, which uses unlicensed spectrum and antennae mounted
on top of grain silos to provide high speed Internet service to communities of
less than 15,000 people in Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri. Everest is pleased to offer these
comments from its vantage point as a supplier of broadband services in urban and
rural communities.
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
POSED
A. What should be the primary policy
considerations in formulating broadband policy for the country? Please discuss the relative importance
of the following: access for all, facilities-based competition; minimal
regulation; technological neutrality; intra-modal competition; inter-modal
competition; and any other policy considerations.
The primary
policy consideration in formulating broadband policy for the country should be
promoting facilities-based competition.
Facilities-based competition requires large amounts of capital
investment. This will not only
benefit the telecommunications sector of the economy, but will result in
redundant infrastructure, which is also a desirable policy outcome as we
reassess our homeland security needs.
Providers who chose facilities-based competition will undoubtedly offer
multiple services to consumers.
Viable business plans for facilities-based residential competition
necessarily require that a provider offer not only telecommunications service,
but also cable and high-speed Internet offerings.
Since
broadband service providers must obtain a cable franchise from the local
franchising authority, the franchise requirements contained in Sec. 621 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, apply. The statute is very clear in that it
requires that service be provided to all residents, thus necessitating
ubiquitous deployment.
If
multiple providers exist, minimal regulation will be necessary. The wireless telecommunications market
is a good example of this. However,
the wireless industry never had a monopoly provider that was fully entrenched
before the market became saturated.
This is not true for either the landline telephone or the terrestrial
cable industries. While the
ultimate goal should be sunset of regulation, until new providers are able to
gain a toehold, laws and regulations must be in place to allow new entrants to
compete on a level playing field.
Thirteen
providers of telecommunications, cable and high speed Internet over terrestrial
facilities have recently announced the formation of the Broadband Service
Providers Association. The group
has identified as its three major barriers to entry (1) access to poles; (2)
access to multiple dwelling units and (3) access to programming. Breaking down these barriers to entry
cannot be accomplished without regulation. Unless these barriers to entry are
removed, facilities-based providers are going to have a difficult time breaking
into monopoly markets.
B. How should broadband services be defined? Please discuss (1) what criteria should be used to determine whether a facility or service has sufficient transmission capacity to be classified as “broadband;” (2) how the definition should evolve over time; and (3) the policy implications of how the term is defined.
Broadband
services should be a term of art, whose definition changes over time with
technological advances. Currently
broadband should be defined as a speed in excess of dial-up modem access. It probably should have a low-end speed
of 125Kbps or 256Kbps downstream.
There are huge policy implications concerning how broadband service is
defined, particularly when Congress or state legislatures are considering tax
credits or loan programs to incent providers to deploy broadband services. Broadband must be defined. The definitions must take into account
affordability and availability of current technology with a goal of pushing
current technology to next generation speeds.
C. Several studies indicate
that the rate of deployment of broadband services is equal to or greater than
the deployment rates for other technologies. What is the current status of (1) supply
and (2) demand of broadband services in the United States? When addressing supply, please discuss
current deployment rates and any regulatory policies impeding supply. When addressing demand, please discuss
both actual take rates and any evidence of unserved demand. Please also address potential underlying
causes of low subscribership rates, such as current economic conditions, price,
cost-structure impediments to the development of broadband content, or any other
factor. To what extent has the
growth in competition for broadband and other services been slowed by the
existing rates and rate structures for regulated telecommunications
services?
It is
difficult to make determinations concerning the current status of supply and
demand for broadband services in the United States today. There are many areas of the country
where people want broadband services, but those services are not yet
available. In other areas, people
may be able to choose between DSL and high speed Internet access provided over
cable modem, but may not find a need for broadband service. People who are accustomed to broadband
access at their place of work find that they are not satisfied until they have
broadband access at home. For
individuals who have a home office or who work at home in lieu of commuting to
work, high-speed access is a necessity.
Evidence of
unserved demand is most prevalent in Class II, III, IV and V cities. Since most providers are focusing on
broadband deployment in large metropolitan areas, end users in smaller cities
are awaiting deployment of broadband services in their communities. Everest and UtiliCorp would like to
expand its broadband service to additional cities, but needs access to the
venture capital markets to achieve this goal. Likewise, Prairie iNet would like to
expand its operations and is hopeful that guaranteed loans will be available to
promote broadband deployment in rural areas. For remote, sparsely populated areas, it
appears that the best hope for broadband access may be wireless solutions,
similar to the Prairie iNet offering.
For some
consumers, an additional $39 – $49 for high speed Internet service is a
deterrent. Yet Everest has found
that many individuals who had been using dial up service have decided to convert
to high speed Internet service, when they subscribed to Everest. Everest’s bundled pricing has made high
speed Internet access more affordable, particularly since our cable modem
service may allow them to eliminate a second line they had been using for
dial-up Internet access and does not require use of a separate Internet service
provider. When offered as part of a
bundled service offering that includes telephone service and cable service,
Everest has found that the vast majority of our customers also subscribe to some
level of high speed Internet service.
Everest’s current product offerings include options for customers at
256Kbps downstream, 1.5Mbps and 3.0Mbps downstream. The most popular offering appears to be
the 1.5 Mbps downstream offering.
As soon as
Everest begins offering service in a municipality, and prior to either
requesting or receiving a determination that it is subject to effective
competition, in accordance with Sec. 623 of the Communications Act of 1934[1],
the incumbent cable company has made “promotional” offers to retain or win- back
customers that attempt to undercut Everest’s “everyday” low prices. These offers are not made available
franchise-wide, but only in neighborhoods where Everest has turned up its
service. Everest believes that the
“effective competition” section of the statute should be modified to exclude the
so-called “local exchange carrier test” for effective competition, which was
added by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Legislative history makes clear that
this section was enacted at the behest of cable operators, who feared that the
Regional Bell Operating Companies (“RBOCs”) would enter the market with video
dial tone. Cable operators feared
the RBOCs, with their embedded customer base and access to capital, would enter
the market with a huge advantage.
Now, almost six years after the Telecom Act was passed, the RBOCs who had
entered the cable business have exited that business, yet this anachronistic
rule permits gives cable operators the ability to engage in non geographically
uniform pricing when a new entrant has barely entered the market in a particular
municipality. It also penalizes a
broadband service provider who offers telephony service[2]. If a new entrant doesn’t offer telephony
service, the incumbent cable company cannot not engage in geographically
non-uniform pricing until the franchise is at least 50 percent built-out and all
competitors have reached a combined penetration of 30 percent.[3]
Since
broadband services are not regulated at the state or federal level, Everest does
not believe that rates and rate structures for regulated telecommunications
services have affected broadband deployment by incumbents. From what it has observed in the Kansas
City metropolitan area, the growth in competition for broadband and other
services has not been slowed by existing rates and rate structures for regulated
telecommunications services. There
is already robust competition between cable modem service and DSL service, where
DSL is available.
E. Do the interconnection, unbundling and resale
requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reduce incumbent local
exchange carriers’ (ILEC’s) incentives to invest in broadband facilities and
services?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, Everest has chosen not to answer this question.
1.
Are there investment disincentives attributable
to the regulated rates for interconnection, unbundled network elements and
resold services?
Everest does
not believe that regulated rates for interconnection, unbundled network elements
and resold services serve as a disincentive to investment. Resale was never
intended to be a long-term entry strategy.
In order for resale to be profitable, the discount would have to be
doubled to at least 40 percent.
While the UNE-P does provide economics that are economically favorable,
and some CLECs have opted to offer telephony service to residential customers
using this mode of entry, it would be dangerous to build a long-term business
case on a UNE-P strategy, since its legal future is far from settled. While Everest has purchased unbundled
loops to serve business customers, Everest, has not purchased unbundled loops to
serve residential customers because of the cable franchise requirements of Sec.
621 of the Communications Act.
Everest and
other broadband service providers face entirely different challenges than CLECs
offering telephony or telephony with DSL provided by leasing facilities from
incumbents. Everest believes that
the only way it is economical to undertake a last-mile build to residential
customers is for a provider to be able to provide additional services beyond
just telecommunications service.
Average monthly revenue per customer must be approximately $100 per month
and penetration must be in excess of 25% to justify a last-mile build
plan.
2.
To what extent are those disincentives due to
ILEC’s uncertainties about their ability to recover the added network costs
needed to accommodate potential requests from competitors? What are the magnitude of those
additional costs? What mechanisms
could be used to share the risks of those costs efficiently and equitably among
ILECs, competitors or users?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, Everest has chosen not to answer this
question.
3.
To what extent are the returns on ILECs’
investments in new infrastructure uncertain? Is the uncertainty of gaining an
adequate return on each infrastructure improvement (attributable in part to
other firms’ ability to use those facilities to offer competing services)
significant enough to deter investment?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, Everest operates primarily over its own facilities, but
does purchase interconnection trunks from Southwestern Bell as well as some T1s
to serve business customers. The
TELRIC rates charged by Southwestern Bell for these facilities should be
sufficient to allow Bell to gain an adequate return on these wholesale
purchases.
4.
What are the principal strengths and weaknesses
of the FCC’s total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) methodology? What changes could be made to render
TELRIC an effective deterrent to the exercise of market power and conducive to
efficient infrastructure investment?
Would it be possible to construct an alternative methodology that would
not depend on cost information controlled by regulated firms?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, Everest does not have a lot of issues with TELRIC
pricing methodology.
F. Some have suggested that a regulatory dividing line
should be drawn between legacy “non-broadband” facilities and/or services and
new “broadband” facilities and/or services. Is this a feasible approach? If so, how would it work?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, this question does not really affect Everest. If non facilities based CLECs were only
able to offer advanced services if they built their own facilities, this would
severely limit the number of competitors offering service in competition with
incumbent telephone companies.
1.
What effects would change in the regulatory
structure for broadband services and facilities have on regulation and
competition with respect to voice telephone and other non-broadband
services?
This is a
matter of economics.
Telecommunications companies that offer voice services alone will not
generate enough revenue to justify building their own facilities. Everest believes that telecommunications
providers who are restricted to providing voice services only will not exist in
five years.
2.
If ILECs deploy broadband services using a
mixture of new and old facilities, will competitors be able to use the older
shared facilities that they previously had access to?
If ILECs
deploy broadband services using a mixture of new and old facilities, competitors
should be able to use the older shared facilities to which they previously had
access.
3.
If ILECs deploy broadband facilities to replace
portions of their existing copper plant, will the displaced copper plant give
competitors a viable opportunity to offer alternative services? What would be the annual costs to the
ILEC (or to a purchaser of the displaced copper plant) of a continuing
obligation to maintain that plant?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, Everest has chosen not to answer this
question.
4.
What regulations, if any, should apply to new
broadband facilities and/or services to ensure a competitive marketplace?
Since
broadband facilities are not lifeline facilities, there should be little, if any
regulation. However, services
should not be priced below total service long-run incremental cost.
G. To what extent have competitive firms deployed their own (a) transport, (b) switching, and (c) loop facilities? Are those investments limited to particular areas of the country or to particular portions of communities and metropolitan areas? What market characteristics must exist for competitors to make facilities-based investments? Do competitors have the ability to deploy their facilities in ways that minimize costs and facilitate efficient network design?
Everest
has deployed its own transport, switching and loop facilities, including loops
to residences. It is Everest’s plan
to build out the entire Kansas City metropolitan area. While it had been Everest’s original
business plan to build out Tulsa, OK, Minneapolis-St. Paul and Grand Rapids, MI,
Everest has had to contract its original business plans due to the lack of
venture capital available for competitive local telecommunications
projects.
In
terms of whether investments are limited to particular portions of communities
and metropolitan areas, the telecommunications world has always been allowed
free entry and exit with no obligation to provide service to all classes of
customers or all portions of a community.
The ability to pick and choose ceases for broadband service providers
such as Everest, who are providing cable service in addition to
telecommunications service. Anyone
who holds a cable franchise must abide by Section 621 of the Communications Act
of 1934 and cannot limit service territory to particular portions of a
franchised metropolitan area.
Certainly
the availability of venture capital will facilitate the emergence of broadband
service providers. However, because
of the massive losses suffered by investors who backed CLECs that did not have
solid business plans, any CLEC now seeking to attract investment capital is
going to be required to prove out their business plan in a pilot program before
it will receive investor backing.
While
competitors do have the opportunity to design their networks in the most
efficient way to facilitate the deployment of broadband services, the cost of
deploying a last-mile build is very expensive. Municipalities require that all
construction in newer neighborhoods be underground, which is expensive. Overhead deployment, while less costly
than underground boring, is still expensive, particularly when pole custodians
require that each pole be reengineered as part of the make-ready process. Everest has also encountered challenges
with city zoning regulations governing pedestals, power supply units and other
equipment that is necessary to provide service. Given a choice, no one opts to have
these structures in their yards.
Zoning regulations that open up placement of these essential structures
to lengthy protest processes can result in a decision not to build in a
particular municipality.
H. What cable companies are currently
conducting trials to evaluate giving multiple Internet service providers access
to broadband cable modem services?
Describe the terms and conditions of ISP access in such trials. What technical, administrative and
operational considerations must be addressed to accommodate multiple ISP
access? How can cable firms mange
the increased traffic load on their shared distribution systems caused by
multiple ISPs?
Everest
currently is utilizing is own Internet service provider and has not opened up
its network to additional Internet service providers. Allowing multiple Internet service
providers is challenging both from a technical and customer service
standpoint. It is also not
economically viable for an independent start-up last-mile provider to open up
its network for wholesale purposes, since the new entrant needs to maximize
revenue its opportunities to justify a last-mile build, when it has no embedded
customer base.
I. What problems have companies experienced in deploying broadband services via wireless and satellite? What regulatory changes would facilitate further growth in such services? Is available spectrum adequate or inadequate? What additional spectrum allocations, if any are needed?
As
a facilities-based CLEC, Everest has chosen not to answer this
question.
J. How should the broadband product market be
defined? What policy initiatives
would best promote intramodal and inter-modal broadband competition?
The
broadband product market should be defined in terms of downstream speed and
upstream speeds and should include the service provided by telecommunications
(DSL), cable (high speed Internet access provided cable modem) and wireless
providers (MMDS). Everest urges the
administration to back policy initiatives that promote facilities based
competition for the reasons previously stated. This includes making sure all types of
providers have equal access to infrastructure, such as poles, customers in all
types of dwelling units, especially multiple dwelling units, and equal access to
programming, especially local sports programming. While the ultimate goal is to
allow the market to regulate itself, new entrants must be given the opportunity
to compete on a level playing field with products provide have comparable
service to end users. Incumbent telephony and cable providers should not be
allowed to exploit their customer base or access to programming to the detriment
of new providers.
K. Would it be appropriate to establish a single
regulatory regime for all broadband services? Are there differences in particular
broadband network architectures (e.g., differences between cable television
networks and traditional telephone networks) that warrant regulatory
differences? What would be the
essential elements of a unified broadband regulatory regime?
At
some point a single regulatory regime for all broadband services may make
sense. At this time it appears to
be premature. As long as digital
subscriber line service is provided over the copper loop, it makes sense to
maintain the regulatory differences that exist between telephony and cable. A unified regulatory regime should
require that prices not be set below total service long run incremental
cost. As content becomes more of an
issue, there should be continuing concerns about exclusive arrangements between
content providers and vertically integrated infrastructure providers to ensure
that smaller unaffiliated companies are not prevented from gaining access to
programming.
L. Are there local issues affecting broadband deployment
that should be addressed by federal policies? Please provide specific information or
examples regarding these problems.
Should fees for rights of way and street access reflect costs in addition
to the direct administrative costs to the municipalities affected? To what extent do state laws and
regulations limit municipalities’ ability to establish nondiscriminatory charges
for carriers’ use of public rights of way?
Please discuss the most appropriate relationship between federal, state
and local governments to ensure
minimal regulation while removing disincentives or barriers to broadband
deployment.
There
are many local issues affecting broadband deployment. Obtaining franchises from municipalities
has been a huge obstacle for Everest.
Sec. 253 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 permits states to manage
their rights of way in a competitively neutral nondiscriminatory manner, but
most of the cities Everest has dealt with have read that section of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 far more expansively than we believe Congress
intended when it was passed.
Legislation
addressing franchising and rights of way issues was passed in Missouri last
year. In Kansas, the
telecommunications industry introduced legislation that would have radically
altered the existing statutes governing franchises and access to the rights of
way to provide telecommunications service.
Initially the cities thought they could kill the bill and were not open
to compromise. However, when it
became apparent that the bill had the votes to pass, the cities persuaded the
leadership of the Senate and the House to enact a moratorium against franchises
with conditions unfavorable to new entrants and a mandate that required the
cities and the providers would meet to try to hammer out compromise legislation
prior to the 2002 legislative session.
After more than 30 hours of negotiation, the providers and cities have
been able to agree on a bill, which hopefully will pass as is, without
amendments. That is a tall order in
Kansas, as in Congress and most state legislatures. The most objectionable requirements that
cities had been trying to impose on providers prior to the moratorium were:
requiring a franchise from everyone using the right of way, including long
distance companies and dark fiber wholesalers; imposing franchise fees on long
distance and DSL services; imposing franchise fees based on linear foot
occupancy of the right of way; requiring minimum franchise fees, which are
initially set based on linear foot occupancy of the right of way, but have a
floor set at the linear foot amount even after customers are acquired and the
franchise fee converts to 5 percent of gross receipts. These minimum fees have been set at
$1.80 - $2.50 per linear foot, and based on current linear foot occupancy have
ranged from $15,000 to $30,000 per year.
The
compromise bill in Kansas and the bill enacted in Missouri also prohibit any
in-kind infrastructure requirements, such as excess conduit, as a condition to
obtaining a franchise. Excess
conduit requirements raise the costs for the second provider to enter the city,
but facilitate entrance for third, fourth and subsequent providers.
Both
the proposed Kansas legislation and the recent Missouri legislation allow the
cities to issue permits and to charge cost-based fees for use of the right of
way. In the past, these fees have not been cost based.
Based
on our observations in Kansas and Missouri, Everest believes that the best forum
to address franchise and rights of way issues may be at the state level. Everest has found it counter productive
to fight these battles on a municipality-by-municipality basis, but is not sure
a federal, one size fits all solution is in the best interests of all parties
involved.
M. Are there impediments to federal lands and buildings
that thwart broadband deployment?
Please provide specific data.
What changes, if any, may be necessary to give service providers greater
access to federal property?
Everest
has not attempted to serve any federal lands or buildings and therefore cannot
provide information on this question.
N. With respect to any proposed regulatory changes
suggested in response to the above questions, can those changes be made under
existing authority or is legislation required?
As indicated above, Everest believes that the local exchange carrier test should be eliminated from Sec. 623 of the Communications Act of 1934. Everest also believes that the sunset date for the regulations promulgated to implement Sec. 628 ( c ) of the Act should be extended and that the prohibition on exclusive programming contained in Section 628 (b) of the Communications Act of 1934, should be expanded to include terrestrial as well as satellite programming. Now, with broadband deployment in its infancy, most of the controversy has been focused on infrastructure and regulatory treatment issues. Content issues have presented themselves, particularly with regard to local sports programming. Content issues will continue to be challenging, particularly if vertical mergers occur between infrastructure owners and content providers.
CONCLUSION
Everest
would be pleased to have the opportunity to meet with NTIA officials to discuss
our successes and the challenges we face as we roll out our broadband services
in the Midwest.
Respectfully submitted,
Rachel Lipman Reiber
`
Vice President of Regulatory and Government Affairs
Everest Midwest Licensee LLC.
dba Everest
Connections
4740 Grand,
Suite 200
Kansas City,
MO 64112
(816)
714-2972 Voice
(816)
714-2995 FAX
Rachel.Reiber@everestgt.com
[1] 47 U.S.C. 541.
[2] 47 U.S.C. 541 (d) and 47 USC 541(l)(1)(D). As used in this section, the term “effective competition” means that a local exchange carrier or its affiliate (or any multichannel video programming distributor using facilities of such carrier or its affiliate) offers video programming services directly to subscribers by any means (other than direct-to-home satellite services) in the franchise area of an un affiliated cable operator which is providing cable service in that franchise area, but only if the video programming services so offered in that area are comparable to the video programming services provided by the unaffiliated cable operator in that area.
[3] 47 U.S.C. 541 (d) and 47 USC 541(l)(1)(B). As used in this section, the term “effective competition” means that the franchise area is (i) served by at least two unaffiliated multichannel video programming distributors each of which offers comparable vide programming to at least 50 percent of households in the franchise area; and (ii) the number of households subscribing to programming services offered by multichannel video programming distributor exceeds 15 percent of the households in the franchise area.