Copyright 2002 Federal News Service, Inc.  
Federal News Service
June 25, 2002 Tuesday
LENGTH: 24101 words

HEADLINE: PANEL ONE OF A HEARING OF THE OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE
 
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
 
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE JAMES C. GREENWOOD (R-PA)
 
LOCATION: RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: TOM RIDGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
 


BODY:
REP. GREENWOOD: The committee will come to order. The chair would announce before the commencement of opening statements that, pursuant to the rules, the chairman of the subcommittee, the ranking member, the chairman of the full committee and the ranking member of the full committee will be accorded five minutes for opening statements. Other members of the subcommittee will be accorded, should they arrive, three minutes apiece. And then, we welcome the participation of other members of the full committee who are not members of the subcommittee. And should they arrive and wish to make opening statements, we will grant them time -- yield them time, the amount of time being dependent upon how many of them there are. And the chair welcomes Governor Ridge, my friend -- glad to have you with us -- and then yields himself five minutes for the purpose of an opening statement.

Good morning. Today, the subcommittee will hold the first day of a multi-part hearing to examine how the Bush administration's proposal to establish a department of homeland security will affect the agencies and the operations over which this committee now exercises principal jurisdiction. Our first witness is the current director of the Office of Homeland Security, and our former colleague and governor, Tom Ridge, who is appearing today in his capacity as the chief of the transition team for this new department.

The president could have made no finer choice in responding to the disaster of September 11 than by appointing Tom Ridge to be director of the White House Office on Homeland Security. The challenge before him is daunting, but those of us who know Tom also know that he has always heeded his country's call. In 1968, while still in law school, Tom Ridge was drafted into the U.S. Army. He fought in Vietnam as an infantry sergeant, and was awarded the Bronze Star. He was the first enlisted Vietnam veteran elected to Congress. Now, he's been enlisted in a new struggle and, true to form, he has labored tirelessly since last September to help improve the security of our homeland and our fellow citizens.

The president's proposal is a bold one. It envisions a department whose mission includes border and transportation security; emergency preparedness and response; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures; and information analysis and infrastructure protection. If approved as now proposed, only the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs would have more employees than the almost 170,000 workers proposed for the Department of Homeland Defense.

Few would dispute the need for consolidation and coordination of the nearly 100 agencies that now share responsibility for these critical tasks. This subcommittee's oversight over the past two years also has demonstrated the need for a single agency to take charge of the responsibility to enhance the protection of our nation's critical infrastructure and key terrorist targets both in the public and private sector. The latter includes several industry sectors over which this committee has principal jurisdiction, including the electricity and telecommunications grids, and our nation's drinking water systems.

And as our hearing last April demonstrated, precious little has been done since 1997 when a presidential blue ribbon panel urged the establishment of a robust public/private partnership to identify critical assets, assess their interdependencies and vulnerabilities, and take steps to mitigate our risks.

Moreover, this subcommittee's oversight with respect to federal counterterrorism R&D programs has raised many of the same concerns. As the General Accounting Office reported to this subcommittee last September, just prior to the anthrax attacks on this city, our federal bioterrorism research programs are scattered throughout a dozen or more agencies, poorly coordinated, and lack a clear sense of priority and focus.

The same is true for the myriad of federal programs aimed at improving the preparedness of federal, state and local governments and emergency response providers to deal with major disasters, terrorist attacks and other public health emergencies. In fact, there were so many such programs within the Department of Health and Human Services itself that in the bioterrorism bill this committee recently shepherded through the Congress, we created a new assistant secretary at HHS just to coordinate all these emergency preparedness and response functions. And this is just one department.

Can there be any doubt why every serious study of this issue has ended in a call for some form of centralization or focal point of coordination in the executive branch? The president's proposal moves us firmly in that direction.

The focus of today's hearing is on the critical aspect of emergency preparedness and response and how the president proposes to improve our national efforts in this area. We cannot move too soon. Yesterday, for example, CNN reported on the new threats being made by a spokesman for al Qaeda, who, in a sickening and warped reference to September 11th, told Americans they should, quote, "fasten their safety belts," and then spoke of the death of up to four million Americans, including one million children through the use of chemical and biological weapons. Although Governor Ridge will testify today on all aspects of the president's proposal, the remainder of our panels and witnesses will focus on the emergency preparedness and response issue, namely Title V of the administration's proposal.

With respect to those functions or programs that are proposed for transfer from any agency to the new department, two questions seem in order. First, how do these programs operate currently? And second, what are the potential advantages or disadvantages to the proposed transfer? In our case, while the president's bill is a useful blueprint, many important questions remain to be resolved. For example, what is the scope of the new secretary's authority over HHS's public health preparedness programs, and how might it alter the current focus on important dual-use programs? Why are some of the agency's preparedness and response programs transferred completely, others transferred partially, and others left unchanged in their respective departments? And for those assets or functions not fully transferred to the new secretary, but under his authority, how does the administration plan to ensure a workable model with one secretary directing the assets or programs of another?

As I said at the outset, the task before the president, the Congress and today's chief witness is daunting, but whatever the challenge, we must meet it. In the midst of the Battle of Bunker Hill, Abigail Adams wrote these words to her husband in Philadelphia, "Dearest friend, the day, perhaps the decisive day, is come on which the fate of America depends." Now, the fate of America rests with us. And of one thing I am certain, unless a spirit of cooperation and trust informs all of our efforts, we are unlikely to succeed. And to be successful, we have a duty to speak plainly to the American people about the clear and present dangers that lead us to this enormous investment and this massive undertaking.

Again, I want to thank the governor -- I want to thank Governor Ridge and all of our other witnesses for agreeing to appear before us today, many on short notice. I will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for an opening statement.

REP. PETER DEUTSCH (D-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Governor Ridge.

This is an issue where I think it is accurately described that there is no light between any of us in the Congress, the 435 members of the House and the hundred members of the Senate. And I think that we stand completely with the president on the creation of this department, which is an integral part of the war on terrorism.

I think if we have learnt anything post-September 11th, it is reminding us that the most fundamental thing that we can do as a government and as elected officials is the security of our constituents. And in fact I think we understand that, unfortunately, prior to September 11th, we were not looking at it quite the way we should. And specifically, I think we acknowledge at this point that terrorists or terrorist states, particularly weapons of mass destruction, are an existential threat to the United States and to our people.

And I think -- Governor, I've read your comments, and I would completely agree with basically all of them, but one I want to focus on, which I think is the -- in a sense, the essence for the creation of the department -- is that at the present time, there really is no one who's responsible or no agency that's responsible -- you are, in your position -- but no agency that is responsible for homeland security.

And my experience in life -- and I think, for most of us, if we think about our experience in life -- is something never gets done correctly unless someone is responsible and in charge. And I think that is the essence of the purpose of this agency, where I think the goal, the need, is absolutely imperative.

I also think the facts of, again, what you have put together and what others have put together at this point specifically show the sort of ad hoc, dispersed nature of some of these responsibilities.

I think, as we move forward -- and I think this is one of these issues where we really are working hand in hand in a very bipartisan tradition in this committee. Although we have many disagreements, we have many agreements as well. We'll disagree, as we did last week on prescription drugs, but on this, I think, there are no disagreements. And I think what we're really looking for is working with you, working with each other, just really trying to make it as good as possible.

And I think we're at the level of details. I don't think that is a case where the devil is in the details. I really don't. I think it's the details of working with you to really try to structure a department that will maximize the imperative that we are successful.

One of the analogies that I have used in talking about post- September 11th and I would add to this creation of this department -- I think there are several World War II analogies, two, really, that I think have been, at least for me and when I've spoken about this, have been very on point. One is clearly, obviously, Pearl Harbor, where the United States really wasn't prepared. And if we look historically, the Japanese might have seen it as a short-term victory, but I think historically, obviously, it was an incredible disaster for them, and had the United States entered the war in the Pacific, which it's unclear whether we would not have -- would have, and I think it was over determined once we entered the war that we would be successful. The another analogy really is the Manhattan Project. And when the Manhattan Project started, it was not over determined that we would be successful in that effort, but if we were not successful, obviously, history would be a lot different.

Governor, I speak to you and I know your commitment is total on this, and I speak to ourselves about this, but I think just as we had no choice but to be successful with the Manhattan Project, I think we have no choice but to be successful with what we are doing to prevent weapons of mass destruction attacking the United States. And I believe that the creation of this department is a critical component of that.

So I look forward to working with you and with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle over the next, really, hopefully, just several months. I think setting the date of September 11 to try to get this resolved by, I think, is doable. As you well know as a former member, we can always argue about things. We'll have enough things to argue about between now and January 20th if we wanted to. Hopefully, we won't. Hopefully, we'll put some real deadlines on ourselves, you know, and force us, you know, with the minutiae of detail, with the minutiae of jurisdiction, hopefully we will get over that and understand that we are all working together for one goal.

So I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman and yields five minutes for an opening statement to the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman, Mr. Tauzin.

REP. W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN (R-LA): Thank you, Chairman Greenwood. And I'm pleased to join you in welcoming Governor Ridge to testify on President Bush's historic proposal for the creation of a new Cabinet- level Department of Homeland Security.

Governor Ridge, I think you and we, too, understand that we are going to play some important roles here, but the truth is that bureaucrats and legislators and even Cabinet-level officials really play a second-place role when it comes to defending the country in this very important time. It's the men and women of the military, of the National Guard, of the fire and emergency response teams and incredible heart and courage of the people of America who are on the front line, the eyes and ears of our country, the first responders, who really have this task at hand. And our job is to help arm them and properly coordinate them.

And I first of all want to thank you because the other side of that coin is that we've learned since September 11th that there can be a lot of finger-pointing in this country when things go wrong, and there can be a lot of people trying to put the blame on someone else for not sharing information or coordinating properly.

You, however, left your job as governor of a great state, at the summoning of our president, and you decided to be the person where the buck stops in coordinating and making sure this doesn't -- this awful finger-pointing exercise doesn't happen again.

And this is the next, obviously, important step in that process to make sure there is someone at Cabinet-level empowerment for whom the final responsibility rests in coordination. And that's an awesome responsibility, sir, and I commend you for taking it on in this temporary position and, frankly, I would hope the president has the good sense to, when we're through with this work, to continue in a permanent position, if you're willing to undertake it.

I wanted to talk just briefly with you this morning about some of our roles in connection with your role in the establishment of this new department.

First, our committee has jurisdiction, and we will continue to have jurisdiction, obviously, over many of the programs at the Department of Energy and National Labs, the Department of Health and Human Services, all of which serve vital roles in preparing and responding to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; all areas where if the spokesman for al Qaeda is real and his statements are believable, all areas of vulnerability that these people hope to exploit. And in these programs, such as the Nuclear Emergency Support Teams, that identify and respond to radiological and nuclear threats, as well as public health programs such as the Strategic National Stockpile of drugs and vaccines that must be stocked and rapidly deployed, this new department will now play an important role. Title 5 of the president's proposal contains a plan for consolidating and coordinating these functions. Well, obviously, we have to help you make sure that that's done properly. That's a critical function as we face new threats.

Secondly, our committee of jurisdiction will continue to have jurisdiction over research and development programs for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures. They're programs that the Health and Human Services Department, DOE and the National Labs, in which the country's top scientists are currently working on new methods for detecting and preventing terrorist attacks. For example, there's improved sensors to detect radiological devices, new scanners to screen luggage and cargo, new technologies to detect and neutralize biological hazards.

Title 3 of the president's plan would transfer many of these programs. And it's important, I think, as we handle this transfer to see what we can do about somehow coordinating the very diverse efforts that are going on at as many as four different labs on the same subject, and to make sure that we get the best in new innovative technologies out there to protect our borders and to make travel in this country as safe as we can make it.

And the third, the country's (sic) jurisdiction -- we'll continue to have jurisdiction over the regulation in many of the nation's most critical infrastructure and assets, including both publicly and privately owned assets in telecommunications, in energy, in safe food and drinking water, as well as many manufacturing facilities in the country that could be targets.

Governor Ridge, I want to thank you for something else, for being accessible to this committee, without subpoena, voluntarily, meeting with us, counseling with us as went through the process post-9/11 of examining all the agencies under our jurisdiction and all these critical assets and where the vulnerabilities might be and what we might do to encourage the agency heads to begin developing protections and countermeasures to make sure these assets were protected. The key is to recognize that most of these critically important infrastructures are privately owned, privately operated, and the only way to succeed is going to be creating the strong private/public partnerships for national security. It doesn't create new regulatory regimes in this country, new bureaucracies that are going to make the economy worse off, but literally relying upon the strength of those private-sector owned and operated entities to work with us in a partnership to make sure that they're protected properly.

We want to point out one more thing that I'll be asking you a couple of questions about. In the meetings we had post-9/11, we were shocked to find out how many of the vulnerability assessments that exist in this country, how many of the detailed plans and drawings of important, critical assets in this country were on the Internet, were available under Freedom of Information for anybody to obtain. And this committee is vitally concerned, as we create this new department, that there are some common standards for vulnerability assessments and there are some real strong amendments to the Freedom of Information Act and other acts that would unfortunately allow some of these -- this critical information to be available to people who might use it as a road map for terror in the future.

We ought to cut a delicate balance here, because we are a free society and we want people to know what our government is doing. But there's a line we have to draw when it comes to providing free to anybody who wants it a road map of how to get into a nuclear plant or how to find a critical telecommunications infrastructure and do something with it.

Finally, Governor Ridge, we just passed the bioterrorism act. This committee was primarily responsible for its development, as you know. There are some conflicts now in the new proposals. We are ready to begin to assess how to coordinate the act we just passed with the new proposal the president just made. We're going to need your help in doing that. We don't want to leave some of the good work we did in bioterrorism undone because we're now changing the structure of things.

Finally, I want to thank the chairman for also calling today Deputy Secretary Claude Allen and General Gordon, who are also going to assist us in this inquiry.

Let me finally say, Mr. Chairman, that yesterday I spent some time with Leader Armey, and I want to inform the committee and the governor that we are sticking firmly to the July 12th timetable. We're going to get this work done quickly, and we in the House are going to finish the work on this critical national proposal, and we're going to do it well. And I want to thank you for helping us do it right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the chairman of the committee and recognizes for three minutes, for an opening statement, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Stupak.

REP. BART STUPAK (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to today's hearing and welcome Governor Ridge. We've spent a lot of time together since September 11th, and I'm sure we'll do more in the future.

Let me say right away that I accept the principle that homeland security is so important it demands a Cabinet-level position. In fact, I was one of the early co-sponsors of some of the proposals put forth by the Democratic Caucus. It's not what caucus put it forward but the idea and the principle that we do need a Cabinet-level position for homeland security.

As such, the secretary serving as head of this department should have the information, the authority and the resources to carry out the task of protecting our citizens and our domestic resources and infrastructure.

That said, however, I believe that members of Congress of both parties want to see a homeland security proposal from the administration that is more than just a mere shuffling of the chairs at the table. If the chain of command for organizations like the Coast Guard and FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, are reorganized, we want to be able to ask about the missions and the staffing and the cost of the change. If information gathering is reorganized, we want to know what intelligence will be collected, how will it be distributed and whether the net change puts information in fewer hands or more hands, and whether it speeds distribution of intelligence or does it encumber it.

Reorganization will come, and the public needs to stay involved, and it needs to make the president, the Republican leadership in the House and the Democratic leadership in the Senate aware of its concerns. And with the chairman's putting forth that July 12th deadline, it's even more important that those concerns are expressed immediately.

Whether reorganization winds up being merely change for the sake of change or a real improvement in protection of our nation will depend on the questions that are asked, the debates that held and the attention paid to the details of the president's proposal.

Again, welcome, Governor Ridge, and I look forward to hearing from you and other witnesses today. And Mr. Chairman, with that, I'll yield back the balance of my time.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman, recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for three minutes, for an opening statement.

REP. ED WHITFIELD (R-KY): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And Governor Ridge, we welcome you to the committee today and look forward to your testimony on what President Bush has described as the biggest restructuring of the federal government in 40 years. We also look forward to the testimony of the witnesses on the other three panels.

I think all of us understand and recognize that this is a complex piece of legislation, and it will be interesting to determine exactly how the new Department of Homeland Security will interact with the existing agencies in working out the areas of responsibility and who has direct authority.

So I'm looking forward to the testimony today as we embark on this very important legislation, and thank you for being here.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman.

And the chair notes the presence of the two gentleladies from California who are members of the full committee but not members of the subcommittee. We welcome your participation. The chair also recognizes the presence of the gentleman from California. The chair will grant each of you three minutes for an opening statement, beginning with Ms. Capps.

REP. LOIS CAPPS (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and welcome and thank Governor Ridge for yet again coming before us with information and insight into what is happening with this restructuring effort.

I don't have formal remarks. I'm very eager to get into the conversation of this.

But let me just state that having come to Congress after putting in a couple of decades's work -- worth in public health in my community, that I am very eager to hear how this appropriation which we have done, and how this legislation, which I helped also to be part of the preparation for the great bioterrorism preparedness bill, those resources need to get into the hands of the first responders. And each time I go back to my district, the safety and health people there are wondering and asking. And I'm very concerned that we do with all haste, while this restructuring is very preoccupying that, and I can understand that, that we don't forget that our mission really is in the local communities, because that's where this battle and this preparedness needs to be waged.

So I will be yielding back my time and looking forward to the conversation. Thank you very much.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentlelady and yields three minutes to the other gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman.

REP. JANE HARMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd also like to thank the chairman of the full committee for personally inviting me to participate.

Good morning, Governor Ridge. I would hope that once we set up this Department of Homeland Security you would not have to spend the entire summer testifying before Congress ever again.

I think this concept is very important. As you know, many pieces of it were borrowed from legislation some of us introduced on a bipartisan basis up here. You have put them in a different order, but I am proud to support your proposal and am one of the original co- sponsors of the Armey bill that was introduced yesterday. I think that we can up here contribute a few refinements which would help the legislation be more successful.

And I just want to address one area right this minute in my remaining few seconds, which is public-private partnerships. You were nice enough to participate last week in a really spectacular meeting that 12 members co-hosted on a bipartisan basis called, "Technology and Terrorism." We had 120 CEOs up here and they were talking about their frustration with connecting their technologies into our homeland security effort. The mechanism for doing this needs to be refined in this department. H.R. 4629, introduced by Congressman Tom Davis, has some very good ideas in it. But I would hope as we proceed that we do refine this procurement process.

Secondly, I said "public-private partnerships." On the partnership point, the government, at the federal, state and local level, must work more closely with private entities to ensure homeland security. The government is responsible for providing security for citizens, but the private sector shares the responsibility to protect against attack or disruption, and it controls many of the assets needed to do so.

When we have questions, I'll ask you more about this. But let's -- I hope, as a committee, especially one focused on commerce, lend our expertise, working with your office, to make the public-private partnership piece of this legislation more effective.

I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentlelady and recognizes for three minutes, for purposes of opening statement, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Stearns.

REP. CLIFF STEARNS (R-FL): Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Ridge, you're going to have a lot of patience in life. Gee! The governor of Pennsylvania might look pretty good to you after this process. (Scattered laughter.)

We all just think you're doing a great job, and we're here to support you in any way we can.

And we're just glad as a U.S. citizen you're willing to tackle this. Most of my speech, Mr. Chairman, I'll make part of the record by unanimous consent.

I think it's already been pointed out that not since, I guess -- the creation of such an enormous department like this, encompassing a vast organization of government resources, has not been attempted since the National Security Act of 1947. I think one of the concerns some of us have, Governor Ridge, is that while we take all this organization and move all these departments together, what about the intelligence failures? And what are we doing to streamline within a department if you just take all these departments and put them together and do nothing to change the individual departments and streamline them and give them more high-tech equipment and make sure that these departments are talking to each other? You know, that would be the question, is the president's proposal adequate in that respect?

Two FBI units, the National Domestic Preparedness Office and the National Infrastructure Protection Center, would be transferred to the new department under the president's plan, but what about reform or transformation of the FBI, of the CIA, related to counterterrorism? You know, in light of what we learn and what we see in Time and U.S. News Report, there's got to be something done there, and I think it would be a false assumption for Americans to think just making this new homeland security is going to solve all the problems.

We on the Energy and Commerce Committee are very concerned about some of our jurisdiction and how that's going to work, because once we have a department getting its funds through you yet the department remains in one agency, how is that going to work?

So you have a daunting task ahead of you, and I want to commend you, and I assume you're part of the wellness preparedness program the president has of running every day and making sure you're not stressed out here. So Godspeed to you, and thanks for testifying.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes for three minutes the gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman.

REP. HENRY WAXMAN (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, Governor Ridge, to this hearing. I'm very glad to have this opportunity to further examine the Bush administration's proposal for the Department of Homeland Security. The proposal raises many questions of importance to this committee as well as other committees.

I'm very concerned about the proposed transfer of important public health functions of the Department of Health and Human Services. I believe that the transfer of these functions may undermine the rebuilding of core public health capacities that is now under way. If our public health system is structured and viewed exclusively through the lens of fighting terrorism, it may seriously weaken our ability to respond to other threats to the health of the American people.

It appears that several HHS offices are to be transferred. These include Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System and the Metropolitan Medical Response System. With these offices may go significant authority to oversee our nation's response to public health emergencies. Such a transfer may also shift to the Department of Homeland Security the power to make bioterrorism and emergency preparedness grants to state and local public health systems. These grants were a cornerstone of the recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act. Their purpose was not only to fund specific preparations for bioterrorism; just as critically, the grants were intended to turn around decades of neglect of our nation's public health infrastructure.

It is beyond argument that our public health system is in disrepair and we cannot protect our citizens from bioterrorist attacks if our public health system is not working. Detecting and responding to a bioterrorist attack is just like detecting and responding to other emerging epidemics. It requires fully functioning and coordinated public health systems at the local, state and federal levels. For this reason, the bioterrorism bill directed HHS to coordinate the repair of federal, state and local public health systems as part of bioterrorism and emergency preparedness.

The expertise to establish priorities and coordinate this effort lies with the public health experts and scientists at HHS and CDC. If priority-setting, coordination and/or grantmaking functions are transferred to a new department focused on terrorism, I'm very concerned that the necessary rebuilding and upgrading of our public health response system will take a back seat. If we attempt to protect ourselves against terrorist attacks at the expense of our nation's public health system, we may find that we have undermined, rather than enhanced, our nation's true security.

I thank you for this opportunity for an opening statement, and look forward to working with you, Governor Ridge, on this very important issue.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman.

Governor, you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing and, when doing so, has had the practice of taking testimony under oath. It's my understanding that you have no objection to offering your testimony under oath?

MR. RIDGE: (No audible response.)

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair also then advises you that under the rules of the House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. My understanding is that you don't feel the need to be advised by counsel this morning. That is correct?

MR. RIDGE: (No audible response.)

REP. GREENWOOD: Then, if you'll stand and raise your right hand, I'll just read the --

(Oath is administered.)

REP. GREENWOOD: Thank you, Governor. You are under oath, and we look forward to your testimony. And please begin.

MR. RIDGE: Chairman Greenwood, -- (off mike) -- committee members, I certainly appreciate the opportunity to testify --

REP. GREENWOOD: With microphone on. (Laughs.)

MR. RIDGE: -- in support of the president's historic proposal to unify our homeland security efforts under one Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, all of America has risen to the challenge of improving the security of our homeland. In partnership with Congress, with states and localities, with law enforcement, with the private sector and academia, America has made great progress in securing its borders, preserving its way of life and security of its citizens.

The president believes our nation must now take the next critical step by unifying our efforts under a single Department of Homeland Security. Only Congress can create such a department, and I'm here today to personally convey the president's deep desire to work with members to accomplish this goal. The president believes the creation of a single department with a single clear line of authority that quite a few of the members of the committee have discussed would not only improve our preparedness for a future attack, but also strengthen these partnerships, thereby helping prevent a future attack.

Earlier this month, the president signed an executive order appointing me as director of the Transition Planning Office for the Department of Homeland Security, to be housed within the Office of Management and Budget. While I will still retain the title of assistant to the president for homeland security, my testimony today will be given as the director of this new entity.

This proposal was the result of a deliberative planning process that really began with an effort led by Vice President Cheney a year ago in May of 2001 and continued as part of the mission of the Office of Homeland Security when it was created on October 8th, 2001, as well. My staff and I have met with thousands of government officials at the federal, state and local levels, with hundreds of experts, and many, many more private citizens. Throughout these discussions, we have constantly examined ways to organize the government better.

The president's proposal also draws from the conclusion of many recent reports on terrorism, reports by blue ribbon commissions such as Hart-Rudman, Bremer and the Gilmore commissions, as well as a variety of reports from the many think tanks who have really investigated the issues relating to international terrorism and homeland security over the past several years. It also draws, admittedly and proudly I might add, from the legislative proposals of congressmen and congresswomen, including Mac Thornberry and Jane Harman, Ellen Tauscher, Jim Gibbons, Saxby Chambliss and others, along with Senators Joe Lieberman and Arlen Specter and Bob Graham.

This historic proposal would be the most significant transformation of the United States government since 1947. The creation of this department would transform the current, rather confusing patchwork of government activities related to homeland security into a single department whose primary mission -- whose primary mission -- is to protect our homeland.

Responsibility for homeland security is currently dispersed among more than 100 different government organizations, and the president believes -- and I sense that it is a belief shared with many members of the Congress of the United States, both chambers, both parties -- that we need a single department whose primary mission is to protect our way of life and our citizens; a single department to secure our borders, synthesize and analyze intelligence, combat bioterrorism and direct federal emergency response activities.

The proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security is one more key step, Mr. Chairman, in the president's national strategy for homeland security. Like the national security strategy, ladies and gentlemen, the national strategy for homeland security will form the intellectual underpinnings to guide the decision-making of planners, budgeters and policymakers for years to come. From securing our borders to combatting bioterrorism to protecting the food supply, most of the initiatives of the federal government in pursuing -- excuse me -- the majority of the initiatives the federal government is pursuing as part of our strategy to secure the homeland have already been discussed publicly. We will certainly refine them with the national strategy. The strategy will pull together all of the major ongoing activities and new initiatives that the president believes are essential to our long-term effort to secure the homeland.

Now permit me, if you will, just a few comments with regard to details of the president's plan.

Preventing future terrorist attacks must be our number-one priority. Because terrorism is a global threat, we must have complete control over who and over what enters the United States. We must prevent foreign terrorists from entering and bringing in instruments of terror, while at the same time facilitate the legal flow of people and goods upon which our economy relies.

Protecting our borders and controlling entry to the United States has always been the responsibility of the federal government, yet this responsibility is current dispersed among more than five major government organizations in five different departments. The new department would unify authority over the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture and the recently created Transportation Security Administration. All aspects of border control, including the issuing of visas, would be informed by a central information-sharing clearinghouse and compatible databases. It will be greatly improved in that process.

The new department would unify government's efforts to secure our borders and the transportation system that move people from our borders to anywhere in this country within just a matter of hours.

Although our top priority is preventing future attacks, Mr. Chairman, we cannot assume that we will always succeed. We cannot assume; it would be perilous to assume that we could create a failsafe system. Therefore, we must also prepare to recover as quickly as possible from attacks that do occur.

The Department of Homeland Security will build upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency as one of its key components in this effort. The new department would assume authority over federal grant programs for local and state first responders, such as firefighters, police, and emergency medical personnel, and manage such critical response assets as the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.

It would build a comprehensive National Incident Management System that would consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into one genuinely all-hazard plan. The department would ensure that response personnel have and use equipment and systems that allow them to communicate with one another.

As the president made clear in his State of the Union address, the war against terrorism is also a war against the most deadly weapons known to mankind -- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. If our enemies acquire these weapons, there is no doubt in anyone's mind, I believe, that they will certainly use them. They will use them with consequences potentially far more devastating than those we suffered on September 11th. Currently, efforts to counter the threat of these weapons are too few and they're too fragmented. The president believes we must launch a systematic national effort against these weapons that is equal in size to the threat that they pose, and the president's proposal, we believe, does just that.

The new department would implement a national strategy to prepare for and respond to the full range of terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Homeland Security would set national policy and establish guidelines for state and local governments to plan for the unthinkable, and direct exercises and drills for federal, state and local weapons of mass destruction response teams. At the very heart of this particular feature of the president's proposal is developing even stronger partnerships with the state and local first responders. The homeland will be secure when the hometown is secure. And that's why the president believes very strongly that we need to have this relationship with the state and local governments, and built in that relationship is the federal support for kind of equipment and drills and training essential to build a national capacity to be able to respond to these threats.

The Department of Homeland Security would provide direction and establish priorities for national research and development, for related tests and evaluations, and for the development and procurement of new technology and equipment. And additionally, the new department would incorporate and focus the intellectual power of several important scientific institutions, including our National Labs, in this effort.

Finally, preventing future terrorist attacks requires good information in advance. The president's proposal recognizes this and would develop a new organization with the authority and the capacity to generate and provide such critical information. The new department would fuse intelligence, integrate intelligence from multiple sources, and other information pertaining to threats to the homeland, including information from the CIA and the FBI, as well as the NSA, INS, Customs, and the many other departments and agencies that have an information-gathering, intelligence-sharing capability within this country.

It would also comprehensively evaluate the vulnerabilities of America's critical infrastructure, to which many of the members have alluded, and map the pertinent intelligence against those vulnerabilities for the purpose of identifying protective priorities and supporting protective steps being taken either by the department, other federal departments and agencies, state and local agencies, and the private sector.

Individuals that work for the organizations tapped by President Bush for the new department are among the most talented and certainly the most capable patriots in our government. We are proud of what they are doing to secure our homeland and we call upon them to continue their crucial work while the new department is created. This consolidation of the government's homeland security efforts can achieve great efficiencies and free up additional resources over time for the fight against terrorism. They should rest assured that their efforts will only be improved by the government reorganization proposal made by President Bush. To achieve these efficiencies, the new secretary will require considerable flexibility in procurement, integration of information technology systems, and personnel issues.

Even with the creation of a new department, ladies and gentlemen, there will remain a strong need for a White House Office of Homeland Security. Homeland security will remain a multi-departmental issue and will continue to require inter-departmental collaboration and coordination. Additionally, the president will continue to require the confidential advice of a close assistant. Therefore, the president's proposal intends for the existing Office of Homeland Security to maintain a strong role. The president believes this will be critical for the future success of the new office itself.

During the transition period, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Homeland Security will maintain vigilance and continue to coordinate the other federal agencies involved in homeland security. The president appreciates the enthusiastic bipartisan response from Congress and is gratified by the expressions of optimism about how quickly this bill might be passed. Until the Department of Homeland Security becomes fully operational, the proposed department's designated components will continue their mandate to help ensure the security of this country.

During his June 6 address to the nation, the president asked Congress to join him in establishing a single permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission: securing the homeland of America and protecting the American people. Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. We know that the threats are real and the need is urgent. And, working together, we all know we must succeed in this mutual endeavor.

President Truman did not live to see the end of the Cold War, but the war did end. And historians agree that the consolidation of federal resources was critical to our ultimate success. Ladies and gentlemen, my colleagues in this effort, we, too, have that opportunity for leadership and to create a legacy that will benefit future generations as well.

I thank you for the attention you've given my remarks and your public expressions of both desire and will to work together to achieve our mutual goal, and that's reorganizing government to enhance our ability to protect our fellow citizens and our way of life. And I thank you very much.

REP. GREENWOOD: Thank you, Governor. Thank you very much.

The chair recognizes himself for five minutes for purposes of questions.

Governor, as you know, this committee worked hard to pass the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. And the title of that act, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, was meant to underline the dual-use nature of the programs and the grants that we wanted to create.

We directed the secretary of Health and Human Services in that statute to award grants to states, cities, hospitals and other healthcare facilities and providers to enhance education, training, supplies and equipment at the local level for bioterrorist attacks and other public healthcare emergencies, many of them naturally occurring.

The -- we noticed that in the bill, DOJ -- we did that because we know that DOJ and FEMA were geared toward more traditional first responders such as fire and police. We wanted to get these grants out to the healthcare providers. In the president's homeland security proposal, these bioterrorism programs would be continued to run through HHS, but the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security can essentially control the HHS programs by establishing its parameters and setting its priorities.

So, the question is, how do we make sure that these resources are there to prepare for an assault by West Nile virus or a new strain of influenza so that we have preparedness for the naturally occurring disasters and still be prepared for possible terroristic -- bioterroristic attacks? And how do you see the secretary coordinating those concerns?

MR. RIDGE: Mr. Chairman, first of all, you and your ranking member in the committee need to be congratulated once again for the extraordinary effort on the bioterrorism measure. It went a long way in help focusing the departments and the government on the critical need not only for now, but for the future, of dealing with this issue.

You raise a very important issue that hopefully is dealt with to your satisfaction within the legislation. You note very appropriately that the public health system really is a dual infrastructure. Whether the microbes of an infectious disease are brought to us in an envelope from a terrorist or as a result of Mother Nature, it's still problematic to citizens and communities.

The Health and Human Services will continue to have an independent funding stream to direct their resources to the dual infrastructure, the CDC and NIH and other laboratories and research facilities as well. But by specific legislative language included in this proposal the president submits to you, there is a direct responsibility for the new Cabinet secretary to cooperate and coordinate and establish priorities in conjunction with the secretary of Health and Human Services.

It, incidentally, is a partnership that predated the legislative proposal. Secretary Thompson has worked very, very closely with the Office of Homeland Security and the White House, and, in fact, Secretary Thompson and his people worked closely with us on the language of this legislation. So, your interests are appropriate in ensuring that the collaboration that preexisted this proposal continues to exist. And we believe that the language in the president's initiative ensures that.

REP. GREENWOOD: On kind of a day-to-day basis, I mean, what happens if the secretary of homeland security calls up the secretary of HHS and says, "I'm concerned about some intelligence that we're gathering about the potentiality of a bioterrorist assault in a particular part of the country, and I'd like to marshal some CDC forces out there and push packs and so forth."

And the secretary of Health and Human Services says, "I don't think we can spare that right now. I'm worried about an outbreak of a pathogen, naturally occurring, that the CDC's been monitoring in another part of the country." And the two secretaries become less than congenial in their cooperation. How do you see that being resolved?

MR. RIDGE: Well, I think there would probably be a two-step process.

First of all, since the president seeks to retain the Office of Homeland Security within the White House, that will continue to have a coordination role, the matter may be resolved by the intervention of the assistant to the president, bringing the parties together. It's a process that we've used on several occasions internally, and I suspect that would be used again. Again, I believe that's at the heart of the president's decision to keep that assistant to the president for homeland security operational within the White House.

But secondly, obviously, if there's a disagreement between Cabinet members or among Cabinet members, the ultimate tie-breaker is the president of the United States.

REP. GREENWOOD: And so it's your understanding that the secretary of Homeland Security would not be able to say to the secretary of Health and Human Services, "I've listened to what you've said, appreciate your concerns. Now do what I tell you." That's not --

MR. RIDGE: The --

REP. GREENWOOD: -- they wouldn't have the power to override unilaterally --

MR. RIDGE: I believe the president preserves the autonomy of both the Cabinet secretaries. Clearly, the intelligence information that would be available to the secretary of Homeland Security would also be available to the secretary of the Health and Human Services. And based upon that information, based upon vulnerability assessments that are available to both, it would hopefully result in agreement on joint action. But in the possible event that there -- a difference of opinion would arise, there are ways -- there are tie-breakers available to move quickly.

REP. GREENWOOD: Thank you, Governor. Appreciate that.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for five minutes.

REP. DEUTSCH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I guess my focus is really a follow-up of what the chairman mentioned. And I think now we're getting into, you know, some of the details.

I think there really is a concern, just trying to flesh out this issue, of how we envision -- because we actually think we've done a good job and are doing a good job and continue to make strides in the public health area -- that, you know, taking public health into -- or what would be left -- what is your envisioning of what would be left in HHS of public health issues after the Department of Homeland Security takes out this significant component?

MR. RIDGE: Well, the most critical pieces, I believe, of our public health infrastructure, NIH and CDC, remain an integral and robust part of the Health and Human Services research effort, outreach effort and response effort. And so I think the point of the legislation is to create an environment and a means by which the secretary of Homeland Security, working in collaboration with the secretary of Health and Human Services, and understanding that the research infrastructure pre-existed the Department of Homeland Security and has that long-standing relationship with Health and Human Services -- NIH, CDC and the other laboratories to which they may refer research -- that infrastructure continues to exist. And Health and Human Services will obviously still have the opportunity to come up and work with Congress on public-health-related issues specifically.

But as they work on health-related issues, bioterrorism issues, there will be that collaborative relationship between the two departments. And when it comes to local preparedness, that grant program that heretofore had been in Health and Human Services will be shifted to the Department of Homeland Security.

It would be in everyone's best interest, however, recognizing the dual nature of the infrastructure that exists out there in the public health system, that the work is done in collaboration. And that's the specific reason that the secretary of Health and Human Services is mentioned in this legislation in Title 3, I believe.

REP. DEUTSCH: And again, this is not really in any way a critique, but really just trying to get the best result.

MR. RIDGE: Right. I understand. I understand. We're all working trying to refine it.

REP. DEUTSCH: And I think this is, again, just focusing on this issue specifically -- and you just mentioned it -- that our understanding is that the public health funding mechanism that HHS does, the department will take over all of that and theoretically, again, within your mission as -- or not your person, but the mission of the new department.

This is, again, I guess where the concerns lies is that -- you know, in my opening statement I talked about the fact that I think people do a much better job -- in fact, it's a necessary condition that they have responsibility, that they have goals and that they achieve those goals. Unfortunately, a lot of the things related to public health are not what we, I think, really envision your goal as a new department. And I guess the concern I have, and I think many of the members of this subcommittee and committee share, is that if anything, we need to be pushing forward on all sorts of public health issues that are really not a component of -- as you in your answers previous to this -- are not really a component of bioterrorism or chemical -- you know -- potential weapons of mass destruction against the United States.

So how do we -- I mean, I understand what you're saying. But as we're structuring an agency, how do we -- how do we deal with this concern? I think it's a very real question. And I know you've responded in a sense, but --

MR. RIDGE: I think you raise a very important point, and you've offered -- as all the committee members have -- to work with us on refining the language so that it continues to meet the goals of the president as well as the committee's goal of continuing to build up a public health infrastructure that has been -- that has deteriorated over the past decade or so for lack of funding. And that refinement we'll just have to work with you on as we go about moving this legislation forward.

But it is clear that the public health infrastructure -- any investment from -- either directly from Health and Human Services or Homeland Security, will end up of having dual value; one in combatting terrorism, another just making our public health system more robust and, frankly, long-term, improving the overall health of the country generally. So working out that refinement with you and the language to make sure that we meet both objectives is certainly something we would want to do.

REP. DEUTSCH: I see my time is running out. I'd just like to ask one much more general question, which is what lessons have we learned, and going forward at this point, in the creation -- obviously we talked about what happened post-World War II in the creation of the national security apparatus. But really the more recent agencies -- the Department of Energy, other agencies, in terms of their creation. And I've read a number of press accounts of just historically or interviews of people that the creation of a new department, almost by definition, has inherent bureaucratic problems in terms of staffing issues, in terms of other issues.

I mean, how are you approaching the just systemic problems of, you know, creating that large a bureaucracy? And what's the apparatus that you have in place at this point to deal with some of those acknowledged issues that you will face?

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, first of all, the legislation provides from the effective date a year transition period, because clear your ability to aggregate all these people and all these departments and the infrastructure is certainly going to take some time. And so there's a year transition process. And you and I can well imagine that it will probably take even longer than that to get the kind of specific changes and refinements we need to maximize the effectiveness of this organization. But we've got a good period of time, a year transition.

Secondly, the president has asked in his proposal that the new secretary be given more flexibility and greater agility in order to deal with issues such as the information system integration procurement, and for that matter, personnel. And depending on the wish and will of the Congress of the United States, investing in the new secretary the ability -- the flexibility to deal with some of these issues I think will depend on how quickly we can get the system operating to maximum effectiveness.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes for five minutes the gentleman -- chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin.

REP. BILLY TAUZIN (R-LA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor Ridge, I hope you'll give me a minute just to get something off my chest. There's a lot of work in this bill and a lot of work that I know you're doing in terms of securing our borders, and they need to be secured. But there are three points I want to quickly make. One is that the instruments for terrorists to use against our people are here. The jet fuel that was exploded at the World Trade Center and here at the Pentagon was made in America. And the airplanes were built in America. And the fuel trucks and the ambulances that a couple of people in New Jersey were trying to buy this week are made in America. And I suspect that we haven't paid enough attention to that; we had better. That someone with an evil intent against our people doesn't have to bring a doggone thing in through out borders. We've got a lot of stuff right here in America that they can turn against us if they're evil enough and intentional enough to do it.

Secondly, the terrorists are here. They're not in Afghanistan. If anybody has not seen jihad in America, pick it up from PBS. The cells are operating not just in New York and Washington, but in little communities all over this country, in St. Louis and New Orleans, in Kansas City and communities all over this country. They're here. They're operating. And they've come in under student visas. In the 1990s, I started an effort to try to do something about student -- could not get any traction to the issue. But we've let people in under student visas and left it entirely up to the school to track their movements. Some of them have never registered to go to school. If they did register in school in English, they could switch to chemical engineering, or nuclear engineering, for all we know, and nobody ever notified the State Department.

And if they graduated or if they left, nobody notified the State Department. And they've settled in in communities all over this country. And we need to face that fact. We've let them in and they're here, and they're waiting for new instructions. We had better face that fact.

And the information they need to do us harm is so readily available in a free society that we really have to be careful. In the 1960s, '70s, in the state legislature in Louisiana, I tried to pass a bill to require the desensitization of something as common as ammonium nitrate fertilizer to make sure you couldn't mix it with fuel oil and make a bomb. Couldn't get any traction on it. This committee held hearings on that issue. A guy named McVeigh simply had to go in an ag center and buy some fertilizer and go to a hardware store and buy a few canisters of butane gas, and he built a bomb that took down a federal building. We predicted that in the 1970s when we were debating whether we should desensitize ammonium nitrate fertilizer before it sold in the public market.

Information about how to do that is on the Internet. Information about how to use thousands of available chemicals and products we make in America to turn them into weapons of destruction -- here in America, not imported, not bringing a doggone thing in through a ship or plane, right here in this country -- the information about how to use those things is readily available.

You've got an awesome task. We have an awesome task. But we have to face some facts. We've let the enemy in, he resides among us, and he's prepared to use the things, the common things in our lives to turn them against us, to do us harm. And a free society, a nation that prides itself on freedom of information and a free access to goods and supplies and information, suddenly is challenged about how to balance all those incredibly important rights that make us special, make this country special against now the threat that lives at home with us in our own neighborhoods. And this department is going to be critical.

And I want to ask you a couple of question about it, but I wanted to make that statement first because I hope everyone realizes just how serious this business is and how creating a department with the absolute "buck stops here" authority to organize and coordinate and to do anything within our legal system to stop these people from harming our citizens here in America now, unlike any threat we've faced in the history of our country, is going to be simply awesome. And we've got to do this thing right.

I noticed in the president's proposal, for example, that the freedom of information changes, the changes you recommend being made about providing new protections against public disclosure of some sensitive information is limited only to information that's provided voluntarily and is -- and is provided by non-federal entities with respect to critical infrastructure activities.

I wonder why that's limited? I wonder why -- why, when the government compels a private entity such as a safe water drinking facility or a electric-generation facility or a manufacturing plant that's manufacturing critical components, when the government complies (sic) it to submit a vulnerability assessment and it's under government requirement, mandate, to do so, why we couldn't protect that information as much as we would protect information that's voluntarily supplied. I hope you'll look at that.

MR. RIDGE: I will.

REP. TAUZIN: I hope you'll look at whether or not the non- federal entity limitation is a good one or whether there's some federal entities that may supply information to your -- to our new Department of Homeland Security that ought not be in the public domain, that may be accessible by the right persons in the government, but nevertheless protected from disclosure on the Internet, because it may open the door to some sort of road map for destruction. We need to be careful, very careful, about that as we go down -- go down to the future.

I notice in the bill, Governor Ridge, that one of the R&D programs, nuclear smuggling, is exempted from complete transfer to the homeland security office, that it suggests instead that DOE jointly operates the program. I wonder if that isn't a better model for a number of the R&D programs. And I would -- you don't need to respond today, but I would love your office, before we act on this proposal, to explain to us why that model wouldn't work for a number of the other R&D programs which are equally sensitive as nuclear smuggling might be in terms of joint operation, rather than simple, pure transfer out of the department.

I want to emphasize the points that Mr. Waxman made about our public health entities, and I believe Chairman Greenwood made it, too. When we debated the bioterrorism bill, we were very, very careful not to create a special unit at the CDC that's strictly related to terrorist attacks to our public health system, because, frankly, when an outbreak of infectious disease hits or something else happens in this country, we don't know at the start how it happened. We just know we've got a problem on our hands. CDC has to respond whether it's a terrorist or whether it's a natural pathogen in our society. And we've got to be careful that we don't create a situation where bureaucrats have to first debate where to send the issue before we can respond. And I would hope that as we evolve this new department, we're careful about that.

I would like to point out to the committee again, in regards to my opening statement, we discovered just this last week that the smallpox -- rather the anthrax bacteria that was sent in the mail was probably cultured here in America, not brought in over our borders again. Cultured here in America and maybe cultured again in America. CDC needs to respond whether or not it's someone culturing it at a lab and it accidentally gets out or if someone has got an evil intent in sticking it in the mail trying to kill people. They've got to have a clear capacity to respond and not wait for some bureaucrat to say, "Okay, we don't think this is a terrorist attack, so you're in charge instead of us."

That's a very, very sensitive decision we have to make.

I want to also mention that in regard to the president's proposal, there are -- there's a proposal in here to give the new secretary authority to take, seek -- or seek to effect protective measures to secure critical assets, including those in the private sector. I mentioned this in the opening statement, but I hope you pay an awful lot of attention. I want to look at this very carefully before we complete action on this bill. The last thing we need is to create another bureaucracy with regulatory authority in this area, and I would hope this is not designed to do that. And we're going to be watching very carefully that this truly represents an effort to coordinate the public-private partnership, rather than creating new lines of authority that are going to contradict other regulatory agencies of the government in some of these private-sector operations.

Finally, Governor Ridge, I think one of the best pieces of information and advice that came to the president the other day at our meeting with you came from John Dingell of Michigan, the ranking member of our full committee, who pointed out to the president and to you -- and I wanted to emphasize his words again -- that we have seen in the past creation of federal agencies cobbled together out of pieces of different other -- other different agencies, with other different cultures and with other different organizational structures. We have seen the creation of some big messes.

He cited the Energy Department as one. I want to second that. The Energy Department represents one of the most difficult organizations in the government to manage, because it was cobbled together with all sorts of different pieces, some of which contradict one another. There are fiefdoms all over that department that don't cooperate with one another. The right doesn't know what the left hand is doing and wouldn't want to know if it was told. The problems inside the Energy Department are not because of the -- of any particular leaders -- and Mr. Abraham's doing his best, as you know, to manage that department, as other secretaries have done before him -- it was a problem inherent in the way it was constructed.

I would urge you and the president to pay special attention to Mr. Dingell's words here as we cobble together a new department, one that may be more critical than any we've ever cobbled together in a long, long time. I would hope that you pay special attention to the pieces you put together and to make sure we don't create another mess like we've created with the Energy Department.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. RIDGE: Thank you very much for your commentary, your observations, and the recommendations and concerns you've expressed.

Let me just try to summarize a quick response, noting the many interests and concerns you have with the legislation, that a good organization isn't necessarily a guarantee of success. A flawed organization is guarantee of failure. And that's why we believe that working together with Congress, as we refine the ideas and address the concerns, we hopefully can avoid the pitfalls that has undermined earlier reorganization efforts and never really led to the unity of command and the kind of effectiveness that I think those who had organized it way back when had intended and had hoped. We need to avoid all those pitfalls as we ramp up this new organization.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes for five minutes for inquiry the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Stupak.

REP. STUPAK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Ridge, you said in your statement that homeland security works when the hometown is secure. I want to talk a little bit about IBETs and some of the intelligence-gathering stuff that we have going on in this country.

The IBETs, as you know, are Intelligence Border Enforcement Teams, and there are 13 of them. And then after September 11th, I think Customs did a pretty good job. But I want to point out one to you where I think there's a gaping hole. I want to see if this is still driven by Custom (sic), or will Homeland Security now take charge?

Thanks to my friend here, Mr. Strickland, here's Michigan, just a map of Michigan. You have an IBET down here in Detroit area -- right down here. And that -- Port Huron comes right around here, so that's pretty much covered there. But then you don't have another IBET until you get way over here, to Thunder Bay, Canada.

So all this area in here, and by way of "crow flies," if you did straight line, it's about 700 miles. But where we have a lot of activity is here in Sault Sainte Marie, Canada.

MR. RIDGE: Right.

MR. STUPAK: And, well, that's about 700 miles. When you come over there, the islands right here by Drummond and them, the Cheneaux, it's very easy -- St. Mary's River, very easy to cross. It's a major hole in our IBETs. So my question is, if you're going to do an IBET, who will make that determination now? Customs or will Homeland Security?

MR. RIDGE: Well, Customs will be an integral part of the reorganization effort. Interestingly, you talk about this rather unique alignment of multiple agencies led by Customs, because when I complete the hearing today, I'm going to spend a little time with some of the officials that are running one down in Key West. It's a good model. It's been very effective where it has been deployed. I see no reason why the new Cabinet secretary would do anything other than to try to continue to enhance and empower its activity.

As you know, the president in his 2003 budget proposal also calls for, I think, the largest increase in support for Coast Guard ever. We need additional people and boats and platforms to build up their capacity, because clearly now, border security and port security has taken on an enhanced dimension. So --

MR. STUPAK: But then who would do an IBET then? Coast Guard or Customs or is it going to be Homeland Security now?

MR. RIDGE: Well, I think that -- that -- that -- well, by definition, if Coast Guard's doing it, under the new department, Homeland Security would be doing it. Again, it is a best-practice that I would suspect that the new secretary would continue to try to deploy. It has proven to be successful.

MR. STUPAK: Okay, well, at these IBETs, and even -- we don't have an IBET here at Sault Sainte Marie where I think we should, we do have a the Sault Area Intelligence Committee. And they're working with the Canadians, and we have 12 federal agencies working out here trying to help secure the border here. But the problem with that one, and it's one of the problems we're concerned about, is while you have 12 agencies working well with the Canadians and all the local and county law enforcement, no one's in charge. You have 12 agencies. They're all working together cooperatively. And I don't mean to be critical of what they do. I think they do a great job. But if something happens or if someone has to call a shot, "We're going to do this," there's no one there who's in charge. And I think that's one of the problems we have when we start talking about security at our borders and elsewhere. And I would hope the new Homeland Security would at least, at these area intelligent (sic) committees, someone to go to. Who's the go-to person in that local area is what we sort of need to do.

MR. RIDGE: Yeah. You highlight a feature of border security that became evident to me as we put together a team from Customs and Coast Guard and INS and other agencies to deal with border security, to develop a 21st century smart border accord with our friends in Canada.

MR. STUPAK: Sure.

MR. RIDGE: That's an ongoing process where we look to critical review of our infrastructure, protective infrastructure; how we facilitate the flow of people and goods at the same time enhancing security.

So, under the new agency, the coordinating function to a certain extent would be replaced by a command function because you have Customs in one department, you have INS in one department, you have Coast Guard in one department, you have Border Patrol in another department.

REP. STUPAK: Sure. You have Border Patrol in one area, Coast Guard, FBI, you've got --

MR. RIDGE: Now under the president's proposal, they would be all aligned singularly under a undersecretary. So I think you will enhance the effectiveness of that kind of program because you now have a command structure that can direct that it be done. And it is a good practice.

REP. STUPAK: But if it's the IBET or like the Sault Area Intelligence Committee, I guess what I want to know, so we aren't pointing fingers, like we do after September 11th, where would I go to get full accountability on the issue? Who, or what department, as we say, does the buck stop here? And will the department order Customs to do it, the new department? Who's going to have the accountability? Where does the buck really stop with this new proposal?

MR. RIDGE: Well, I think it's a very appropriate question that you've asked because you want the authority to get things done, be aligned with the accountability. And at the end of the day, that will be determined by the new Cabinet secretary. But clearly --

REP. STUPAK: So the Cabinet secretary would be --

MR. RIDGE: Clearly I think that's the primary reason behind the president's reorganization effort, aligning authority with accountability. And here what you finally have is the consolidation of the many agencies that are involved in IBET under one command structure. You can go so far trying to coordinate activity among organizations; I think you can go even further when you can command activity among organizations. And now I think you have a unitary command structure that will enhance the capacity of those multiple agencies to do that kind of job.

REP. STUPAK: Well, when you do see your Florida IBET, I'd be interested in seeing your reaction to it and see if there is one person in charge down there or it's still all cooperatively.

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentleman has expired.

REP. STUPAK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for five minutes.

REP. WHITFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Ridge, Chairman Tauzin touched on a matter that I'm interested in and I'm sure other members of the committee are also, and that was the FOIA protection in the president's proposal being limited to voluntary information supplied by non-federal entities. And as he's indicated, EPA and others sometimes require entities to provide vulnerability assessments, which under the president's legislation would be subject to a FOIA request. Is that an issue that you-all are willing to revisit and determine whether or not his proposal would be subject to change in that area, or not?

MR. RIDGE: Yes, it is, Congressman. The legislation as drafted was directed specifically at a problem that's been experienced by a lot of the Cabinet secretaries and even during the work of the Office of Homeland Security; that is, getting -- in understanding that 80 to 90 percent of the critical infrastructure in this country is owned by for-profit entities, and they are anxious, just as all Americans are, to help. They're anxious to participate. They want to let the government know, for a variety of reasons, where they view themselves as vulnerable. The companies are custodians of not only their proprietary interests, but their neighbors' and communities'. They're corporate citizens and have a responsibility to all these different groups. But they're not -- our sense is that they would be a lot more forthcoming voluntarily in sharing this kind of information with us if it was part of a limited exemption to the Freedom of Information Act.

So whether or not we expand it is certainly worth consideration, not only in this bill, but in the -- down the road, in the years ahead.

REP. WHITFIELD: Okay. Well, thank you, Governor.

And I notice also that some of the transferred functions that would be coming into the new department relate to DOE's nonproliferation work with certain countries and particularly Russia.

And this is a little bit parochial interest of mine, narrow- focused, and maybe you don't know the answer to it, but recently DOE entered into a new agreement with the United States Enrichment Corporation to be the executive agent for bringing in enriched uranium from Russia as a part of the nonproliferation efforts in that country. Is that a type of agreement -- would be transferred to the new agency, or would that remain with the National Security Council? Or do we know?

MR. RIDGE: The -- that kind of agreement, as presently drafted, I believe, remains with the national security apparatus of this country.

REP. WHITFIELD: Okay. Okay.

MR. RIDGE: You should note that the agencies and departments and programs that we've grafted into the Department of Homeland Security have been done with very close collaboration with the Department of Energy and others. And because of the complex nature of these programs -- you've just alluded to one of them -- there are international aspects to this that involve issues that are related to homeland security, but also involving the Department of State and the national security adviser and the like -- so we've been very careful, in grafting these programs, that that would remain with the national security apparatus of this country.

REP. WHITFIELD: Okay. I notice that we have some private companies, like FedEx and the Port of Virginia, that are actively testing and pursuing installation of radiation detection devices throughout their systems right now. But there are no federal standards in this regard for radiation detection devices, and there's no single federal entity to which the companies can look to guidance -- for guidance and support. Will this new Department of Homeland Security be able to assist in providing leadership in that area for these private companies that want to pursue this?

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, you raise that question. Congresswoman Harman's raised that question. Literally dozens of your colleagues have done the same thing.

It is the purpose of the creation of the unit within Homeland Security of weapons of mass destruction's countermeasures and to involve a means by which we can establish the kind of standards and the point of access, so that companies can know, one, the standards that we'd like their equipment to meet, and two, a point of access to get their equipment, their technology tested against those standards -- so again, this is a work in progress -- but develop a center of excellence around the Lawrence Livermore Lab, but using the other national labs and the other research facilities in this country. We would hope to, one, create a point of access for testing and evaluation, and two, as we develop national strategy, to set national standards.

One of the big challenges we have in setting a -- in developing a national strategy over a federal system is, we can't necessarily dictate to state and locals or federal agencies, for that matter, the kinds of equipment that they must acquire or purchase. But by setting standards, we can go a long way in making sure that the equipment, from whomever the vendor might be, is interoperable with the other equipment that may be needed at the time.

REP. WHITEFIELD: Thank you.

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentlemen has expired.

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Strickland, for five minutes.

REP. TED STRICKLAND (D-OH): Thank you. And my friend from Michigan has a quick question here. I do have some questions, but I'll yield the time to him temporarily.

REP. BART STUPAK (D-OH): Thanks. Exactly on that point, the radiation issue -- detection. Customs said we're going to do it, then Customs says we know nothing about it and so they give it to DOE. DOE says we don't know anything about. So we give it to Lawrence Livermore now. So now have three ways down the scale. Who's making the decision, who's going to be ultimately responsible and accountable? This has been going on for some time.

MR. RIDGE: It has.

REP. STUPAK: And someone's got to say, enough is enough, let's get the decision done, let's get it made. Here you had Customs coming in saying do this; then they say, well, we really don't know anything about it, so we'd better get the DOE. They contracted DOE. DOE says yeah, good idea, we should do a standard, but we don't know what it is. Let's contract one of our labs. Now we're three ways down the ladder, three rungs down the ladder. How is this ever going to get done? We need someone to take the bull by the horns and say get it done.

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, I think you reflect a challenge not only for homeland security in terms of how those three departments operate, but overall the operation of the federal government. You know, bringing some kind of concerted effort to resolve these issues, getting someone to make a decision based upon a national strategy, national priorities and natural vulnerabilities is what needs to be done, and that is at the heart of the president's proposal. One Department of Homeland Security, where this kind of issue can be resolved once a strategy is developed, priorities have been developed, based on vulnerabilities and threat assessments, and then targeting the research, the appropriate research dollars to that end.

We have a fairly robust and fairly expansive and expensive series of research and development activities within the federal government. It's ad hoc. And at least under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security, those kinds of efforts relating to protecting our way of life and our citizens would be given, I think, a strategic focus, long overdue, as you pointed out in your question.

REP. STUPAK: Right. And in this whole thing, we have entities willing to install the equipment, we have vendors willing to sell the equipment. How do we bring it all together? It is really sort of the crux going back to the accountability issue. You know, vendors, again, willing to sell. You've got people willing to install. But what do we install, what's the standard, how do we do it? That's the part we've got to get our hands on. And I'm just looking for more specific proposals than the president's legislation that would put someone in charge to get it done, to get that accountability.

MR. RIDGE: Well, I think if you take a look at the one unit in there that deals with research and development, science and technology, that is the president's intention that the centerpiece of the strategic direction for homeland security research and development would be here. It would be through the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. You'd have centers of excellence at some of the other laboratories. We've got an extraordinary system of academic research institutions around this country. I mean, we have got plenty of people who are prepared intellectually with the laboratories and the experience to direct their focus, once the federal government decides where that research should be directed. We've got plenty of people out there that can help us do it, once we give them specific direction. We don't do that now; we just do it on an ad hoc basis.

REP. STUPAK: Thanks.

REP. STRICKLAND: Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to share some information that was in the Youngstown Vindicator regarding the possible location of the new department.

And just to let you know that Youngstown, Ohio, would be more than happy to provide a home for your new department. There has been some discussion that the department will not be --

MR. RIDGE: I thought maybe in Pennsylvania somewhere, but apparently -- (laughter) --

REP. GREENWOOD (?): That's exactly what I was thinking, Mr. Ridge.

REP. STRICKLAND: Well, we can get close to the river, sir, so that we both can benefit. But I've been thinking about this new department since the president made his proposal, and one of the things that has concerned me is the fact that it appears that there was at least some failure to analyze data and to communicate data and so on. And I've been wondering how this new secretary, who's going to be responsible for homeland security, is going to be able to do what they need to do, he or she needs to do, if they don't have some direct authority over the agencies that are most responsible for intelligence in this country, specifically the FBI. And I'm wondering how will the new secretary be able to assure us and the nation that the failures that have been identified in terms of not only data collection, but data analysis and dispensation and the sharing of data and so on, how will the secretary be able to deal with that problem if it continues to exist without having some direct authority over that agency?

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, your question goes to the heart of the ultimate desire of the president, the Congress of the United States and the people of this country. We must do everything we can to prevent the attacks from occurring in the first place. And at the very heart of that effort is acting on credible intelligence and information, interdicting and preventing the attacks from occurring.

By specific legislative language, the Congress of the United States will empower the new secretary to secure the reports and the assessments and the analytical work done by the CIA and the FBI, but also be empowered to get the information intelligence that any other agency generates. This is an historic new capacity within the intelligence community because within the Department of Homeland Security, there will be an integration and fusion function that heretofore has not existed. It'll be based upon whether or not that -- they're credible assessments with regard to threats, because in the same department, you'll match that up against potential vulnerabilities. More often than not, private rather than public, but if you have a credible threat targeted to a specific sector, to a specific company, to an area, you'll be able to match and take a look at the vulnerabilities that may exist there and then again in the same department have a recommendation of prescriptive or protective measures to be taken in response to the threat based upon the vulnerability.

Let me just say, if I might, that the president believes very, very strongly that the CIA, which obviously gathers from time to time information that is relevant to domestic terrorism, also secures information with regard to terrorism around the world, also is involved on a daily basis with securing information with regard to challenges from sovereign states, weapons systems, biochemical systems and the like. So, the portfolio of responsibilities for the CIA far, far exceeds just the targeting of domestic terrorist information.

The president also believes very strongly that there is a direct line of authority from the DCI to one person in the executive branch, and that's directly to the president of the United States. The president also believes that the FBI should remain an integral part of the chief law enforcement agency of this country, the attorney general's office.

But again, by specific legislative language, if the Congress adopts the president's proposal, you will create a new capacity of intelligence integration, fusion, analysis and then application, because the reports and the assessments -- the Phoenix memo would come to the new agency. Prior to this legislation, the Phoenix memo might have been lost in the department, in the FBI. But as the language is written with regard to the president's new Department of Homeland Security, the Phoenix memo would obviously be shared internally, but also be a piece of the information-gathering that the FBI has done that would be shared with the new Department of Homeland Security.

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentleman has expired. The chair recognizes the gentleman --

MR. RIDGE: I'm sorry. That's a long-winded answer to a very appropriate question.

REP. GREENWOOD: That's what we're here for.

MR. RIDGE: All right.

REP. GREENWOOD: The gentleman from Kentucky is represented (sic) for five minutes.

REP. ERNEST FLETCHER (R-KY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Governor, I want to thank you. I know we probably all have some questions how this new agency will operate. I think there's very little question as to your capability of leadership and the choice that the president's made in you. So I want to say thank you for your leadership thus far.

As I look over your testimony, and of the three really mission areas of this new agency -- to prevent the terrorist attacks; reduce America's vulnerability; and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur -- I think I understand a little more clearly the prevention the portion and the kind of the reducing the vulnerability. In the minimizing the damage and more on the response, as I understand it, if there were a major terrorist attack today, whatever type it might be, that the roles and responsibilities of the various federal agencies to respond to such emergencies are currently well defined in the federal response plan.

MR. RIDGE: Right.

REP. FLETCHER: The FBI would be the lead for the crisis management portion. FEMA would lead for consequence management. And if the attack occurred overseas on foreign soil, then the State Department would take the lead. And there are various other scenarios as well where the lead federal agency may change.

And I think we've all been assured that this seemingly convoluted system would work and that everyone would understand the chain of command in it. But under this new plan, let me ask you, would the new Homeland Security secretary be the lead federal agency for all events, whether criminal or of a natural origin, whether domestic or foreign? How would that be sorted out.

MR. RIDGE: I believe it is the intent of the president that the unit within the new department dealing with the emergency preparedness and response become an all-hazard agency, and that is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Heretofore, it would be responsible for the consequence management of acts of nature and potentially even horrific accidentally caused acts such as the fires out in Arizona. But under the president's proposal, it would become the lead agency to respond to both terrorist incidents and natural incidents as well.

REP. FLETCHER: What -- given that, and the FBI -- say you went back to an event like 9/11, and of course the Justice Department, there's criminal investigations --

MR. RIDGE: Right.

REP. FLETCHER: -- the Department of Defense. How would you see, as far the leadership role of the secretary of the agency in responding? What roles would the FBI take? Would they still lead the criminal aspect and FEMA the natural disaster if it were a different situation? And would -- what would the new secretary's responsibility -- and who be the lead -- who's going to be the boss in some of these decisions?

MR. RIDGE: First of all, I would share with you that at the time the disaster occurs, I think the lines are -- between law enforcement and FEMA are very much blurred, because the natural impulse of the men and women who rush to the scene, whether they're police, firefighters, emergency medical folks, or civilian volunteers, are to save as many lives as possible. And so I think the -- you'll find that the first responders at the scene as you go about trying to save lives as quickly as possible, will ultimately have the responsibility. That means as soon as FEMA can get to the scene they would oversee the response and recovery effort. That is not to exclude, if the circumstances warranted, the FBI from the very beginning trying to preserve whatever evidence there might be at the scene. But as we've discovered in the two horrific -- in the multiple horrific events around 9./11, the first impulse is to save lives, and that's exactly what they did. And the information that the FBI has gleaned isn't so much from the scene of the crime, it's from other sources as they patch together the profile of the terrorist and learn what they did and how they did it in preparation of the 9/11 tragedies.

Again, the anthrax is a little bit situation where you really had to have a collaborative effort at the scene. So I think it's going to vary from incident to incident. But at the end of the day I believe you're going to have -- you need FEMA to be in charge of the response.

REP. FLETCHER: Then the FBI would still maintain --

MR. RIDGE: Yes, sir.

REP. FLETCHER: -- control and the lead of the criminal aspect of it?

MR. RIDGE: Correct. Correct.

REP. FLETCHER: FEMA kind of the first response, and the humanitarian -- to make sure the -- reduce the loss of life and recovery?

MR. RIDGE: Right. Correct.

Interestingly enough, when I visited Fort McClellan, Alabama, where they are preparing first responders to get to the scene, they were training the firemen and the emergency medical technicians and others to be sensitive, depending on the scene and the kind of incident, about the necessity of trying to preserve what might be viewed later as evidence. And at the same time they were training the police -- the local police, the state police, the auxiliary police -- how to respond in a more traditional life-saving capacity. So there's a sensitivity within the first responder community to protect each -- to support each other in the long-term -- with regard to their long- term duties. But the first response, when people get to that scene, is to save lives, not to gather evidence. But then it sorts itself out down the way -- down the road.

REP. FLETCHER: Okay. And I think -- certainly, as this goes along, I think, at least in my mind, it would help to be a little more clear of, you know, who's going to be in charge of what, who's -- because one of the problems you have in management is always, if you have -- you know, two or more bosses makes it very difficult as -- where the responsibility lies in a lot of these issues.

MR. RIDGE: Clearly the law enforcement function related to a terrorist incident, the investigation, the follow-on would vest in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I mean, there -- hopefully there's no confusion there.

Where there is confusion from time to time is, who is in charge as soon as the incident occurs. In the experience that America witnessed and participated in on 9/11, people didn't pay any attention to the authority given to them by virtue of their badges, whether it was law enforcement or first responders. The first impulse is, let's go in and save lives. Then you have a very appropriate delineation of responsibilities. But the investigative, the law enforcement side of this still belongs to the FBI.

REP. FLETCHER: Thank you. I see my time has expired.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Capps, is recognized for five minutes.

REP. CAPPS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And again, Governor Ridge, I want to pick up on a theme you referred to earlier -- that our homeland is secure when the hometown is secure. Going back to that local system and systems in place, I want to concentrate, if I could, on the Centers for Disease Control, the CDC, and how that affects our local communities.

And if I could, in the third panel, a representative from the GAO, Janet Heinrich, has made a couple of statements that I want to bring into this and give you a chance to respond to her. She's expressing concerns about the proposed transfer of control from HHS or, in this case, CDC, under them, to the new department for public health assistance programs that have both basic public health and homeland security functions. And she says, "These dual-purpose programs have important synergies that we believe should be maintained." And she expresses concern that transferring control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities. "We do not believe" -- these are her words -- "that the president's proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and public health objectives would be accomplished."

And if I could -- again, I was privileged, with Congressman Deutsch, to visit the Centers for Disease Control site not long after 9/11 and to see that they were stretched beyond capacity before that date and now have so many additional responsibilities, and acknowledging that when I -- in my years of being a school nurse, relied on them very directly for help with ongoing epidemics and issues of is there enough flu vaccine on hand. These are the questions that my first responders are asking me. And so how can you -- can you describe and will you describe how this -- these fears can be allayed?

MR. RIDGE: Well, first of all, again, you and your colleagues have raised a very important question with regard to the distinction between homeland-security-related research and activities of the CDC and the traditional public health work of the CDC. And we believe there's a very distinct tear line here where the Department of Homeland Security would be would be involved in those issues that had primary -- not necessarily exclusive, but primary -- homeland-security dimension.

That's not to say that the CDC would not continue to deal with public health issues -- maternity care, child care, immunizations. I mean, they're going to continue to have the same programs they have, working with the states and the localities on a variety of public health issues, continue to have the programs dealing with the restoration of some of the public health infrastructure, continue to have money for research-related issues of -- and cancer and smoking and things of that sort.

REP. CAPPS: Right.

MR. RIDGE: So I think there is a distinguishable line now, and if we need to further clarify that with language in the legislation, we certainly want to entertain that.

But it's also, I think, very important to note that the legislation specifically calls for the two secretaries to establish the kind of relationship so that both can take advantage of the dual-use infrastructure that has been built up through the extraordinary work of the Health and Human Services and CDC over the past several decades.

REP. CAPPS: Let me -- thank you, but let me push this even further, because we can talk about charts and flow charts, but it really becomes clear when you talk about dollars. And CDC, many would say -- I would be in the area of group who would say -- was underfunded before 9/11. How will the dollars flow to do those basic structures?

And let me add on to that an additional challenge that we have faced here in our Health Subcommittee on this committee in dealing with the -- what some would say, at least from where I am in California, a crisis of health-care delivery. And the upper payment limit cuts to the state of California, for example, $300 million to our public health safety-net hospitals will be in addition to -- I mean, that's going to be difficult to meet if there is no bioterrorism attack. That's going to be a real hardship on a state like ours because those institutions are exactly where people go when the flu epidemics hit. And when and if, God forbid, there's a bioterrorist attack, that's exactly where they will go. If we continue to cut resources to these programs, these hospitals, how can we add on another layer of preparedness?

MR. RIDGE: Well, I'll tell you, I think you raise a question that under a new configuration of the executive branch would be appropriately raised with both the new secretary of Homeland Security and the secretary of Health and Human Services, the point being is that there will be an identifiable money stream with regard to specific programs that I think can be identified and -- can be identified today. Over the years, obviously, the Congress of the United States will have the opportunity to increase dollars, whether it's through homeland security for those issues and that research relating more particularly to weapons of mass destruction, bioterrorism, chemical attacks and the like, but also work with the secretary of Health and Human Services to bolster and fund programs related strictly to public health.

I mean, so many of these programs -- again, that will be a balancing act that will require the best efforts of both the executive branch but working in collaboration with the Congress of the United States that ultimately has the constitutional responsibility and authority to appropriate the monies. So you'll help create that balance.

REP. CAPPS: Well, I know my time is up, but, you know, the president has said there is no -- there are no additional dollars for this effort, and we're saying there weren't enough in the beginning; what shall we do now?

MR. RIDGE: Well, there are -- for 2003 as we ramp up the new Department of Homeland Security, the president has spoken recognizing what he has in the 2003 budget, which includes about a $14 billion increase for homeland security initiatives over the 2002 budget. What happens in 2004 and beyond, again, will depend upon the interaction and the priorities set collectively between the Congress of the United States and the president.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentlelady and recognizes --

REP. CAPPS: Thank you. I yield back.

REP. GREENWOOD: -- for five minutes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gillmor.

REP. PAUL E. GILLMOR (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Governor, one of the things I wanted to inquire about was, in the bioterrorism bill which we just completed, we provided for drinking-water systems' vulnerability assessments and recommendations for action be done by EPA.

Now, under the proposed bill we have, it's my understanding that would take that authority out of EPA, put it under the new department. I guess the question is, does it make a lot of difference? Is it something that you feel really is an improvement in homeland security? Or would it just as well be left with EPA where there is at least some body of expertise?

MR. RIDGE: It would be our hope that the president's initiative could be embraced to include pulling that into the Department of Homeland Security because of the vulnerability assessment requirements that will be imposed upon the new department. If it's the congressional will to keep it at the EPA and mandate that that information be shared, become part of the infrastructure -- the information infrastructure upon which the Department of Homeland Security operates, so be it. But it's just a feeling that in this new department, we've got, remember, the threat assessment matched against the vulnerabilities. And clearly, the water system, the energy systems, telecommunications, utilities, financial systems and the like are part of our critical infrastructure. So, it was consistent with the president's belief that we ought to have that information- gathering capacity with regard to critical infrastructure within this department.

REP. GILLMOR: I wasn't strongly suggesting that it stay with EPA. I was just trying to feel you out on where you were coming on that.

MR. RIDGE: We think it would be better to put all this within this -- this assessment within the new department.

REP. GILLMOR: In Title III, the president proposes to transfer certain R&D programs from DOE to the new secretary. Mostly, those are the ones dealing with development of detectors or sensors for nuclear, bio and chemical agencies (sic). Now, most of the research is done by DOE's laboratories, which are public and private entities under control of DOE. The labs conduct such research, however, not just for DOD. They do similar research under the work for other programs, where CIA, FBI, State and the Secret Service can also request their own work. Now, while it seems to make sense to have a single agency coordinating and directing and prioritizing all the research, I'm not sure that the proposal does that since it only transfers the DOE programs and doesn't touch the rest of them. So, why just transfer the DOE programs? Why not also transfer the work for others programs at the labs? Is that an oversight or is there a reason for that?

MR. RIDGE: I think we focused, Congressman, on the programs within the Department of Energy because of the very specific focus they have at the national labs and the expertise they've developed. But particularly, the chem-bio national security program, where they have as their mission the development, the demonstration and delivery of technologies and systems that will help this country prepare for, prevent and respond to a terrorist attack. And they have been -- this is work that they have been doing for years. It deals with bio and chem detectors. It deals with modeling capabilities to predict the effects of a chemical/bio attack. And again, in consultation with the Department of Energy, as we try to pull into the new Department of Homeland Security, those programs, if not exclusively, then at least primarily, deal with securing the homeland, this was very appropriate.

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentleman has expired.

REP. GILLMOR: Thank you.

REP. GREENWOOD: The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, is recognized for five minutes.

REP. JANE HARMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Governor Ridge, for your testimony. I've been listening carefully and agree with your testimony and with your answers to questions.

I would like to associate myself with the comments of our chairman about the urgency of the threat and the fact that it is among us right now. And that prompts me to talk about the urgency I believe there is not just to pass this legislation, but to implement certain changes which we could do this minute and not even wait for the legislation. One of them is information sharing across the federal government and between the federal government and local first responders.

As you know, Governor, H.R. 4598, a bill that Saxby Chambliss and I introduced some months back, has now been reported by the House Judiciary Committee and also has the unanimous support of the House Intelligence Committee and is ripe for action the House floor. I would like to thank you for your help in fashioning this legislation and just mention to my colleagues that this is a way to share information now, stripping out sources and methods so that those without security clearances can receive it. It would cover the FBI, the CIA and all those agencies not in this new department, and would get their information down to first responders who desperately need to understand better what our threats are. So thank you for your help with this.

That's one thing we can do now. The other thing we can do now I think relates to interoperability. When Saxby Chambliss and I visited your excellent emergency facilities some weeks back, at your invitation, we saw state-of-the art technology that you've been putting together. There's still an enormous amount of work down the road, and we all agree about hooking in private-sector, cutting-edge technology into this new department.

But meanwhile, there exists now integrating devices that can put together the different frequencies and different hand-held communication devices in an emergency and create interoperability which we absolutely need for first responders from different police and fire and EMT agencies to come together at the scene of a terrorist attack in somebody's hometown. As you point out, all terrorist attacks are local.

There is a device called the ACU-1000, which is built in North Carolina, and which many communities are using. Its problem is that it's too small to handle the requirements of large metropolitan areas like Los Angeles County. Yesterday, in front of this building, I saw in a van a technology developed by a large aerospace company that "wraps" this ACU-1000 -- a technical term meaning "adds to it" -- and can connect these things, you know, in five or more vans to cover the frequencies that an entire metropolitan area might need to use in an emergency. Example: LA County has 88 cities, 55 police departments, 33 fire departments. It could, they allege, cover LA County.

My question to you is, how do we get to these bridging technologies -- they may not be the perfect answer, but they sure are better than where we are -- now? How do we make things like this happen right now, even before this department is up and running? Because as our chairman points out, these terrorists are among us and could attack us, you know, in -- 20 minutes from now.

MR. RIDGE: First of all, Congresswoman, I think your point about bridging technologies and systems integration now, as we develop even more robust technologies and better systems down the road, is very appropriate, because I think it will take us, once we determine what our mission is and how we're going to achieve our goals, I think we can have the technology overlay, but we still have to work out some of these matters before we take advantage of the entrepreneurial nature of this country and our extraordinary technology sector.

I would suggest that there are a couple of things that we have done and we can do. One, our Office of Homeland Security has been working with the president's Office of Science and Technology Policy. And my recommendation would be that we take a look at the technology application that you've just discussed, make it available to these groups, and have them give us an assessment as to the impact on particularly urban communication systems where there remains a huge gap.

Obviously, we need interoperable communications. We need a bridging system now. Down the road, we hope to have a unified system not only within urban America, but around the country.

The second thing I would recommend -- and I say this with enormous respect -- there's a -- the $3.5 billion first-responder money is sitting in the 2003 budget. So as Congress sets its priorities for dealing with the budget proposal in 2003, if we could make the homeland security portion, or as many of those portions available to local communities as quickly as possible, once we give -- once there is a stamp of approval, once there is an imprimatur on pieces of equipment like this that it does the job it claims it can do, then they'll be in a position to buy these technologies immediately.

REP. HARMAN: Thank you.

My time's up, Mr. Chairman. I just want to note -- it's going to take 20 -- 10 seconds -- that at our conference on technology and terrorism last week, Dr. Marburger was there from the Science and Technology Office. He was talking in terms of this whole effort coming on line in 2004. I think this effort is online this minute, and bridging technologies, as you have just said, are the answer. And I would just hope you would encourage him to be thinking with a little more urgency of the need to tap these various technologies in our country now to confront the various terrorists in our country now.

MR. RIDGE: Thank you, Congresswoman.

REP. HARMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Governor Ridge.

REP. BURR: The gentlelady's time has expired.

Governor -- the chair would recognize himself at this time. Let me welcome you. Apologize that I was not here for opening statements, but to also say I'm supportive of the president's proposal. There are a number of areas of the bioterrorism bill that we took a tremendous amount of time trying to integrate; where we knew there were strengths within agencies, we tried to beef up those strengths; where we knew there were weaknesses, we tried to compensate through the legislation to make sure that the tools, the resources were there for that in fact to be a success. And I think that many of those areas, as we anticipated, would be encompassed in the new homeland security agency, and I think that in most cases we are very supportive of that.

My questions are going to deal more with the areas where not 100 percent of the responsibility of that area that we saw, where it might have been weak to start with, is shifting over, and whether we've thought through exactly the consequences of stealing half of the responsibility and leaving the other half.

The new department is a security entity, first and foremost, by the mission statement.

MR. RIDGE: Right.

REP. BURR: Tasking it with the disaster mitigation and response, and to a certain extent research and development, might distract from the security responsibilities that homeland security has.

Do you have any reservations about the pieces that you pick up that deal with research and development and mitigation of disaster response?

MR. RIDGE: I believe the president's proposal tries to encompass the broadest range of homeland security matters under one agency, and that is from prevention to detection through preparation and response. And it is for that reason that you see the -- this is a multi-tasked agency that covers the full spectrum of activities that would be appropriately associated with securing our homeland. And I think, in time, the integration of these different responsibilities, the establishment of a strategic plan dealing with research and development clearly has implications for the new analytical unit potentially, for the border aggregation clearly, and for the preparedness and response. So, I think you can see that if you take a look at the different units, they're not really stovepiped. At the end of time, there's a -- there's really a relationship among all of them.

REP. BURR: We looked very closely at things like the national medical response teams that we had. We tried to explore why they weren't more effective. They are very crucial to our entity today, and I think through our efforts with bioterrorism, we felt that there was a need to create an assistant secretary at HHS to sort of shepherd those areas. Now, we sort of shift those responsibilities. I guess my question is, do you still think there are enough areas at HHS that we need that assistant secretary there, or can you envision the need, whether its HHS or other agencies where you've pulled in jurisdiction and responsibilities, do you need an assistant secretary there as a liaison for homeland security?

MR. RIDGE: I know the committee was very concerned about creating that capacity within Health and Human Services, and I'd leave it to your good judgment to determine whether or not you'd want to create another one to work as a liaison. Clearly, given the dual nature of the infrastructure that both the Department of Homeland Security and HHS would be using, clearly, given the dual benefit of many of the research dollars and the need for communication and coordination, I'm going to leave that to your best judgment as to whether or not you think it would enhance that collaborative effort to create a similar position now in the HHS as we bring this position over to the new Department of Homeland Security.

REP. BURR: Well, clearly, there are areas -- I think Section 905 of the president's proposal and 906 deal with the pharmaceutical stockpiles and select agent registration. Select agent registration was something that in the last administration was by default handed over to CDC because we found we didn't have a successful means to keep up with it. I'm a little bit concerned. We all believe that there needs to be a list that's kept, one that the appropriate people have access to, one that we don't question its accuracy. The difficulty that exists is that CDC seems to still be responsible for allowing these agents out for the purposes of research, but there's the problem of making sure that in fact that information gets from CDC to homeland security, where, in fact, the registration of where that product has gone would have to be. Do you have any concerns about that?

MR. RIDGE: I think for security reasons, the select agent list must be -- should be part of the homeland security function, and any regulations attendant to the preservation and maintenance of that list.

But CDC continues to have that public health responsibility and would continue to do the research on these pathogens and continue to oversee the work done, whether it's done at CDC or elsewhere, in conjunction with the new Department of Homeland Security.

REP. BURR: I truly do not raise it as a criticism. I --

MR. RIDGE: No, I understand.

REP. BURR: I raise it as a question, that there's a link there where we're almost relying on the system we had five years ago of somebody making a notification to another agency when the decision is made to let one of the pathogens go out for research purposes. And I know we were all faced with a shocking reality when the anthrax scare came and we tried to track down how many places might have had anthrax under research, and we found --

MR. RIDGE: And we weren't sure.

REP. BURR: We weren't sure, you're exactly right.

Title VII of the bill deals with the coordination with non- federal entities, the IG and the Secret Service. My only concern in Section 701, which requires the secretary to direct and supervise grant programs of the federal government for state and local emergency response providers -- and it's not a lack of confidence in homeland security to make those grants. I guess the question that I would have, how much input will the agencies that currently have that responsibility, since a lot of the grant -- a lot of the research, a lot of the programs that the grant money will be for might still be the responsibility of the other agency.

MR. RIDGE: If I might, Congressman, give you a good example, the folks at the local level generally would like to go to one federal agency to get emergency preparedness and response grants. They also recognize that they take many forms. There's a bioterrorism response initiative that HHS has; there's an Office of Domestic Preparedness that actually has even more dimensions, but that's in the Department of Justice; and then, obviously, FEMA.

What I think is proposed under this legislation is that, one, that we by statute continue the collaboration with Health and Human Services so that when these dollars go out, they do go out in collaboration with Health and Human Services as it relates to the bioterrorism prevention and public health prevention. Two, the Office of Domestic Preparedness in the Department of Justice, I believe it is envisioned that that entire operation would become of a more robust, a more muscular agency that FEMA becomes when they have responsibility for in excess of $3 billion under the president's 2003 budget. And then clearly FEMA has been reaching out over the past several months, working with states and local communities, trying to work with them to set up a framework through which these multiple grants can be issued. So FEMA has also undertaken as part of its longer-term goal the establishment of the kind of relationship they need with the states and the local communities to help frame the issuance of these grants.

The goal here is to build up a national capacity of some sort around the country. It obviously will not be done in a year. Congresswoman Harman pointed out the need for interoperability of communications. My sense is, from talking to FEMA and a lot of other people, that may be the number-one priority. If you're going to save lives, it's predicated on time. The best way you minimize time is better communication . And unfortunately, we don't have integrated systems -- communication systems in too many places in this country.

Having said that, FEMA is working with state and local governments to develop these plans. And what we are -- what the president is hopeful of as it relates to the 2003 budget -- and I know I'm going off just a bit, but I say this to members who will be appropriating the dollars -- that the monies that would be issued, not just in 2003 but in future years, as we build up a capacity to respond to terrorist activity, that we build it up consistent with plans that begin at the local level, then take in the regional level and move up to the state, that we begin to develop a capacity around mutual aid pacts, a capacity built on standards that are designed after consultation within the departments and agencies but are also designed based on threat assessments and vulnerabilities.

So we still have a lot of work to do, and the purpose of the president's integration of all these agencies is to give some strategic focus not only to the efforts of the men and women, 170,000 men and women that have been providing homeland security services for this country for a long time, but also give strategic focus to the dollars and the technology and the kinds of equipment that we provide to this country to prepare for a potential response to a terrorist act.

REP. BURR: Governor, I thank you. My time has expired. I do want to say this. One more time, I want to commend you personally for the job that you've done. You were asked to step in at a -- I can't think of a more difficult time, to take on a task that was then undefined and un-understood -- and not understood. You were asked to do it with a limited group of people, and I think that you have done an extraordinary job. My hope is that as we take up this legislation and hopefully pass it in an expedited way, that you, like we, remember that we can do things of this magnitude without growing bureaucracies that are bigger than the last one. And I know that the president's legislation chooses a secretary and a deputy and five undersecretaries and no more than six assistant secretaries, but there's room for an additional 10 assistant secretaries. My hope is that you will always think smaller from a standpoint of the internal structure up here and, in fact, remember what I think you learned very early on, that most of the intelligent folks and the best ideas happen in the localities around the country that are ultimately the ones that we need to communicate with in real time so less emphasis is spent up here and more around the country. I thank you for that.

MR. RIDGE: Thank you, congressman.

REP. BURR: The chair would recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, for questions.

REP. EDWARD J. MARKEY (D-MA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Governor Ridge, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy and Defense have historically had jurisdiction over nuclear facilities, whether they be civilian or government. And they have had the responsibility for constructing the design basis threat against which each of these facilities has to be protected. And they also have responsibilities for conducting the force on force tests against those facilities. Now, in the overriding -- in the legislation that you've sent up, it says that this new department will have primary responsibility for infrastructure protection. And so the question is, what does that mean in terms of the agency -- yours or the NRC, or Department of Energy or Defense -- that will have primary responsibility over the security around nuclear facilities once the legislation is passed?

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, I believe that your question highlights a characteristic of homeland security that can't be underscored enough, and that is the continuing need for intergovernmental and interdepartmental communication and coordination.

To the point that you make very effectively, DOD, DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have multiple responsibilities with regard to the security of our nuclear facilities, be they power plants or storage systems for nuclear weapons. That will continue to be the case. However, this new department, working particularly with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the design threat assessment as it relates to potential vulnerabilities that might exist, will play a very important role as we go about matching threats against vulnerabilities in taking prescriptive actions.

REP. MARKEY: So, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, nine months after September 11th, has refused to begin a new design basis threat rule-making, even though we know we've moved from non- suicidal, non-technically sophisticated handfuls of terrorists that had to be protected against before September 11th, to something which is suicidal, technically sophisticated, heavily armed, and large numbers. Would, under the new system, the Office of Homeland Security have responsibility for ordering the design basis threat regulation to be upgraded, or would that still remain with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Who would have the ultimate authority, the NRC or the Office of Homeland Security?

MR. RIDGE: Well, ultimately, Congressman, if the Department of Homeland Security felt that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hadn't moved either quickly enough or effectively enough vis-a-vis the threat that you're talking about, one would hope that the new Cabinet secretary, in conjunction with the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can resolve that.

Clearly, the president has said that he seeks to retain as part of the White House apparatus the assistant to the president for homeland security that's been tasked with coordinating that activity and resolving differences of opinion. But if there's a difference of opinion, finally you've got one tiebreaker, and that's the president of the United States.

REP. MARKEY: The president. So the tiebreaker is the president; the tiebreaker is not whoever heads up the Office of Homeland Security?

MR. RIDGE: Well, I think the -- I think the new secretary of Homeland Security is going to be empowered with enormous authority and responsibility to deal with vulnerability assessments --

REP. MARKEY: No, what I'm saying is if --

MR. RIDGE: Based on the vulnerability assessment --

REP. MARKEY: I guess all I'm saying is, if you identify a flaw in the security at Livermore or at Diablo Canyon, and you go to the NRC or the Department of Energy and you say, "Upgrade," they say, "No, we're not going to upgrade, we're not going to go to a new system," you're saying that the head of the Office of Homeland Security can't say, "Upgrade," then it goes to the president to resolve the dispute between the two offices?

MR. RIDGE: Well, first of all, I think it is important that we always play out the worst-case scenario. And my judgment is, Congressman, that if the vulnerability assessment is significant, that we won't have any difficulty getting the cooperation --

REP. MARKEY: No, but if there are --

MR. RIDGE: But if you want to go the worst-case scenario, Congressman --

REP. MARKEY: Yes, please.

MR. RIDGE: -- the worst-case scenario, the matter would -- since the assets themselves, none of the national labs are part of the infrastructure of the Department of Homeland Security -- you talked about having problems at the national labs, at Livermore, Los Alamos and the like.

There's not direct command and control responsibility over those entities, so the first responsibility is to identify the vulnerability; to convince them of the vulnerability; to get them to do something about the vulnerability, if it is to -- if there remains a conflict, it would be resolved, presumably, within the -- by the assistant to the president for homeland security. There is a coordinating function, and that function remains within the White House.

REP. MARKEY: You say that would be someone on the president's staff then, that would resolve any conflict?

MR. RIDGE: Well, I don't -- it would be an assistant to the president. Again, Congressman, the worst case scenario --

REP. MARKEY: So, that's -- that's the job to get then.

MR. RIDGE: That's a pretty good job. It's the one I have right now, Congressman. It's --

REP. MARKEY: Yeah, that's what I'm saying. I'm figuring it out now.

MR. RIDGE: You're vested with a great deal -- you're vested with a great deal of authority.

REP. MARKEY: Again, when you say presumably --

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentleman has expired.

REP. MARKEY: Could I have one more minute, please?

REP. GREENWOOD: With unanimous consent, the gentleman is granted an additional minute.

REP. MARKEY: Thank you.

When you say presumably, will that -- the person on the president's staff will then break the tie between the Office of Homeland Security and the NRC or the DOE, is that going to be written into the statute?

MR. RIDGE: It's a function of the executive order signed by the president of the United States creating the office on October 8th. And I must say, the other leverage that you have on any department or agency changing its direction or focus is also the Congress of the United States would have to be -- could be a potential partner in that enterprise as well. But if we are -- as we've said before, this is an enterprise within which we're all engaged. And I guess I can imagine a worst case scenario and I guess we do have to plan for it, but I think it's very unlikely, Congressman.

REP. MARKEY: Thank you, Governor, very much. We very much appreciate your being here. Thank you.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass, for five minutes.

REP. CHARLES F. BASS (R-NH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Governor, for coming here. This must be a very interesting time in your life, and certainly one of the most important issues that this Congress will deal with. And I have a question having to do with DOE's nuclear emergency support teams, the NEST teams. I served on the Intelligence Committee, and we had some involvement with this issue in prior years. Now, it's my understanding that the president's proposal transfers the control of DOE's nuclear response teams to the new secretary in the event of an attack and emergency and also gives the new secretary authority to set standards for DOE's group, as well as conduct training and exercises for these teams. But as I understand it, these DOE teams also always -- almost always work in concert with DOD and usually conduct joint exercises with DOD, FBI, State and other agencies. That's because of their responsibilities that deal with just more than a nuclear issue. Will this new secretary coordinate the exercises and training of all of these interagency components or just the DOE, Department of Energy, portion?

MR. RIDGE: I believe it is envisioned from time to time that we would want to deploy all of these agencies in a realistic drill or exercise. So, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the drill, Congressman, it could very well oversee an exercise involving all those agencies and serving a coordinating function.

REP. BURR: Okay, good. That's good. I also understand that DOE's radiological assistance teams, which are spread out regionally throughout the country, currently are authorized to respond to requests from state and local officials for assistance and need not wait until the secretary of Energy formally calls them into action. Will the president's proposal change that, requiring action by the new secretary before these teams can be deployed for any reason?

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, in that change in the -- I cannot give you a specific answer to the change in the historical relationship. And I'll get back to you on that.

REP. BURR: Okay. Very well.

MR. RIDGE: I know that's the way they used to be deployed. Whether or not -- I think there's a lot to be said for maintaining that kind of relationship, but I need to get back to you with a specific answer.

REP. BURR: Okay, thank you very much. I appreciate that, and I'll yield back to the chairman.

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes for five minutes the gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman.

REP. WAXMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ridge, in your own home state of Pennsylvania, a newspaper reporter from the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review conducted an investigation to determine how vulnerable chemical facilities were to terrorists after September 11th. I don't know if this article came to your attention, but it was pretty shocking. According to that article, which was published on April 7th, the security was so lax at 30 sites that in broad daylight a Trib reporter wearing a press pass and carrying a camera could walk or drive right up to tanks, pipes and control rooms considered key targets for terrorists.

And I want to read to you specifically what they found. "Absent, dilapidated or unfinished fence lines or carelessly open gates allowed access to 18 sites."

Inside the sites, no one stopped the reporter from going wherever he wanted, even into control rooms and up to tanks and train switching and derailing levers. No security at the potentially deadliest plants.

Of the 123 plants nationwide that individually could endanger more than a million people, two are in western Pennsylvania. The reporter spent more than an hour walking through each, without encountering a guard or employee.

Now I wrote to the president on this issue on September 26th, 2001, asking him to just use 7 million out of the $40 billion of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery and Response to Terrorist Attacks, to examine the vulnerability of these facilities to attack. Congress required these vulnerability assessments to be completed by this August, yet apparently the administration has not even begun them. I'm also concerned the administration's failed to make any proposal to address these significant risks.

Does the administration support Congress requiring decisive action to address these risks? And if so, why isn't it in your proposal?

MR. RIDGE: Congressman, the -- your reference to that -- the critical infrastructure and the potentially devastating consequences associated with a terrorist attack on chemical facilities is something that the Office of Homeland Security has been focused on and clearly will become a priority of the new Department of Homeland Security. And I think the -- clearly the -- not only this president but previous presidents have called on and, I believe, the Congress of the United States has called on the private sector and others to do a -- perform critical infrastructure assessments and then take action to deal with the vulnerabilities.

Obviously, the pace of change within some sectors of the economy and within some companies hasn't been what you or I or most Americans would like. At the end of the day, when you have a Department of Homeland Security, Congressman, whose responsibility is to match threats with vulnerabilities and to work with other agencies within the federal government to harden these targets that are owned by the private sector, I think we'll certainly accelerate the changes that are needed. And until such time, we continue -- the administration continues to work with the -- all industry sectors to identify vulnerabilities and to get them to commit to taking action. I refer to a conversation that I had with some folks with regard to these vulnerabilities across the board in various sectors.

And I think one of the ways, Congressman, that we can make sure that those chemical facilities or some of these other facilities in your neighborhood, in my neighborhood, your state or mine and everybody else's is up to the standard that we seek is to have our first responders in those communities visit and work with those companies to make sure that the standards are met, because these are the men and women who are going to have to show up if these facilities are attacked.

REP. WAXMAN: Well, with all due respect, it seems to me what you've just said is that we want this new department to be sure to do this job, we want the corporations in the private sector who run these plants to be sure they're doing the job, and then we want the first responders to be doing the job; but you've been head of the Office of Homeland Security, and one of the mandates from Congress was to look at these vulnerabilities and do something about them. So does it strike you that maybe I'm hearing you just point your finger at everybody else but not taking responsibility for getting this done?

MR. RIDGE: Oh, no. Clearly, Congressman, I wouldn't want you to interpret it that way. I suspect that there has been sufficient follow-up by Congress, and I would assure you that there has been sufficient follow-up within the Office of Homeland Security. As part of the president's directive to our office, we were to, in the designing of a national strategy, we were to work with both the public and the private sector to do a critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment. That process is an ongoing process. It's something that needed to be done for a long, long time. And we're in the process of doing that, and that will be part of the national strategy that we'll present to the president and to the Congress and to the public in the next several weeks.

REP. WAXMAN: Just one last short question. Was I incorrect when I said that this was required to have been completed by August but the administration has not even begun the assessment of the risk from these facilities?

MR. RIDGE: Well, no. The administration began that quite some time ago. It's an ongoing -- it's been a work in progress within our -- within the Office of Homeland Security. And in my recollection of the executive order creating our office. there was no specific timetable. We created our own internal timetable. We're trying to get most of it done before we submit the strategy to the president, to the Congress and the people sometime in July.

REP. WAXMAN: What's your internal deadline?

MR. RIDGE: But you can well imagine, though, Congressman --

REP. WAXMAN: What's your internal deadline? You say you have your --

MR. RIDGE: Pardon me?

REP. WAXMAN: -- own internal deadline.

MR. RIDGE: Well, we've said that we're going to get the strategy to the president for his eyes by first of July, mid-July. I mean, we are working on it.

REP. WAXMAN: That's the strategy. There's a vulnerability assessment.

MR. RIDGE: Well, that assessment -- Congressman, you -- the enormity of that task, we don't shy away from it in any manner shape or form, but this is a process that I believe Congress has been and probably been working on for years and years as well. We've taken the advantage of some of the work that Congress has done. But our own internal work started several months ago. It will need a few more months to be completed to give you the kind of specificity that I think you are looking for. But we're doing our job, and when Congress completes its work and when the other agencies complete that work, I think we're going to have a pretty good system of determining where the vulnerabilities are and then, working together, come up with the means to harden those targets and to reduce the vulnerability.

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

REP. WAXMAN: I appreciate your answer, but assessments are required by Congress to be completed by August 2002.

REP. GREENWOOD: The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

The chair would note that the mandate from Congress to do the vulnerability assessment of the chemical facilities was passed in 1999, and it was the Clinton administration that did nothing subsequent to that.

The chair thanks the governor for your presence with us and for your testimony and for your guidance. The chair --

REP. WAXMAN: That's a little cheap, Mr. Chairman, isn't it?

REP. GREENWOOD: The chair has the floor. And the gentleman is --

REP. WAXMAN: It's a little cheap, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GREENWOOD: -- may or may not be recognized in the future.

The -- the chair knows that the -- Governor, that you are thanked for your service many times a day, for good reason, because you have given us such a sense of confidence. But I would like to take the opportunity as your friend to thank your wife Michele, to thank your daughter Lesley and your son Tommy. I know that after 10 years or so in the Congress, eight years as governor of Pennsylvania, they were probably and you were probably expecting to take off the mantle of responsibility and hang it up in the home cabin for a little while.

And I know that it is only because of the dire circumstances that we faced and your sense of duty to your country that you put that mantle -- and a large mantle it is -- back on your broad shoulders. And we thank you for that.

But we want to thank your family for --

MR. RIDGE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

REP. GREENWOOD: -- for the sacrifices that they make every day in letting you do this job.

MR. RIDGE: Very good. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GREENWOOD: Thank you again.

MR. RIDGE: Thanks, all.

END

LOAD-DATE: June 26, 2002