13. Travel and Migration

Securing the borders of the United States against the entry of criminals, terrorists, illegal migrants, and traffickers in narcotics, weapons, or persons consists of a series of concentric rings of protection, with the Department of State—through its overseas visa adjudication responsibility—providing the outermost ring of security and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) providing security at the border.  The tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated just how critical this mission is to the national security of the United States.

Consular officers abroad must facilitate legitimate travel while preventing the travel of individuals who present security or other threats to U.S. interests.  To do this effectively, consular officers need electronic access to information from border security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies that will assist in identifying high-risk travelers.  Until after the terrorist attacks on September 11, consular officers did not have access to important law enforcement and intelligence information for screening visa applicants. 

Although we have a state-of-the-art visa namecheck system that is regularly upgraded, it is only as good as the information it contains.  In the wake of the terrorist attacks, our longstanding requests for enhanced data sharing with intelligence and law enforcement agencies are beginning to be fulfilled.

We have been continually engaged in efforts to design, deploy, and improve the consular processes, systems, and services that support our goals related to travel to and from the United States.  We have a comprehensive border security strategy that addresses all facets of consular work. 

Meet anticipated increases in demand for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas.
The decrease in immigrant visa (IV) case numbers from FY ’00 to FY ’01 is due to the extremely heavy demand from INS for visa numbers to adjust the status of large numbers of aliens already in the United States.  The nonimmigrant visa (NIV) demand in FY ’01 was higher than projected and would have been even higher, except for the terrorist attacks, which disrupted international travel in the last 3 weeks of the fiscal year.

Accommodate workload increases resulting from new legislative mandates projected at approximately 5 percent.
The Border Biometric Program processed 2,333,967 Border Crossing Cards (“laser visas”) during the fiscal year.  Technical difficulties prevented the implementation in the summer of 2001 of the desired Local Card Production Program.  We now expect to start a local production pilot program in Mexico City in early 2002 and hope to produce 2,000 cards per week.  Since Congress did not extend the deadline on which Border Crossing Cards without biometric indicators expired, demand for new cards surged dramatically and will probably continue through FY ’02.

The event that had the greatest impact on visa processing prior to September 11 was the passage into law in early FY ’01 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, which created two new nonimmigrant visa categories that will involve hundreds of thousands of additional applications.  The first of these new visas was issued on April 1, 2001, and by the end of FY ’01 posts abroad had processed almost 34,000 of them.

Improve management of core consular functions, maximize technology, and improve business practices.
Beginning in 1996, using funds derived from Machine Readable Visa fees, we undertook a major modernization of consular systems.  By March 2001, all visa data collected abroad was being replicated to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD).  In May 2001, consular officers abroad gained access to the Consular Consolidated Database.  The details of visa issuance, once available only to the post taking action, are now available in real-time to all visa offices worldwide.  Visas can be checked at any point in the issuance process against all issued and refused visas worldwide, and consular management in Washington now has access to up-to-the-minute information about visa and passport issuance around the world.  This data and the associated digital photographs of NIV applicants proved to be critical to our ability to support the anti-terrorist task forces after September 11.  As FY ’02 began, we had searched more than 900 nonimmigrant visa records at the request of Federal law enforcement task forces investigating the terrorist attacks.  Passport Services provided law enforcement with 305 records. We used facial recognition software to compare the photographs in our Consolidated Consular Database of the hijackers against other visa photographs, but found no evidence that they had applied using different names. 

During FY ’01, we took steps to enhance the integrity of the nonimmigrant visa by developing a new, even more secure machine-readable visa (MRV).  We are designing a matching machine-readable immigrant visa to upgrade the security of that visa.  We also worked with the Secret Service laboratory to identify a secure ink with which to cancel MRVs that are voided by a consular officer, in order to prevent the “recycling” of expired MRVs.

We continued to work with state officials to raise awareness of the dangers of posting vital records on the Internet, where impostors can obtain information allowing them to steal others' identities.  We also began discussions with a professional association to determine whether CA could participate in selecting the information fields to be entered by SSA as part of a project to automate birth records of the 50 states.  Enhanced security and reliability of birth certificates and other documents submitted in support of passport applications helps to safeguard the integrity of US passports.  In conjunction with this, we also began a pilot program to provide passport adjudicators with electronic means of detecting counterfeited drivers licenses.

The National Visa Center (NVC) processed 364,837 immigrant visa petitions during the fiscal year, and reviewed an additional 63,900 cases for the completeness of various supporting documents before sending the cases to consular sections abroad for action.  NVC also enhanced border security by running approximately 1.67 million National Crime Information Center namechecks for various categories of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.  The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC), established to process the millions of pieces of mail received annually by the Diversity Visa "Lottery" program, began operation.  The concept of both of these centers is to centralize critical processing functions in the United States to allow leaner operations to run at posts abroad.

We developed a Web-based system called INSAMS (INS Allocation Management System), with which INS officers can obtain authorization to use immigrant visa numbers around the clock.  This system, in the pilot stage in three sites, is intended to replace a fax-based system that involves manual data processing of INS requests and operates only during Washington business hours.  The program should benefit both the Visa Office and INS with timesavings and accuracy.

During the year, we coordinated with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee to develop and test a system called the Olympic Visa Information Database (OVID) to issue United States visas electronically on Olympic and Paralympic Identity Cards for accredited participants in the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics.

In January 2001, we sent a cable reminding posts of general guidance for making and removing entries in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) in order to improve the quality and usefulness of the data in CLASS.  We enhanced the capabilities of the namecheck system by deploying a Russo-Slavic namecheck algorithm.  All visa-issuing posts and all passport offices are currently connected to the CLASS system through telecommunications links.

To ensure the availability of information needed for effective visa adjudication, we deployed facial recognition software to the Kentucky Consular Center to combat a problem of multiple Diversity Visa applications under assumed identities. We provided nearly 800 small‑footprint computers to posts in FY ’01 for use in interview windows, making it possible for posts with minimal space to have easy access to online information when speaking to visa applicants.  We initiated a deployment of stand-by Oracle servers to posts, providing a readily available back-up contingency in case of catastrophic server failure.

We continue to rely on Machine Readable Visa fees to finance the salary and basic benefits of over 2,000 American employees who provide worldwide consular services, including adjudication of NIVs and IVs.  In FY ’01, CA funded 35 new entry-level overseas consular positions.  To cover staffing gaps and address increased workload worldwide, we also increased the number of WAE and other TDY assignments from 106 in FY ’00 to 235 in FY ’01 (person/years of assistance grew from 19 to 33 in the same period).  CA provided over $22 million in MRV funds to keep our consular sections functioning.

Ensure training of consular personnel.
CA and FSI worked together to provide 21^st century management tools to consular employees.  CA provided $1.782 million in funding for FSI training for consular personnel and supported FSI regional consular leadership and development conferences for mid-level officers.  Consular trainers made 161 trips to posts for refresher training in automated systems.

Using the consular Intranet home page, we have made up-to-date guidance and reference materials (including consular policy guides and training manuals) available to consular personnel.  We have also used the Intranet to facilitate long-distance interaction between posts and Washington, D.C. and provide on-line training.

In FY ’01, we reissued two anti-fraud self-instructional guides for consular staff, and drafted another.  We conducted four weeklong fraud courses for consular personnel (an increase of 25 percent).  Also during the year, CA’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs provided anti‑fraud training at eight conferences hosted by other Department entities.  These activities helped ensure that consular personnel provide knowledgeable and efficient service to the American public while still preventing the abuse of U.S. citizenship documents.  We provided basic training on fraud issues to approximately 500 new personnel who will be going overseas to adjudicate visas and passports.  Our twice‑monthly sessions provide instruction on detecting fraudulent applications.  The training we offer is not duplicated elsewhere and is essential to the education of consular officers who ultimately protect the security of U.S. borders.

For officers in the field, we provided monthly intelligence on fraud trends and management of fraud prevention programs overseas through our Fraud Digest, supplemented by weekly Intelligence Alerts.  The Alerts also provided the latest information on stolen blank foreign passports.  We distributed daily information on immigration and smuggling trends from INS through distribution of INS's publication, Borderline. 

In November 2000, CA’s Assistant Secretary asked consular offices worldwide to do something we had never done before—to put aside routine work for one day in January and focus on leadership and management issues.  CA and some posts had activities that spanned several days.  Several posts took lessons from private-sector management theory and practice and adapted them to consular work.  At some posts there was a focus on some of the challenges that we, like businesses, must consider: recruitment and retention of employees and potential burnout of middle management.  Unit chiefs at one European post surveyed their staffs to find out areas in which they were succeeding as managers and areas where they could improve.  The chiefs met weekly prior to leadership day to begin thinking about ways in which they personally could make a positive change.  Several other posts held team building and leadership exercises, challenging participants to identify problems and explore solutions. Many posts organized presentations by regional medical officers to talk about stress in the workplace.  Another recurring theme was how to provide consistent, reliable, customer-friendly, and respectful service. This exercise was a useful effort to enrich the professional experiences of consular staff, both American and FSN, and to ensure that we provide a work environment in which each of us can achieve our best.

Share data with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
We are working to widen the flow of information to relevant Federal Inspection Services.  We are mindful of the challenges that INS faces in inspecting millions of foreign visitors at ports of entry.  We have a number of initiatives underway to share additional information with INS in order to improve border security.  The Consolidated Consular Database allows us to make visa information, including digital nonimmigrant visa photographs, immediately available both in Washington and at all consular sections worldwide.  We want INS to be able to make good use of this data, particularly the photographs of the individuals issued visas.

Since the mid-1990’s, State and INS have had a cooperative program which has resulted in State forwarding to INS, for use at ports of entry, electronic data on 55 percent of all immigrant visa recipients.  The two agencies have cooperated in exchanging information at all stages of the immigrant visa process, from approving petitions to issuing legal permanent residence cards.  In FY ’02, we will make certain software changes that should allow complete sharing of immigrant visa information with INS.

State has for some time been prepared to share all of its replicated non‑immigrant visa files with INS as soon as INS is ready to receive it.  Toward that end, in July 2001, we deployed a pilot program to share limited nonimmigrant visa data with INS inspectors at Newark and with the INS forensic document lab.  The program was expanded to Miami in September, and the INS Commissioner pledged to make the data available to all ports of entry early in 2002.  We look forward to the day when we can share this information with all INS ports of entry, as it will give INS inspectors near real-time access to data that will allow them to better detect fraud and facilitate legitimate travelers.  In the meantime, INS inspectors have access to our electronic visa data via telephone contact with the Visa Office.

Since February 2001, information on all lost and stolen foreign passports reported to State has been entered into the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and transmitted to the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). We developed an e‑form by which posts can report lost/stolen/missing foreign passports with U.S. visas in them.  By simplifying the reporting process, we not only encouraged a 500 percent increase in notifications, but also delivered the information to INS for inclusion in the ORION/LEADs system.  The latter achievement adds significantly to the information available to INS inspectors at ports of entry.  In September 2001, transmission of information on lost and stolen U.S. passports to IBIS began in London. 

In August 2001, Diplomatic Security’s connection to CLASS was greatly enhanced to provide support for increasing security needs. Washington-based agents now have desktop access to CLASS.

We have long sought “serious violator” data from the U.S. Customs Service and gained final agreement with Customs for the transfer of approximately 18,000 lookouts beginning in FY ’02.  The lookouts will come from Customs through its direct electronic link to IBIS.  CLASS already transmits its most serious lookouts electronically to IBIS for use by INS and other border inspection agencies.

Reduce the risk of illegitimate entry of aliens hostile to our interest by using all-source information from throughout the U.S. Government to identify foreign terrorists and criminals.
TIPOFF, a counterterrorism tool funded by CA and maintained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), utilizes sensitive intelligence and law enforcement information contributed by the CIA, NSA, and FBI to watchlist known or suspected terrorists.  The objective of the program is to detect these individuals either as they apply for visas overseas or as they attempt to pass through U.S., Canadian, or Australian entry points.  In FY ’01, Canada with which we have shared terrorist lookout information since 1998, began reciprocal sharing. The TIPOFF CRIME program performs the identical functions with regard to members of Russian organized crime groups, but for U.S. watch systems only. The Visas Viper program, created in 1993, solicits information on suspected terrorists from overseas posts for inclusion in the TIPOFF database, as well as for watchlisting in CLASS and IBIS.  The procedural annex of Visas Viper, called TIPPIX, incorporates photographs of terrorists into the TIPOFF and IBIS databases.

TIPOFF can add lookouts directly to the CLASS namecheck database, where they are immediately available to Foreign Service posts worldwide.  TIPOFF records currently comprise over 48,000 of the 5.8 million entries on aliens in the CLASS system.  A subset of these entries, held to a higher standard of biographic data, is also entered in the IBIS port-of-entry namecheck system, operated by INS and Customs.  There are over 23,000 TIPOFF entries in IBIS.

Since its inception in 1987 to the beginning of FY ’02, the TIPOFF program has enabled the Department to detect and deny visas to 741 hijackers, hostage holders, assassins, bombers, and other terrorists.  (Some of these individuals later received waivers of ineligibility either for foreign policy reasons, or to facilitate law enforcement action upon their arrival in the United States.)  Similarly, INS was able to intercept and deny entry to 254 terrorists from 79 countries at 80 different ports of entry; another 11 were arrested upon arrival.

In FY ’01, preliminary figures indicate that there have been 178 true TIPOFF hits for visa applicants checked through CLASS.  Of those, 81 were denied, 14 abandoned their applications, and 4 withdrew applications.  There was insufficient information in the other cases to make a finding of ineligibility under Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  TIPOFF (via the IBIS system) yielded 86 true hits from the terrorism database at ports of entry in FY ’01.  Of these, 38 of the individuals in question were denied entry, and one was arrested.  Three were paroled for operational reasons, and 23 were questioned and admitted.  There was insufficient information in the other cases to deny admission.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 caused other agencies to share a great deal of information regarding terrorists with State.  The number of TIPOFF entries into CLASS ranged from 256 to 364 in June through August 2001.  In September, 990 entries were made.  In early FY ’02, the President directed the creation of an interagency Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to institutionalize the information sharing process.  State is working closely with the FTTTF and the Homeland Security Council on this issue and others related to U.S. border security.

Again this year, we worked with the Department of Justice (INS and FBI) on legislation that would give consular and immigration officers access to certain crime information.  We were not successful in having a bill introduced until after September 11.  This and other provisions we had sought were included in the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted early in FY ’02.  Consular officers now will have access to certain law enforcement and intelligence information that will aid in efforts to keep terrorists and other criminals out of the United States.

The Department is also working closely with the Homeland Security Council, Customs, INS, and other relevant agencies to strengthen border security measures with Canada and Mexico in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  These consultations will continue to be a major priority in FY ’02.

The Department is supporting the efforts of INS to deploy the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) on a nationwide basis.   SEVIS will track foreign students in the United States, and while the project is primarily an INS responsibility, it will likely require changes in some student-visa issuance procedures.  The Department has long maintained a listing of sensitive areas of study which trigger special visa clearance procedures for certain applicants; the Department fully supports the Homeland Security Council's creation of an interagency working group to formalize the process of defining sensitive technologies and areas of study.

The U.S. Government's antiterrorism efforts also received a boost at the end of FY ’01 when a provision that State had proposed was enacted as S. 1424.  That bill made permanent the "S" visa program, which was created in 1994 to support State's terrorism information rewards program and had expired on September 12.  Over the years, the offer of lawful nonimmigrant and potential lawful permanent resident status in return for critical and reliable information concerning criminal activities has encouraged many persons to divulge information to the authorities that otherwise would have been much more difficult or perhaps impossible to obtain. Up to 250 people can receive "S" visa status each year. The President signed the bill on October 1, 2001.