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Statement on Science and Security in an Age of
Terrorism From Bruce Alberts, Wm. A. Wulf, and Harvey
Fineberg, Presidents of the National
Academies
October 18, 2002
After the
September 11, 2001, assaults on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, and the subsequent anthrax attacks via the postal system,
the scientific, engineering, and health research community was quick
to respond at many levels, from initiating new research to analyzing
needs for improved security. This community recognizes that it has a
clear responsibility to protect the United States, as it has in the
past, by harnessing the best science and technology to help counter
terrorism and other national security threats.
In meeting
this responsibility, the scientific, engineering, and health
research community also recognizes a need to achieve an appropriate
balance between scientific openness and restrictions on public
information. Restrictions are clearly needed to safeguard strategic
secrets; but openness also is needed to accelerate the progress of
technical knowledge and enhance the nation's understanding of
potential threats.
A successful balance between these two
needs -- security and openness -- demands clarity in the
distinctions between classified and unclassified research. We
believe it to be essential that these distinctions not include
poorly defined categories of "sensitive but unclassified"
information that do not provide precise guidance on what information
should be restricted from public access. Experience shows that vague
criteria of this kind generate deep uncertainties among both
scientists and officials responsible for enforcing regulations. The
inevitable effect is to stifle scientific creativity and to weaken
national security.
To develop sharp criteria for determining
when to classify and/or restrict public access to scientific
information, as well as to address the other important issues
outlined below, we call for a renewed dialogue among scientists,
engineers, health researchers and policy-makers. To stimulate such a
dialogue, we present two "action points": one focused on scientists,
engineers, and health researchers and the other focused on
policy-makers.
Action Point 1
The
scientific, engineering, and health research community should work
closely with the federal government to determine which research may
be related to possible new security threats and to develop
principles for researchers in each field. Among the questions that
the scientific, engineering, and health community should address are
the following:
- Are there areas of currently unclassified research that
should be classified in the new security environment?
- How can the scientific, engineering, and health community
establish systems that can monitor this issue effectively, as
science and potential threats change over time?
- Do any materials widely used in research require additional
security procedures?
- How can the scientific, engineering, and health community
establish systems that will rapidly detect new potential threats
from terrorism, as well as novel opportunities for countering
terrorism, that arise from new discoveries, and convey these in an
effective manner to the relevant government
agencies?
Action Point
2
The federal government should affirm and
maintain the general principle of National Security Decision
Directive 189, issued in 1985:
"No restrictions may
be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally funded
fundamental research that has not received national security
classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. statutes."
In determining what research and information should
be restricted from public access, agencies should ask:
- How should we apply the principle of building "high fences
around narrow areas" in the new security environment, so as to
protect critical and well-defined information and yet permit the
essential flow of scientific and technical knowledge and human
capital?
- How can such determinations be made at the outset of a
research program so as not to disrupt the research?
- How can we avoid creation of vague and poorly defined
categories of "sensitive but unclassified" information that do not
provide precise guidance on what information should be restricted
from public access?
- How can the government enlist the help of a large number of
the nation's best scientists, engineers, and health researchers in
counterterrorism efforts, for both the unclassified and the
classified areas of the overall program?
Achieving
the purpose of scientific and technological activity -- to promote
the welfare of society and to strengthen national security -- will
require ingenuity from our science, engineering, and health
community, as well as from the many agencies of the federal, state,
and local governments involved in counterterrorism. The nation's
safety and the continued improvement of our standard of living
depend on careful, informed action on the part of both governments
and the scientific, engineering, and health community. A continuing,
meaningful dialogue needs to begin -- one that produces a true
collaboration for the many decisions that need to be
made.
BRUCE ALBERTS, President, National Academy of
Sciences
WM. A. WULF, President, National Academy of
Engineering
HARVEY V. FINEBERG, President, Institute of
Medicine
Read
the accompanying background material.
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