TESTIMONY OF PETER
PEYTON
ON BEHALF OF 60,000 MEMBERS OF
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION
BEFORE THE
COAST GUARD & MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HEARING ON SECURITY CREDENTIALS FOR PORT PERSONNEL
FEBRUARY 13, 2002
My
name is Peter Peyton. I live and
work in the adjoining ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach California, which
together constitute far and away the largest, commercial seaport area in the
United States. I am equally proud
to be an active member of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (known
as the “ILWU”), which since 1934 has been chosen by the thousands of West Coast
port and dock workers to represent us in all matters related to our
employment. Our union, the ILWU,
presently represents about 60,000 working men and women, not just in the
longshore and maritime industry, but also in warehouse, hotel-restaurant, health
care, mining, office clerical and a variety of other industries in California,
Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii and Canada.
ILWU members are proud to
have the most democratic, rank-and-file controlled union in the United States
and perhaps in the World. This, of
course, is not by luck or accident.
Union democracy, just like state democracy, requires hard work and the
active, persistent and informed involvement of the members and citizens being
served.
So
it should not surprise you to learn that I am not an elected official of the
ILWU, though I did serve one year as Vice-President of the Marine Clerks local
in Los Angeles/Long Beach. On my
first day as Vice-President, I called for a work stoppage because flammable
liquids were being stored beside hazardous chemicals, and hazardous materials
were being loaded improperly and I felt that practice jeopardized the safety and
security of the workplace and the surrounding community.
Like many ILWU members, I volunteer to
serve on various rank-and-file committees, which help develop the policies and
positions of the ILWU. Presently, I
serve on a five member committee called the “ILWU Coast Legislative Action
Committee”. While we deal with all
types of legislative matters affecting the longshore industry, our Committee has
devoted most of its attention to seaport security issues, in general, and S.
1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, in particular, long before the
terrible events of September 11.
Before going further, I want
to thank the Chairman and the entire Subcommittee for the opportunity to share
with you the views of American port and dock workers concerning port
security. For us, port security is
not just one among many issues on the post 9-11 American agenda. For us, port security is a matter by
which we, our families and our port communities live and possibly may die every
single day. If you can imagine
unloading thousands of containers, each filled with unknown items packed by
unknown people at any and all locations throughout the world, and virtually none
of these containers or ships go through any security screening before you, the
longshoreman, work the ship, then you can begin to appreciate the risks and
fears we face every day and understand why port security is our absolute, top
concern. Working these foreign flag
ships is like boarding an airplane, owned, operated and crewed by foreign
nationals, a plane loaded with luggage from countless places and the luggage, for the most part, has
never, ever been inspected! And all
the time you wonder, will it explode? Am I being exposed to some poison or
bio-weapon infecting not just me but my family, friends and neighbors? Think on that and then you can really
see how vital this issue is for us.
We hope you know that the members of the ILWU are committed to making our
ports and surrounding areas safe, secure, and free of criminal or terrorist
activities. It is a simple matter
of survival for us.
And
we hope you can also appreciate that our views on port security are formed by
actual, hands-on experience. We
know better than just about anyone how ports and commercial docks operate and
what are real, and what are imagined security problems.
It
is in this context that we present our views today and urge that Congress amend
S. 1214 to provide for effective, not cosmetic, security measures to protect our
ports and port workers.
The
basic problem with S. 1214 is that it places unwarranted suspicion and burdens
on American port workers by requiring criminal background checks – checks that
lack adequate due process and confidentiality protections – while providing
completely inadequate measures for the inspection and screening of foreign
ships, foreign crew and foreign cargo.
Going back to the airplane analogy because that is something everyone in
this room knows by personal experience, S. 1214 gives us whatever security and
comfort you can find in having our planes handled and operated by screened
workers and yet loaded with uninspected baggage. S. 1214, as currently written, gives us
this type of so-called “security” for our ports. It gives us phoney rather than real port
security. And it does so at the
expense of American workers.
American port workers are
not the enemy or the problem. After
the unspeakable terrorist crimes at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
longshore workers have worked cooperatively with the Coast Guard and law
enforcement to heighten security and to contribute to the effort to secure our
ports and surrounding communities from these threats. This response, of course, is nothing
new. ILWU members have always done
more than their part in providing our country with highly productive and secure
commercial ports in times of war and national crisis.
It
is absolutely contrary to the facts and to the goal of maintaining secure
seaports to treat longshore workers as security risks. Longshore workers are the front-line
defense to terrorism in our ports and a critical part of the solution for
keeping our ports safe and secure.
It is the well-established longshore workforce that knows how things work
best in the ports and, perhaps most importantly, knows who belongs where in the
marine terminals. It is ILWU members who are best able to detect and report
suspicious and unusual activity in the ports. The government should, therefore, enlist
these dedicated workers as partners rather than as suspects in the efforts to
secure our nations ports.
It
is equally critical that the government not respond to the new terrorism against
our country in ways that harm the productivity of our commercial seaports. Excessive or imprudent regulations that
fail to account for the true realities of port operations will only result in
further damage to the national and world economies, at a time when they are in
perilous circumstances. We must
not, through rash government regulation, accomplish the very result our enemies
seek and we are trying to avoid – the disabling of waterfront commerce and
elimination of our civil liberties. Rather, the ILWU urges Congress and the
Department of Transportation to devote needed funding for the development of
port infrastructure to remedy port congestion. In this regard, security measures, in
order to be truly effective and affordable, must be linked and developed with
plans to improve port infrastructure and to relieve port
congestion.
As
a general matter of policy, the ILWU membership opposes background checks on any
workers. During the investigation
of the Interagency Commission on Seaport Security (the Graham Commission) the
ILWU challenged the Commission to prove their assertion that internal
conspiracies are a problem at many of our nation’s ports. We asked them for an example of an
internal conspiracy to commit crimes involving ILWU longshore workers. They could not produce one example of
ILWU workers at our nation’s ports involved in criminal conspiracies. Not one. In fact, the only involvement our
members have with serious criminal activity is reporting to authorities
suspicious activities and cargo. In
previous testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee, we pointed out that the actions of one longshore worker at the Port
of Tacoma led to the largest cocaine seizure in the Port’s history.
The
ILWU and its members, therefore, believe that background checks on incumbent
longshoremen, who have proved their reliability as productive workers, is
misguided. It should be
self-evident that any disqualification or denial of waterfront employment would
wrongly impose unfair penalties on the very people who have served the maritime
industry and who face the greatest personal and financial risks should terrorism
strike U.S ports. In addition,
disqualifying incumbent workers from their jobs, which they have successfully
performed safely and securely, based on past crimes for which they have already
received the legally appropriate penalties, would violate constitutional
protections, including due process and the prohibitions against double jeopardy
and ex post facto laws.
In
Coast Guard workshops and other meetings, the industry has advocated for
biometric credentials. The current
Pacific Maritime Association card is biometric because it includes a
photograph of the worker. The ILWU
longshore caucus met last month and moved to require that every longshore worker
carry this card and that the card be authenticated by a foreman prior to
entering a marine facility. We do
not feel the need to require that additional cards or credentials be issued to
the majority of our longshore workers except for those workers who would be
required to undergo background checks and security clearances . Unfortunately, we are convinced by their
own statements that our employer would like to use a biometric card for purposes
other than security.
The union took the step of meeting with the employers representatives, the Pacific Maritime Association, to discuss ways that management and labor could help beef up security. No commitments to enhance security were made by the employers. In fact, the union never received a response to the attached proposal.
Recognizing the strong push
for background checks from various sources, we urge Congress to ensure that S.
1214 absolutely mandates certain due process and confidentiality protections and
limits background checks just to those persons with security-sensitive
positions. The ILWU believes that
legislation introduced by Representative Corrine Brown (D-FL) wisely places
limits on background checks.
We also make a plea for the addition of several other provisions, such as
increased inspection of containers and vessels, which are absolutely necessary
for true, effective port and national security. We urge that the following be considered
and adopted:
1)
Experienced longshore
workers should not be subjected to intrusive background checks. Workers with established seniority pose
little, if any, risk to port security.
These tenured workers have demonstrated their commitment to the safe and
productive operation of their port.
2)
At a minimum, any government
background checks of port workers must be carefully tailored to accomplish the
objective of promoting national and port security against terrorism. Accordingly, no worker with a past
“criminal record” should be removed from any position, absent a determination,
based on sufficient evidence that the individual actually poses a security risk with
respect to potential terrorism.
After all, the point of any background check is not to add new penalties
for past offenses but to identify individuals who may presently pose a security
risk.
3)
Any port worker subject to
disqualification or to any limitation affecting employment must be given the
right to a meaningful appeal. While
S. 1214 mentions an appeal process, it does not specify the criteria and
procedures to be used. Some have
argued that under the current appeal provision, the only issue for review would
be whether the criminal record check is accurate. This is hardly a meaningful appeal
process. The provision must be
clarified to ensure that the appeal review focuses on whether the individual,
based on all relevant circumstances, poses a threat to port
security
4)
Although S. 1214 strongly
suggests that criminal background checks and any resulting disqualification are
limited to security-sensitive positions, additional language should be inserted
to ensure that this is the case.
5)
The confidentiality
provisions in S. 1214 are inadequate.
Given the nature and massive scope of conducting background checks on
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people, the risk of improper
disclosure and abuse in violation of privacy and other rights looms large. The Senate Bill would allow FBI and
other government reports on individuals to be shared with their employers and
here is where confidentiality begins to be compromised. The best way to ensure confidentiality
is to limit the information given to employers and private parties. The bill should require that only the
results of a check, specifically whether an individual passed or failed the
background check, should be shared with the employer. At the same time, however, the
individual should be entitled to a copy of all information used in his
background check, especially for purposes of a meaningful
appeal.
6)
Any employment security
check program should apply not just to port workers, but to all individuals, no matter their status,
title or rank in any company, who have access to secure areas in port
facilities or access to cargo manifests.
This would include, managers and executives in the maritime industry as
well as truck drivers and vessel crew members. It is equally important for port
security that all individuals, no matter
their physical location, who have free access to cargo and ship manifests,
be subject to the same background checks as port workers. It would be a major breach to the
integrity of any background check program, if the thousands of employees located
in offices outside port areas were excluded from such a program where they have
the same, and often greater, access to manifests than do port
workers.
7)
Many security measures
depend, in large part, on the definition of “security-sensitive positions” and
“secured areas”. The findings in
section 101 of the Senate Bill correctly note that security must necessarily be
tailored to reflect the unique realities of each port and each port
facility. So while the bill wisely
does not define “security-sensitive positions” and “secured areas”, it should be
amended to specify that such terms be defined and applied by the Local Port
Security Committees. It is these
local committees, created in section 104 of the bill, that have the expertise
and knowledge to best determine what areas and jobs need to be treated as
security-sensitive.
8)
As for who will serve on the
Local Port Security Committees and the National Committee, we urge that the
initial language in prior versions of the bill be restored to require, not just
permit, that membership include representatives from private sector maritime
businesses and labor organizations.
Effective security measures can only be developed and implemented with
the active involvement of the industries and people who are most familiar with
port operations and responsible for the implementation of such
measures
.
9)
The containers on vessels
and in port facilities need to be subject to some type of security screening to
protect U.S. seaports and international maritime commerce. Obviously, it is both impractical and
cost-prohibitive to inspect every one of the tens of thousands of containers
that flow in and out of our ports each day. As an effective and fairly inexpensive
alternative, the proposed legislation should at least mandate that port workers
who receive containers inspect the
integrity of the outside seal on each container, including supposedly empty
containers. A broken seal would
alert the port facility that the container has been tampered and that it needs
to be carefully inspected before entering a facility or being placed on a
vessel. A systematic check of
container seals also provides authorities with a record as to the parties
responsible for placing the seal on any container that may be the means of a
terrorist act.
10)
Another equally necessary
security measure is the mandatory inspection of so-called “empty containers”,
which regularly move on and off ships each day. Many countries, including Japan, require
such inspections because of the increased risk that these “empties” pose for the
placement of bombs, weapons and contraband. In fact, inspection of empty containers
on American docks was the customary practice up until a few years ago when
companies decided it cut into profits.
11)
Again, while we recognize
the impracticality of inspecting every container, the legislation should at
least require that cargo be fully documented and subject to on site inspection,
at random, and whenever there is probable cause at the marine terminal before
allowed entry. Clearly, enhanced
random and for cause inspections would provide immeasurable deterrence against
terrorism.
12)
Legislation should require
that trucks pick up and deliver cargo to secure “staging areas” at the entrance
of each marine terminal to protect the terminal and the vessels from terrorist
attack.
13)
The legislation should
require security clearance requirements for all vessels, their owners, operators
and crew before being allowed to enter a U.S. port. Presently, these vessels operate under
secrecy and without regulations by the scheme of flying the flag of a country
that lacks any meaningful regulations and scrutiny. The London Times has reported
that the terrorist group, Al Queda,
presently operates dozens of these flags of convenience vessels. This is made possible by the absence of
meaningful regulation and accountability of flags of convenience
vessels.
14)
The legislation should
require that cargo be fully documented and subject to on site inspection, for
cause or at random, at the marine terminal before allowed
entry.
15)
It is essential that the
proposed legislation be amended to specify that its provisions may not be used in the context of any labor
dispute. Legislation addressing
security concerns should not and must not be cynically used as a means to alter
established federal law concerning labor-management disputes.
I
appreciate the opportunity to submit comments for the record on behalf of the
ILWU and our members. Let me end by
saying once more that it is our deepest wish to work with Congress, the U.S.
Coast Guard and our employers to make sure our nation’s ports are safe and
secure from terrorism as reasonably possible. I am prepared to answer any questions
from Committee members.
Attachment
ILWU PROPOSAL FOR SPECIAL
CLRC MINUTES
RE WATERFRONT
SECURITY
September 20, 2001
The CLRC met to begin
assessing waterfront security issues in light of the terrorist attacks inflicted
on the United States on September 11, 2001. The Coast Parties condemn these
terrorist acts and will not be deterred from performing the work that is so
vital to the nation’s interest.
Accordingly, the CLRC agreed to the following:
1)
The Union and the Employers
pledge to work together to assess the safety of waterfront personnel and the
security of operations covered by the PCL&CA with respect to the threat of
terrorist attacks.
2)
The Union and the Employers,
through the CLRC, will jointly develop any programs and initiatives that they
deem appropriate in response to the threat of terrorist attacks affecting
waterfront personnel and operations covered by the
PCL&CA.
3)
The Employers will promptly
notify the Union of any developments and initiatives, including any actual or
proposed government mandates, that could affect waterfront security or
operations covered by the PCL&CA.
4)
The CLRC will have
Waterfront Security as a standing item of its regular meetings= agenda until such time as
it deems appropriate.
5)
The CLRC instructs all Joint
Port Labor Relations Committee to review Waterfront Security as a standing item
of their regular meeting’s agenda and to report promptly to the CLRC any
problems or proposals for its review and action.
The
CLRC agreed to send copies of these minutes to all JPLRCs by facsimile
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