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National Academy of Engineering Annual Meeting
October 6,
2002
Wm. A. Wulf
President
It is an immense
honor to welcome our new members and foreign associates. You must feel
honored as well; my own induction is one of my fondest memories. The
academy is renewed and enriched by each new class. Your knowledge and
experience enable us to continue to play a unique and invaluable role in
service to our country. I also want to acknowledge the families and
friends of the members of the new class. I know that none of those being
inducted would be here if it weren't for their support.
I am going
to raise a somewhat weighty issue with you today, so I hope you'll forgive
me for diving right in. By way of context, I should explain that in 1999,
after two years of preparation, NAE proposed a new strategic plan. Every
year at its August meeting the NAE Council reviews the plan and sets
operational objectives for the coming year. This year the council affirmed
the new plan. But rather than talk about the plan itself, I want to talk
about a question that arose in our discussion of it.
As many of you
know, the National Academies operate under an 1863 charter from the U.S.
Congress that calls on us to provide advice to the government on issues of
science and technology, and to do so without compensation whenever we are
asked. Our role is unique among academies around the world, and in that
role, we have been of immense value to the United States. But it's a
passive role. That is, if and when we are asked, we provide advice to the
government. By contrast, the new strategic plan starts with the words: "to
promote the technological health of the nation..." That may sound innocent
enough-but notice that the words do not say wait to be asked or only
provide advice or limit our target audience to the federal government. The
new strategy is a much broader and much more proactive mandate.
In
the course of our discussions, a question arose about the need for
technical leadership in terms of the new policy. As president of NAE, I am
at the nexus of science, engineering, and public policy. Every day I see
that technologically astute leadership is essential to wise governance in
our increasingly technology-dominated world. Questions of technology are
integral to many of the most important issues facing the country-energy,
the environment, defense, both at home and abroad, and on and on. These
issues require more than a superficial knowledge of engineering and
technology. They require the sort of deep, visceral understanding that
only comes with the practice of engineering.
In the context of an
extended discussion of the profound need for technically savvy leadership,
the following question was raised: Although there is no doubt that we need
technologically astute leadership, will engineers "stand up" to fill that
need? Are engineers, both individually and collectively, willing to
provide that kind of leadership? When the question was first asked, I
thought it was a "no brainer." Of course we would! On reflection, however,
I am not so sure--for several reasons:
1. The culture of
engineering is for engineers to be unassuming, to be
inconspicuous.
2. The culture of engineering rewards technical
achievement, not leadership. How often have you heard someone say, "She
isn't an engineer any longer; she's become a manager."
3. The
culture of engineering proscribes our giving advice, except on technical
matters. How often have you heard someone say, "That's a political
question; we have nothing to contribute."
4. The culture and
practice of the NAE reflect the culture of engineering. We regularly
decline to undertake studies if the answer isn't technical.
Perhaps
one of the most telling reflections of our reluctance to stand up is that
only eight members of Congress have engineering degrees (two of whom also
have law degrees). That's eight out of 535! That's 1.5 percent, much lower
than our representation in the population that might be qualified for
office. Engineers just don't seek elective office in this country. That's
quite a contrast with countries like China where the prime minister and
about a third of the ministers are engineers. There's nothing in the
genetic makeup of people who choose to be engineers that makes them shy
away from public office; it's something in the culture of this country.
Don't misunderstand me. I believe we should stand up. But we're going to
have to ask ourselves some tough questions about what we value and how we
preserve those values when we stand up-or, indeed, perhaps decide that we
won't. Either way, it should be a conscious decision.
My summer
reading this year included Tuxedo Park, the story of the people who
provided technical leadership just before and during WW II. One of them,
Vannevar Bush, was an engineer, but most of them were physicists. I found
it interesting that they faced some of the same cultural issues we face
now. They resolved them fairly quickly, under the pressure of the war-but
there is no doubt that radar, the Norton bombsight, the proximity fuse,
and the atomic bomb, which were crucial to winning the war and saved
millions of lives, were possible only because the physics community stood
up.
I know of no organization other than the NAE that can begin the
conversation about standing up. I am going to use the events of 9/11 as a
concrete framework for my remarks, but I believe the general issues apply
to a much broader range of topics. This discussion can be divided into two
broad sets of issues. The first set, which relates to the use of
technology in countering terrorism, will be fairly comfortable territory.
The second set may be less comfortable because, although it is
technologically grounded (that is, one needs a technical background for an
in-depth understanding of the issues), the required response isn't
necessarily technical. When talking about these kinds of issues, we must
ask ourselves whether we're prepared to stand up.
Let's begin with
the familiar ground. When Bill Perry was secretary of defense, he liked to
point out that one of the reasons we won the Cold War was that we never
actually had to fight a conventional, non-nuclear war because NATO would
be a credible adversary in a conventional war. We were credible in spite
of the significant numerical advantage-in both troops and armament-of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. NATO was a credible adversary as the
result of the "offset strategy. We offset their numerical advantage with
superior technology. Our troops could locate, identify, target, and
destroy potential attackers with far greater accuracy, speed, and
lethality than Warsaw Pact troops. MAD (mutually assured destruction) may
have prevented a nuclear war, but the offset strategy was a major
component of the larger strategy for preventing a conventional
war.
We are now faced with a very different adversary with a
different advantage, and we need different technologies to offset those
advantages. But the principal is the same. With technology, specific
threats can be detected and countered; for example, sensors can detect
explosives and chemical and biological agents. Technology can also reduce
the costs of security. Some of the technologies of most interest can
reduce the costs to our lifestyle and our civil liberties, rather like a
metal detector, which is both faster and less intrusive than a pat-down
search.
As a trusted advisor to the federal government, the
National Academies will undoubtedly play an important role in identifying
and validating technologies; in fact, we are already up to our eyebrows in
doing exactly that. More than 50 studies and activities are going on. Some
are long term, such as a study requested by the President's science
advisor, Jack Marburger, for an R&D agenda. That report, Making the Nation
Safer, was published in June. Other activities are shorter
term, such as advising the FBI on its next-generation computer
system.
These activities are very, very important, and the
Academies are uniquely capable of doing them. In fact, we've been doing
them since shortly after the founding of the NAS in 1863. This is a
familiar, comfortable role, and we have no trouble standing up in this
way. But now let me shift to the second class of issues-technologically
based issues that require advice that is not necessarily technical-and may
not even be intended for the government. I am going to use four examples:
(1) the balance between openness and national security; (2) student visas;
(3) the root causes of terrorism; and (4) need-driven basic
research.
In each case, engineers understand the issues far better
than either the general public or most policy makers. We understand the
issues because of our experience and our technical expertise. But the
answers aren't technical, and may in fact be political. With these
examples, I invite you to think about whether, and if so how, engineers
should stand up.
Openness vs Security
During the Cold War,
the government and the technical community developed a consensus on the
balance between openness and security, especially with respect to nuclear
weapons technology. In fact, we came to understand that a certain degree
of openness enhanced our security. For example, MAD, the policy of
mutually assured destruction, depended on each side knowing enough about
the other's capability to ensure that neither made a
miscalculation.
More generally, openness in research allowed
researchers to make rapid progress toward a deeper understanding of nature
and allowed engineers to translate that understanding into a better life
for everyone. Of course, some things had to be classified to ensure our
national security. But the people involved in setting policy understood
the wisdom of building high fences around small areas. That is, we opted
in favor of openness, except in the areas where secrecy was essential-and
those secrets we protected vigorously.
Since 9/11 and the anthrax
incidents of last fall, there has been a knee-jerk response to reduce
openness. For example, we have restricted access of foreign nationals to
national laboratories, barred some foreign nationals from attending
certain college courses (such as classes in cybersecurity), and required a
government review of research papers before they are published. I believe
we must find a new balance point between openness and security; the
situation today is quite different (in terms of the adversary and the
relevant technologies) from the situation during the Cold War. In many
cases, the people advocating these restrictions have little experience
with the openness/security balance of the past. Specifically, they are not
aware that openness actually contributed to our real security. That lack
of experience is leading to overly cautious, and potentially
counterproductive, behavior. Unless the engineering community, which by
and large has much more experience with national defense than the
scientific community, becomes engaged, it is unlikely that we will find
the optimal new balance point.
The issue of openness and security
arises from a combination of technical concerns and security concerns,
both of which we know a lot about. But the actions indicated are
definitely not technical. Should we stand up? If so, how?
Student
Visas
Student visas may be a special case of the previous example.
As many of you in academia know, it is now much more difficult for
students to get visas to enter the United States-especially for young men
from Asia and the Middle East. You also know that foreign students and
immigrants have contributed enormously to the welfare of this country. As
a first-generation immigrant, I have a visceral sense of the contributions
that my father, and all of the immigrants entering today, have made to the
United States. Even students who return to their native countries can be
of immense value to the United States. Because they understand us and our
values, they are often our best spokespersons.
Two years ago my
wife and I, with Bruce Alberts and his wife, visited our counterpart
academy in Iran, a country that President Bush has labeled part of the
"axis of evil." That may or may not be true-I'm not an expert, and I
haven't been briefed on the information that prompted that remark.
However, I quickly learned that Iranian universities and the Iranian
academy are filled with people who are influential in their country, have
been educated in the West (the United States in particular), are
sympathetic to our goals and values, and are anxious to have better
relations with us.
No one outside the research community can
possibly have the kind of in-depth, gut-level understanding of the
technical contributions and the ambassadorial role of our foreign
students. At the same time, however, we must take into account that some
of the terrorists who hijacked the four planes last September were here on
student visas. Therefore, benign neglect in granting and tracking students
is no longer acceptable. Sensible precautions are certainly in order. Just
as with openness, we must find a new balance point.
Again I ask the
same basic question. We have experience that is highly relevant to
resetting the balance point. Should we stand up? If so, how?
Root
Causes of Terrorism
The NAE is conducting a study to help channel
resources to ameliorate our most serious vulnerabilities. Rather than just
fortifying airports, we need to take a broad look at the kinds of
vulnerabilities that exist and the risks they pose-that is, the
probability of an incident and the consequences of that
incident-associated with each vulnerability. The resulting assessment
should be the basis for our investments in protection.
As a result
of my involvement in this study, I now know that we have a huge number of
vulnerabilities-vulnerabilities that can have cataclysmic consequences. I
now know what engineers in this area have known for a long time-that we
cannot defend against all threats. We can move the target a bit, but if we
have a perfect defense against the N most serious threats, terrorists will
simply select the N+1 threat. So we can move the target, but we cannot
create a perfect shield.
Much the same is true of mounting an
offense against networked terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda is not likely
to conveniently (for us) amass again in an area where we can use our Cold
War era armaments to advantage. Oddly, the same technical properties that
make the Internet robust to failure make the human network of terrorists
robust to failure. I think only engineers can appreciate that statement in
depth. The popular press and our political leaders, by contrast, seem to
be operating on the assumption that a combination of defensive actions at
home and offensive actions abroad can keep us safe. As we know, they
won't.
In the long run, we will have to deal with the reasons
terrorists hate us-what some have called the root causes of terrorism. I
am not an expert, although I have been getting a crash course for the last
13 months. But I've learned that terrorism arises from a complex interplay
of geopolitics, religion, regional/ethnic pride, economics, and other
factors. The eventual solution will have to address a broad spectrum of
issues, including bringing democracy, freedom, justice, and especially
hope, to potential terrorists. I do not want to delve into all that now,
except to note that poverty and hopelessness breed desperation and create
a climate for terrorism.
If we are really going to eliminate
terrorists, if we are really going to make ourselves safe, we will have to
address the issues that affect the quality of life in developing
countries, and engineers will play a central role in this. That's not a
fuzzy, humanitarian, do-good statement. It's a national security
statement. It's also not a complete statement, because the issues of
democracy, freedom, justice, and hope must also be addressed. But a decent
quality of life is a necessary precursor.
Engineers have the
expertise and experience. Relatively straightforward risk analysis shows
that we cannot defend against all threats. Should we stand up and explore
the consequences for national policy? If so, how?
Need-Driven Basic
Research
My fourth and last example is directed at us rather than
at the government. At the end of WWII, Vannevar Bush submitted a report to
the president, Science, the Endless Frontier, which set the tone for
federal support of research for the next 50 years. In his report, Vannevar
Bush defined the difference between basic and applied research. He argued
that mission agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) could not be expected to support basic
research. The demands of their mission, he said, would drive out basic
research in favor of applied research. Ultimately, that argument led to
the creation of a new agency-the National Science Foundation-to support
basic research. In the intervening 50 years, the academic community has
reinforced this argument many times. But is it true? And is it
appropriate?
Unfortunately, it's not true. First, mission agencies
like DOD, DOE, NASA, and others do support basic research. In fact, they
are the principal funders of certain areas of basic research! Second, as
pointed out by Donald Stokes in his book, Pasteur's Quadrant, the
basic/applied dichotomy is too simplistic. Not all basic research is
motivated by intellectual curiosity alone. Sometimes it is motivated by
both curiosity and practical concerns. As a prime example, Stokes cites
Pasteur's germ theory of disease, which Pasteur discovered while he was in
pursuit of very practical concerns related to the brewing of
beer.
I believe some basic research questions are also motivated by
practical concerns about counterterrorism. I know this is true in my field
of computer security, and I believe it is true in virtually all fields.
The question remains. Are we, especially we academic engineers, prepared
to stand up and let our intellectual pursuits be at least partly directed
by the nation's needs? Are we willing, for example, to devote a fraction
of our capacity to addressing the needs of the developing world in order
to reduce the risks here at home? The physicists at Tuxedo Park, in the
Rad Laboratory, the Manhattan Project, and thousands of others did that
during WW II. Are we prepared to do it now?
Conclusion
I
chose these four examples because each of them highlights a different
aspect of the basic question of whether engineers, individually and
collectively as an Academy, are prepared to step beyond our traditional
role, although in that role we have been invaluable to the nation. This is
hardly an idle question. Much of the authority of the Academies rests on
our reputation for providing authoritative, fact-based reports. There is
some danger that we could tarnish that reputation. If the Academy stands
up now, we must carefully consider how to do it in a way that enhances
rather than detracts from our reputation-and hence our
effectiveness.
In conclusion, let me note that the increasing
relevance and influence of the Academies is stressful in many ways, but it
reflects the importance of engineering and science in the modern world.
Our relevance demands that we rethink our traditional role as passive
responders to questions posed by the government. Our relevance may also be
pushing us toward the role of commentators on issues with technological
roots that require nontechnical action. Think about it. Are we prepared to
stand up and take on that role? If so, how? Your officers and council
members will be grappling with these questions, and we welcome your input!
The urgency of these questions underscores why you, our new members, are
so important to the Academy and to the country. Your knowledge and
expertise make it possible for us to provide our policy makers with the
best engineering and scientific advice available anywhere.
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