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Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company  
The New York Times

January 25, 2002, Friday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 11; Column 3; National Desk 

LENGTH: 989 words

HEADLINE: A NATION CHALLENGED: LABORATORY SECURITY;
Bill Would Require Laboratories to Adopt Strict Security

BYLINE:  By DIANA JEAN SCHEMO 

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, Jan. 24

BODY:
In the months since the anthrax scare, Congress has hammered out legislation with universities and researchers to reduce the risk that viruses, bacteria and toxins might turn up in biological weapons.

It is now close to completing laws that will require laboratories, at significant expense, to adopt stricter security measures, inventory lethal agents and deny some scientists access to the materials altogether.

But except for smallpox, all of the pathogens that most concern lawmakers, some 40 in all, are freely available beyond American borders, often in the very regions that terrorists have come from, and scientists and international organizations that monitor disease outbreaks say the new laws, despite their time-consuming and expensive measures to reassure the public, may do little to keep deadly agents out of terrorists' hands.

Whether Rift Valley fever, found in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, which appeared last year in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Ebola, which killed 23 people in Gabon according to today's World Health Organization report, the agents soon to be under lock and key in United States laboratories exist in abundance beyond American borders.

"Anybody trained in the most basic aspects of health care can go in and take a blood sample from anyone infected with one of these agents," said Glen N. Gaulton, a pathology professor who is vice dean for research and research training at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School. "If it's blood or sputum, feces, body tissue, you'd isolate the organism, and then you'd just have to have somebody trained in general bacteriological principles grow it up. It's very simple."

Growing the organism from infected people or animals, scientists said, is a procedure done routinely in diagnostic laboratories and clinics, particularly in the third world.

At universities across the country, researchers said they did not think it was a mistake for Congress to tighten access to laboratory materials, which they acknowledge has generally been lax, but they cautioned against presuming the new laws would provide real protection against a deliberate release of a biological weapon.

Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, said tightening controls over deadly agents at American laboratories represented only a first step.

"The next step, clearly, once we get our house in order, is to proceed to effect some international protocols which govern the use of these pathogens," Ms. Feinstein said through a spokesman.

Mike Wheelis, a microbiologist at the University of California at Davis who is involved in the American Federation of Scientists Biological Weapons Verification Project, said gaping loopholes overseas did not mean that laboratory security in the United States should be ignored.

"The fact that there are many places in the world that do not have the resources or intention to institute comparable controls doesn't mean we don't have to get our house in order," Dr. Wheelis said.

With slightly different versions of a Bioweapons Protection Act having passed the House and Senate, university officials and lawyers are analyzing the bills to gauge just how much laboratories will have to change practices and, in some cases, infrastructure, to accommodate the new regulations. In recent years, Dr. Gaulton noted, the trend has been toward large, open space laboratories that promote collaboration between scientists.

He estimates that the University of Pennsylvania may have to spend $5 million to $15 million for security features like special filters and pressurized air for handling the 40 agents that can be used to make biological weapons -- particularly if Congress rules that researchers working on any genetic or molecular pieces of a lethal organism must take the same precautions as scientists working with the organism in its entirety.

The U.S.A. Patriot Act, passed last November, expands the list of toxins considered highly dangerous, and requires background checks for scientists who work with them. It also bars so-called restricted persons -- a category that includes citizens of states known to sponsor terrorism, convicted felons, people dishonorably discharged from the United States military, illegal aliens and people caught with illicit drugs -- from working with the lethal agents.

"If you think of the 19 hijackers, I don't think any of them were citizens of states that sponsor terrorism, so they presumably would have been O.K.," said one Congressional aide.

In addition, the Senate and House versions of bioweapons protection bills passed last month require laboratories possessing the potential weapons agents to register with the Department of Health and Human Services, while the House bill requires labs to register individual scientists as well. One provision of the Senate bill that could prove particularly useful requires genetic identification of the strains present in each lab, which would ease tracking of any material used in an eventual outbreak. The bills will next go to a conference committee, to iron out differences between them.

Aside from the availability of lethal agents overseas, scientists noted other loopholes in the legislation as passed. While an inventory might prove useful for keeping track of nuclear materials, they said it provided only the illusion of security for biological materials, even those only found in laboratories.

"This is not the same as radioisotopes, where you can account for each one," Dr. Wheelis added, since a biological material can easily be multiplied.

Before the anthrax-laden letters turned up last year, laboratory safety measures aimed exclusively to prevent an accidental release of deadly agents. For the first time, lawmakers are grappling with the threat of a deliberate release, while the anthrax that terrorized the country last fall appears to have come from an American laboratory.  

http://www.nytimes.com

LOAD-DATE: January 25, 2002




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