Copyright 2002 FDCHeMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional
Testimony
July 16, 2002 Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
LENGTH: 1133 words
COMMITTEE:HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
HEADLINE:MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAM
TESTIMONY-BY: JOSEPH T. "JAY" KEEGAN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF U.S. SHIP
AFFILIATION:
MANAGEMENT INC.
BODY: STATEMENT OF
JOSEPH T. "JAY" KEEGAN PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF U.S. SHIP
MANAGEMENT INC.
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE SPECIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON MERCHANT MARINE
JULY 16, 2002
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Panel:
My name is Joseph T. "Jay" Keegan. I am
President and Chief Executive Officer of U.S. Ship Management, Inc. (USSM), and
pleased to be here today to provide brief testimony concerning the importance of
maintaining the Section 2 citizenship policy of the Maritime
Security Program. Congress may decide in the future to expand the number of
ships that participate in the MSP. Congress may decide in the future to change
the amount to be paid for each of these ships for their guaranteed readiness in
the event of a national defense emergency. However, Congress should not now or
in the future modify a well entrenched policy which limits eligibility in the
MSP to American-flagged vessels, with American crews, and which, most
importantly, are controlled by Americans citizens. Whatever limited exceptions
that are provided in the law regarding priorities should, if they are to
continue, certainly not be expanded.
In 1999, A.P.
Moller/Maersk of Denmark purchased the international business of Sea-Land
Service, Inc. which had 19 U.S. flag vessels, 15 of which were enrolled in the
MSP. Since Maersk could not qualify as a Section 2 citizen - Maersk entered into
time charter contracts with my company for these vessels. My company has 42
dedicated and talented shoreside employees and 380 seagoing positions. We are
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina and have offices in Edison, New
Jersey and Long Beach, California. We are ISM certified by the American Bureau
of Shipping for all nineteen vessels which we operate and for our shoreside
operations. As an operator our company is in actual and legal control of the
vessels. Simply put, we operate the vessels. This is consistent with traditional
maritime law and practice. In fact, I understand that approximately half of A.P.
Moller/Maersk's fleet is time-chartered and therefore operated by other foreign
companies.
A.P. Moller/Maersk is a $35 billion
conglomerate headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark, which is equivalent to 20% of
Denmark's GDP.
We understand that legislation is being
advocated by companies like Maersk which demeans companies like mine as
"unjustified middle men" which increase Maersk's costs and add little value to
the MSP. Simply because they have existing relationships with the Department of
Defense, Maersk believes it is entitled to an exception or a change in the law
which would eliminate or substantially modify the Section 2 citizenship policy.
Their existing defense contracts required Maersk to sign Special Security
Agreements (SSA's) which essentially provide that classified material will not
be made available to those who do not have appropriate security clearances.
However, this is not the same as citizenship. The agreement, in a vacuum, not to
engage in unlawful, unauthorized sharing of sensitive material is not a
guarantee which would preclude conflicts between a foreign company's commercial
interests with our national security interests.
I will
be happy to answer questions in more detail after my testimony. However, in
summary there are several reasons which should cause Congress to conclude that
the Section 2 citizenship policy is too critical to our national security to
change.
A.P. Moller/Maersk has financial interests and
conducts business in many countries, some of which could have strong policy
conflicts with the United States. Commercial relationships between Maersk and
such countries could present a clear conflict in the event of a national defense
contingency. Will a foreign controlled company such as Maersk be primarily
concerned about its commercial relationships with such countries or will it
primarily be concerned with our national security? Let's consider a
hypothetical: if our government determines to deploy MSP enrolled ships to the
Taiwan Straits in the event of a national security contingency, I can
unequivocally represent to this Panel that my company will unhesitatingly and
willingly do as asked. However, please consider the factors which a company like
Maersk, which does a huge amount of business with the Peoples Republic of China,
would be forced to consider in the event of such a contingency. For example, I
understand that Maersk has built more ships in China in recent years than any
non-Chinese company. How would such a contingency affect relationships between
Denmark and the Peoples Republic of China? More specifically, how would such a
sealift impact the commercial relationship between Maersk and the Peoples
Republic of China?
There is no good policy reason for
our government to voluntarily inject even the slightest possibility of such a
risk into the Maritime Security Program. When ships in the MSP
are controlled and operated by United States citizens, our national security
interests are paramount. The United States government cannot afford to be
vulnerable to quandaries between a foreign owned company's commercial interests
and our national interests. The citizenship policy guarantees to the DoD that
the vessel will be available under any national defense contingency - including
conflicts in which the United States may become involved that may or may not be
internationally popular. The Section 2 policy is essentially a national security
check and balance which should not be altered. Our companies are not shams. Our
control of these ships is vital to our national security. We provide real jobs
to real people and provide exactly the type of protection intended by Section 2
to ensure our national security.
Section 2 companies
bear the "burdens" of citizenship and should at least continue to exclusively
receive the "benefits" of priority in MSP participation. Foreign controlled
companies are not subject to the full range of U.S. corporate taxes and are
subject to substantially less U.S. regulation.
Equating
foreign controlled "documentation citizens" with Section 2 citizens could be the
first step in undermining the Jones Act.
The Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 states that "it is necessary for the national defense and
development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States have a
merchant marine . . . owned and operated under the United States flag by
citizens of the United States". The Section 2 citizenship policy of the MSP is
based on that foundation. It is a policy that has served our country well, and I
would respectfully submit that it should not be modified.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look forward to
answering any questions which you or any other Panel Member may have.