BACKGROUND ON EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION CONTROLS TO DETER TERRORISM October 15, 2001 For Immediate Release Contact: Stephanie Cutter (202) 224-2633 Strengthening the security of our borders is an indispensable part of the nation's efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact laws that meet the serious security threats we face from abroad, and we must do so without obstructing the entry of the more than 31 million foreign nationals who legally enter the U.S. each year as visitors, students, and temporary workers, or the large numbers who cross legally from Canada and Mexico on a daily basis to conduct business or visit family members. The screening of foreign nationals who seek entry into the U.S. must be improved. Effective immigration and border controls to stop terrorism can have a significant impact on our national security. But to do so, we must make better use of intelligence information to identify high risk individuals who seek to harm us, and make sure that information is in the hands of the proper authorities in time. Congress should take several steps to increase the likelihood that potential terrorists can be detected and apprehended before they act. Intelligence, Technology, and Cooperation. Accurate and Timely Intelligence Is Critical. Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain "lookout lists"containing the names of foreign nationals who should not be admitted to the U.S. These are individuals who have criminal records, who have been denied visas or previously deported, who are suspected terrorists, or who require serious scrutiny for other reasons. To successfully prevent the admission of these persons into the U.S., all intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, including the CIA, DIA, NSA, and FBI, must share this critical information with the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in a timely manner. Currently, some of this information is not shared with these two agencies, which are responsible for making determinations about who is granted a visa or is admitted to the U.S. Legislation is now pending which will provide the Department of State and INS with electronic access to the FBI's criminal history databases. The Department of State and the INS should also have electronic access to all lookout lists maintained by the CIA, DIA, NSA and FBI. The new Office of Homeland Security should coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive data sharing system to provide these front line agencies with the critical information they need. Biometric Technology Can Improve Security. Weaknesses exist in the lookout systems. Potential terrorists often use aliases and obtain false or stolen identification. Biometric identification technology can improve the reliability of the lookout lists and enhance border security. The most common biometric data include fingerprint and hand imaging, iris and retina scans, and facial recognition. These data cannot be borrowed, or stolen, and forging them is extremely difficult. These new technologies can match a unique identifying characteristic of an individual with a name, and they need to be used effectively. Machine-readable passports and visas are becoming more prevalent and more difficult to counterfeit. Biometric data are currently being incorporated into some immigration documents, and their use should be significantly expanded, for inclusion in passports, visas and other travel documents. With such technology, a traveler's identity can be quickly and definitively verified by matching the identity with biometric data incorporated in their documents. Biometric technology should also be used to screen incoming travelers. Systems, such as INPASS, which use biometric imaging, have proven successful in screening frequent low-risk travelers. Such systems should be expanded where practicable, since they enable more resources to be allocated to anti-terrorist and security activities. A North American System. The U.S., Canada, and Mexico can clearly do more to coordinate border efforts against terrorists. Cooperation between our countries can be strengthened, taking into account each other's security concerns, while still facilitating the movement of goods and persons. Efforts to share lookout lists, develop and improve joint inspection regimes and facilities, and train intelligence and other enforcement personnel should be expanded. Criminal smuggling rings, with knowledge of the weaknesses in our border security, have developed into multi-billion-dollar-a-year operations, and potential terrorists could use these smuggling operations to cross the border. Detecting and shutting down smuggling operations requires close cross-border cooperation, and these border security efforts must be strengthened. In addition, we should work more closely with our European allies and other countries, to develop reciprocal agreements to share intelligence databases and collect information on persons who may be a potential threat or who have engaged in terrorist activity. MB Screening Individuals Before They Arrive In the U.S. Consular Offices: The First Line of Defense. Most foreign nationals traveling to the United States must apply for visas from U.S. consulates abroad. Consular officers, who tend to be junior personnel with little job experience, interview applicants to determine whether they are eligible for visas. Until now, consular screening has focused primarily on detecting visa over-stayers, examining indicators such as bank accounts, which have no bearing on whether the applicant is a security risk. Although this focus is important, more emphasis is needed on issues of security. We should build a corps of knowledgeable and experienced consular officers, skilled in screening for security threats. Immigration Checks at Airports Abroad: Foreign nationals are generally inspected by immigration officers upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. In some high-volume airports abroad, U.S. immigration checks are performed at pre-clearance sites at the point of departure, where travel documents are inspected before an individual boards a U.S.-bound plane. Pre-clearance sites should be expanded. They allow more time for thorough inspection. While a U.S. inspector has no authority to arrest a suspected terrorist at a pre-clearance site, the U.S. could cooperate with authorities who do have the power to apprehend suspects. Sharing Passenger Lists: Once travelers have boarded, many airlines transmit the passenger manifest to the destination airports. Passenger lists are investigated while the planes are enroute. Once the planes have landed, authorities can intercept passengers who are on the lookout lists. Transmittal of airline manifests is currently being used in 75-80% of all cases, but it should be used for all international flights. The State Department should also transmit electronic versions of its visa files to inspectors, so they are available at the time of inspection. Monitoring Foreign Nationals in the U.S. Automated Exit/Entry System. Upon arriving in the U.S., non-citizens, including permanent residents and temporary foreign visitors, workers, and students, complete a form, called the I-94 form, which they are supposed to return when they leave the country. Upon departure, travelers are required to return the I-94 forms to airline representatives, who are supposed to turn them over to the INS. Compliance is inconsistent, as not all carriers return the I-94 forms to the INS. Persons leaving the country at land borders are also supposed to turn in I-94 forms, but many do not. These forms are currently completed by hand, and cannot be used to track the departure of specific persons until entered into a computer. In 1996, Congress enacted legislation mandating the development of an automated entry/exit control system to record the entry of every non-citizen arriving in the U.S. and match it with a record of departure. The INS lacked the technology to implement this needed measure at all ports of entry, especially at the land borders, without serious disruptions. Last year, Congress enacted legislation to establish reasonable implementation deadlines. The Attorney General is required to implement the integrated system by December 31, 2003 at all air and sea ports. For the 50 busiest land border ports of entry, the system would be implemented by December 31, 2004, and for all other land border ports, by December 31, 2005. Technology is available to implement electronic entry/exit controls at all air and sea ports, but it is costly. Other countries utilize electronic controls that could be models for a similar U.S. program. For example, Australia has an electronic visa that is incorporated into the airline ticket. Implementation should be funded by the federal government, and airline compliance should be mandatory. Since implementation at land borders is more difficult and has the potential of disrupting commerce, additional time and resources will be needed to establish effective exit controls at these borders. In the meantime, other steps can be taken. The U.S. has experimented with commuter lanes that permit officials to pre-screen applicants, and to issue more secure documentation and devices for automobiles, to expedite crossings without sacrificing security. Such programs should be expanded to permit rapid crossings of low-risk commuters and enable the INS to concentrate its resources on those who have not been pre-screened. Monitoring Foreign Students. In 1996, Congress established a program to collect information on non-immigrant foreign students and exchange program participants. The CIPRIS program was designed to apply to non-immigrants with F (student), J (exchange visitor), or M (vocational) visas. Information collected includes name and current address, major field of study, termination date and reason for termination, the number of credits completed per year, and any disciplinary action taken against the student. A pilot phase of this program ended in 1999, but the system has not been implemented nationwide. Universities and colleges expressed serious concerns about the costs and administrative burdens of the tracking program. Some of these concerns were addressed in legislation last year, but other problems persist. They include lack of adequate funding for State Department consular operations and INS monitoring systems; gaps in reporting systems that make it impossible for the INS to know when foreign students leave, or when they fail to show up for their programs; and inadequate support for university officials responsible for ensuring compliance with visa requirements. Federal funding is critical to implement and effectively operate the this tracking system. The INS has estimated that the cost of implementation is approximately $32 million over the next three years. Gaps in the tracking program should be closed by requiring the INS to notify institutions of a student's entry into the U.S., and requiring institutions to report to the INS the non-appearance of any student reported and any student who leaves the program. A related problem is the large number of U.S. educational institutions authorized to issue forms to allow foreign students to obtain visas. Currently, more than 26,000 institutions are authorized to enroll foreign students. Periodic review is warranted to ensure that these institutions are professional and competent. They should certify that they agree to comply with the reporting and recordkeeping responsibilities or risk losing their authority to enroll foreign students. An Integrated Approach. The implementation of an automated entry/exit system and the student tracking system will notify authorities whether foreign nationals have left the country under the terms of their visas, and whether foreign students are properly maintaining their status. But, it is important to remember that foreign students represent less than two percent of the 30 million temporary visitors admitted annually to the U.S. And the vast majority of foreign visitors, students and workers who may overstay their visas are not criminals or terrorists. Focusing INS resources on those who fail to comply with the terms of their visas will do little to enhance our national security. Linking these tracking systems to lookout systems and law enforcement databases, however, will enable the INS and law enforcement agencies to screen foreign nationals more closely and identify and apprehend those who do present a threat to our national security.

-30-